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
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THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF
BANKING.

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OF

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THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF
BANKING.

CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE BANK CHARTER IN
1800 TO THE ACT FOR THE RESUMPTION OF
CASH PAYMENTS IN 1819.

1. Soon after the year 1800, a remarkable phenomenon began attract the notice of persons who had paid attention to the currency. We have just seen how lamentably deficient the harvest of 1799 had been, and the enormous quantities of grain became necessary to purchase. The autumn of 1799, and the ensuing winter, were equally unfavourable as the preceding had been to all descriptions of farming operations. The spring of 1800 was exceedingly wet, and in the middle of the harvest heavy and continuous rains set in. In consequence, the harvest was even more calamitous than the preceding one. In the north part of the island, the crops were a total failure. Notwithstanding that the unprecedented quantity of 1,242,507 quarters of wheat were imported, prices continued to rise to a famine level. The public peace was with difficulty preserved, and in November, when Parliament met, the country was in a very alarming condition. Parliament pursued the usual course, recommended the most stringent economy in the consumption of

provisions, and offered to guarantee 100s. a quarter to all wheat imported wheat. In spite of all these measures, wheat rose in March, 1801, to 156s., barley to 90s., and oats to 47s. In the autumn of 1799, failures of great magnitude took place in Hamburg; 82 houses came down with liabilities amounting to £2,500,000. In consequence of these, discount rose to 15 per cent. Under the influence of the enormous sums of money that had to be sent abroad in purchase of grain, the attraction of the high rate of discount, and other causes, the exchange on Hamburg which had stood so high for some years, fell in January, 1801, to 29·8., being upwards of 14 per cent. against England.

2. We have already seen that, in the great monetary crisis of 1696-97, it was universally acknowledged by Parliament and the most eminent merchants, that it was the bad state of the coinage which produced the great rise in the market price of bullion, and the heavy fall in the foreign exchanges; and we have seen that the restoration of the coinage immediately rectified the exchange. At that time bank notes were not a legal tender, and the language invariably applied to them, when their current value differed from their nominal value, was that they were at a *discount*. When the men of that day saw that the bank notes were a promise to pay many "pounds" on demand, and when they saw that the persons who issued them were unable to pay that number of pounds, and that no one would give that number of pounds for them, they never used any other expression regarding these facts, than that the notes were at a discount. There is no trace of any one having thought of saying that it was the notes that denoted the pound sterling, and that bullion had risen. When the reform of the coinage took place, and the exchanges were simultaneously rectified, it was said that the reform of the coinage *caused* the restoration of the exchange, and numerous merchants had written pamphlets to combat a delusion which was rather prevalent among some persons, that bullion as a commodity could have a different value to bullion as coin, except on account of the depreciation of the coinage.

3. Adam Smith had laid it down as a principle, that any permanent difference between the market and the Mint price of bullion must be necessarily caused by the condition of the coinage.

itself; and Hume had observed that the exchange never could vary but little beyond the cost of the transmission of specie. All these fundamental truths, which are as pure matters of demonstration as any proposition in Euclid, had been discovered and established long before the period we are now speaking of.

4. Such were the truths established, when a metallic currency was the only one thought of, in estimating value. But at this time a new principle was introduced—there was what was substantially an inconvertible paper currency. At this period most men's ideas were transferred from the metallic currency to the paper currency. Ever since the issue of £1 notes, people thought of them, when they spoke of prices, as being so many pounds. When the suspension of cash payments first took place there was a general expectation that the Bank notes would be depreciated, but the general resolution of bankers and merchants to support the credit of the Bank, the determination of the Government to receive Bank notes in payment of taxes at their par value, and the great caution exercised by the directors during the first few years after the restriction, had removed all these apprehensions, and for some years Bank notes circulated at par.

5. At this time, however, phenomena occurred which directed the attention of many persons to the state of the paper currency. The market price of standard gold up to September, 1799, had continued at £3 17s. 6d. per ounce, and the price of foreign gold in coin had been somewhat higher, on account of its greater use as coin than as bullion. But in June, 1800, the price of foreign gold experienced a sudden and extraordinary rise; it rose to £4 5s. per ounce; silver rose 5s. 7d. per ounce; and the foreign exchanges fell below par. In January, 1801, gold and silver had each risen 1s. per ounce, and the exchange at Hamburg was at 29s. 8d., being a depression of 14 per cent. below par. But the expense of transmitting specie to Hamburg was estimated not to exceed 7 per cent., and, consequently, there remained a difference of 7 per cent. to be accounted for.

6. It was at this time that the great and palpable truth was discovered, that if a deterioration of the coinage produced a rise of the market price of bullion above the Mint price, and a fall in the

foreign exchanges under a metallic currency, then that the opposite proposition was also necessarily true. That under a paper currency which was only the representative of a metallic currency, if the market price of bullion (*i. e.*, the paper price) exceeded the Mint price, and the foreign exchanges fell beyond the cost of the transmission of specie, that excess could only arise from the depreciation of the representative of the metallic currency, and, therefore, that when these circumstances occurred THEY INFALLIBLY INDICATED THAT THE PAPER CURRENCY WAS DEPRECIATED.

7. We are not certain to whom the merit of the discovery of this great and important truth is due. If he had not the actual merit of discovering it, Mr. Walter Boyd was certainly one of the first to proclaim it, and call public attention to it. It was enforced with much greater ability and clearness, by Lord King, and with not so much distinctness by Mr. Henry Thornton, in his *Inquiry into the effects of Paper Credit*. To these three writers, however, as far as we have been able to ascertain, the merit is due of establishing this principle, which is as important in the subject of currency as the Newtonian law of gravity is in astronomy.

8. The preliminaries of peace with France were signed in October, 1801, at London, and the definitive treaty at Amiens, on the 27th March, 1802. The restriction on cash payments expired of itself six months after that event; but, though the Bank declared that its coffers were well supplied with specie, and that it was anxious and ready to resume payments in cash, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Addington, brought in a bill on the 9th April, 1802, to continue the restriction till the 1st of March, 1803, which was passed. The arguments alleged in favour of this measure shew a wonderful decline in financial knowledge in the Government of 1802 compared to 1696. At the latter period the great reason alleged for the reformation of the coinage was the adverse condition of foreign exchanges, and the rise of the market above the Mint price, caused by the depreciation of the currency. Notwithstanding the vehement opposition of the enemies of the Government, we have seen the triumphant success of the re-coinage, which restored the public credit and the exchange. The sagacity of a Montague would at once have seen that the adverse state of the exchange, and the high price of

bullion, were entirely owing to the depreciated state of the currency, and that the only method of restoring them to par was the immediate resumption of cash payments. So great, however, was the ignorance upon the subject, that the fact of the exchange being adverse was the very reason alleged why cash payments should *not* be resumed ! Sir R. Peel said the course of exchange was, at this moment, against us all over Europe. Mr. Addington, in bringing in the bill, said—

“ It cannot be necessary for me to inform the House that the rate of exchange between this country and foreign parts is disadvantageous to ourselves—that the export trade has been for some months at a stand, that while the rate of exchange is disadvantageous to us, *an augmentation of the circulating cash* would create a trade highly injurious to the commerce of this country. *For several months past, there has been a trade carried on for purchase of guineas with a view to exportation.* It is on these grounds that I submit to the House the expediency of continuing the restriction with regard to the cash payments of the Bank.”

Why, these were the very reasons why a return to cash payments should have been made without delay ! The reason why the trade of buying up guineas was going on was just because of the redundant quantity of paper ; the paper “promises to pay” were falling in value as compared to the guineas, and, as a necessary consequence, guineas were exported, and, so far from a return to cash payments augmenting the circulating medium, it would infallibly have considerably diminished it by making the Bank reduce its paper issues. It was because the prices of articles were so high in this country that the export trade was unprofitable, and a reduction of the Bank notes would infallibly have compelled such a reduction in prices as would have facilitated the export.

9. The result of this extraordinary amount of financial error could have been easily predicted. The circumstances of the country did not improve, as the Ministry had taken the most effectual measures to prevent them doing so. In February, 1803, Mr. Addington had to come forward again to prolong the restriction. He said that the reasons which suggested it were too strong, and the necessity too urgent, to be resisted. The restriction was continued last Session because the exchanges were

adverse—the exchange at Hamburg was then at par—that with Amsterdam adverse. Upon these grounds, he said, it was expedient to continue the restriction, until the progressive advance of our commerce would produce such a steady inclination of the exchange in our favour, as to render it safe to resume cash payments. That the scarcity of the last three years had made it necessary to export twenty millions of bullion in payment of corn, and until that came back cash payments could not be resumed. Mr. Fox said that such a mode of arguing went to establish it as a general axiom that, whenever the exchanges were adverse, cash payments of the Bank ought to be suspended; and then he touched the right point. “Perhaps, even, it might happen that the unfavourable turn of the exchange against this country *might be owing to the very restriction on the Bank.*” And he said—

“In 1772, or 1773, when there was a great quantity of bad money in the country, the course of exchange was then also much against us, but when, in the room of this adulterated money, good gold was substituted, the consequence was that the exchanges turned almost immediately in our favour. As long as our currency continued bad, the exchange was against us, so it is now, *because paper is not much better than bad gold*; as it is attended with the same inconveniences. May it not, therefore, be expected that, as in the former case, when our currency was ameliorated, the course of exchange turned in our favour, so also if the Bank now resumed its cash payments, the same favourable circumstances might attend the change?”

The trace of truth thus hit upon was not followed up; and, while the directors of the Bank alleged that they were perfectly able to resume cash payments, the Ministry enforced a continued restriction upon them, for political reasons, until six weeks after the beginning of the next Session of Parliament. In the Lords, Lord Pelham said that the idea of renewing the restriction at the present moment originated solely with the Government, who had had no communication with the Bank on the matter. The great truth doubtfully hinted at by Mr. Fox, was much more strongly and fully stated by Lord King and Lord Moira in the House of Lords. The Ministry complained that the importation of bullion was hanging fire; was it not plain that the reason was that its value in this country was depreciated by the plethora of

paper? and the true way to attract it was by diminishing the quantity of the paper, and so raising the value of the gold. The bill was carried without a division.

10. If the resumption of cash payments was unadvisable under the preceding circumstances, the untimely end of the short and feverish peace in 1803 rendered it still more impracticable, and, immediately upon the opening of the Session, a bill was brought in to continue the suspension. We find it stated that the hoarding of guineas had been going on to such an extent, that it was with the utmost difficulty that they could be procured for the common purposes of life. The Chancellor of the Exchequer talked of the baseness of such a practice, which was inconsistent with public spirit and the duty of a good citizen. Precisely the same language had been held by the revolutionary leaders in the tribune of the French Convention regarding assignats. The debate in the Lords produced some excellent speeches. Lord Grenville, who had been of the Cabinet who proposed the suspension originally, now gave very evident signs that his opinion was very much altered, and severely censured the attacks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon those who preferred to keep their guineas at home. Lord King now gave the clearest enunciation of the principles of a paper currency, which had before been rather feebly hinted at. He said—

“The natural and only true limit of every paper currency was the power of compelling payment in specie, at the will of the holder. A paper currency, not convertible into specie, had no rule or standard except the discretion of the persons by whom it was issued. To determine the quantity of currency necessary for circulation was in all cases a difficult and delicate problem. *A very strict attention to the price of bullion, and the state of the foreign exchanges, was alone capable of affording a just criterion by which the quantity could be truly ascertained.* Without a perpetual reference to these tests it was impossible to maintain the full value of the currency. That the Bank directors had failed in the performance of this duty was evident, from the enormous increase in the quantity of their notes, and the great derangement which had taken place in the price of silver and the foreign exchanges since the period of the restriction. He said that the excessive quantity of Bank notes, by

raising the market price of silver above the Mint price, was one of the causes of the present scarcity of the silver coin."

11. The Act which restrained the Bank of England from paying in specie also enacted that country bankers should be liable to discharge their notes in Bank of England paper. Hence the very same rules applied to the issue of the country banks, where paper was converted into Bank of England notes, as formerly applied to the Bank paper when convertible into specie; and the country Bank paper was based upon Bank of England paper, just in the same way as the latter had been based upon specie. So the Directors of the Bank not only controlled their own issues, but those of every other Bank in the country, and any excess of paper issued by them was immediately multiplied and propagated throughout the kingdom.

12. The facilities of communication with the metropolis, even in that age which we are now accustomed to consider as slow, as compared with our own, were sufficient to prevent the depreciation of a local currency in Great Britain, at least since 1765, when the Scotch notes were depreciated, on account of certain conditions they contained impeding their payment in gold on demand. But Ireland, from the distance of the sea passage, and the difficulty of access, might be considered as a foreign country, which resemblance was further promoted by its having a currency of its own, distinct from that of Great Britain. The Irish shilling in those days contained 13 pence, and as the pound, both English and Irish, was 240 pence, a slight calculation will shew that £100 English=£108 6s. 8d. Irish. Hence the par of exchange between England and Ireland was called eight and one-third.

13. Although there was no run upon the Bank of Ireland, and the exchange with England was favourable, and bullion was flowing in, the Bank of Ireland was directed by Parliament to suspend its payments in cash at the same time as the Bank of England, and an Act was passed by the Irish Parliament containing analogous provisions to the English Act.

14. Ever since the year 1794 the exchange at Dublin on London had been uniformly in favour of Dublin, standing usually

about £7 10s. In the first three months of 1797, it rose so high as £6 14s. 9d. ; in the second three months it rose to £6 7s. 2d. ; and in the third period of three months, it attained the very great height of £5 18s. 10d. ; the highest it stood at on any day being £5 10s. From that period it began steadily to decline, and it continued to fall progressively through each year, until in January, 1804, it reached the extraordinary depression of £18. No guineas were to be had for Bank of Ireland notes, except at a premium of 2s. 4d. or 2s. 6d. This enormous depression was noticed by Lord Archibald Hamilton, on the 13th February, 1804, in the debate on the Irish Bank Restriction Bill. He stated that, when the restriction Act passed, the issues of the Bank of Ireland were £600,000, whereas now they were £2,700,000. He said that between Dublin and Belfast, though not more than 100 miles apart, there was a difference in the exchange of 10 per cent., and that in the exchange with London it was sometimes as much as 20 per cent. against Dublin. That gold coin rose in value just in proportion as paper was depreciated.

15. This great disorganisation of the monetary business between the two countries at length excited the serious attention of Parliament, and, on the motion of Mr. Foster, a Committee was appointed "to inquire into the cause of the present high rate of exchange between Great Britain and Ireland, and the state of the currency in the latter kingdom." The Committee consisted of Mr. Foster, Lord A. Hamilton, Lord Henry Petty, Lord Folkestone, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Mr. Grey, Mr. Rose, Mr. Canning, Sir W. Pulteney, Sir J. Newport, Mr. J. C. Beresford, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Brogden.

16. The circumstances which gave rise to the appointment of this Committee and its report, are deserving of great attention, as they are the first regular investigation by Parliament into the theory of the paper currency, and they were the antetype of what afterwards occurred in England, and gave rise to the appointment of the Bullion Committee.

17. The Bank of Ireland sent two of its Directors to be examined as witnesses, Mr. Colville and Mr. D'Olier. Mr. Colville stated that the issues of the Bank notes at the time of

the restriction were between £600,000 and £700,000, but they were now about £3,000,000; and when asked the motives for such an extraordinary increase, said that the exchange became extremely adverse about two years after the restriction, the money of the country was carried out of it, for the purpose of paying the balances of remittances, and, consequently, as the medium of gold decreased, *it became necessary to supply its place with paper*. He said that, after the restriction, it was necessary to supply notes for the payments that would have been made in guineas, and this amount he placed at £1,200,000. He admitted that before the restriction, whenever there was a drain of gold from the Bank, they were in the habit of diminishing its issues to strengthen themselves against the continuance of the drain. That whenever the exchange was unfavourable, the necessity for self-preservation compelled them to reduce their issues, and that this limitation was for the purpose of lessening the drain of guineas. But he said that it was generally thought that the extension of paper in Ireland was the cause of the high exchange, but, in his opinion, it was directly the reverse, inasmuch as far as the circulation of paper has supplied the circulating medium, it enabled the gold which before stood in its place to be exported out of the country, and so far was a clear and decided cause of preventing the exchange getting to a higher pitch; and he said that it must appear that his opinion was that the circulation of Bank paper in Ireland was in no shape the cause of the high exchange. He said that he clearly and decidedly considered the sole cause of the high rate of exchange to be that Ireland owed a great deal more money than she could pay. He considered the true criterion of such balance of debt to be the state of exchange between Dublin and London, and London and Dublin. That when the exchange was considerably above par it was said to be against Ireland, and in that case certainly at that time Ireland owes more money than she is able to pay. Mr. Colville repeated these opinions several times: more often than it is necessary to quote. When pressed with the question whether the rates of exchange might be influenced by the value of the medium in which the balance of debts was paid, as, for instance, if it were paid in degraded or adulterated coin, he admitted that it might be so with respect to *coin*, but he denied that such views in any way applied to Bank of Ireland paper. Mr. D'Olier coincided with these

DERANGEMENT OF THE IRISH CURRENCY IN 1804. 11

views, and attributed the state of the exchanges to the same causes. When asked whether it was possible, in any case whatever, for there to be such an augmentation of inconvertible Bank paper as to diminish its value in exchange for goods, although the confidence that they might be paid off at some remote and indefinite period might be maintained, he said he thought it possible, but not probable. He said—"I have heard it stated that because gold is bought at a premium, that, therefore, Bank of Ireland notes are by so much depreciated, and at an absolute discount as to the amount of that premium. That was not the proper way to look at the question. The circulation said to be depreciated must first be proved to have become burdensome to the holders, and bargains to have been made by unnecessary purchasers to get rid of that which they found inconvenient, or were apprehensive to hold. The mere buying of gold at an advanced price beyond that of the Mint, is the effect, and not the cause, of the exchange, and, therefore, no proof of the depreciation of the paper itself." As both these witnesses maintained that the exchanges might be depressed to any extent by the mere fact of debts being due by the country, it is much to be regretted that the Committee did not ask them if it were possible, in their opinion, for the exchange to be depressed beyond the limit of the expense of the transmission of bullion, and, if so, how it could be possible?

18. The description given by the witnesses of the state of the metallic currency was most astonishing. Mr. D'Olier had some of it weighed. The base currency took about 126s. to the pound weight; the Mint silver which was in circulation, was very scarce and very much worn, contained 94s. 6d. to the pound weight, whereas, when new from the Mint, it contained 62s. to the pound weight. Of the base shillings, the best did not contain more than 6d., and the worst about 3d. These base pieces were coined and sold privately to agents who had the means of circulating them, at 28s. to 35s. the guinea. When such was the state of the metallic currency in Dublin, the provinces in the south were even worse off. One witness stated that the silver currency had totally disappeared from the southern parts, that the vacuum was supplied by silver notes; that these silver notes had driven out the whole of the silver

currency, and from their increased amount, as well as the increasing issues of private bankers' notes of every other description, prices had risen greatly. That the bad currency had been increasing most mischievously during the last twelve months, that there was still a very good supply of good silver in the south which was hoarded on account of these silver notes; but if they were suppressed, it would come into circulation again. He said all sorts of traders, as well as bankers, issued notes for 8s. 9½d. and 6s., payable at twenty-one days after date. He thought that the increase of the paper circulation augmented the state of exchange against Dublin. That the premium on guineas was a proof of the depreciation of the Bank notes; and that as the exchange rose the depreciation continued. That the premium on guineas was then 7 or 8 per cent. He himself had bought large quantities of guineas at a premium of 2s. 6d. each. In the north of Ireland, however, all bills were payable in gold; they would have nothing to do with any paper currency, and while the exchange on Dublin was 16 (7 two-thirds below par), the exchange on Belfast was 7 or 8 per cent. (one-third above par). He argued that, since the exchange in gold was favourable to Ireland, the real exchange must be in her favour, and that if any considerable quantity of gold came into circulation, it would at once tend to diminish the premium on guineas, and lower the rate of exchange. However, he thought that the high state of the exchange was a clear proof that the balance of payments was against Ireland annually. While no Bank of Ireland or private Bank notes could be exchanged for guineas, except on paying a premium of 2s. 6d. each, Bank of England paper bore exactly the same premium as guineas, and were received in every transaction as equivalent to guineas. And yet the directors of the Bank of Ireland maintained that their notes were not depreciated!

19. In the north of Ireland, where nothing but gold was current, and paper was tabooed, the exchange at Belfast with London had always continued favourable to Belfast, and even while the exchange at Dublin was progressively sinking, the exchange at Belfast continued to rise; thus, the state of the exchanges during the years 1803 and 1804, when the Committee were appointed, was as follows:—

DERANGEMENT OF THE IRISH CURRENCY IN 1804. 13

1803.		Dublin.	Belfast.
Average of 1st quarter	...	£11 1 9	£7 12 6
2nd	...	13 8 11	8 8 8
3rd	...	15 17 0	7 12 6
4th	...	15 8 7	5 12 6
1804.			
January 27th	...	18 0 0	6 0 0

There was, therefore, at that time, a difference of 12 per cent. between the exchange at Dublin and at Belfast. Consequently, if the opinions of the Directors of the Bank of Ireland were true, enormous payments were being made from Dublin to London, and a balance of payments was due from London to Belfast. However, Mr. Marshall, the Inspector General of Imports and Exports at Belfast, held a very different opinion with respect to Irish Bank notes, for he appends to the table of exchanges prepared by him this note—

“ It has certainly been heretofore held as a maxim of commerce, that the balance of trade has in a great measure regulated the rate of exchange ; and, if specie was equally in circulation in England and Ireland as formerly, the criterion would, no doubt, still be tolerably just. *But the issue of paper in Ireland is so great as to make it subject to a heavy discount*, whilst in England it circulates without any depreciation at all. *I imagine the rate of exchange between the two countries, therefore, is very much influenced by the rate of discount on Irish Bank notes.*”

20. It is scarcely necessary to observe that if the opinion of the Directors of the Bank of Ireland were true, that the rate of exchange at Dublin on London was due entirely to the heavy debts due from Ireland to England, their townsmen must have been great simpletons to purchase bills on London in Dublin at such an enormous sacrifice, when they could have got them at Belfast 10 to 12 per cent. cheaper. But it appeared that specie was at a premium of 10 or 12 per cent. in Dublin, so that the bills, when paid for in *cash*, were exactly the same rate in Dublin and Belfast.

21. In order to test the *fact* that the rate of exchange was due to the excess of payments owing by Ireland, the Committee had evidence on the subject, and it appeared most decisively

that so far from the balance of payments being against Ireland, there was a very large balance in her favour. The witnesses differed as to the precise sum, but they agreed as to the fact of there being a large sum due to Ireland, and, consequently, that the exchange ought to be in her favour, *which was precisely the case at Belfast, where payments were made in specie*. With this incontrovertible evidence before them, the Committee did not hesitate to express their conviction that the real balance of pecuniary transactions was greatly in favour of Ireland, and that, consequently, the real exchange was and ought to be under par, and that they felt themselves compelled to seek in other causes than the balance of debts for the unfavourable exchange then existing between them.

22. We have already seen that when in 1696 the silver coinage was being recoinced, a difference arose between Bank notes and specie of 20 per cent., and between tallies and specie of 40 per cent., it was universally said that Bank notes and tallies were at a discount of 20 and 40 per cent. There is no trace of any other language but that being applied to them. In the year 1804 Irish Bank notes were exchanged for specie at a difference of 10 per cent., so that, with a guinea in specie, any one might purchase a guinea note and 2s. or more in silver. The merchants of 1696 would have expressed such a state of things by saying that the note had fallen to a discount of 10 per cent. But at this period a new mode of expressing it was discovered; it was stoutly maintained that it was not the paper which was depreciated, but the guinea which had risen in value! Thus, one witness being asked—"Do you know that the Bank of Ireland paper is depreciated?" said—"I am not aware of it, because I should not say paper was depreciated, unless there was a forced issue of it, and that it was offered at a discount on all occasions. I should rather now say that gold is increased in value than the paper is depreciated." When asked—"What do you consider to be the best criterion of the depreciation of paper currency, an alteration of its value compared with the general property of any country, or its alteration compared with a given article, viz., guineas?" he says—"I think the first the best criterion, because guineas may be wanted, as in the present case, for special purposes." It is somewhat surprising that the witness did not remember that

Bank notes are a "promise to pay" guineas, and they are not a promise to pay another kind of property. When asked—"Do you not conceive that the fact of a premium existing on English Bank notes in Ireland and exchanged for Irish Bank notes, affords some indication that it is Irish paper which is depreciated, and not the price of gold which is locally raised?"—"I do not." Other witnesses agreed in these opinions. When we consider the nature of an exchange, and the state of facts proved with regard to the Irish coinage, at that time, we might almost smile at these ideas, and attribute them to the peculiar methods of thinking which are sometimes prevalent on the western side of St. George's Channel; but we shall find that when a precisely similar state of things took place in England, with regard to the foreign Exchanges, the very same doctrines were long and stoutly asserted by a very numerous party in this country, and would probably be so again under similar circumstances.

23. There was one witness, however, who held very different opinions—Mr. Marshall, the Inspector General of Imports and Exports. He said that there were shops in the principal streets of Dublin for buying and selling guineas, and that the retail price of a guinea then was a paper guinea and 2s. 2d. He said that at the end of December, 1803, the price of a bill in Dublin upon London for £100 British was £116 10s., if bought with Irish Bank notes, but if purchased with specie the price was only £106 10s. Irish. The same thing was observable in all domestic transactions. The man with a gold guinea in his pocket, going to market, had the advantage of the same premium over the man with the paper guinea, so he could go to a specie shop, and with his gold guinea buy a paper guinea and the premium; then he had a paper guinea of the same value as the other man and the premium besides. Bank of England notes were exactly equivalent to guineas. From all these facts, it appeared that the Irish Bank note wanted 10 to 12 per cent. of the value of specie. It was contended that this was due to the rising in value of specie, and not to the depreciation of notes; but if specie had risen so much in value, or, which was the same thing, if commodities had fallen so low as 10 or 12 per cent., such a state of things could not have continued for any length of time, because such a degree of cheapness would have attracted specie from Great Britain, where it had not risen.

Moreover, Bank notes had been issued at par with specie, at its current value, whatever it was, and they ought to have risen *pari passu* with it, so as to be exchangeable with it, and, therefore, whatever they wanted of this exchangeable property must be considered as a falling off from their original value, or a depreciation to that extent. And, therefore, he was clearly of opinion that the Irish paper currency was depreciated.

24. After shewing that the balance of payments had been for a long series of years favourable to Ireland, but that the exchange had never ceased to be greatly depressed, he was asked—

“Do you also mean, on the whole of your evidence, to give it as your decided opinion that there is and has been a depreciation in the paper currency in Ireland, and that the high rates of exchange, which have prevailed and still prevail, have arisen from the depreciation?”

“I do; the high exchange in Dublin which has now continued for some years, MUST, NO DOUBT, HAVE ARISEN, LIKE ALL OTHER PERMANENTLY HIGH EXCHANGES WHICH HAVE EVER EXISTED, FROM THE DEPRECIATED STATE OF THE CURRENCY WITH WHICH BILLS OF EXCHANGE ARE PURCHASED, and the same remedy might, perhaps, be resorted to with success in the present case, which has never failed to be effectual on all former occasions, namely, a removal of the depreciation.”

These are the ideas of the men of 1696; we shall find a long dreary period elapse before their truth was again generally recognised in this country. The amazing absurdity of supposing that the exchange could have fallen to 118, on account of the balance of payments alone, can be easily shewn. We cannot suppose that the cost of transmitting the specie from Dublin to London could have been more than £2 at most. Consequently, as £108 6s. 8d. was the par of exchange, if the rate of the exchange fell below £110 6s. 8d., it would have been cheaper to send the specie itself. Surely, the Irish would never have been so foolish as to pay £118 in Dublin to purchase a debt in London of £100, when they could place the cash itself on the spot for £110 6s. 8d.

25. The directors of the Bank of Ireland had admitted that before the Restriction Act they were obliged to regulate their

issues of paper by the price of guineas and the exchange with London. Whenever they had an unusual demand for guineas, and the exchange was adverse, they had been obliged to diminish their issues to prevent the continuance of the demand for guineas. As soon, however, as they were released from paying in cash, they no longer thought themselves bound to follow the same rules, and we have seen how prodigiously they had extended their issues. They admitted, however, that it was a possible case, that their issues might be too great, and a new theory was now advanced which we shall be called on to discuss at some length in a future chapter, but we notice it now because this appears to have been the first occasion it was propounded by mercantile men. Mr. Irving being asked if, in his opinion, Irish Bank notes were depreciated, said that he did not think so, although guineas were selling at a premium—

“Explain your reasons.”

“I am of opinion that a bank, managed with prudence, would only issue notes in proportion to the demand which may be made for those notes, in exchange for good and convertible securities, such as mercantile bills of exchange payable at specific periods of undoubted respectability, founded upon real mercantile transactions, upon Government securities such as exchequer bills, in the purchase of Spanish dollars, or other bullion; and the circumstances of the bank notes of Ireland being demanded for such good and convertible securities, I am of opinion, is a proof that they are not too large in amount, and that their value is not depreciated.”

We shall see afterwards that this theory was adopted by the directors of the Bank of England. It is one quite opposed to that by which the Irish directors acknowledged themselves obliged to follow whilst they were liable to pay their notes in gold. Hence, if it was correct, it inevitably followed that the issues of a bank should be governed on totally different principles under a convertible and an inconvertible paper currency.

26. After accumulating a considerable body of evidence upon the subject, and examining witnesses of all sorts of various opinions and various professions, the Committee reported that the real exchange was in favour of Ireland, and that the difference between the real and nominal exchange arose from the depre-

ciation of the Irish paper. They pointed out the absurdity of supposing that the value of gold had risen, and not that the paper was depreciated. They said that the difference between the rate of exchange could never vary more than the cost of transmitting specie from one to the other, and that any excess above that could only arise from other causes. They then noticed the enormous increase of the paper currency that had taken place, since the only check against over-issue was removed, namely, convertibility into gold at the will of the holder—the great quantity of base and counterfeit coin fabricated and forced into circulation—and shewed that, under an unfavourable state of the exchange, the paper currency had always been diminished. “If prudence had not dictated such a course, necessity would have compelled a diminution of issues, by diminishing the stock of specie which could only be replaced at a loss proportionate to the existing rise of exchange, and your Committee observe that, in fact as well as in theory, the result of such practice always was and must be the redress of the unfavourable exchange. Since the Restriction Act, however, the directors had acted exactly upon the opposite principle, when the exchange was unfavourable, they had greatly increased their issues. Excessive issues of paper produce a proportionate rise in the rates of the exchange, for these are obviously influenced by the value of the medium in which the payments are made and the *quantity* of that medium necessary to effect a given payment must be increased as the value of the medium diminishes, no matter whether the payments be made in a degraded and adulterated coin, or in a depreciated paper. If paper by depreciation comes to represent a less quantity of money than it professes to do, it must make the exchange which it is to pay appear unfavourable, in the same manner as coin in which it were to be paid would have done, if by degradation it should cease to contain the same portion of gold which it used to do; and the removal of the degradation in the one case, and of the depreciation in the other, would have the same effect in bringing the exchange to par, or whatever might be its real state.”

27. After recommending several minor remedies the committee said—“But all the benefits proposed by this mode of

remedies would be of little avail, and of very limited duration, if it did not promise at the same time to cure the depreciation of paper in Ireland, by diminishing its over-issue. And your Committee do, in express terms, declare their clear opinion, that it is incumbent on the Directors of the Bank of Ireland, and their indispensable duty, to limit their paper at all times of an unfavourable exchange, during the continuance of the restriction, exactly on the same principle, as they would and must have done, in case the restriction did not exist, and that all the evils of a high and fluctuating exchange must be imputable to them if they fail to do so."

28. They then noticed the miserable state of the silver coinage, or rather the base metal, and notes and I. O. U.'s substituted in its place, which they said was clearly to be traced to the unfavourable exchange. As long as the exchange continued in that unfavourable state, all the genuine silver coin transferred itself to England, and the place of the genuine silver coin was supplied by these small silver notes in the country districts, and in Dublin, where they were not issuable, by an extremely base silver coinage which was privately fabricated in great quantities, all of which evils could only be cured by the restoration of the exchanges to their true state, and the issue of a genuine silver coinage.

29. The Committee contented themselves with declaring, in the most emphatic terms, that the Bank of Ireland ought to regulate its issues by the state of the exchanges, but it did not disavow the new theory propounded, that the paper currency should be regulated by the mercantile bills of exchange offered for discount. No one who has paid any attention to the principles of the subject, and carefully considered the facts produced before the Committee, can fail to acquiesce in their judgment, and we cannot fail to remark that none of the professional witnesses, i. e., the directors of the Bank of Ireland, or the other Bankers examined, had attained the smallest glimpse of the principles which governed their own business, and by which they should have directed their policy. Its true principles were clearly seen and announced solely by the extra-professional witnesses, and laid down by the statesmen who formed the Committee. We may suppose that fear of

giving offence to their customers, and so diminishing their business and profits, may have somewhat dimmed their perception.

30. As it was evident that as long as the different currencies between the countries continued, there must be an exchange from the want of a common medium of payment, the Committee strongly recommended that the moneys of circulation and account should be assimilated, and that Bank of Ireland notes should be payable in Bank of England paper, and that the Bank of Ireland should establish a fund at their credit in London for that purpose, and that all bills should be payable at a fixed date, which measures had been found to reduce the Scotch exchanges to par, and maintain them so ever since the year 1763, through all the political and commercial convulsions of the period.

31. The presentation of this report does not seem to have excited any discussion in the House till many years afterwards. In 1809 Mr. Parnell moved that the currencies of England and Ireland should be assimilated in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee, which was rejected without a division. The Report does not seem to have been printed for public circulation till 1826 ; but it was probably communicated to the Bank, and produced some effect upon their policy. A fact was stated by Mr. Foster in the House that in the months of May, June, and July, 1804, the directors diminished their issues from three to two millions and a half, and the exchange rose ; in August they increased them again, and the exchange fell. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Addington) declared that it was a perversion of terms to infer that the depreciation of paper had any real effect on the exchange. The excessive issue of paper might produce a depreciation, but each country had a different circulating medium, and the depreciation of either could only have a nominal effect on the course of exchange. Mr. Addington wholly overlooked the fact that payments were made in Bank of Ireland paper, and the course of exchange referred to that paper. If payments had been made in silver coin of full weight, then it would have been true that the exchange would not have been disturbed by the depreciation of the paper. But the course of exchange always relates to the medium in which the payment is actually made, and a depreciation of that medium necessarily causes an adverse state, in

whatever state the other parts of the currency may be, which are not the medium of payment. Of this we have seen a conspicuous instance in 1696, when the restoration of the silver coinage immediately rectified the exchange, although Bank paper continued to be depreciated long afterwards. Mr. Fox, with premature exultation, said that he was glad to hear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer allowed that an excessive issue caused a depreciation, and that the House was never again to hear *the fantastical opinion that the paper was not depreciated, but the value of gold raised*. Had Mr. Fox been able to look forward only six years he would have found that this fantastical opinion not only re-appeared, but was maintained with more stubbornness and pertinacity than ever.

32. Such was the occasion of the first declaration by a Parliamentary Committee, of the principle that the issues of the Bank should be regulated by the foreign exchanges ; a Committee, comprehending almost all the great names of the different parties of all opinions. As it was not then the custom to publish the lists of the divisions in committees, we are not able to say whether they were unanimous on the subject ; but, from the exceedingly strong and decisive language of the Report we may fairly infer that the opinion of the Committee was equally strong and decided, and that if any minority differed from the resolutions of the majority, it must have been a very small one.

33. We have not much to detain us in the few following years. In 1804 the scarcity of the silver coinage was so severely felt, that the Bank issued 5s. dollars to supply the want, of which 1,419,481 were put into circulation. In 1806 the loan of three millions, which was the consideration for the renewal of the Charter in 1800, became due ; but the Bank was persuaded to renew it at 3 per cent. per annum until six months after the ratification of peace. In 1807 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the various branches of the public expenditure, and, amongst others, into the payments made into the Bank of England. In the second report are some interesting details respecting the connection between the Bank and the Government.

34. At this period political circumstances occurred, which led to a great derangement of the British currency, and of which we may be allowed to give a short summary—"For ten

years (before 1805) Prussia had flattered herself that, by keeping aloof, she would avoid the storm, that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the North of Germany, and, hitherto, success had in a surprising manner attended her steps. At once all her prospect vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own Ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already been discreditable." The state of universal contempt into which Prussia had fallen, precisely similar to that which she did in the Crimean War from an analogous course of conduct, was at last too strong even for her, and just then the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and, by his influence, a secret treaty was signed on the 3rd November by the two States, to curb the ascendancy of France in Europe. Prussia bound herself, in the event of Napoleon not agreeing to certain conditions to be offered him, to declare war against him on the 15th December, and the King bound himself by the most solemn oaths to adhere to his engagements. After considerable delay, the Prussian Minister started for the head quarters of the French Emperor on the 28th. Napoleon, who was then manœuvring in preparation for the Battle of Austerlitz, but who was perfectly aware of the nature of Haugwitz's mission, put off receiving him for a short time, and sent him to Vienna. On the 2nd December, Napoleon destroyed the Russian and Austrian armies in the great Battle of Austerlitz, before the eyes of their respective sovereigns, and the Prussian Minister immediately rushed off to congratulate Napoleon on his successes! and to propose to him a treaty of Alliance by which Prussia was to seize all the continental dominions which belonged to her ally the King of England. This treaty was signed with Napoleon on the 15th December, the very day on which Prussia had agreed to declare war against him. In the following March, Prussia, under the compulsion of Napoleon, issued a decree, prohibiting British merchandise from entering any port in the Prussian dominions, thus cutting off a principal source of the supply of corn to Great Britain.

35. Swift and sure was the retribution that fell upon Prussia for her matchless meanness and perfidy in 1805. Napoleon was

perfectly informed of the object of Hangwitz's mission to him. "You have come," said he, "to present your master's compliments on a victory, but fortune has changed the address of the letter ;" and, though he was too anxious to forward a measure which would consign her to public infamy, and embroil her with Great Britain, he did not, nevertheless, for one instant from that time, pause in his determination to destroy her at the first opportunity. "From the moment the treaty was signed, Napoleon did more than hate Prussia, he conceived for that power the most profound contempt." He proceeded to treat her with the most unmeasured arrogance, and, after a series of aggravated insults, that perfidious power was astonished to discover that Napoleon was secretly treating with Great Britain for the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign. Negotiations for peace had been going on for some considerable time between France, England, and Russia, which led to nothing. The popular ferment in Prussia had been increasing for a long time from her disgraceful position becoming more notorious and galling every day, and the Government, with a rashness, violence, and imprudence, only to be surpassed by its perfidy, sent a haughty summons to Napoleon to evacuate Germany. This insane insult reached Paris on the 1st October, when Napoleon was already far on his way to Berlin, and on the 14th, Prussia met her well deserved doom at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt. Napoleon visited the tomb of Frederick the Great on the anniversary of the day on which, on the same spot, the King of Prussia had bound himself by solemn oaths to the Emperor Alexander.

36. Soon after Napoleon arrived at Berlin he issued the Berlin decree against British commerce, on the 21st November. This decree was soon afterwards met by a retaliatory order in Council on the part of Great Britain, and during the course of 1807, a series of decrees were issued both by England and France, each endeavouring to outdo the other in violence, ferocity, absurdity, and illegality, the result of which was, however, to exclude the British flag from every port of Europe, except Sweden. This state of hostility, the avowed object of which was the destruction of British commerce, led to a short supply, and an apprehended scarcity of every article of European production required as raw materials for our manufactures. The

natural consequence was a boundless spirit of speculation in these articles; and, under the influence of this speculation, the prices of all the products of Russia, and the East of Europe, rose to double and triple the ordinary figure. At the same period Spain was occupied by the French, and similar speculations tripled and quadrupled the price of Spanish wool. France, too, was supreme in Italy; and the produce of that country, chiefly consisting in silk, rose in a similar proportion. Nor had our own conduct been less ruinous in other respects. The vindictive nature of the orders in Council had proved so destructive to the rights of neutrals, that a rupture with America was imminent, which produced an equally speculative rise in the prices of American products, such as tobacco and cotton.

37. Speculation in these productions was favoured by an expected narrowing of the sources of supply; circumstances of an opposite nature came to excite still further perturbations in the usual course of trade. The entry of the French into Spain and Portugal had paralysed their power over their colonies, and the Great South American continent became from this time virtually independent. It had been hitherto rigidly closed against British commerce. On the 13th November, 1807, Napoleon published a decree in the *Moniteur*, deposing the House of Braganza from the throne of Portugal, and Junot took possession of Lisbon, and the Royal Family immediately embarked for the Brazils. These events opened up the whole of the South American trade to the British, and the speculation of the merchants swelled in a proportion commensurate to the vastness of the markets that were thrown open to them. A complete phrenzy of speculation seized upon the nation. It spread from commerce to joint stock companies. The infatuation of 1720 was reproduced. Joint stock companies of all descriptions, for canals, bridges, insurances, breweries, and multitudes of others, started up like mushrooms. At the same time, the Bank of England fanned the flame of speculation to an extent far beyond the bounds of ordinary rashness. It is stated by Sir Francis Baring, in his evidence before the Bullion Committee, that since the restriction he knew of many instances of clerks not worth £100, who had started as merchants, and had been allowed to have discount accounts of from £5,000 to

£10,000, which demand, he said, was caused by the Bank, and not by the regular demands of trade, and which could not exist if the restriction were removed. The paper discounted by the Bank, which had been £2,946,500 in 1795, rose to £15,475,700 in 1809, and to £20,070,600 in 1810.

38. Along with this extravagant speculation, partly caused by it, and partly fanning it, a multitude of country banks started up in all directions, and inundated the country with their notes, exactly as had happened before 1793. In the year 1797, they had been reduced to 270; in 1808, they had increased to 600; and in 1810, when the Bullion Committee was appointed, they amounted to 721, and the quantity of paper they had put into circulation was supposed to amount to £30,000,000. At the same time, the Bank of England had increased its issues to £21,000,000, a quantity declared by some of the most eminent witnesses far to exceed the legitimate wants of the country.

39. Concurrently with these extravagant speculations and issues of notes, the price of gold bullion rose rapidly, and the foreign exchanges fell with equal rapidity, exactly the same symptoms as had been manifested in Ireland in 1804. The following figures, taken at intervals, are sufficient to shew the rapid rise of the price of bullion and the fall in the foreign exchange:—

	Price of Standard. Gold.					Price of Silver.			Exchange with Hamburg.	
	£	s.	d.			s.	d.		s.	d.
Jan. 1805	...	4	0	0	5	4	35	6
Oct. 1805	...	4	0	0	5	5	33	9
July 1808	...	no quotation			5	3	34	9
Feb. 1809	...	4	10	0	5	3	31	0
May 1809	...	4	11	0	5	5	29	6
Jan. 1810	...	no quotation			5	7	28	6

40. Under these circumstances, Mr. Horner, on the 1st February, 1810, moved for several accounts relating to currency and exchanges. Mr. Baring stated that guineas then brought 26s. or 27s. The Bullion Committee were then appointed.

41. Before proceeding to analyse this famous Report and the evidence produced before it, we may observe that what has so frequently happened when two or more persons or occurrences have contributed to any result, if one of these persons or occurrences has been much more prominent than the rest, the others come, in course of time, to be forgotten, and the whole merit or blame is attributed to the one which has attracted most public attention. So it has been in this case. The Bullion Report of 1810 has, from various circumstances, attracted so much public attention to itself, as to have thrown completely into the shade the Report on the Irish Currency of 1804; and that Report seems to have been so soon forgotten, that the directors of the Bank of England in 1810 had little or no knowledge of it. The circumstances, however, of the derangement of the Irish currency, upon which the Committee of 1804 sat, were precisely identical with those of the English currency in 1810, which caused the appointment of the English Committee. The same sets of opinions were delivered and adhered to stoutly by the professional witnesses in both cases, and the Report of the Committee in each case was precisely identical; in each case they condemned the doctrines and policy of the Bank directors in the most emphatic manner. The Report of the Committee of 1810 is written in a more methodical and scientific form, and is superior as a literary performance, but the principles adopted and enforced in it are absolutely identical with those of the Committee of 1804.

42. It may be interesting to compare the composition of the two Committees, who at different times came to similar conclusions as to the principles that should govern the Bank in its issues during the restriction of cash payments. The Committee of 1810 consisted of Mr. Horner, Mr. Spencer Perceval, Mr. Tierney, Earl Temple, Mr. Brand, Mr. Parnell, Mr. Magens, Mr. Johnstone, Mr. Giddy, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Thornton, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Baring, Mr. Manning, Mr. Sharpe, Mr. Grenfell, Mr. Foster, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Irving, Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Abercrombie. On comparing this list with that of the Committee of 1804, it will be seen that there were only two members, Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Foster, who were on both Committees.

43. The witnesses examined before both Committees consisted of the same varieties. 1. Bank directors. 2. Private bankers. 3. General merchants. 4. Independent witnesses. On reading over the evidence by these respective sets of witnesses, we find that the opinions given by the English Bank directors and merchants were precisely similar to those of the Irish Bank directors. The directors of both banks vehemently repudiated the idea that the Bank paper was depreciated ; they equally maintained that it was the price of specie that had *risen* ; they both admitted that, while they were liable to pay their notes in specie, they were obliged to regulate their issues by the foreign exchanges and the price of bullion ; they both admitted that since the restriction they had paid no regard to their former rules, and they denied the necessity of so doing. They both denied that the issues of their notes had any effect upon the exchanges, or were in any way the cause of the high adverse exchange, and they both denied that a limitation of their issues would have the slightest effect in reducing the exchange to par. They both maintained that there could be no over-issue of their notes so long as they were confined to the discount of paper of undoubted solidity founded upon real transactions.

44. Nothing can be more remarkable than the perfect identity in sentiment in every point of opinion and policy, between these two sets of directors, but we must remark a circumstance that will detract considerably from the weight of their opinion, namely, that they were all *interested* witnesses. In the first place, since the restriction upon paying in specie, and so being relieved of fulfilling their obligations, they had extended their discounts enormously, and their profits upon their extended issues had been proportionate, the dividends to the proprietors had greatly increased ; and secondly, they were in the position of semi-defendants ; their policy was certainly impugned ; the Committee was a species of court of inquiry into their conduct, and it certainly was not likely that they would admit that the principles they were acting upon could be wrong, when they were so very lucrative to the proprietors of the Bank. The same objection of interested testimony equally applies to that of the merchants, for they were interested in obtaining as large an amount of accommodation from the Bank as possible, and a restriction of its issues would have curtailed their

operations, speculative or otherwise ; consequently their interests were better served by the doctrines and policy of the Bank directors. Both Committees, however, examined witnesses of an independent position, who had no interest one way or the other, and in each case they totally disagreed from the opinions of the Bank directors, and condemned their policy. And in both cases the Committee, having examined all those witnesses of different shades and opposite opinions, presented reports strongly condemning the opinions and practice of the directors of each bank, and called upon them to alter their policy : the report, in the Irish case, in language of great severity, that in the English case equally strong in fact, though milder in expression.

45. As this division of opinion on these financial questions seems to be as permanent and deep-seated as the divisions on political questions, it may be of advantage to state shortly and precisely the points upon which the respective parties were at issue. The facts, of course, were easily ascertained and agreed upon. They were as follows—

1. That the Mint price of gold bullion, or the legal standard of the coin, was £3 17s. 10½d. per oz.
2. That the market price of gold bullion was then £4 10s. per oz.
3. That the foreign exchanges had fallen to an enormous extent ; that with Hamburg, 9 per cent.—that with Paris, 14 per cent.
4. That the increase of bank notes had been very great during the last few years, and was rapidly augmenting.
5. That specie had disappeared from circulation.

46. Upon this acknowledged state of facts, the opposite issues maintained by the two parties, were as follows :—

The one party maintained—

- I. (a) That the Bank notes were depreciated.
- (b) That the difference between the market price and the Mint price of gold bullion, was the measure of the depreciation.
- II. (a) That the extreme limit to which the foreign exchanges could, by the nature of things fall, in any case, was defined, and easily ascertained, and con-

sisted of the expense of freight, insurance, and some other minute causes.

(b) That, in the then state of the exchanges, there was a very large excess of depression over and above that limit, which was not attributable to any of these causes.

(c) That this residual depression of the foreign exchanges, and the rise of the market price above the Mint price, was caused by the excessive issues of Bank notes in circulation.

III. That a diminution in the quantity of Bank notes would increase the value of the domestic currency—would cause the foreign exchanges to rise to par—and the market price of gold to fall to the Mint price.

IV. That the Directors of the Bank of England ought to follow the same rules in the extent of their issues during the restriction of cash payments, as they were obliged to do before, viz., by regulating them by the foreign exchanges. When the exchanges were favourable, and bullion flowing in, they might enlarge them; when the exchanges were adverse they must contract them.

47. In opposition to these principles, the other party maintained—

I. (a) That it was not the Bank notes that were depreciated, but the price of specie that had risen.

(b) That there was no difference between the price of bullion, whether paid in notes or specie.

II. That the depression of the foreign exchanges was in no way whatever attributable to the depreciation of the currency, but was entirely caused by the adverse balance of payments to be made by Great Britain, the remittances to the army, the continental measures of Napoleon, and other political measures.

III. That no diminution or increase of the issues by the Bank would have any effect whatever upon the foreign exchanges, either in raising or depressing them, or on the market price of bullion.

- IV. That since the restriction, there was no necessity for observing the same rules in issuing their notes by discounts as before, *i. e.*, by observing the course of the foreign exchanges, but that the public demand was the sole criterion, and so long as they adhered to these rules, there could be no over-issue.

48. With respect to the first point at issue between the two parties, after the very full explanation of the principles involved in it, given in a previous chapter, we need say very little about it here, as, according to what has already been said, it is quite clear that it certainly was a very fantastic opinion to suppose that gold could rise in comparison to a "promise to pay gold." There was one circumstance, however, different in the cases of England and Ireland. In the latter country, the Bank notes were openly at a discount; there were two prices in every transaction, a money price, and a paper price: and there were specie shops where guineas were openly sold for Bank notes and several shillings over. In England this was not the case, partly because Bank of England notes were received at their full nominal value in payment of taxes, but chiefly because it was an indictable offence to sell guineas for more than 21s. Shortly before the Bullion Committee was appointed, a man named De Yonge was tried and convicted for the crime of selling guineas for more than 21s. This law only applied to heavy guineas. Light guineas, below 5 dwts. 8 grns. might be sold, and were usually sold, for a Bank note and 6s. or 7s. Considering, therefore, that by law it was a crime to sell guineas of full weight at their market price, it is clear that the value of guineas was not an open question—they were forcibly depreciated by law, and, consequently, that is no argument for the equality in value between the paper and the coin. If it had not been a criminal offence, there would have been two prices for every thing, a money price and a paper price.

Mr. Merle was asked—

"What is the difference between the Mint price and the market price of gold per cent.?"

"About fifteen or sixteen."

"When you buy gold you pay for it in Bank paper?"

"Yes."

"The payment being made in Bank paper, the price is £4 10s. per ounce?"

"What I have sold for the home trade I had only £4 8s. for."

"If you were to pay in guineas, should you get the gold at a cheaper rate?"

"I could not pay in guineas, I cannot get them."

"Supposing you had guineas to give, could not you buy that gold at a cheaper rate than £4 10s. an ounce?"

"No, I should not offer a less price, certainly; if I was to buy any quantity of gold and pay for it in guineas, I should offer the same price as in Bank paper."

"When you speak of the Mint price being £3 17s. 10½d. an ounce, do you calculate that in gold coin or in Bank paper?"

"We make no difference; and I do not believe there has been any difference in paying in specie or Bank paper."

"Is not the reason why an ounce of gold is worth £3 17s. 10½d. that as many guineas as weigh an ounce amount to that sum?"

"Yes, if a gentleman came and brought me gold, I should pay him exactly the same, whether I paid him in gold coin or in Bank notes."

"The Mint price of gold is the price calculated in gold coin?"

"Yes."

"And the market price of gold at present is calculated by paper?"

"Yes, it is all paid in paper."

Thus, we see that nobody bought gold bullion at the market price in gold coin, but only in Bank paper.

49. Among the other witnesses who held the opinion that the Bank paper was undepreciated, we may cite that of Mr. Chambers, an eminent merchant, which condenses the whole subject into a single point—

"Have you ever had occasion to consider the effects of an excessive or forced paper currency in any country, upon its foreign exchanges with other countries?"

"In a small degree, I have."

"What do you conceive the effect of such excess to be upon the foreign exchanges?"

"I apprehend the effect on the exchange would follow the depreciation of a forced currency."

"What do you say to an excessive currency, though not forced?"

"I do not conceive the thing possible."

"What do you mean by a forced paper currency?"

"A paper which I am obliged to take against my will, for more than its value; it is not forced so long as people take it willingly, which they will naturally do whilst undepreciated."

"May not the quantity of metallic currency be increased in proportion to payments which it has to effect, by an increased issue from the mines; and will not that have the effect of raising the money prices of all commodities?"

"I conceive an increase or abundance of silver or gold would have the same effect upon those precious metals, as a glut of any other commodity upon the market."

"And, in the same matter, may not that paper currency which continues to preserve its credit unimpeached, and which commercial people are perfectly willing to receive, be so augmented in quantity as to raise the local prices of commodities?"

"I do not conceive that that piece of paper, for which I am obliged to give a valuable article of merchandise, can be increased beyond the want of it; nobody will give a valuable article for a piece of paper that does not want it."

"Have you ever happened to pay any attention to the history of the paper currency of Scotland between 30 and 40 years ago, or to that of Ireland about the year 1804?"

"Some years ago I remember reading something about them, but the recollection is rather faint upon my mind."

"Do you call that paper, in your sense of the word forced, a forced paper currency, which either by law as it stands, or by the force of public opinion, is not convertible into specie at the option of the holder?"

"If it be convertible into other objects of my gratification without depreciation I do not consider it forced."

"At the Mint price of standard gold in this country how much gold does a Bank of England note for £1 represent?"

"Five dwts. three grns."

"At the present market price of standard gold, of £4 12s. per ounce, how much gold do you get for a Bank of England note for £1?"

"Four dwts. eight grns."

"Do you consider that a Bank of England note for £1, under these present circumstances, is exchangeable in gold for what it represents in that metal?"

"I do not conceive gold to be a fairer standard for Bank of England notes than indigo or broadcloth."

(Question repeated.)

"If it represents twenty shillings of that metal at the coinage price, it is not."

"Will you state to the Committee, in your opinion, to what cause is referable the present unfavourable state of exchange between England and the continent?"

"To the balance of payments being against this country."

"Can you give cases to illustrate the fact that you have assigned of the balance of payments being against this country?"

"Large British armies upon the continent; slow returns for exports; quick payments for imports; and very large stocks of imported goods now on hand in the country."

"Is there any other cause to which you attribute the present state of exchange?"

"I know of none other that can affect it, excepting that of a forced depreciated paper."

"Is it your opinion that the currency of England is depreciated?"

"Certainly not."

50. Upon this, Mr. Huskisson remarks—"In these answers this leading doctrine is manfully and ingeniously asserted, and maintained; and all who stand up for the undepreciated value of Bank paper, however disguised their language, must ultimately come to the same issue." It was, in fact, as the same writer just before states, that these persons had persuaded themselves, and endeavoured to persuade others, that Bank paper is the real and fixed measure of all commodities, and that gold is only one of the articles, of which in common with others, the value is to be ascertained by a reference to this invariable standard and universal equivalent, Bank paper.

51. It is certainly amazing to think how persons of ordinary intelligence, could seriously make such answers as Mr. Chambers

did, and that these views pervaded the whole of the mercantile evidence adduced, the reply to which is so obvious. A Bank note was a promise to pay a certain specified weight of *gold* of standard fineness, and it did not profess to represent any amount of indigo or broadcloth whatever. A £1 Bank note professed to represent 5 dwts. 3 grns. of standard gold and nothing else, and if it was only really equivalent to 4 dwts. 8 grns., those who maintain that it was not depreciated must also assert that 4 dwts. 8 grns. is the same thing as 5 dwts. 3 grns. There is no escape from this conclusion. Those who maintained that a £1 Bank note, which was a promise to pay 5 dwts. 3 grns. of gold was still a "pound" when it was only worth 4 dwts. 8 grns., ought also to have maintained that if the fifth part were to leak out of a pint bottle of wine, it was still a "pint of wine" because it was contained in a pint bottle. In each case the "promise to pay" and the "pint bottle" were only the outward sign of what the contents ought to be; in either case, it was the quantity of the substance, either of gold or wine, they actually did contain, that was their true value.

52. Those who maintained that the Bank note was not depreciated should also have maintained that the worn, the clipped, and degraded coin of William III. was not depreciated, when 6s. 3d. and 7s. only contained as much silver as 5s. 2d. ought to have done by law; so that 5s. 2d. was only equal in reality to 4s. 1d. of the legal standard currency.

53. It must be admitted, however, that there was one argument to show that there was no difference in transactions between specie and paper, for specie had totally disappeared from circulation; it had no existence. The Bank paper and tokens were the sole circulating medium of the country. When people found that they could get no more for their good golden guineas than for the depreciated Bank paper, they hoarded them; they either retained them locked up, or melted them down for exportation, the temptation to perjury being exactly 12s. per ounce. The explanation of these phenomena is very simple. When Bank notes were declared inconvertible, they took rank as a new substantive currency (being merely representative before), exactly like silver. Now, the relative value of gold and silver purely

depended upon their relative quantities, and when their relative values were fixed by law, if the legal value did not correspond to the market value, we have seen over and over again that the metal which was *undervalued* was driven out of circulation. So, also, when heavy and light coins circulated together, the heavy coins were driven out of circulation because the heavy coins were undervalued, and nobody would give 6 ounces of silver for what they might buy with 5 ounces. It was exactly the same with Bank notes. They could only preserve their relative value with gold by preserving certain relative proportions in their quantity; as soon as this quantity was exceeded, their relative value fell, and as their relative value to guineas was fixed by law, a change in their market value was followed by exactly the same consequences as a difference between the market and legal value of gold and silver. The guineas which were undervalued were driven out of circulation, as always has been done under similar circumstances, and as always will be done to the end of time. Nobody would give 5 dwts. 3 grns. of gold for what they could get for 4 dwts. 8 grns. Thus this iniquitous and ignorant law to force down the value of guineas, brought its own punishment with it: it destroyed their existence as a circulating medium; but then it became literally true that there was no difference between specie and paper; the power of making an invidious distinction between notes and gold was effectually cured,—*solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*; when the inhabitants were massacred, the Russians proclaimed—“*L'ordre regne à Varsovie.*”

54. With respect to the second issue joined between these parties, the principal places with which London had established exchanges were Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Paris, in all of which the currency was metallic. The Committee examined witnesses, who proved that the whole expenses of freight, insurance, war risk, and every other charge, varied from about 4 to 5½ per cent., but beyond these there was a depression of 12 to 14 per cent., totally unaccountable for by any of these causes. If it were true that this difference arose from a demand for gold on the continent, it is quite evident that gold should equally have risen in the continental markets; but those who alleged this cause should have been prepared with a proof of their

assertions, which, however, they were totally unable to duce. On the contrary, it was proved that there was alteration in the Mint price of gold in foreign places, and the market price had experienced no rise at all in proportion to the rise in England.

55. While the English merchants so strenuously maintained that the rate of exchange was entirely due to the balance of payments being against England, and that the Bank paper was not depreciated, it may be as well to compare the opinion of a foreign merchant, who looked at the same circumstances from a different point of view. After stating the difficulty of obtaining the exact par of exchange between London and Hamburg from the fact of one currency being silver and the other paper, he considered that the rate of exchange might be considered 15 per cent. against England.

"Has not a large quantity of circulating specie a powerful tendency to steady the course of exchange?"

"Yes, certainly, when its importation and exportation is prohibited, and as forming the only basis that regulated the course of exchange."

"Is not, then, any country whose chief circulation is in paper likely to experience great fluctuations in the course of exchange with other nations?"

"When that paper is not convertible into cash, it only represents, in my opinion, an ideal and not a real value, subject to public opinion, and, consequently, liable to the very great fluctuations which public opinions are subject to."

"Is there not an agio (or premium) at Hamburg, for the paper above the current money?"

"Not according to my ideas; but, on the contrary; *the different current coins that bear an inferior value to the Bank money, and which vary daily, every thing being valued according to Bank money, or a certain weight of fine silver.*"

"What is the extent to which you conceive that the exchange is capable of falling in any country in Europe at the present time, supposing it to be computed in coin of a definite value, or in something convertible into a definite quantity of gold or silver bullion?"

"The charge of transporting it, together with an adequate profit in proportion to the risk the transmitting such specie is liable to, would be the extent of the fluctuation."

The witness stated that the whole of these causes put together might amount to $5\frac{1}{2}$ or 6 per cent.

"Do you then conceive that such a fall of our exchange as has exceeded the sum necessary to compensate for the expense of transporting gold or silver, in the last 15 months, must be referred to the circumstance of the existence of a paper currency not convertible into specie?"

"Yes, certainly."

"Do you conceive, then, that out of the 15 or 20 per cent. which the English exchange has fallen in the last 15 months, the large portion of from 10 to 12, or 13 per cent. may be referable to the circumstance of our paper currency not being convertible to cash?"

"I am clearly of that opinion."

"Do you then consider our paper as depreciated 10 to 13 per cent. in consequence of its non-convertibility into cash?"

"As I value everything by bullion, I conceive the paper currency of this country to be depreciated to the full extent of the 15 or 20 per cent., or rather the difference in this country between the price of bullion and the rate by which the coin is issued from the Mint."

"Do you conceive the balance of trade with the continent of Europe to be now for or against this country?"

"I conceive it to be considerably in favour of this country, though not to the extent as generally stated in figures; those figures, representing, in my mind, only about 80 per cent. of their nominal value."

56. With respect to the third issue between the parties, nothing can be clearer than that a diminution in the quantity of paper in circulation must have enhanced its value relatively to all other commodities, including gold; and as the market price of gold was determined solely with reference to the price paid for it in Bank paper, and not in guineas, it is evident that a reduction of the quantity of paper must have reduced the price of gold when expressed in paper, and brought the real value of the note nearer to its nominal value; and, by thus raising the value of the whole

currency, it must necessarily have raised the foreign exchanges to par, if the diminution was carried to a sufficient extent, and so would have brought gold back again into circulation.

57. The fourth issue between these parties contains a perfectly new theory of the paper currency, which had previously been announced by the directors of the Bank of Ireland. As this may be considered as one of the most famous theories of currency, we think it will be advantageous to defer the discussion of it till the chapter in which we shall consider several theories of the subject together. It is sufficient to say here that the Bullion Report especially condemns it.

58. The above may be considered as the chief points agitated before the Committee, which are material to our subject. We may now give a short abstract of the arguments and recommendations of the Report. It begins by stating the existing difference between the market and the Mint price of gold. The former being about £4 10s., being $15\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. above the latter. The same difference prevailed in the price of silver. The foreign exchanges had also begun to be extremely unfavourable to England in 1808, and had become more so during 1809, at that time the exchange with Hamburg was 9 per cent. below par; with Amsterdam 7 per cent. below par; and with Paris 14 per cent. below par. So extraordinary a rise in the market price of gold above the Mint price, coupled with the extraordinary depression of the foreign exchanges, had early convinced the Committee that the cause of them was to be found in the state of our domestic currency. But upon both those points they had been anxious to collect the opinions of merchants.

59. Most of the witnesses attributed the high price of gold entirely to an alleged scarcity, arising from the unusual continental demand for it, but it was proved that at Hamburg during the preceding year when the price rose so high in this country, the fluctuations had never exceeded 3 or 4 per cent. At Hamburg the price of gold was expressed in *silver* like any other commodity, and the Committee considered the change in the market and Mint price of gold at Hamburg and Amsterdam in the last few years, to shew that a change had taken place in

the relative value of the two metals all over the world. Silver having fallen in its relative value to gold all over the world, gold has appeared to rise in price in those markets where silver is the legal measure, and silver to fall in those markets where gold is the legal measure.

60. With respect to the demand on the continent causing the rise in the market price, the same effect ought to have been observed in former wars if that had been the case. But it had not been so during the seven years' war, and in the American war there had been no want of bullion in the country. The two most remarkable times when the market price had exceeded the Mint price, were in King William's reign, when the silver coin was very much below the standard, and in the beginning of George III.'s reign, when the gold coin was in a very degraded state. In both cases the reformation of the coinage had effectually lowered the market to the Mint price, and since 1773, when the gold coinage was reformed, till 1797, the market price had never materially risen above the Mint price; even in 1796 and 1797, when there was such a scarcity of gold, on account of the demand of country bankers to meet the run upon them. The Committee, moreover, totally disbelieved the fact of the alleged scarcity of gold, and witnesses had proved that there was no difficulty at all in getting any quantity of it, by those who chose to pay the price of it, and that the changes which had lately taken place in commercial matters, had caused immense quantities both of gold and silver to be imported into this country. There was, therefore, not only no evidence of the alleged scarcity, but, on the contrary, the evidence proved the opposite fact.

61. But even, had there been a scarcity, the idea that the market price could rise above the Mint price, arose from a misconception. That gold was in this country the measure of all exchangeable value both by custom and law. That commodities were said to be dear or cheap, according as they exchanged for more or less gold; *but that a given quantity of gold could never exchange for a greater or less quantity of gold of the same standard fineness*, except by a very small quantity, which was the measure of the convenience of having it in coin rather than

in bullion, or the reverse. An ounce of standard gold, then, could never fetch more in the market than £3 17s. 10½d., unless £3 17s. 10½d. in our currency contained less than an ounce of gold. That if gold became exceedingly scarce it would become more valuable, compared to other commodities, whose prices would consequently fall, while the money price of gold must necessarily remain unaltered, but that was not the case at present, the prices of all commodities had risen, and the price of gold had also risen, which facts could only be accounted for by the state of the currency.

62. The report, then, explains the circumstances which might cause a difference between the market and the Mint price of gold, the deterioration of the coinage, the delay in having bullion coined, the obstruction to exportation,—these two latter causes amounted to about 5½ per cent. None of these causes existed at Hamburg with respect to silver. The currency was a regular fixed weight of silver, of standard fineness, and no obstruction was offered to the utmost freedom of exportation. And in England, the variation had never exceeded 5½ per cent., while the Bank paid in gold, and the coin was of full weight.

63. Since the suspension of cash payments, however, gold, in a manner, had ceased to be the measure of value, nor was there any other standard of prices than that circulating medium, issued partly by the Bank of England, and secondly, by the country banks, the variations in value of which were only proportionate to their quantity. That it was highly desirable that the value of this circulating medium should be brought to a conformity with its real and legal standard, gold bullion.

64. If the gold coin of the country were to become much lessened in weight, or debased in the standard, the market price would evidently rise in like proportion above the Mint price; for the Mint price is the sum in coin, which is equivalent in value to a given quantity, say an ounce, of the metal in bullion, and if the intrinsic value of that sum in coin be lessened, it is equivalent to a less quantity of bullion than before. The same effects would follow, if a paper currency, no longer convertible into gold, were issued in excess. For that excess, not being

exportable to other countries, or convertible into specie, remains in the channel of circulation, and is gradually absorbed by the increasing prices of all commodities, which will rise exactly in the same manner as they rose when the great increase of the precious metals took place. Consequently, the prices of all commodities, bullion included, must rise, and, if this fall in the value of the currency of one country takes place without a corresponding fall in the value of neighbouring countries, their currencies will no longer retain the same relative value, and, consequently, the exchanges will fall to the disadvantage of that particular country. Such must be the effects in any country of an excessive quantity of currency which is not exportable, and which is not convertible into coin which is exportable.

65. The difference of exchange between any two places, arising from the state of trade, and payments between them, could never permanently exceed the expense of conveying and insuring the precious metals from one to the other. The position was so plainly true, and agreed upon by all practical authorities, both commercial and political, as to be perfectly indisputable. That in time of war the risk would, of course, be increased; but, taking into consideration all these circumstances, the entire expenses of sending bullion to Holland did not exceed 7 per cent., and to Paris a little more; these causes might, therefore, depress the exchange to that extent, but no lower. But the depression had lately amounted to nearly 20 per cent.; consequently, after exhausting all these causes of depression, there remained a large residual depression to be accounted for; and that RESIDUAL DEPRESSION COULD ONLY BE ACCOUNTED FOR AND WAS OWING TO THE DEPRECIATED STATE OF THE DOMESTIC CURRENCY.

66. The great general result, then, of all these foregoing principles and facts was, that in the then artificial state of the currency, it was a point of the greatest importance to watch the foreign exchanges and the market price of gold bullion, and the Committee were anxious to know if the Directors of the Bank of England regarded the matter in the same light, and whether the great disturbance in the price of gold and the foreign exchanges, during the last year, had made them suspect that the

currency was excessive. The directors, however, totally repudiated those notions and ideas; they maintained that their issues and the foreign exchanges and price of gold had no connection whatever with each other, and that, in making their issues, they never paid the slightest regard to either one or the other, and that no modification of their paper currency would influence either the price of gold or the foreign exchanges.

67. The report then proceeds to disprove the opinions of the Bank by historical references. They quoted the cases of the derangement of the Scotch currency in 1763, of the Irish currency in 1804, both of which are fully detailed in this work, they then quoted the case of the Bank of England in 1696-7, which has been described with much minuteness in the preceding chapter, where the extract from this report has already been quoted and commented upon. But, though we have been obliged to point out the grievous chronological errors with which it abounds, it is remarkable that the correction of these errors does not in any way weaken or contradict the arguments of the Bullion Report; on the contrary, the true state of the case materially strengthens and adds force to all the principles of the Report.

68. In former times, a high price of bullion, and an adverse state of the exchanges, had compelled the Directors of the Bank to reduce their issues, to counteract the drain of guineas, and preserve their own safety. They, perhaps, did not understand the principles of the case better than the Directors of the then time, but they felt the practical inconvenience, and were obliged instinctively to obey its impulse, which circumstance imposed a practical limit upon their issues. But, since the restriction, they did not feel the inconvenience, and that check had been removed; nevertheless, it was the clear and decided opinion of the committee, that the Bank ought to continue to regulate their issues by the market price of bullion and the foreign exchanges, in the same manner as they had been obliged to do before the suspension, and that the high price of gold bullion, and the depression of the foreign exchanges beyond the limits before described, were to be ascribed to the neglect of the due limitation of the paper currency.

69. Since the checks above described had been removed, the Committee were anxious to know upon what principles the directors had regulated their issues. The Directors and some of the merchants shewed a great anxiety to state a doctrine, of whose truth they were thoroughly convinced, that there could be no possible excess in the issue of Bank of England paper, so long as the advances in which it is issued consist of the discount of mercantile bills of undoubted solidity, arising out of real commercial transactions, and payable at short and fixed periods. These were the principles which then governed the Bank, and what they said indicated the only true limit that need be imposed on their issues. Nevertheless, the Report says such a doctrine is wholly erroneous in principle, and pregnant with dangerous consequences. The Report then proceeds to shew the fallacy of this theory of paper currency, which, as we have already observed, we shall reserve for future consideration, along with several other theories upon the subject.

70. The limitation of the rate of interest by law to 5 per cent. produced injurious effects, by fanning a spirit of speculation, and making more extensive demands for discounts. Consequently, the Directors themselves had been obliged frequently to limit their advances, and did not act up to their own principles, which they considered sound and safe, and, consequently, they had no distinct or certain rule to guide them.

71. The suspension of cash payments had thrown into the hands of the Directors of the Bank the important charge of supplying the circulating medium of the country at their sole discretion. That the most complete knowledge of the state of trade, combined with the most profound science in all the principles of money and currency, could not enable any set of men always to adjust the circulating medium properly to the trade of the country. That the precious metals were the only natural adjusters of these things, which could not be replaced by any human wisdom or skill. That the Directors of the Bank had exercised the new and extraordinary discretionary powers entrusted to them, with great integrity and regard to the public interests, according to their conception of it, and with more forbearance than might have been expected; but, unfortunately,

the principles upon which they acted, were fundamentally erroneous, and they had been in a great measure the cause of the continuance of the great disturbance in the monetary system.

72. The Report then gave some statistics regarding the quantity of notes in circulation at different periods since the restriction. However, they said that the actual numerical amount of notes in circulation at any given time was no criterion whatever, as to whether it was excessive or not. Different states of trade, and different extents of commercial operations, would require different amounts of notes. When public credit was good, a smaller amount would be required than when public alarm was felt, and people had recourse to hoarding. Moreover, the different methods of doing business and economising the use of the currency, much influenced the amount which might be proper and necessary at any period. The improved methods of business, the policy of the Bank, the increased issues of country bankers, had all tended to diminish the quantity of Bank notes necessary for commerce. Consequently, the numerical amount alone was no criterion whatever; a surer test must be applied, and that sure criterion was only to be found in the state of the exchanges, and the price of gold bullion.

73. The experience of the crisis of 1793 had proved that an enlarged accommodation was the true remedy for the failure of confidence in country districts, such as the system of paper credit was occasionally exposed to. That it was true that the Bank had refused the enlarged accommodation in 1793. But the issue of Exchequer bills was exactly the same in principle, and the good effects that followed that issue proved the truth of the principle, that if the Bank had had the courage to extend its accommodation in 1797, instead of contracting it as they did, the catastrophe which followed might probably have been avoided. Some persons thought so at that time, and many of the directors since the experience of 1797, were now quite satisfied that the course adopted by the Bank in that year increased the public distress, in which opinion the Committee fully concurred.

74. A very important distinction, however, was to be observed between a demand for gold for domestic purposes, sometimes great

and sudden, and caused by a temporary failure of confidence, and a drain arising from the unfavourable state of the foreign exchanges, *that a judicious increase of accommodation was the proper remedy for the former phenomenon, but a diminution of its issues the correct course to adopt in the latter.*

75. That the present issues were excessive, but that it was essential to the commercial interests of the country, and to the general fulfilment of mercantile engagements contracted during the too free issue of paper, that the reduction should be made gradually and with great caution and discretion. They then give some details of the great increase of country Bank notes, and the facilities of abuse and excessive issues afforded by the then state of the law respecting them.

76. Upon all those facts and reasonings, then, the general conclusions arrived at were: That at that time there was an excessive paper currency, of which the most unequivocal symptom was the very high price of gold bullion, and next to that the very depressed state of the foreign exchanges. That the excess was to be attributed to the removal of all control on the issues of the Bank of England by the suspension of cash payments. It was greatly to be regretted, therefore, that this Act, which at best was only intended to be temporary, had been continued as a permanent war measure. The enormous evils and injury to all classes of the community by the great derangement of the measure of value, were too notorious to be necessary to describe, and there was every prospect of their continuing and increasing: "that the integrity and honour of Parliament imperatively required that an end should be put to this state of things at the earliest practicable moment.

77. That the continuance of this state of matters held out a temptation to Parliament, to have recourse to a depreciation of the gold coin, by an alteration of the standard, which had been done by many Governments under similar circumstances, and which might be the easiest remedy to the evil. But it would be a great breach of public faith and of the primary duty of Government, to prefer the reduction of the coin down to the paper, rather than the restoration of the paper to the legal standard of the coin.

78. Some proposals had been made of remedying the evil by a compulsory limitation of the amount of the Bank's advances or discounts, or of its profits or dividends. All these, however were futile, because the necessary proportions never could be fixed, and even if it were so, might very much aggravate the inconveniences of a temporary pressure, and even if their efficacy could be made to appear, they would be most hurtful and improper interferences with the rights of commercial property.

79. The only true and proper remedy for all these evils was therefore, A RESUMPTION OF CASH PAYMENTS. That, however was an operation of the greatest delicacy, and it must be left entirely to the discretion and prudence of the Bank to carry it into effect. Parliament should merely fix the time, and leave it to them to carry out the details. Under all the circumstances a period of two years seemed to be not longer than necessary and at the same time sufficient to enable them to prepare for it. The Committee finally concluded by recommending an Act to be passed to compel the resumption of cash payments in two years from that time.

80. Such, we trust, is a fair analysis of this famous Report which has acquired a celebrity probably exceeding any report that has ever been presented to Parliament. It contains the eternal and immutable principles which must regulate every paper currency which makes any attempt to conform to the value of the gold it represents, and if any legislation on paper currency be considered necessary, it must endeavour to enforce the practical application of the principles of this Report, and just in so far as it deviates from or contravenes them, so it will be found to thwart and contravene the eternal principles of Political Economy. All legislation, then, on the currency should have as its object merely to provide the best machinery for ensuring the practical application of these principles. The general principles laid down in this Report are as complete a matter of demonstration as any in Euclid; the method of treating the subject is as scientific as any of the great discoveries in natural philosophy which have excited the admiration of the world, nor could it fail to carry conviction to any one of ordinary intelligence who was capable of understanding the force of the arguments. No

sooner, however, was it published than it was assailed by a whole multitude of pamphleteers, whose obscure memory it is not worth while to revive now. The interests affected by the Report were too deep and extensive for it not to be attacked by every species of ridicule and acrimonious controversy. We must now advert to its reception and treatment in the House of Commons.

81. The report was presented by Mr. Horner on the 9th June, 1810, but was not formally taken into consideration till the 6th May, 1811. It was the joint composition of Mr. Horner, Mr. Huskisson, and Mr. Henry Thornton. The debate was opened by Mr. Horner, who addressed the House for upwards of three hours in a speech which obtained the admiration of all who heard it. It is unnecessary to go over that speech here, because its line of argument has already been anticipated. He ended by moving a series of sixteen resolutions. The first seven related to the legal standard of value in this country, with reference to which all contracts were made in this country. 8. That the promissory notes of the Bank were stipulations to pay on demand the number of pounds sterling specified upon them. 9. That when Parliament passed the Restriction Act it had no intention that the value of these notes should be altered. 10. That, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time been below their legal value, (11) which was caused by the excessive issues of them, both by the Bank of England and the country banks. 12, 13. That the extraordinary depression of the foreign exchanges was in great part owing to the depreciation of the currency of this country, relatively to that of other countries. 14. That during the suspension, the Directors of the Bank ought to regulate their issues by the price of bullion and the foreign exchanges. 15. That the only method of preserving the paper currency at its proper value was to make it payable on demand in the legal coin of the realm. 16. That cash payments ought to be resumed at the period of two years from that time.

82. Mr. Rose replied to Mr. Horner—"He said that he could shew that there was no depreciation of Bank paper from excessive issue, and that the Report was more full of errors and misstatements than any that had ever been made to Parliament. He was convinced that the issue of Bank notes could have no

effect on the price of gold, or on the foreign exchanges. He denied that the increased price of commodities was in any way to be attributed to the increase of Bank paper. The report of the Committee was directly in opposition to the opinions of all the witnesses examined, except two. All "experience" was against the "reasonings" of the Report. He produced a table shewing the number of bank notes in circulation at different periods, and the market price of bullion and the exchange with Hamburg, to shew that there was no connection whatever between them. However, the Committee had themselves most pointedly remarked that the numerical amount of notes alone was no test of their depreciation. The enormous payments which England made to the continent during the last two years were quite sufficient to account for the fall in the exchange. That the rise in the prices of all commodities on the continent had been equally great in countries where there was no paper currency as here. He went into arguments at great length to disprove the idea that the issue of Bank notes had any effect on the price of gold or the exchanges.

83. Mr. Henry Thornton stated that the great question at issue between the Bullion Committee and the Bank was, whether its issues should be regulated by the price of gold and the foreign exchanges, and if its excessive issues produced any effect upon them. Mr. Thornton argued at great length in support of the principles of the Report, and cited the case of the Bank of France in 1805 as a remarkable confirmation of the truth of its principles. The French Government, having occasion for a loan, applied to the merchants for it, such a transaction being contrary to the rules of the Bank. The merchants proceeded to fabricate among themselves bills to the requisite amount, which they discounted at the Bank, which thus ultimately became the real lender. There was, in consequence, an enormous increase of the Bank paper, a great demand for specie. The Bank had to bring back specie from the provinces at a great loss—at length it stopped payment. Bank notes fell to a discount of 10 or 12 per cent., and the foreign exchanges fell 10 per cent. But the Bank reduced its paper, and in three months resumed payment without difficulty, and the foreign exchanges were rectified. Mr. Thornton also quoted several other cases of other countries.

where the same phenomenon had occurred. He then passed on to the question of the standard of the currency, which he said was becoming endangered by this continued depreciation. Indeed, the argument in favour of a deterioration of the coin grew stronger every day. The very argument of justice, after a certain time, passes over to the side of deterioration. If we have been only two or three years using a depreciated paper, justice is on the side of the former standard; if ten or twenty years have passed since paper fell, it may be deemed unfair to restore the ancient standard. He concluded by strongly urging Parliament to return to the ancient standard before it was too late.

84. Mr. Vansittart, who moved the counter-resolutions to Mr. Horner, controverted, at great length, the principles of the Report. He asserted that the only mode in which a metallic currency could have a favourable effect on the exchanges was by *exportation*, and that if exportation was prohibited by law, no effect could be produced. The amazing absurdity of this assertion has been sufficiently proved in the course of this work to need repetition here. These assertions, however, were sober good sense compared to the lengths of wild extravagance into which he subsequently plunged. He said that the first seven resolutions argued on the supposition that the standard was something visible and tangible. "I affirm that a standard, in the sense used by these gentlemen, namely, a fixed and invariable *weight* of the precious metals as a measure of value never existed in this country!!" He ridiculed the idea of the resolution that the weight at which any such money is authorised to pass current is fixed!! These extraordinary ideas he attempted to support by reference to the degraded state the coin had been in at different periods, but which were yet legal tender, and which, he contended, proved that the coin was not any definite weight of bullion. It was upon this point, he said, that the question of depreciation depended. "Now, I do not consider myself bound either to admit or deny that Bank notes have lost a value which they never possessed, and which the legal coin of the country never possessed, namely, a value estimated by a fixed weight of gold or silver bullion. They never had any other than current value, founded on the public

confidence in the Bank, and this value, I firmly believe, and have distinctly stated in my third proposition, that they possess as much as ever." When the whole of the rest of his speech was a mere repetition and development of such crazy ideas, it is a mere waste of time to give any more details of it. There is one more specimen, however, which we cannot refrain from extracting. He says—"It appears, then, that a diminution of the value of currency may have the effect of improving the exchange, but cannot by possibility depress it!!" Which means that the more debased and worthless the currency of a country is, the more favourable should be the foreign exchanges, or the higher should foreigners estimate it. So that, while the French assignats were daily falling lower and lower at home, the more should foreigners have given for them: so that, while the French themselves gave one livre in coin for 1,200 in assignats, the English and other foreigners ought to have given their full nominal value in coin, and even more than that according to Mr. Vansittart. He then made several triumphant observations about there being no difference in transactions between Bank notes and coin. He admitted that he had been a member of the Irish Committee of 1804, and had concurred in the opinion that Irish Bank notes were depreciated, but he said that the two cases were not parallel; for it appeared not only that the current coin was openly sold at a premium, but that an established difference of price existed between payments in coin and in Irish paper, while Bank of England paper passed as equivalent to guineas. This depreciation, however, he denied had proceeded from excessive issues, but from the political circumstances of the period.

85. Such were the leading arguments against the conclusion of the Committee, which, though somewhat varied in expression, were constantly repeated. After the exposition given in our chapter on the Coinage, it would be waste of time to attempt seriously to disprove the outrageous folly of the proposition that the coins of Great Britain never were intended to contain any fixed or certain quantity of gold or silver bullion in them. If this had been true, what was the need of having any gold or silver in them at all; if it was not to regulate their value?

86. With respect to the assertion that there was no difference in common payments between guineas and Bank notes, and that guineas were not openly selling at a premium, as in Ireland, the answer was simple and decisive: if it were so, it was merely through the terrors of the penal law. At the very time of this debate three men were lying under a conviction of the crime of selling guineas for more than 21s. They had been convicted under an old statute of Edward VI., which did not extend to Ireland, so that the reason why guineas were sold publicly at a premium in Ireland was, that there was no law against it; in England it was a criminal offence, and, in consequence of this, guineas had disappeared from circulation. But Mr. Vansittart threw out another challenge, he acknowledged that it was legal for tradesmen to make a distinction in prices, according as they were paid in money, or in Bank notes, and he denied that such a distinction existed. On this point, however, he was met with a distinct denial by Mr. Huskisson, who said—"If paper were sustained at all in public estimation, it must be by a support growing out of terror, by an estimation proceeding at that moment from a consideration of a pending judgment. If this were once settled, public estimation would soon shew what it really was. In every part of the country there were already two prices; he had undoubted proof of the fact. He had in his pocket a letter from a person intimately acquainted with such matters, which said that two prices were prevalent in the country, and that the usual premium for guineas was half-a-crown."

87. Mr. Sharp, a member of the Bullion Committee, adduced further facts to prove that the Bank notes were depreciated; he said it had been usual to send over specie to Guernsey to pay the troops there. *Each guinea had lately been paid to the soldiers at 23s.*; one regiment, however, had refused to receive them at that rate. In another case he knew of a person who had received a legacy of 1,000 guineas which was paid in specie; he went to invest it in the funds, and, on asking the price of the 3 per cents., was told 64½. But, on asking what the price would be if paid in real money, he was told, after some consideration, he might have it at 60, which was the price actually paid. So that, while the Government were arguing at Westminster that

guineas were of the same value as Bank notes, they were at the same time dishonest enough to pay them away to the soldier at 23s.

88. Sir Francis Burdett stated that, in Jersey, Bank of England notes were at a discount of 3 per cent. as compared to the notes of their own little bank; that it was perfectly notorious that two prices were common throughout the country. I knew it from his own experience; he had been offered wheat at far different prices, according as he should pay for it either in Bank notes or in specie.

89. We have now given so much space to this interesting discussion, that we can scarcely afford room to notice any of the other speeches upon the subject. When we read the arguments and evidence, which seem to be so perfectly satisfactory according to all the usual principles that command assent, we feel some curiosity to know what was the opposing theory set up against them, and it was simply this, that the pound sterling was nothing tangible at all! It was an imaginary vision! a vague idea! an airy nothing! which never had an existence in nature at all, and that, accordingly, everything money and bullion included, might vary in endless change round this ideal centre. It had even less substantiality than a whiff of smoke! It was "a sense of value" communicated in some mysterious way from one person to another. Mr. Cannan pursued the author of this insensate folly with unsparing ridicule in his speech. He also ably pointed out the consequence of not allowing guineas to circulate at their market value, which had been followed by their total disappearance, whereas dollars which were beginning to disappear when they were brought down to the value of the depreciated Bank paper, were immediately restored to circulation when they were allowed to pass current at their real value. However, though fully agreed in all the principles and reasonings of the Buller Report, he did not think it expedient that the Bank should be called upon to resume cash payments in so short a period as two years.

90. After a debate of four nights the Committee divided on the first of Mr. Horner's resolutions, and it was negatived by a majority of 151 to 75. The fourteen next were negatived without a division, and the last was rejected by a majority of 180 to 45. Among the names of the majority was that of ROBERT PEELE.

91. The Ministry, having defeated the Bullion Committee by so great a majority, would have done well to let the matter rest. As to the matter of fact agitated between the parties, the depreciation or the non-depreciation of the Bank notes, it would be useless to waste one word more, and in arguing against so palpable a fact, the ministerial party shewed little discretion. They might easily have saved their credit by admitting the fact, but arguing that it was not expedient for the public service that so momentous a change should be made during the war. Not content, however, with procuring the total rejection of Mr. Horner's resolutions, Mr. Vansittart, in the plenitude of his power and party strength, and in the mere wantonness of tyranny, determined to drag the House through the lowest depths of ridicule and absurdity. He moved a series of resolutions which are too long to be inserted here, to the effect that there was no legal weight of bullion in the coins, beyond what the caprice of each Sovereign might dictate; that the Bank notes were merely promises to pay in these coins, and they always had been, and at that moment were held equivalent in public estimation to the legal coin of the realm, and generally accepted as such in all pecuniary transactions to which such coin is lawfully applicable, and that the price of bullion and the state of the foreign exchanges were in no way owing to excessive issues of Bank paper.

92. In introducing his resolutions Mr. Vansittart made a speech of enormous length, repeating his former views, that the state of the domestic currency had no effect upon the foreign exchanges, and, with a flight of unheard-of audacity, he, in defiance of the recorded opinion of Parliament and the unanimous testimony of all contemporary writers, made the extraordinary assertion that in 1696 and 1774 "the fall of the exchange was the cause, and not the consequence of the

depreciation of the currency !” Mr. Canning in vain attempted to persuade the Ministers to rest satisfied with the defeat of the Bullion Committee, and, for the sake of the reputation of the House, not to make them pass a vote which no one outside the House could speak of without laughter. His amendment was rejected by a majority of 82 to 42 ; and, after some other minor divisions, Mr. Vansittart’s resolutions were carried.

93. We have observed that guineas were not sold openly at a premium, because it was generally believed to be a criminal offence to do so, and three men were tried and convicted for so doing. To draw any argument of the equality of the value of the note and coin under such circumstances, was nothing but a contemptible piece of sophistry. But nothing could be more whimsical or absurd than the presumed state of the law on the subject. It was held to be penal to part with a Bank note for less than 20s. in bullion, but it was quite legitimate for a tradesman to make two prices for his goods. In his speech against Mr. Horner’s resolutions, Mr. Vansittart had taunted his opponents with the circumstance that this was not done. It is incredible how any one could have made an argument of such an absurdity, when it was so easy to outwit the law. If any one wished to avoid the legal offence of parting with a guinea for more than 28s., what more easy than a collusive sale ? Sell a loaf to any man for a £1 note and 5s., and buy it again from him at a guinea, and the interchange between the guinea and the £1 5s. was effected in the most legal manner. But such subtleties were at once put an end to by the Court of Common Pleas unanimously quashing the conviction of De Yonge, and declaring that it was no crime at all to sell guineas at a premium.

94. After the House had indulged in this wild freak—the very saturnalia of unreason—and given so great an encouragement to the Bank to pursue its wild career, it became evident to any one who understood the subject, that the value of every man’s property depended upon the will of the Bank directors. This was fraught with the most alarming consequences to every one who had a fixed annuity, as, while the price of every article of prime necessity kept pace with the depreciation of the currency, any one, like a landlord, having a fixed rent to receive

was paid in a depreciated paper, while his tenants received the increased nominal prices of their commodities. As matters were continually getting worse, gold having risen to £4 16s. per ounce in March, Lord King issued a circular to several of his tenants, reminding them that their contract was to pay a certain quantity of the legal coin of the country, and that the present paper currency was considerably depreciated. He said that, in future, he should require his rents to be paid in the legal gold coin of the realm, but that, as his object was merely to secure the payment of the real intrinsic value of the sum stipulated by the agreement, he should be willing to receive the amount in Portugal gold coin of an equal weight with that of the stipulated number of guineas, or by an amount of Bank notes sufficient to purchase the weight of standard gold requisite to discharge the rent.

95. That such a demand was legal no one pretended to deny ; but when this practical sarcasm was passed upon the resolution of the House of Commons, it drove that party wild, and the most unmeasured abuse was heaped upon him for *incivism*. Not only was this in every way legal, but nothing could have been more equitable. His tenants were receiving the increased market prices for their crops, and only paid him in the same number of depreciated notes. It is quite clear that, if his tenants got an increase in the price of their corn owing to the depreciation, he ought to have received a proportionate increase in his rents. Lord Stanhope brought in a bill, which, after being considerably modified, was ultimately passed, making it a misdemeanour to make any difference in payments between guineas and Bank notes. Lord Stanhope, in bringing in the bill, mentioned several instances which he had been informed of, in which 27s. were demanded for a guinea. Lord Holland also said that a pound note and seven shillings were currently given for guineas. Admirable commentary upon the resolutions carried so triumphantly in the House of Commons only two months before, and then standing on their journals, that in public estimation guineas and Bank notes were equal !

96. Lord Grenville opposed the bill with great earnestness, and his opinion is particularly valuable because he was one of

the Cabinet who originally proposed the Restriction Act. He said he had never seen the Ministers of the country in so disgraceful a position as they were that night. He turned the famous resolutions of the House of Commons into great ridicule, and said that it had been left for Robespierre, the Jacobins, and the present Ministry to raise a cry of *incivism* against the private actions of individuals. He said that it was one of the most painful days in his and Mr. Pitt's political life, when they felt compelled to come to Parliament to propose the restriction. "By what consideration we were afterwards induced to extend it for successive short periods, it is unnecessary to explain, suffice it to say, that they are considerations which I shall ever deeply regret had any influence upon my mind. I do assure my noble friend (Lord King) that I have long since fully concurred in the arguments which he has urged against the original policy of that restriction." He said that the present course, if persevered in, must end in the same manner as the Mississippi and South Sea Schemes, in total ruin. "My Lords, it has often been my lot to point out the inevitable results of the issue of assignats in France. How little did I then imagine that, in the description I then gave, I was but anticipating what, in the course of twenty years, would be the faithful picture of my own country!"

97. Although we have given so much space to this debate, we cannot refrain from giving a few sentences of Lord Stanhope's reply, as they concentrate in the shortest space the whole of the ministerial arguments and views on the subject—

"Earl Stanhope, in explanation, said that there was no such thing in this country as a measure of value founded on a quantity of bullion of standard fineness. The legal coin was the money with the stamp upon it. The stamp was what made it the lawful coin, not to be melted nor transported, and not the weight and fineness. He did not know what mathematicians he had to deal with, but if Bank notes and gold bore a fixed proportional ratio to the pound sterling by law, they were equal to one another, and to prove this he need go no further than the first book of Euclid, where it was laid down as an axiom that things equal to the same are equal to one another."

98. We are accustomed to smile at the famous decree of the Inquisition, which resolved that the motion of the earth was false, and sympathise with Galileo, who, when retiring from their rebuke, said "*e pur si muove*," "it moves for all that." But the famous resolution that guineas were equal in public estimation to Bank notes, when guineas were currently sold for a £1 note and seven shillings, and the dictum of Lord Stanhope that they *were* equal because the law *declared* them to be so, infinitely transcends it in absurdity; and, when we feel inclined to be merry at the expense of the worthy fathers of the Inquisition, we should think of Mr. Vansittart's resolution, and be grave.

99. The Bill was warmly contested in every stage of its progress through the House of Lords, but finally passed the third reading by a majority of 43 to 16. In the House of Commons the debates were equally warm and protracted, but it was finally passed by a majority of 95 to 20. The Act was originally limited to the 24th March, 1812, but it was subsequently continued during the continuance of the Bank Restriction Act.

100. We shall reserve some remarks regarding the effects of the great overtrading of 1809 and 1810, till the chapter in which we shall consider the theory of the Bank respecting the issues of its notes upon mercantile security,

101. Among other arguments alleged against the opening of the Bank, was the injustice of compelling it to buy gold at the increased market price. Now that we are enabled to take a more dispassionate view of the subject than those whose interests were so much involved in it at the time of the debate, we can see that there was no hardship in such a requirement. Every creditor who was paid in these depreciated notes was defrauded of 20 per cent. of his debt, and, considering the enormous gains made by the Bank at the expense of the holders of its notes, justice evidently demanded that the Bank should purchase whatever quantity of gold was sufficient to discharge its obligations, cost what it would. The injury to the holders of its notes, severe as it was, was only temporary, but a very much more serious injury was done to the nation, by adding an enormous

amount to the national debt, which was contracted in this depreciated currency.

102. The harvest of 1811 was extremely deficient, and that was the period, too, when the power of Napoleon was at its height, and the continental sources of supply were cut off. Towards the middle of 1811, the price of corn began to rise very rapidly, and continued doing so till August, 1812, when it reached its greatest height during the war. The average of wheat for England and Wales was then 155s., and some Dantzic wheat brought 180s., and, in one or two instances, oats were sold at 84s. The advocates of the rival theories attributed this extraordinary rise to different causes; one party almost entirely to the depreciation of the paper currency, the other party almost entirely to the great scarcity. Mr. Tooke is the most distinguished advocate of the latter view, and, in support of it, brings most forcible arguments from the corresponding rise which took place in France during the same period, where the currency was almost purely metallic. Admitting to the full extent the powerful arguments adduced by Mr. Tooke, which derive additional force from his being a cotemporary of the circumstances he describes, we can yet hardly think he can be correct in so entirely excluding the effect of the depreciation of the paper currency as he does. We have abundance of evidence that before the Gold Coin and Bank Note Bill, there were very generally two prices in the country, a gold price and a paper price: after that Bill that was abolished, and there was nothing but a paper price, and gold totally disappeared from circulation; but can we doubt that if any price had been paid in gold, there would have been a very great difference between the two, fully as great as before that Act? If, then, it be granted that such would have been the case if payments had been made in gold, it seems to follow that, when prices were paid solely in paper, they must be considered to have been enhanced by just so much as the difference would have been if any payments had been made in gold. There does not appear to be the least reason to suppose that the scarcity was comparatively greater in 1812 than it was in 1800; in fact, the evidence seems to be entirely the other way, that the scarcity and distress was much greater in the former period, yet in 1812, the average rose to 155s.; in the former it

was only 133s. Whence this difference? We think the evidence points clearly to the depreciation of the paper in which payments were reckoned. Now, in May and June, 1812, the price of gold bullion was about £4 18s. per ounce, at which the real value of the note was 15s. 11d. Now, are we to suppose that the enhancement of prices, when paid in paper, which was quite notorious before Lord Stanhope's Bill, was actually annihilated by that Act?

103. The principles of the Bullion Report having been decisively rejected by Parliament, and pronounced to be fallacious, by the resolutions which declared 21 to be equal to 27, the Bank took no measures to bring their notes to a nearer conformity to their nominal value, and the market or paper price continued to rise till, in November, 1813, it stood at £5 10s., the greatest height it ever reached. The long continuance of high prices, partly caused by a continued series of deficient harvests, and partly by the depreciation of the paper in which they were paid, gave rise to the belief that they would continue permanent. Immense speculations began in land-jobbing, vast tracts of waste and fen land were reclaimed. It was at this time that the immense agricultural improvements in Lincolnshire were effected. Rents in most cases rose to treble what they were in 1792; all the new agricultural engagements entered into at this period were formed on the basis of these extravagant prices; landlords and tenants increased their expenditure in a like proportion, family settlements were made on a commensurate scale. As a natural consequence, country banks greatly multiplied. In 1811 they were 728, in 1813 they had risen to 940, and the amount of their issues were supposed, on the most moderate estimate, to be about £25,000,000. After the disasters of the French in the Russian Campaign of 1812, and the Battle of Leipsic, the ports of Russia and Northern Germany were thrown open to British commerce. This naturally gave rise to enormous speculative exports and overtrading.

104. The harvest of 1813 was prodigiously abundant, so that the price of corn, which in August, 1812, had been 155s., and had receded gradually from that point, till August, 1813, fell with great rapidity, and in July, 1814, was only 68s. The ex-

porting speculations were at their height in the spring of 1814, and the prices of all such commodities rose to a very unusual height, in many cases to double and triple of what they had been before. Every branch of industry was by the preceding causes affected, and the natural and inevitable consequences soon followed: a violent revulsion and general depression of prices of all sorts of property, which entailed such general and universal losses and failures among the agricultural, commercial, manufacturing, mining, shipping, and building interests, as had never before been paralleled. As is always the case, the consequences of the wild speculations and engagements persons had entered into during the continuance of the fever continued to be felt for some years after. The disasters commenced in the Autumn of 1814, continued with increasing severity during 1815, and reached their height in 1816-17. During these years 89 country bankers became bankrupts, and the reduction of the issues of country paper was such, that in 1816 its amount was little more than half what it had been in 1814.

105. This general discredit of country bank paper, resembling what had previously occurred in 1793 and 1797, caused a demand for additional issues from the Bank of England, to help to maintain public credit; and, though this caused an extension of the Bank paper by upwards of three millions, so great was the abstraction of country Bank paper from circulation (to certainly three times the amount of the Bank of England issues), that the value of the whole currency rapidly rose, so that, while in May, 1815, the market or paper price of gold was £5 6s., the exchange on Hamburg 28·2, and that on Paris 19· in October, 1816, the paper price of gold had rapidly fallen to £3 18s. 6d., the exchange with Hamburg was 38·, and that on Paris 26·10., and they remained with little variation at these prices till July, 1817.

106. Hence, at length, was manifested the most complete triumph of the principles of the Bullion Report. The great plethora of this worthless quantity of paper currency being removed, the value of the whole currency was raised almost to par, so near, in fact, that the smallest care and attention would have brought it quite to par; and if means could have been taken to prevent the growth of the rank luxuriance of country Bank

notes, cash payments would have been resumed at this period with the utmost possible facility, and, as a matter of course, without exciting the least comment.

107. We have seen that, on several previous occasions, the Bank had intimated to the Government their perfect readiness and ability to resume payments in cash, but had always been prevented from doing so for political reasons. In 1815, when peace was finally restored, they prepared in good faith to be ready to do so as soon as they should be required, and, during that year and 1816, they accumulated so much treasure that, in November, 1816, they gave notice of their intention to pay all their notes dated previously to the 1st January, 1812, and in April, 1817, all their notes dated before 1st January, 1816. When this was done, there was found to be scarcely any demand on them for gold. The nation had got so accustomed to a paper currency that they were most unwilling to receive gold for it. Mr. Stuckey, one of the largest bankers in the West of England, said, that during this partial resumption of cash payments it cost him nearly £100 to remit the surplus coin which accumulated upon him to London, as he could not get rid of it in the country, his customers all preferring his notes; many persons who had hoarded guineas requested as a favour to have notes in exchange.

108. In March, 1812, the restriction was prolonged to July, 1816. The bill was brought in and passed before the news of Napoleon's quitting Elba had reached England. The Act was scarcely passed when the new war broke out which ended at Waterloo, and the expenses of the campaign made the Ministers dread a monetary crisis, and the restriction was subsequently prolonged till July, 1818.

109. The partial resumption of cash payments was attended with perfect success; it caused no very great demand for gold, which continued to accumulate in the Bank till October, 1817, when it reached its maximum, being £11,914,000. In that month the Bank gave notice that it would pay off in cash all the notes dated before 1st January, 1817, or renew them at the option of the holders. In the course of 1817 a very large

amount of foreign loans were contracted for; Prussia, Austria, and other continental States of lesser importance, were endeavouring to replace their depreciated paper by a metallic currency, and, as money was abundant in England, a very large portion of these loans was taken up here. The effect of this began to manifest itself in April, 1817, when the exchanges with Hamburg and Paris began to give way, and the market price of gold to rise. These phenomena increased gradually throughout 1818, until January, 1819, the price of gold was £4 3s., the exchange on Hamburg 33·8 and that on Paris 23·50. In July, 1817, the new gold coinage began to be issued from the Mint in large quantities. The consequence was a steady demand for gold set in upon the Bank, and, in pursuance of its notices, the sum of £6,756,000 was drawn out of it in gold. Just at this time the British Government reduced the rate of interest upon Exchequer bills. The much higher rate of interest offered by continental Governments caused a great demand for gold for exportation, and in the beginning of 1818 a very decided drain set in. The Bank directors, however, determined to set all the principles of the Bullion Report ostentatiously at defiance. While this great drain was going on, they increased their advances to Government from £20,000,000 to £28,000,000, and though they knew perfectly well that the demand of gold was for exportation, they took no measures whatever to reduce their issues for the purpose of checking the export. At the same time the issues of country banks had increased by two-thirds since 1816.

110. This demand for gold became more intense during 1818 and 1819, and it became evident that the Bank would soon be exhausted if legislative interference did not take place. Accordingly, on the 3rd February, 1819, both houses appointed Committees to inquire into the state of the Bank; and, on the 5th April, they reported that it was expedient to pass an Act immediately to restrain the Bank from paying cash in terms of its notices of 1816-17. An Act for that purpose was passed in two days' time. It was stated in the Report of the Commons that in the first six months of 1818, 125 millions of francs had been coined at the French mint, three-fourths of which had been derived from the gold coin of this country. The Act forbade the

Bank to make any payments in gold whatever, either for fractional sums under £5, or any of their notes, during that Session of Parliament. The Act, therefore, totally closed the Bank for payments in cash.

111. As we have given the names of the Committees of 1804 and 1810, we subjoin those of the Committees of both Houses in 1819. Those in the Commons were Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Canning, Mr. Wellesley Pole, Mr. Lamb, Mr. F. Robinson, Mr. Grenfell, Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Abercromby, Mr. Banks, Sir James Mackintosh, Mr. Peel, Sir John Nicholl, Mr. Littleton, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Stuart Wortley, Mr. Manning, Mr. Frankland Lewis, Mr. Ashhurst, Sir John Newport. The Committee of the Lords were the Earl of Harrowby, Duke of Wellington, Marquis of Lansdowne, Duke of Montrose, Earl of Liverpool, Earl of St. Germans, Earl Bathurst, Viscount Sidmouth, Earl of Aberdeen, Earl Granville, Lord King, Lord Grenville, Lord Redesdale, Earl of Lauderdale.

112. The chief points of interest in these reports regarding our present subject are the opinions held by the witnesses respecting the great doctrines of the Bullion Report. The reports of neither House entered into the question of the theory of the currency, they were confined to recommending a certain course of action; but they examined a number of witnesses of the first eminence on the subject, and the result of their evidence is most extraordinary. It will be remembered that, both in 1804 and 1810, the immense preponderance of commercial testimony was entirely adverse to the doctrine that the issues of paper currency had any effect upon the exchanges, or the price of bullion, or should be regulated by them. Nevertheless, the reports of both Committees were entirely in the teeth of the mercantile evidence. The Bullion Report had now been before the country for nine years, and had caused more public discussion, both in Parliament and in the press, than almost any subject whatever; and it is perfectly manifest that if its principles were erroneous, the commercial world would only have been further strengthened in their opposition to them. But what was the result now? The overwhelming mass of commercial evidence was entirely in their favour. The current of mercantile opinion was now just as

strong on their side as it had formerly been against them. What could be more triumphant than this? What could be more splendid testimony to their accuracy and soundness than the fact that they had converted the immense hostile majority of the commercial world?

113. In order to give some idea of this remarkable change in opinion, we must make some extracts from the evidence of the witnesses.

Mr. Dorrein, Governor of the Bank, said to the *Lords' Committee*, p. 31—

“The advances of the Bank to Government upon Exchequer bills cannot be recalled at the pleasure of the Bank. But, when money is lent at short periods, the Bank has a control over an excess of circulation, so as to check any improper speculation, and the means of sending bullion out of the country; and thus the Bank would have an influence over the foreign exchanges.”

“Are you, then, of opinion that the exchanges are affected by the increase or diminution of the number of Bank notes in circulation?”

“A scarcity of circulating medium, of whatever it may consist, will oblige merchants to draw in their funds from foreign countries, and the superabundance of it will send the precious metals out of the country.”

“The consequences of a scarcity of money would be to force an export of merchandise and manufactures, which would render the exchanges favourable to this country.”

(*Before Commons' Committee*, p. 32.)

“A lessened circulation will have an effect to render the exchange favourable?”

“Because it would force an export of merchandise, and an export of merchandise would bring money into the country.”

“You have said that a contraction of the issues would lower all prices. Are the Committee not to understand that it must lower the prices of gold and silver, as well as of all other commodities?”

“I apprehend it would.”

“Assuming the course of foreign exchanges to be 5 per cent. against this country, would not the effect of a diminution in the

price of commodities, clearly, consequent on a diminution of issues, be to restore the exchanges to par?

"The effect would be to force an export, and thereby raise the exchange."

114. Mr. Pole, Deputy-Governor to the Bank, said to the *Lords' Committee*, p. 35—

"Whether the gold appearing to vanish, and going out of the country, does not proceed, in your judgment, from the unfavourable state of the exchanges?"

"Certainly."

"Is it your opinion that the exchanges are affected by the increase or diminution of the circulation of Bank of England notes?"

"Inasmuch as in that case the interest of money becomes so reduced in this country as to hold out a beneficial prospect to persons in sending their capital from this country, to be invested in foreign securities, where a larger interest is made, consequently, a debt is created from this country, payable to foreign countries."

(*To Commons' Committee*, p. 35.)

"Do you think a considerable reduction in the amount of your paper issues would affect the exchange?"

"I do."

"Is the answer you have given with respect to the effect upon the exchange of a reduction of the issues of the Bank founded on observation and experience of particular cases, or the result of reasoning only?"

"Entirely upon reasoning; and my reasons are, that I conceive it would compel persons to withdraw their capital from the continent to this country, on purpose to be able to support their own payments."

115. Mr. Haldimand, a director for ten years, but at that time out by rotation, said to the *Lords' Committee*, p. 40—

"Do you conceive that, by a considerable reduction on the part of the Bank of the amount of its issues, the Bank would be enabled to resume with safety its payments in cash?"

"Most decidedly."

"Are we to understand, then, that, in your judgment, the

effect of such a reduction of its issues would be to render the exchange favourable to this country ? ”

“ I certainly have always considered the amount of the issues of the Bank of England to act as a powerful lever upon all our foreign exchanges, so as to regulate their rise and fall.”

“ I conceive the exchange to be affected by the aggregate amount of the issues of the country bank, and Bank of England paper.”

“ You have stated, on a former day, that you always considered the amount of issues of Bank notes to act as a powerful lever upon all foreign exchanges, so as to regulate their rise and fall; do you apply this to the price of gold ? ”

“ I do.”

“ Do you ground this opinion upon reasoning, or upon what you have observed to take place ? ”

“ I have grounded my opinion formerly upon reasoning, and my observation has since justified that opinion.”

The witness produced a report of the Governor of the Bank of France, detailing a commercial crisis, and offering very strong and clear proof that an excess of paper circulation did affect both the exchanges and the price of bullion.

“ It appearing from the accounts before us that the exchanges were very nearly par in the month of September last, and afterwards became more unfavourable than they had been since 1815, to what do you ascribe the great depression which has taken place since that time ? ”

“ It would be difficult to point out the particular circumstances independent of the great principle of the depreciation of our paper currency, which affect our exchanges from time to time. I believe that the investments in foreign stocks did for a moment produce part of that fall, but I should attribute a very small part of it to that cause, and fall back upon my principle of an excess of currency. I most certainly believe that, had the Bank at that moment been paying its notes in specie, the depression alluded to would not have taken place. I ground my opinion on what I observe to be passing between other countries with regard to their exchange operations. France has at this minute nearly twenty millions sterling to pay to foreign powers; and although three payments have been already made, and the whole are to be completed within 27 months, no sensible effect has

been produced upon its exchanges with other countries equally paying their notes in specie, such as Holland and Hamburg; nor does it appear that any inconvenient diminution has yet taken, or is contemplated to take, place in the metallic currency of that country. My opinion is, that a very small portion of this large payment will be made in specie or bullion. When a certain amount of the circulating medium has left France, the remainder will rise in value, and goods fall in price, when, consequently, it will become more advantageous to France to remit the remainder in its produce and manufactures from time to time."

(Before Commons' Committee.)

"I look upon this forced reduction of the issues of the Bank of England as necessary in order to restore the rest of the paper in circulation to its ancient value in gold, and the exchanges to par. I have no hesitation in stating it to be my decided opinion, that the exchanges would be restored to par immediately the Bank resumed its payments. I think the depressed state of the exchanges arises entirely from the excessive issue of Bank of England notes. I have never heard of any country not paying its paper in specie on demand where such paper has not been depreciated."

"You are understood to say, it is your opinion that the foreign exchanges and the price of gold are principally affected by the amount of issues of paper currency?"

"That is my opinion."

"What reason have you for believing that the circulation for the last half-year bore a greater proportion to the supply required for the purposes of trade than the circulation of the last half-year of 1817?"

"Because the paper was more depreciated at one time than at the other; or, in other words, because the market price of gold was higher at the former than at the latter period."

"Do you consider the price of gold to be the chief criterion by which to judge of the excessive issue of Bank notes?"

"I do."

"I happened to be in Paris in October last, when the Bank of France reduced its issues upon discounts very considerably and suddenly. The issues of the Bank of France upon discounts at that period were 130 millions of francs, which was more than

double the highest amount that was ever previously known— This step on the part of the directors of the Bank of France was occasioned by the following circumstances. The metallic currency was leaving the country in all directions, owing, in all probability, to some trifling degree to the over-issue of paper, partly to some large financial operations in Russia, and partly to the enormous payments that France had engaged to make to foreign powers, which amounted to nearly 20 millions sterling. The Paris bankers, therefore, anticipating a great demand for bills upon all foreign countries, were remitting specie to meet the drafts which they intended to negotiate to the agents of all those foreign powers, with a small advantage upon their remittance. The sudden diminution, however, of the discounts of the Bank, caused the exchange to turn in favour of France, and immediately paralyzed all these operations; the metallic currency made a retrograde movement, and was restored to Paris and to those parts where the greatest distress had been felt."

"You have stated that you attribute the present high price of gold above the Mint price, and the unfavourable state of the exchange, to the excessive issues of the Bank of England, influencing thereby the general paper circulation of the country; have you any other reason for deeming the issues of the Bank of England to be excessive, except that indication which you collect from the price of gold and the state of the exchange?"

"I never saw these effects produced by any other cause in any country in the world."

"Is the Committee to understand your opinion to be, that a high price of gold and an unfavourable state of the exchange ought, in the discretion of the Bank of England, to lead to a reduction of their issues until that high price of gold or unfavourable state of exchange is reduced, if not to par, to that price above par which amounts to the expense of transfer of the precious metals from one country to the other."

"I am decidedly of that opinion."

"Is the Committee to understand you to be of opinion that that is the true criterion for the Bank to look to, whether the Bank be open or shut?"

"It is, in my conception, the only criterion."

"I consider the same doctrine to hold good in the case of war as well as of peace."

"You are of opinion that the partial openings of the Bank failed in effect, because the Bank did not simultaneously contract their paper issues, and not because a partial opening would in no case have any effect whatever?"

"In my view of the subject, a partial opening will always fail unless the whole currency of the country be previously reduced in amount, so as to restore it to the standard of the metallic currency thus partially issued."

"Of that restoration, you are understood to admit no other test than the favourableness of exchange and the reduction of the price of gold to the Mint price?"

"I know of no other test."

"If we reduce the amount of our paper circulation sufficiently the precious metals would flow into the country from every direction—no Act of Parliament could stop the current."

"I should consider it a breach of contract for the Government of this country to alter the Mint price of gold."

This witness entered into numerous details in support of his opinions, which would be too long to insert here.

116. Mr. William Ward, a Bank director, a cambist, and Mediterranean merchant. *Lords' Committee*, p. 60—

"You have stated that a reduction of four millions in the amount of Bank notes in circulation would probably produce a favourable turn in the exchanges; do you found such an opinion upon reasoning, or upon having observed, as a cambist, that the diminution or increase in the numerical amount of Bank notes has usually produced corresponding effects upon the exchanges, and the price of gold in this country, since the Bank restriction?"

"I ground my opinion upon reasoning; I do not rely upon the numerical amount of Bank notes exclusively."

"Can we confidently depend upon the effect of a reduction of Bank notes towards producing a favourable exchange?"

"I would rely upon it in an exchange transaction where my own interest was at stake."

(*To the Commons Committee*, p. 73.)

"To what extent do you conceive the rate of exchange and the price of gold are affected by the issue of Bank notes?"

"I conceive they are affected to a very considerable extent, directly or indirectly."

"Supposing the other causes which affect the exchange to operate equally at two different periods, do you think the price of gold, and the rate of exchange, would be the criterion by which you might judge the adequate or excessive issue of Bank notes?"

"Yes, I do."

"Under a system of cash payments, do you believe that the market price of gold will ever be permanently above the Mint price, or the rate of our foreign exchanges more below par than would amount to the expense of the transmission of gold from this country to the Continent?"

"No; the market price would not exceed the Mint price permanently."

"Then, would the Bank ever have occasion to pay more than the Mint price for the gold they purchase?"

"I conceive they would not have to pay more."

117. Mr. Samuel Thornton, Bank director for thirty-nine years. *Commons' Committee*, p. 85—

"In regulating the amount of their issues, by what principle is the conduct of the Bank of England guided?"

"I have always considered it my duty to consider the amount of the notes out, and what could be the cause for a call for an increase. I also felt it my duty to look at the state of the foreign exchanges, and the price of bullion."

"Have the goodness to state your reason for thinking it desirable to take into the account the rate of exchange, and the price of bullion, in regulating the amount of the issues?"

"It must be obvious that if there were an excess of Bank notes beyond what was required by the trade of the country, the price of bullion would thereby be raised; and I am ready to admit that it would have the same effect upon the exchanges."

118. Mr. John Irving, of the firm of Reid, Irving, and Co. *Commons' Committee*, p. 94—

"Putting out of consideration the embarrassment of trade, which might be occasioned by a limitation of the issues of the

Bank, do you think it is in the power of the Bank, by such imitation, to restore a favourable rate of exchange, and to reduce the price of gold?"

"I am of that opinion."

"Could such fluctuations take place if we possessed a metallic currency, as the measure of our exchange with foreign countries?"

"Certainly not."

119. Mr. Holland, a partner of Baring, Brothers, and Co., *Commons' Committee*, p. 114—

"In what degree do you consider that the foreign exchanges are affected by the increase or diminution of Bank of England paper?"

"I certainly consider that the foreign exchanges are affected by the increase of Bank of England paper."

"Do you think a considerable reduction of the amount of Bank of England paper would have the effect of restoring the exchange in favour of this country, and of preventing any very considerable depression?"

"That is my opinion."

"As you consider there would be no great fluctuation in the price of gold, supposing the circulation of this country to consist of coin, or paper convertible into coin, to what do you attribute the present fluctuations?"

"The quantity of paper in the market is greater than the market can bear. If it is thought desirable to reduce the price of gold to £3 17s. 10½d., I conceive that that can only be done by a reduction of the paper."

"You have stated that action and re-action will bring exchanges round, and bring gold to its level; if that is the case, in what way can you account for the circumstance that the coin has, from the beginning of his present Majesty's reign, constantly found its way out of the country, and not found any re-action to bring it back again?"

"If the market price of gold is higher than the Mint price, it is impossible to keep it in the country."

"Would you not think one of the circumstances that would render the exchanges unfavourable to this country, and raise the price of gold above the Mint price, to be an unfavourable state

of things in this country, or, in other words, a balance of payments against the country?"

"No, I do not; because I should call gold the general leveller between all commercial nations, and that it invariably brings back the exchanges to their proper level, taking gold against gold, as the standard of value."

"If the Bank of England paid in specie upon demand, do you believe there ever could exist, for any length of time, a material difference between the Mint and the market price of gold?"

"Decidedly not, in my opinion."

120. Mr. Thomas Tooke. *Lords' Committee*, p. 168—

"By what means do you think that the exchanges could be restored, and the price of gold reduced?"

"By keeping down the Bank issues of their notes to their present amount, and judging, by the course of exchange and of the bullion market, how far any further reduction might be necessary to accomplish that object."

"What do you mean by our circulation being at a level with that of other countries?"

"When the price of bullion and the exchanges combined are at, or within a trifle of, par."

"Do you consider a favourable course of exchange as an indication that there is not an excess of paper issues?"

"If that state of exchange is of any considerable duration, it affords a presumption that the issue has not been excessive during that period, but the only undeniable test is the price of gold being that into which the paper is convertible."

"It appearing by accounts before the Committee, that from the 13th April, 1804, to the 17th November, 1805, being eighteen months, that the market price of gold was uniformly £4, and that during the same period of eighteen months the course of exchange was uniformly in our favour, are you of opinion that during that time there was an excess of paper issued?"

"Upon the whole I should answer in the affirmative, as I have before said that I consider the price of gold to be the only unerring test, and that the exchanges, even for moderately long intervals, afford only a presumption."

"State the ground upon which you consider the price of

bullion as a surer test of the question of the excessive issue of paper, than the course of exchanges?"

"Because, if the coin be perfect, and the paper strictly convertible into that coin, there cannot be any inducement to any individual (the Bank issuing the paper excepted) to give more than £3 17s. 10½d. per oz. for gold of the same standard, while the exchange may be influenced by several circumstances, within the limits in time in which, and of expense at which, the coin could be brought from one country to the other. The exchange may, therefore, fluctuate, while the price of gold remains stationary."

"Do you mean by an excess of paper issued, not an excess above what the demand of internal commerce may require, but an excess above that amount to which you think the paper should be reduced, in order to bring the market price of gold down to the Mint price?"

"I do not know any criterion of the internal demand for a medium of circulation, but that amount which would have circulated if the currency had consisted of coin only, or coin and paper convertible into coin."

121. Mr. Ricardo. *Lords' Committee*, p. 187—

"The Bank has always the power to regulate the price of bullion by limiting or increasing the quantity of their notes."

(*Commons' Committee*, p. 133.)

"Do you conceive that the paper currency of this country is now excessive, and depreciated in comparison with gold, and that the high price of bullion, and low rate of exchange, are the consequences as well as the sign of that depreciation?"

"Yes, I do."

"Then, do you consider the high price of gold to be a certain sign of the depreciation of Bank notes?"

"I consider it to be a certain sign of the depreciation of Bank notes, because I consider the standard of the currency to be bullion, and, whether that bullion be more or less valuable, the paper ought to conform to that value, and would under the system we pursued previously to 1797."

"It appears by the accounts already referred to, that the price of gold in this country in April, 1815, was £5 7s., and in April, 1816, £4 1s., being a difference of from 25 to 30 per cent., such

price being always measured in our paper currency ; do you know whether, during the same period, any such variation, or any variation, in the price of gold, took place in France, or in any other continental country ? ”

“ It appears to me that in France there can be no variation in the price of the metal, which is the standard of the currency, and, with respect to the variations in the other metal, which is not the standard of the currency, it must at all times be confined to the variations which take place in the relative value of the two metals generally in Europe.”

“ If then it should appear that during the period referred to no variation whatever has taken place in the price of gold in Paris, would you infer from that circumstance that the variation in the price of gold between April, 1815, and April, 1816, arose from the variation in the value of paper, and not of gold ? ”

“ Every fall in the price of the standard metal is immediately corrected in France, by a reduction of the amount of the circulation ; if no similar reduction takes place under the same circumstances in our circulation there must necessarily be a redundancy, and an excess of the market above the Mint price of gold ; IN A SOUND STATE OF THE CURRENCY THE VALUE OF GOLD MAY VARY BUT ITS PRICE CANNOT.”

“ The variation you alluded to in your answer to a former question is what you meant by the depreciation of the paper in your answer to a question before put to you ? ”

“ From whatever cause may arise the difference in the value between paper and gold (and I have enumerated several), I always call the paper depreciated when the market price exceeds the Mint price of gold.”

“ Do you consider the difference between the market and Mint price of gold to be the criterion of the depreciation of Bank notes ? ”

“ Strictly so.”

“ Do you not consider that coin or bullion are distinguishable from Bank notes in this important respect, that the coin or bullion, being the medium of universal exchange, operates in the nature of a bill of exchange, whereas the Bank note does not possess this quality ; must not, therefore, the value of the coin or bullion follow the rate of the exchange, whilst the Bank note cannot be influenced by such an operation ? ”

"Certainly; a Bank note not payable in specie is confined to our circulation, and cannot make a foreign payment; a Bank note payable in specie is the same thing as coin or bullion."

"May not this distinguishing quality between the Bank note and the bullion explain the difference of value, without its following that the Bank note is depreciated for any purpose of measuring the value of commodities within this country?"

"No, I think it cannot; the term depreciation, I conceive, does not mean a mere diminution in value, *but it means a diminished relative value on a comparison with something which is a standard.* And, therefore, I think it quite possible that a Bank note may be depreciated, although it should rise in value, if it did not rise in value in a degree equal to the standard, by which only its depreciation is measured."

"You have stated an opinion, that the contraction of issues of paper would at all times restore the price of gold to the Mint price, and render the exchange favourable to the country; supposing the balance of payments of the country to be against us, in what manner would you have them paid?"

"It appears to me that a reduction in the amount of currency may always restore the price of bullion to the Mint price; but I have not said that that will always restore the exchange to par."

122. Mr. Alexander Baring, afterwards Lord Ashburton.
Lords' Committee, p. 10—

"Is it your opinion that the exchanges and the price of gold are affected by the increase or diminution of the circulation of the notes of the Bank of England?"

"I can have no doubt of it whatever; I have always considered the price of bullion and the rates of exchange, which, for this purpose, are the same things, dependent on the paper circulation, and liable to be regulated by its contraction or expansion. I do not mean to say that the foreign exchanges, or the price of bullion, would vary always in proportion to any alteration in the amount of the paper of the Bank of England, or even of the paper of the country at large, because there are various circumstances which, at different times, vary the amount of the circulating medium required for the use of every country; and sometimes, for instance, twenty-five millions of Bank paper

may be too much, when, at another period, thirty millions may be too little. It is the great defect of a paper currency that it cannot adapt itself to this change of circumstances."

"Are you of opinion that the loans which have been contracted for in foreign States, particularly in France, since the peace, have had an unfavourable effect upon the exchanges of this country?"

"The circulation of the country being in its present state payments abroad, from whatever cause arising, must have an effect upon the exchange."

"What do you mean by the present state of the circulation of the country?"

"I mean that if the circulation were in its former state of payment in specie, that no payments abroad would bring the exchanges materially below their par; but with a paper which has no regulator of its value, it is undoubtedly liable to depreciation by foreign payments, as has been amply proved in the course of the last war."

"Were you at Paris at the time of the great crisis of the Bank of Paris?"

"I was; and I believe the information contained in the Governor's report to the proprietors in January last, as to the effect of the reduction of their issues upon foreign exchanges, and upon the amount of bullion in their vaults, to be correctly stated. The effect of the reduction in their discounts upon the exchanges and upon their bullion, seems to me singularly applicable to the present question. Their bullion was reduced, by imprudent issues from 117 millions of francs to 34 millions of francs, and has returned, by more prudent and cautious measures, to 100 million of francs, at which it stood ten days ago."

"Are we to understand, then, that, in your judgment, considerable importations of grain in years of unfavourable harvest would have an unfavourable effect upon the exchange?"

"I think it would in any country having a circulation of paper, not payable on demand, and where there are no means of contracting its amount, so as to perform for the circulation the same office which a sound circulation of specie would do for itself."

"Would it have the same, or any, effect in a country where the circulation was partly of specie and partly of paper, convertible into specie, as before the Bank restriction?"

"I think that no demand, however pressing, and of whatever nature, would make such a fall in the exchanges as would exceed the expense of the transport of coin, combined with the risk of the violation of the law, so long as a law exists against exporting the coin. This opinion, founded, as it is, upon the principle of circulation, is amply confirmed by the uniform experience of this country before the restriction of cash payments, and of every other country with which I have been acquainted. This principle has been put, perhaps, more severely to the test within the last two years in France than in any other instance. France having had a large payment to make abroad, beyond the apparent means of her commerce, and without any equivalent return, and these payments having produced no derangement whatever of the circulation of that country."

123. Mr. John Ward, general merchant, with much experience in money operations. *Commons' Committee, p. 239—*

"Is it your opinion that the rate of foreign exchanges, and the market price of gold, are affected by an increase or diminution in the amount of Bank paper?"

"Certainly."

"Do you think it would be in the power of the Bank, by a reduction in the amount of their paper issues, to restore a favourable rate of exchange, and to reduce the market price of gold to the Mint price?"

"That is my opinion."

"Are you of opinion that, under the restriction of cash payments, the excess of the market price above the Mint price of gold is an indication of the paper currency being depreciated, during the restriction of cash payments?"

"Certainly."

"Is the amount of that excess of the market above the Mint price of gold the measure of that depreciation in your opinion?"

"It is."

"You have stated that you consider the paper of the Bank of England to have been depreciated by excessive issue; during how long a period do you consider that depreciation to have existed?"

"I cannot distinctly state for how long a period unless I could compare it with the value of gold."

"About how long?"

"So long as the price of gold bullion has been above the Mint price."

124. The above extracts, which are only a portion of the evidence given by the great majority of the witnesses, are sufficient to shew the extraordinary change which had taken place in the opinion of the commercial world since the Report of the Bullion Committee, with respect to the great question of the connection between the paper currency, the price of bullion, and the foreign exchanges. The old opinions had scarcely a voice in their favour; even Mr. Harman, who had on all previous occasions been the stoutest antagonist of the principles of the Bullion Report, was considerably shaken in his opinion. Notwithstanding, however, that the governor and deputy-governor, and several other directors of the Bank, had given in their adherence to these doctrines, the majority of the court still persisted in the old opinions; and, on the occasion of some questions having been sent for their consideration by the Committee of the House of Commons, took the opportunity of recording publicly their disapproval of the doctrines which were now in the ascendant. On the 25th March they resolved—

"That this court cannot refrain from adverting to an opinion, strongly insisted upon by some, that the Bank had only to reduce its issues to obtain a favourable turn in the exchanges, and a consequent influx of the precious metals; the court conceives it to be its duty to declare that it is unable to discover any solid foundation for such a sentiment."

125. The Report of the Lords' Committee contented itself with recording the opinions of the different witnesses upon the great question so long agitated, it pronounced no judgment of its own upon the soundness of the different views. It, however, was very decided in the recommendation to return to the ancient metallic standard as speedily as could be done, with a due regard to the interests of commerce. The Committee of the Commons expressed their opinion that, when the exchanges became unfavourable, and the market price of gold rose above the Mint price, the only mode in which the Bank could have

retained the coin in circulation was by contracting their issues. And they said that, however the exchanges might have been affected during the last and preceding year, they had no reason to apprehend the same or any other causes could continue to affect them in such a degree as to preclude the Bank of England, by a constant reference to the exchanges and the price of gold, and, when necessary, by a cautious reduction of their paper currency, from gradually approximating its value to that of gold, and ultimately re-establishing and maintaining it at par. Both Houses agreed in recommending that after the 1st February, 1820, the Bank should be required to deliver gold of standard fineness in quantities of not less than 60 ounces, at £4 1s. per ounce; that after the 1st October, 1820, the rate should be reduced to £3 19s. 6d.; and after the 1st May, 1821, it should be reduced to the Mint price of £3 17s. 10½d. per ounce, that this liability to pay in bullion should continue for not less than two, nor more than three years, from 1st May, 1821, when payments in cash should be resumed. They also expressed their opinion that the great destruction of country bank paper of 1816-17, had been partly instrumental in reducing the price of gold, and making the exchanges favourable during that period. That, from the numerous circumstances affecting the value of Bank of England paper—the varying state of commercial credit and confidence—the fluctuations in the amount of country bank paper, and other reasons, no satisfactory conclusion could be drawn from the mere numerical amount of their issues at any given time.

126. The Report was brought before the Lords on the 21st May, 1819, when a petition, signed by about 500 merchants, bankers, and others, was presented against it, on the ground that the extensive contraction of the Bank's issues in so short a time, as would be rendered necessary by it, would cause general embarrassment. The directors of the Bank communicated a very strong representation, containing similar views, to Lord Liverpool, which was also laid before the House. Lord Harrowby, however, that evening, brought in the ministerial resolutions, which were framed in accordance with the Report, and the last of which was—"That it was expedient to repeal all laws prohibiting the melting or exportation of the gold or silver

coin of the realm." Lord Lauderdale moved a series of resolutions in opposition, the principal of which was that the Mint price of gold should be altered to correspond with the market price.

127. The resolutions were moved in the Lords by Lord Liverpool, in a speech of singular clearness and ability. Every word that he uttered told with crushing effect upon the course of the Government in 1810. He was an entire convert to the principles of the Bullion Report, in their fullest extent. He said that the three chief points in question were, whether—1. It was expedient to return to some fixed standard of value. 2. Whether that standard should be the ancient one. 3. By what means it could be done. That the first point was the most important, because it would be found that all the opposition to the measure was simply a disguised hostility to return to cash payments at all. Many considered that there should be no standard of value; but what civilised country had ever acted upon this principle since the world began? In former times the most disgraceful measures had been resorted to, to depreciate the standard, but even that was not so bad as having *no* standard. No country in the world had ever established a currency without a fixed standard of value; it might be gold, silver, copper, or even iron, but it must be something which had a real value; it could not be paper, which had no real value, but is only a promise of value, and England, the first country for commerce and knowledge of political economy, should not be the first to confer on any body of men, however pure their motives and conduct, the power of making money according to the suggestions of their own interests. Policy, good faith, and common honesty called on them to return to the ancient standard. No doubt some of the public debts were contracted in a depreciated currency, but yet the contract was to pay according to the ancient standard, and they must adhere to that if they meant to act honestly. He ridiculed the idea of the danger or difficulty of doing so. In 1816 gold fell to the Mint price, and, when it was quoted at £3 18s. 6d. in the public lists, it might, in fact, have been bought cheaper, only the Bank determined to be the only purchaser, and gave that price. Since then it had risen to $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. above the Mint price, but at the time he was speaking it was only 3 per cent. above the standard price. A noble

Earl had doubted whether it was in the Bank's power to bring gold to the Mint price by contracting its issues. The question was, no doubt, somewhat obscure, but the Report would shew that there was not a single practical man, even among those most hostile to the intended measure, who did not admit that a contraction of the Bank's issues must necessarily have the effect of rendering the exchange favourable to this country, and of lowering the price of bullion. He himself entertained no doubt upon the point. The plan proposed by the resolutions, gave ample time for the Bank to make all necessary preparations without injury to the commercial interests by too sudden a contraction. The subject of the quantity of the circulating medium necessary for commercial transactions was one of the greatest importance; it was one, however, in which it was impossible to fix any nice proportion, and, in his opinion, THE ONLY CRITERION OF A CIRCULATION BEING SUFFICIENT OR EXCESSIVE WAS TO BE FOUND SOLELY IN ITS VALUE WHEN COMPARED WITH THE PRECIOUS METALS. The real value of paper could only be ascertained by its convertibility into specie. If that test was adopted it made little difference what the circulating medium was composed of. In Lancashire it chiefly consisted of bills of exchange, which was found to succeed perfectly in that county. If any country or district was possessed of real and substantial wealth, it would soon find a circulating medium for itself. The measures proposed, in his opinion, would lead to no inconvenience; if any could have arisen, they had been incurred already, and if Parliament would steadily adhere to the course recommended, they would see the ancient standard restored without material distress to any one.

128. Lord Lauderdale made some severe remarks upon the strong speech made by Lord Liverpool in favour of the very doctrines he had been twelve years in controverting. Lord King heartily approved of the resolutions, and especially that the time was fixed by Parliament, when the Bank should resume cash payments, as the public would now have a security beyond the discretion of the Bank directors. The numerical amount of Bank notes could be no guidance for the amount of issues. The only rule which could be given for their regulation was to keep gold at the Mint price. This was the only check on the vicious

practice which 22 years' usage had accustomed some to consider as the natural state of the currency of the country.

129. Lord Grenville spoke with great earnestness in favour of the resolutions, and his sentiments deserve most particular attention, because he was one of the Cabinet who originally proposed the Restriction Act. He now, however, came forward to repeat, in the most emphatic terms, what he had already avowed, that he considered the restriction as one of the greatest calamities under which this suffering country laboured. He had frequently had occasion to lament and deplore the part which he had himself taken on its original proposition, in prolonging it for the term of the then existing war. Having avowed his error in so doing, as became an honest man, at the commencement of the last war, and having foreseen, but too truly, all the misery that followed, he felt great joy that the country could now look forward with certainty to the repeal of that injudicious and unfortunate measure. There was no difference in principle between the excessive issues of the Bank of England and those of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. He was most anxious to place on record his opinion, that the evils of the restriction had far counterbalanced its good, and that future statesmen might know that the opinion that this measure had saved the country was not unanimous. He hoped it would be recorded of him, as his decided conviction, that in proportion to the danger under which the country laboured, was the impolicy and desperate madness of such a measure as they were now considering how to rescind. Whatever temporary advantages might be furnished to individuals from too liberal issues, those very individuals generally suffered tenfold injury. While the Bank was lending money with one hand, with the other it was shaking the foundation of contracts, affecting all prices, involving the country in distress, and individuals in ruin ten times greater than any benefits they could derive from liberal issues. Increased bankruptcies invariably followed increased issues. The miseries of 1816 were the sure consequences of the extravagant issues of the preceding year; the country bank paper, which was not propped up by law like Bank paper, was fearfully depreciated and had involved the whole kingdom in general desolation. Trade, commerce, agriculture, the classes even most remote from any

connection with the paper system, found themselves suddenly consigned to total and inexplicable ruin. The sight of the misery thus caused would fill them with horror. In commerce, as in war, there could be but one sure basis of management, and that was a currency regulated by a standard of metallic value. Not that metal was necessary as *metal*, but as possessing *value*. It was impossible to represent value except by value. For this reason, all civilised countries had adopted a metallic standard. The original names of the divisions of money in all known languages referred to the weight of the metal. It was so among the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, the French, the English. The pound in England, and the livre in France, were originally a pound weight of metal. The weight of the metal had been diminished in each country in the coins at different periods, but each case of such reduction was a fraud upon the people, and it had always been done in times of discontent and turbulence. It was attempted to be done in the days of Edward VI., but the advisers of the measure were compelled to retrace their steps through fear of an insurrection. It was time, therefore, to return to a fixed measure, and to put an end to a system of variable value, when every one's property was at the mercy of a body of individuals. We must have a currency established on public faith—on public laws. The depreciation of the paper currency had been nearly one third, and every one who held it had lost to that amount. There was no disposition now in any class to deny this. The Directors of the Bank of England alone refused to admit the principles of the Bullion Report—so wisely and irrefragably established by that great man, the late Mr. Horner—a report, which could not be read without instruction and admiration, for the depth and soundness of its doctrines, and bitter regret for the premature loss of a statesman who was so well calculated to serve and adorn his country. If the Directors would only now believe in the Bullion Report, there might be some hope of them, but as they did not, they were the last persons who should be left to manage the currency at their own discretion. He did not believe in any calculations as to the quantity of circulating medium necessary. It was now time that the connection between the Government and the Bank of England should be dissolved. It was in direct violation of the principles upon which the Bank

was founded. They must revert to the legitimate standard of this country, in respect to its currency. It was not the value of that currency, but the value of the metal by which it was regulated, as paper was regulated by the price of bullion. In the Bullion Report, which, hereafter, he did not doubt, WOULD FORM A STANDARD, CONSTANT AND UNERRING, in the political economy of this country, of whose extraordinary merit he was not aware until lately, this subject was clearly defined. He gave his entire, unlimited, and unqualified approbation to the ministerial resolutions.

130. Such are short outlines of the speeches of Lord Liverpool and Lord Grenville upon this momentous question, which well deserve to be studied at length in the present time, when many of the heresies and fallacies they combated so strongly and convincingly, seem springing up again in the public mind. The resolutions were then put and agreed to without a division.

131. The resolutions in the Commons were introduced by Mr. Peel, on the 24th May, who freely owned that, in consequence of the evidence he had heard, and the discussions upon it, his opinions had undergone a material change. He acknowledged, without shame or remorse, that his opinions were very different now to what they were when he voted against Mr. Horner's resolution in 1811. Having determined to dismiss from his mind all former impressions, and the memory of the vote he had formerly given, and to give the question his unprejudiced and undivided attention, he had now come to the conclusion that Mr. Horner's resolutions represented the true nature and laws of our monetary system. Every sound writer agreed that the true standard of value consisted of a definite quantity of gold bullion, a certain weight of which, with an impression on it denoting it to be of that certain weight and fineness, constituted the only true, intelligible, and adequate standard of value. No doubt the Bank was perfectly solvent, but did it follow from that there could be no over-issue of its paper? If solvency alone was a sufficient proof that there was no excess of circulation, the theory of Mr. Law was just, and the land, as well as the funds, might be safely converted into a circulating medium. There was, in fact, no test of excess or deficiency, but a comparison with the price of gold,

As the Bank had so entirely repudiated the principles of the Bullion Report, they could not be expected to act upon them; it might, therefore, appear necessary to prescribe such a limitation of their issues as would secure the power of the Bank over the foreign exchanges. He himself thought this a very unwise plan because it depended so much on circumstances, whether or not there was an excess of circulation. *There were occasions when what was called a run on the Bank might be arrested in its injurious consequences by an increase of its issues.* There were other occasions when such a state of things demanded a curtailment. In the year 1797, when a run was made on the Bank, but when the exchanges were favourable, and the price of gold had not risen, it was proved that an extension of issues might, by restoring confidence, have rendered the original restriction unnecessary. On the other hand, if the run was the effect of unfavourable exchanges and the consequent rise in the price of gold, the alarm must be met by a reduction of the issues. *It was, therefore, impossible to prescribe any specific limitation of issues to be brought into operation at any period, however remote.* The quantity of circulation which was demanded in a time of confidence, varied so materially from the amount which a period of despondency required, *that it was an absolute impossibility to fix any circumscribed amount.* He said that the time was come when the connection that existed between the Government and the Bank must be dissolved, and it must revert to its original principle of business. The obstinate opinions of the Directors of the Bank, shewed that they were unfit to be trusted with the management of the pecuniary interests of the British community. The House must resume its powers which it had abdicated too long. There could be no inconvenience in compelling the Bank to pay in specie at the Mint price. They had done so from 1776 to 1797, and the price of gold never rose above £3 17s. 6d. But it was said that it had since risen to £5 2s., and that the standard was variable. The fact was, we had since then introduced a substitute for gold, and its price was considered in relation to that substitute. Let not the House be led away by any calculation to mistake the PRICE for the VALUE. When people talked of gold rising in *price*, were they prepared to shew that it had risen in *intrinsic value*? Let them not talk of its price in paper, but in any other commodity

of a real and fixed value. So far from gold having risen in value, since the last fifty years, it had actually fallen in value, partly from the greater abundance of the metal itself, and partly from the substitutes that were used for it. A very prevalent theory was, that instead of regulating paper by the value of gold—gold should be regulated by the value of paper. This was nothing less than a fraud upon the public creditor. It was vain to think that foreign nations could be imposed upon by such a deception. The only result would be, that after the public creditor had been cheated, the coin would be debased. The only course was, to revert to the ancient standard of the realm, and to beware of arguments, which were not only fraudulent, but would not accomplish their own objects, while they would aggravate present difficulties. Every deviation from the ancient practice would be quoted as a precedent for a more extended departure from that practice. Under future difficulties the conduct of their ancestors would be panegyrised by the advocates of the suspension of cash payments, and conclude because the price of gold had risen still further in its relation to paper, that the principle by analogy ought to be extended. The restoration of the value of our currency had always been a striking political feature in the history of the country, and an object of the most earnest solicitude of our most distinguished statesmen. Three periods were especially memorable for great reforms in the coinage—in the reigns of Edward I., Queen Elizabeth, and William III. These periods must ever be regarded with pride and satisfaction. They were of much greater difficulty than the present. On Queen Elizabeth's accession, the coin was reduced to $\frac{1}{4}$ of its nominal value. Under Burleigh's advice she resolved to restore the value. Plenty of persons dissuaded her from that idea, alleging the difficulties of the attempt. But Burleigh maintained that those very difficulties should constitute the motives for perseverance, as they must raise and establish the character of the country, and inspire its enemies with respect. The Queen had nobly persevered, and in her monumental inscription, above all her titles to distinction, this one shone preeminent "*MONETA IN JUSTUM VALOREM REDUCTA.*" He then detailed the restoration of the coinage by William III. The arguments against it in those times were identical with those used against it at the present

time. However, fortunately, the firmness of King William and Mr. Montague triumphed over prejudices in theory, misconceptions in reasoning, and the greatest financial and political difficulties. The idea that this country owed its glory and military honours to an inconvertible paper currency was ridiculous; we had abundance of prosperity and military glory before 1797, before we were blessed with an inconvertible paper currency. The true reason of her difference from other States was that she always kept her faith inviolate. It was this that cheered the country under all dangers, and caused her to exult in victory. It was this feeling that carried the country through the dismal voyage she had just accomplished, and now that they had reached the other shore in safety, let them not abandon the great principle which had supported them. Every consideration of policy, good faith, and justice, called upon them to restore the ancient and permanent standard of value. He allowed that he had once entertained views different from those he now held, but he had given his mind candidly to a re-investigation of the whole subject, and he felt himself bound to state honestly, that he was now a convert to the doctrines regarding our currency he had once opposed.

132. The debate that followed was chiefly composed of a strain of congratulation and rejoicing at the course adopted by the Government, and approval of the resolution. Mr. Tierney was averse to compliment Mr. Peel too much, as he was thereby only complimenting the opinions he himself and his friends had been advocating for many years. But, nevertheless, it was a source of sincere pleasure to him to see the maxims he had so long been contending for adopted as true policy by the House, especially as such ample justice had been done to them by Mr. Peel, who now avowed them for the first time. Mr. Ricardo said that, when the directors of the Bank were called individually before the Committee, they fully admitted that the price of gold and the foreign exchanges were affected by the amount of their issues, but, when collected as a court they resolved in direct opposition to such opinions. When they avowed such inconsistent opinions, and after the experience the House had had of their conduct, it would be the highest indiscretion in Parliament not to take the preparations for the resumption of cash payments

out of their hands. Mr. Alderman Heygate was almost left alone to adhere to the opinions of Parliament in 1811; he maintained that no depreciation of the paper did exist at that time, or ever could exist. However, the current of opinion was so strong and unanimous, that, though some unimportant amendments were brought forward, modifying some details in the resolutions, but not at all denying their general truth, these were all withdrawn, and the resolutions were passed without a dissentient voice. Mr. Canning declared, amidst loud and general cheering, that it was the unanimous determination of Parliament that the country should return as soon as possible to the ancient standard of value, in the establishment of a metallic currency. The bill passed the Commons with little further remark.

183. In the House of Lords the Marquis of Lansdowne rejoiced at the introduction of the Bill, on account of the sound principles of political economy it contained, by recognising a metallic standard as the only safe foundation for the circulating medium. It recognised the great principles, that the price of gold and the foreign exchanges depended upon the state of the currency. He hoped the country never again would hear the wild theories about the currency, which had been so prevalent, which were very properly stigmatised by the bill before them, every enactment of which declared their falsehood. By acting on those ruinous ideas, the country had been burdened with an overwhelming mass of debt and taxation. The Earl of Liverpool said the bill had met with no opposition, and required no defence. The chief provisions of this Act, Statute 1819, c. 49, were—

1. "The Acts then in force for restraining cash payments should be continued till the 1st May, 1823, when they were finally to cease."

2. "That, on and after the 1st February, and before the 1st October, 1820, the Bank of England should be bound, on any person presenting an amount of their notes, not less than of the value or price of 60 ounces, to pay them on demand at the rate of £4 1s. per ounce, in standard gold bullion, stamped and assayed at the Mint."

3. "That between the 1st October, 1820, and the 1st May, 1821, it should pay in a similar manner in gold bullion at the rate of £3 19s. 6d. per ounce."

4. "That between the 1st May, 1821, and 1st May, 1823, the price of the gold bullion should be £3 17s. 10½d. per ounce."
5. "During the first period above mentioned, it might pay in gold bullion, at any rate, less than £4 1s., and not less than £3 19s. 6d. per ounce; in the second period, at any rate, less than £3 19s. 6d., and not less than £3 17s. 10½d., upon giving three days' notice in the 'Gazette,' and specifying the rate; but, after doing so, they were not to raise it again."
6. "These payments were to be made in bars or ingots of the weight of 60 oz. each, and the Bank might pay any fractional sum less than 40s. above that in the legal silver coin."
7. "The trade in gold bullion and coin was declared entirely free and unrestrained."

134. In conjunction with this Act, a most salutary measure was passed (Statute 1819, c. 76), to put a stop to the evil which the Bank directors themselves alleged had brought about the catastrophe of 1797, viz., the enormous sums the Government had been in the habit of demanding from the Bank by way of advances, without any parliamentary security, which Mr. Pitt had so grossly abused. By this Act, the Bank was forbidden to make any advances of any description, without the express and distinct authority of Parliament for that purpose first had and obtained.

135. Thus, at length, this great act of national good faith was accomplished. The final triumph of these great principles of truth and honesty is a memorable example of the innate power of truth to gain the ultimate victory when allowed the inestimable advantage of free discussion. No one of ordinary intelligence will now venture to deny that the currency was greatly depreciated at the time the Bullion Committee were appointed, and if the coin had been degraded to the value of the paper, it would simply have been a national bankruptcy. An amazing amount of ingenious sophistry was employed, no doubt much of it proceeding from honest though mistaken conviction, a still larger portion of it arising from the supposed interests of commerce, to maintain that Bank notes were not depreciated. The real truth, however, was discovered by Mr. Thornton and Lord King, and published by them, in the pamphlets alluded to above. It was

unhesitatingly adopted by the greatest statesmen of that day, as appears by the Report of the Committee of 1804; it was then pronounced more loudly and distinctly, and with greater authority by the Bullion Committee in 1810, but it was ridiculed and condemned by the great majority of the commercial world, whose wild speculations it had a tendency to curb, and rejected by an immense majority in Parliament in 1811. But the labour was not wasted in vain. The seeds of truth were firmly planted in the public mind; the doctrines, thus despised and rejected in 1811, were sifted and discussed by the public during the next eight years, and when the next discussion upon them took place in 1819, they had obtained the irresistible ascendancy in the public mind, so that they were enthusiastically adopted by Parliament without a dissentient voice.

136. The overwhelming preponderance of mercantile opinion in 1819 adhered to the doctrines of the Bullion Report. One body alone obstinately refused to be convinced—the majority of the court of directors of the Bank of England. Six of their directors had given their evidence in favour of the new doctrines; but the court determined, with inveterate pertinacity, to have a last fling at them, and passed the resolution we have already quoted. It took eight years longer for the light to penetrate the Bank parlour. At length, in 1827, the Bank was at last compelled to strike its colours, and the resolution of 1819 was solemnly expunged from its books.

137. When, as we have already seen, the doctrine of the rise of the market price of bullion, and the fall of the foreign exchanges from a depreciated currency, were so well understood by the merchants and statesmen of 1696-7, and the political economists of the last century, it may be interesting to inquire what was the fallacy that so long imposed upon men of undoubted ability, and who doubtless held their convictions in perfect good faith and honesty? What was the cause of the great degeneracy in sound doctrine between 1696 and 1811, so that it became necessary to argue the question from its very foundations? It was this, that the men of 1696 could see that the coinage did not contain much more than half of its proper weight of bullion. But the men of 1811 failed to see that the Bank note

could only preserve its value by maintaining a certain proportion with the metallic currency. That an excess of *quantity* of the notes diminished their value relatively to gold; and this diminution in the value of the promise compared to what it professed to represent, was exactly identical in principle with a debasement of the coinage by alloy, or a depreciation of it from deficiency in weight of bullion. When the Bank note became the measure of value, it was imperatively necessary that they should be able to purchase in the market the weight of bullion they professed to represent. When bullion rose to £5 10s. when paid in Bank notes, they were exactly in the same predicament as the coinage was under William III., when it had lost 25 per cent. of its weight. The diminution in the weight of the coinage was palpable to the senses, the diminution of the value of the "promises to pay" was only perceptible to the eye of reason and intelligence, and long escaped the observation of men who conscientiously disbelieved it.

138. We will now bring this long but important discussion to a close, by observing that the grand principles of the Bullion Report are not what are properly termed matters of OPINION at all, but of DEMONSTRATION. Persons of the most excellent taste and judgment may entertain the widest differences of opinion on the comparative merits of various poems, or pictures, or pieces of music. There is no absolute standard of truth, which will enable any man to assume the office of arbiter on any of these subjects; at least none has yet been discovered. Different poets, artists, and musicians are most in harmony with different mental constitutions, of which there is no unerring standard of excellence. So in politics, it is a pure matter of opinion and judgment which is the best form of government, and which is most suitable for any particular people. But the principles of monetary science, as laid down in the Bullion Report, are matters of a totally different nature, *they are matters of pure geometrical demonstration*. They are no more matters of opinion, in the proper sense of the expression, than the demonstrations of Euclid are matters of opinion. It is acknowledged that there is an absolute standard of truth in such matters. There are many excellent persons, and of good ability in other respects, whose mental constitution is such that they never can follow out the

train of reasoning, which establishes the truth of a certain famous proposition in Euclid. But we never heard of any one writing a pamphlet against the *pons asinorum*. Now, the famous doctrine of the regulation of the paper currency by the price of bullion is demonstrably true, and it is as vain to write pamphlets against it as against Euclid, B. I., prop. 5. When, therefore, a modern author says, "the fundamental error of Mr. Huskisson, and the Bullion Committee, on the subject, consisted in the principles which they laid down as axioms, that the measure of the depreciation of the currency was to be found in the difference between the market and the Mint price of gold"; this sentence is as wise as if one were to say, "the fundamental error of Cocker, and subsequent writers on arithmetic, is the principle which they adopt as an axiom that twenty-one is equal to twenty-one"; and when he says a little further on, "for as bank notes never sank in value compared with specie, whatever party spirit may have affirmed to the contrary," he makes a statement which there is overwhelming evidence to prove to be untrue.

VARIATIONS IN THE PRICE OF GOLD BULLION. 93

Table shewing the chief variations in the market price of gold bullion from 1790 to 1819, and the true value of the Bank of England £1 note during the Restriction.

	Market Price of Gold Bullion.	Real Value of the Bank Note.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
January, 1790	3 17 6	
to		
August 25, 1797		
September 1, 1797		
to	3 17 10½	1 0 0
October 19, 1798		
October 26, 1798		
to	3 17 9	1 0 0
September 13, 1799		
September 20, 1799		
to	No quotation.	
April 6, 1804		
April 13, 1804		
to	4 0 0	0 19 6
October 15, 1805		
October 22, 1805		
to	No quotation.	
October 2, 1810		
October 9, 1810	4 5 0	0 18 4·2
February 12, 1811	4 12 0	0 16 11·4
March 26, 1811	4 16 0	0 16 3
October 25, 1811	4 18 0	0 15 11
October 2, 1812	5 7 0	0 14 5
January 22, 1813	5 4 0	0 15 0
August 6, 1813	5 10 0	0 14 2
February, 1814	5 8 0	0 14 4·2
April 12, 1814	5 5 0	0 14 9
May 31, 1814	5 3 0	0 15 1·7
June 7, 1814	5 0 0	0 15 7·2
June 28, 1814	4 10 0	0 17 4
September 20, 1814	4 6 0	0 18 1·6
November 15, 1814	4 8 0	0 17 8·7
April 4, 1815	5 7 0	0 14 5
June 9, 1815	5 5 0	0 14 10
June 30, 1815	5 0 0	0 15 7·2
July 7, 1815	4 14 0	0 16 7·2
August 4, 1815	4 10 0	0 17 4
September 15, 1815	4 9 0	0 17 6·3
October 13, 1815	4 3 0	0 18 9·5
January 2, 1816	4 2 0	0 19 0·3
April 9, 1816	4 1 0	0 19 3·1
April 23, 1816	4 0 0	0 19 6
July 9, 1816	3 19 0	0 19 8·7
October 8, 1816		
to	3 18 6	0 19 10·2
April 4, 1817		
April 18, 1817	3 19 0	0 19 8·7
July 18, 1817	4 0 0	0 19 6
January 23, 1818	4 1 0	0 19 3·1
February 13, 1818	4 2 6	0 18 11
October 6, 1818	4 2 0	0 19 0·3
January 22, 1819	4 3 0	0 18 9·5

CHAPTER X.

FROM THE ACT FOR THE RESUMPTION OF CASH PAYMENTS IN 1819 TO THE BANK ACT OF 1844.

1. The great Act for the preservation of the national good faith, the restoration of the measure of value, was accomplished amidst universal applause; but, unfortunately, it had no sooner become law, than an unusually severe and long-continued disturbance in the ordinary proportions of supply and demand in a great variety of productions took place. The violent fluctuations in prices, which necessarily followed this great derangement caused much public distress, and afforded an opportunity for the antagonists of the Act of 1819 to acquire such strength as to induce the Government to tamper with the Act, before it came into full effect.

2. The utter prostration of all the great producing interests of the country in 1815-16, had caused such severe distress as to diminish the consuming powers of the people to an enormous extent. The importations of the great articles of consumption in 1816 were, in most cases, not half what they had been in 1814. In 1817, when the general prosperity was reviving, the shortness of the supply caused a very general and rapid rise in prices of all commodities. The inevitable consequence followed, speculation began to revive again, and was much fostered in 1818 by an expected dearth of provisions. A long-continued drought from May to September, was supposed to have destroyed the greater part of the crops, and, as imported produce was unusually low, the prices of all sorts of farming produce rose to an extravagant height. Enormous importations of wheat, added to the home crop, which turned out considerably better than was expected, caused rather a reduction in the price of that, but all other sorts of farming produce mounted up to a great height, barley being at 63s. 6d., oats at 35s., beans at 76s., and peas at

70s., in December, 1818. The high prices thus held out in this country, caused importations on a scale of enormous magnitude, at the close 1818. After deducting the quantities re-exported the imports of colonial and foreign produce were more than double what they were in 1816. Mr. Tooke well remarks that before any great turn in the prices of commodities, there is usually a pause of more or less duration, before it finally declares itself, like the slack water at the turn of the tide. There is a period during which sales are difficult or impracticable, when the prices are at a maximum, the buyer refuses to submit to them; and when they are at a minimum, the seller refuses to submit to them. A struggle of this nature prevailed through the autumn and winter of 1818-19, and just as the Act for the restoration of cash payments passed, the fall in prices was decidedly in progress.¹

3. The usual consequences followed these extravagant importations. Importers, trusting to the prices of 1817, had given orders to the growers, based upon these prices, and, when the crops came to be brought to market, the price had given way. Failures, accordingly, were numerous in 1819, both in England and in America, the necessary consequence of a transition from high prices, caused by scarcity, to low prices, arising from excess of supply. Towards the autumn of that year commercial credit had revived. The great importations of wheat in 1818, somewhat reduced the price in 1819, but it stood at 75s. in August, and the average for the whole year was 72s. This price continued, with a few fluctuations, till August, 1820, and at that time, wheat was still at 72s. A decided and unanswerable proof that the discussions in Parliament, and the Act for the resumption of cash payments, had no effect at all on the price of corn. Although the Bank was permitted to pay its notes in gold, at the rate of £4 1s. per ounce, yet they were actually at par, as the market price of gold fell to £3 17s. 10½d. in August, 1819, and continued at that rate till June, 1822, when it fell to £3 17s. 6d. And, in fact, it must be remembered, that for a great part of 1816-17, the note had been within a few pence of par, and had not varied more than about 5 per cent. from par since that time.

¹ The whole of Mr. Tooke's observations on this great crisis are perfectly invaluable, and must be read at length by every one who wishes to form a fair judgment on the subject.—Vol. II., pp. 60-116.

4. The spring of 1820 had been unpropitious, and vegetation backward, until the 18th of June, when some warm and very brilliant weather occurred just at the critical period of the blooming of the wheat. In July, some wet weather excited fears for the crop, and the prices advanced to 72s., but the weather became very fine in the beginning of August, and thenceforth continued most propitious during the ripening and gathering of the harvest. The result was a harvest of most extraordinary abundance, and of excellent quality. And even its unprecedented exuberance did not become fully known till two or three years afterwards, when it was not yet exhausted. The best authorities calculated that the quantity of the crop of 1820 was one third above the average. In July, 1821, wheat had fallen to 51s. from 72s. in August, 1819. May, June, and July, 1821, were cold and wet, and the harvest very late; wheat rose to 62s. in September, but the quantity produced was extremely large, and the quality very bad. In consequence of the enormous unexhausted stock of 1820, wheat fell to 50s. at the end of 1821, and to 42s. in August, 1822. The harvest of 1822 was remarkably good both in quantity and quality, and was got in early, long before the preceding crops had been consumed. In addition to this, the importations from Ireland were on an unprecedented scale. In 1817 corn was obliged to be exported to Ireland; in 1820 and 1821 Ireland exported to England upwards of 4,000,000 quarters of grain of all sorts. The natural and inevitable consequence of this was an immense and ruinous fall in the prices of all agricultural produce. Wheat fell to 38s. at the end of 1822.

5. The accumulation of treasure became so rapid in the vaults of the Bank in 1820, that early in 1821 the directors felt themselves in a position to resume cash payments, and an Act was passed to permit them to do so on the 1st May, 1821, instead of in 1823. By this time the Government had repaid £10,000,000 of the debt it owed to the Bank, which all the witnesses agreed was a necessary preliminary to enable the directors to contract their own issues. The Statute 1821, c. 26, enacted that the Bank might resume payments in gold coin on the 21st May, 1821. That persons offered to be paid in coin should not have the right to demand ingots. That if the Bank did not offer to pay in coin, the right to demand ingots should continue. The last impedi-

ments to the export of bullion were swept away. The Bank was bound to exchange their larger notes for any one who demanded it, for £1 notes or gold coin, but they had the option of payment in gold or notes.

6. The extravagant height to which the combined effects of an unusual and long-continued scarcity and the greatly depreciated currency, in which payments were made in 1811 and 1812, had produced the most extravagant speculations in farming. Barren wastes were reclaimed at an enormous expense, which never could have been repaid, except by maintaining corn at famine prices. Rents and debts had advanced in a similar proportion, and all classes of agriculturists, farmers, and landlords, had adjusted their expenditure according to the new scale of prices which they expected would endure. Family settlements and encumbrances were calculated on the same basis. Immediately after the peace, the great fall in the price of all sorts of agricultural produce, both from greater abundance and the destruction of the rotten country paper currency, threatened all persons connected with the "landed interest" with general ruin, and, after a considerable struggle, the Corn Bill of 1815 was passed, the intended and expected effect of which was to prevent wheat ever falling below 80s. a quarter. The "landed interest" calculated that, with the "cost of production" of which they considered "rent" as a necessary element, wheat could not be grown with a profit at less than 80s. a quarter, and the intention of that Act was to secure that price to agriculturists. Buoyed up with delusive hopes, and firmly believing that the Act had for ever nailed up wheat to 80s. a quarter, the farmers received a fresh stimulus to speculation, and vast sums were laid out in further extending the cultivation of barren wastes. However, the circumstances we have already detailed disappointed all these calculations, and wheat stood at 38s. at the end of 1822 in defiance of the Act which said it ought to be at 80s.

7. The advocates of a national bankruptcy had been in such a small minority in 1819, that they scarcely uttered a word in Parliament, much less attempted a division. When the distress caused by the fall in prices began to pinch some classes in the country, they began to gather strength again, and commenced

an attack on the Currency Law on April 9, 1821. This attack proved a complete failure, being rejected by a majority of 141 to 27. As prices continued to fall during that year, the distress continued to increase, and early in 1822, a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to report upon the subject. They presented their report on the 1st of April; but it did not contain a word imputing the low state of prices to anything connected with the currency. They attributed it to the unprecedented abundance of agricultural produce, and proposed plans for affording the farmers and others relief by temporary advances of Exchequer bills, until the glut in the market had diminished. They recommended that the limit of 80s. should be reduced to 70s., as 80s. represented a higher value at that time than in 1815. In the debate that followed, the first symptoms were manifested of the determination to make an onslaught on the Currency Act of 1819. But Lord Londonderry ridiculed the idea that the currency had anything to do with the question, and said Members had only wasted precious time in bringing it forward. But he declared that he entered his most solemn protest against the purpose of these Members to induce Parliament to commit the most flagrant deviation from sound policy and common honesty—a breach of faith towards the public creditor. Could a British House of Commons sanction such a measure, it would relieve no class of the community; but it would overwhelm all classes with ruin. Were it possible for them to be dishonest and base enough to listen to a project of national bankruptcy, the result must be most calamitous. If a Parliament could be found so degenerate, and a people so destitute of honour and common honesty, as not to start at the idea of such an abandonment of principle, the most sordid calculation would forbid the adoption of such a measure.

8. The £1 note issues of the country bankers in England had been suppressed by Statute 1777, c. 30; but in 1797 they were again permitted, and, by various Acts of Parliament, this permission was continued till two years after the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England. By the operation of these several Acts, they must have been withdrawn in 1825. The distress, however, which was attributed by so numerous and

powerful a party to the contraction of the currency, was employed to induce Ministers to relax this restriction, and country bankers were permitted to continue their £1 notes till the expiry of the Bank Charter in 1833. (Statute 1822, c. 70.) In order to improve the quality of the country bank notes, the Government attempted to enter into negotiations with the Bank of England to permit joint stock banks to be formed at a distance of 65 miles from London. The Government was satisfied that if joint stock banks on the Scotch system could be formed, it would add much to the stability of public credit. Lord Londonderry pronounced a warm eulogy upon the Scotch banks, and said that it was the wish of the Ministry that a similar system should be introduced into England. The bribe to the Bank of England to consent to this arrangement was an extension of their Charter for ten years. But the negotiation failed.

9. The attacks upon the Act of 1819, thrown out in the discussion of the Agricultural Distress Report, were merely preparatory to a formal onslaught on the Act itself. On the 11th of June, 1822, Mr. Western moved for a Committee to inquire into the effect of the Act upon the general interests of the empire. The burden of his speech was that all the distress the country was then suffering was due to the Act of 1819, and to that only, which, he said, had made a violent contraction in our currency at once. This assertion, which was the main pillar of his argument, is demolished by the simple fact, that the great contraction of the currency, and the restoration of the note to par, took place in 1816. He moreover assumed that the currency had been depreciated ever since the restriction Act in 1797. Mr. Huskisson immediately followed in a speech demolishing the whole of Mr. Western's sophistries, one by one, and drawing a close parallel between the state of the currency in 1696, and at that time; and he concluded by moving the same resolution that Mr. Montague had done in 1696—"That this House will not alter the standard of gold or silver in fineness, weight, or denomination." After a debate of two nights, in which several members who supported the motion disavowed all intention of tampering with the standard, Mr. Western's motion was rejected by a majority of 194 to 30, and Mr. Huskisson's amendment agreed to.

10. It was strongly alleged by one party that they were compelled to pay in the restored currency the debts they had contracted in a depreciated one, and they called for what they were pleased to term an "equitable adjustment of contracts." But the argument was futile, as they knew at the time they made their contracts, that Parliament was pledged to return to cash payments within a very short period after the termination of the war. Moreover, they totally left out of consideration, that they had been able to discharge an immense amount of mortgages, burdens, &c., in a depreciated currency, which had been contracted in a good currency. All the mortgages and annuities on landed property which were contracted before the great depreciation of the currency, were paid for some years in a currency 25 per cent. less valuable than at the time of the contract. But while these debtors clamoured so loudly for an "equitable adjustment" of contracts grievous to themselves, they never uttered a whisper indicative of their wish to have an "equitable adjustment" of those contracts where the change was favourable to themselves. The only instance recorded of any person making an "equitable adjustment" against himself, and paying his creditors according to the true value of the Bank note, was Lord King, who incurred so much resentment for his letter in 1811. It is quite evident that such a one-sided "equitable adjustment" as was proposed by this party was nothing else but robbery. Under the double stimulus of famine prices and a depreciated currency, the rents of land had tripled since the beginning of the war, so that properties which were mortgaged before it, might have been comparatively unincumbered at its close. But the unfortunate mortgagees and annuitants were paid in a fixed amount of depreciated currency, so that, when prices rose to meet the depreciation, they were clearly mulcted. But they had no powerful party to advocate an "equitable adjustment" in their favour; and it is quite clear that no "equitable adjustment" could take place, unless all these payments were included in it.

11. There was one perfectly satisfactory argument to shew that the low prices of that year had nothing to do with the act of 1819, namely, that the prices of all sorts of agricultural produce were equally depressed all over the continent of Europe

from the same cause. The fluctuations, indeed, on the continent were much more violent than even in England. Wheat, in France, which had risen higher, fell lower. At Vienna, wheat which was 114s. in March, 1817, fell in September, 1819, to 19s. 6d.; at Munich, wheat fell from 151s. in September, 1817, to 24s. 5d. in September, 1820. The same phenomena were observed in Italy. A similar fall, but not to so great an extent, took place at Lisbon. What could the Act of 1819 have to do with these places? The speech from the throne, in France, very properly attributed the low prices to the enormous abundance of production.

12. But not only is it an absolutely certain historical fact, that the Act of 1819 had not the remotest connection with the low prices of 1822, but it is proved by the most overwhelming evidence that it caused no *contraction of the currency at all*. Mr. Turner, a director of the Bank states—"With regard to the effect of Mr. Peel's bill on the Bank of England, I can state from having been in the direction during the last two years, that it has been altogether a dead letter, It has neither accelerated nor retarded the return to cash payments." And Mr. Tooke shews most conclusively that the amount of the currency, so far as it consisted of Bank of England notes and coin, was much larger in 1822 than it had been in 1819. That this Act caused any CONTRACTION of the currency is, therefore, a statement most contrary to the truth. Its only effect was, what Parliament had over and over again solemnly pledged itself to do, to fix a time for the return to cash payments, and such a return to payments in cash would, by its own natural operation, prevent the extravagant issues which the Bank had made during the restriction, which depreciated the note 30 per cent., and robbed every creditor of one-third part of his property. The Act of 1819 merely restored the Bank to its condition before 1797, and it became subject to the same unerring laws of nature as its directors had confessed it felt before the restriction.

13. There is much individiousness in endeavouring to fasten the responsibility of this Act upon Sir Robert Peel, as if he had had any either of the peculiar merit or blame of passing it through Parliament. The Legislature was solemnly pledged to

return to cash payments as soon as the war was over, while he was yet a schoolboy in the junior forms of Harrow. There does not appear to have been any speaker fantastic enough to propose that the Bank should never return to cash payments. The Bank itself, of its own accord, attempted to resume payments in cash in 1817, and would have succeeded in doing so, if it had not so perversely rejected the principles of the Bullion Report; and if it had not been owing to circumstances which disturbed its management in 1818, cash payments would have been resumed while Peel was still in that unconverted state in which he voted against Horner's resolutions in 1811. So far was he from converting Parliament, that he was himself one of the latest converts, and the Ministry conferred great honour upon him in allowing him, while yet so young, to take such a prominent part, and be the mouth-piece of the unanimous determination of the Legislature.

14. By the beginning of 1823 the very inferior stock of 1821 had been chiefly consumed, and the crop of 1822, being of far superior quality, prices began slowly to rise, and the spring of 1823, proving very backward, prices rose rapidly, so that in June wheat stood at 62s. 5d. These prices, however, tempted the farmers to produce their long reserved stores, and an unusual quantity having thus been brought to market, wheat fell in October to 45s. 5d., but the crop turning out worse than was expected, prices rose a little at the end of the year, but they were still 37 per cent. below the "remunerative" 80s., which Parliament had held out to farmers as the point which should be insured to them. It is a favourite theory with many persons that the rise of prices in 1823 was owing to the extension of country bank issues, in consequence of the Act of 1822 prolonging the term of their existence. Such a supposition, however, is very decisively negatived by the evidence of Mr. Burgess, secretary to the committee of country bankers, before the Committee of 1832 (Report, p. 414). He presented returns from 122 country banks, forming a fair evidence of the whole. Assuming that the issues of each bank were 100 in 1818, the issues of the whole were 12,000 in that year, and the following table exhibits their value up to 1825—

	£		Difference.	£	s.	d.	
1818	12,200	..					—
1819	11,991	..	209	being	1	15	0 per cent. decrease from 1818.
1820	11,487	..	709	„	5	16	10½ „
1821	11,352	..	848	„	6	19	0 „
1822	10,778	..	1,422	„	11	3	1½ „
1823	10,748	..	1,452	„	11	18	0½ „
1824	11,640	..	560	„	4	11	9 „
1825	12,478	..	278	„	2	5	6½ increase.

Mr. Tooke also shews that during 1823, while the price of wheat was rising, the prices of most other commodities were falling, from which circumstances he very conclusively pronounces that the idea that the variations of the currency had anything to do with the prices in those years to be utterly unfounded.¹

15. The continued depression of prices of agricultural produce so much below what had been expected, created, no doubt, much distress among those persons who were hampered with obligations they had entered into upon the scale of 1811 and 1812, and several petitions were presented to both Houses of Parliament complaining of it. Mr. Western, not satisfied with the great rebuff he met with in 1822, when the distress was far more severe, again endeavoured to induce Parliament to disturb the settlement of 1819. He introduced his motion on the 11th June, 1823. It may be as well to take notice of some of the leading fallacies he brought forward, as they are too often repeated even at the present day. After saying that great variations had taken place in the value of the currency during the preceding 30 years, which was unquestionable, he said—

“It will be admitted that a diminution of value followed the suspension of cash payments by the Bank in 1797; that such diminution continued and increased during the latter years of the war, and up to the time of *Peel's Bill*; and that *Peel's Bill*, whilst it restored the old metallic currency, gave to it the value which it possessed prior to its suspension. The injustice attendant upon an alteration of a currency in any way cannot be

¹ If anything were wanted to shew the utter fallacy of the idea that the contraction of the currency had anything to do with the low prices of 1822, we might refer to the present price of wheat. There are many clamours of a contracted currency at present, and yet the price of wheat is nearly 90s. per quarter; in the Edinburgh market it was sold at 104s. a few weeks ago. (December, 1855.)

questioned a moment. The injury that was done to creditors by the Act of 1797 (the origin of all our difficulties in regard to currency) is not to be doubted, but my position is that, after a period of twenty-two years, the resumption of the old standard could by no means be an act of justice or retribution. A new currency upon a new standard necessarily ceases to be new in any sense of the word at some period, and an old one revived again is, to all intents and purposes, new and productive of all the same effects. Is twenty-two years such a period as shall suffice so to establish a standard as to make recurrence to the antecedent as mischievous as the adoption of the new one? This is the important question; and I answer most distinctly, yes; and that justice required us to establish and perpetuate that measure of value which had been so long current, as near as the same could be ascertained."

16. The Marquis of Titchfield supported Mr. Western's motion, but made some caustic remarks upon Mr. Vansittart, and his famous resolutions of 1811, saying that he might possibly be ridiculed for advancing axioms and evident truth—

"This latter danger, however, he should make bold to defy, sheltering himself under the fact that, notwithstanding all the discussion this subject had undergone, it might still be heard any day in society, from persons otherwise intelligent, that, in their opinion, to talk of the depreciation of the currency must be nonsense, for that they were unable to comprehend how a pound note at one time could differ from a pound note at another—that a pound note must be a pound note always—that it was impossible that the same piece of paper, with the same characters marked upon it, should be more valuable at one time than at another; and when, above all, the famous resolution of 1811 was recollected, he thought it would be perfectly excusable for him, even in that assembly, said to be so enlightened, to set out with the mathematical axiom that, 'a part is less than the whole'—an axiom which now that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer was no longer among them, he apprehended no one would be found hardy enough to dispute. In mentioning the name of that extraordinary person, he much lamented his inability to do justice to the merits of so great a master of reasoning and eloquence, which so confounded the philosophers of

1811, by unfolding to his admiring audience that the old favourite axiom of Euclid was nothing but a popular delusion, that in reality a part might easily be equal to the whole; and that, therefore, there was no reason for doubting that the pound note, which required the assistance of eight shillings to procure a guinea, was equal to the pound note, which required the assistance of but a single shilling of precisely the same value with those of which eight had become necessary. That great man, for his singular merits, he supposed, or, perhaps, for their unworthiness of him, had been taken from them, and bestowed upon another assembly, which, not having had the same practice in finance, it was to be hoped he would long continue to enlighten. He could not, however, be said to have finished his course prematurely, for twelve years before he had obtained an imperishable name, by placing triumphantly on the journals of the House of Commons, that astonishing resolution which had deprived Euclid of his ancient and long-acknowledged reputation. He was most anxious to disclaim all personal ill-will towards the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. Indeed, it was impossible he should be under any such impulse, but he would not shrink from confessing that, in a political point of view, he could never hear his name pronounced, much less pronounce it himself, without a feeling something like bitter animosity, because he considered that minister as the author in great part of the calamities in which the landed interest of the country was involved. He believed that few parts of the financial administration of that period were exempt from much and well-merited censure, but all the other measures were trifling in the scale of mischief compared with that fatal resolution which ministerial influence unfortunately carried in the House of Commons, the effects of which were now helplessly deplored, and which would so long survive the name as well as the administration of those with whom it originated. The mischief of that resolution might be described with perfect justice in a very few words. Its effect was to blind the public to their real situation; thereby both promoting the evil and rendering the sufferers less capable of guarding against it. It assured the public, in the midst of a great and rapidly-increasing depreciation, that no depreciation existed. The Bank, therefore, went on fearlessly adding to its issues, which, of course, increased the evil by increasing the cause of it, and the landlord went on with

the cultivation of poor soils, undertaking expensive improvements, fondly imagining that the additional Bank notes he was receiving were additional riches. The landholder, never suspecting that his dealings were virtually in a lower coin, borrowed fearlessly sums vastly larger than he could have dreamed of, that would have staggered his imagination if he had had a suspicion that wheat could ever be at 39s. a quarter, for, while he was receiving 140s., he took for granted he might safely calculate upon hard times not bringing him lower, perhaps, than 70s. or 80s.; and thus the prudent man, even, was induced to borrow what it was clear he had now no chance of paying without ruin. That ever memorable House of Commons told him what they knew to be false, or ought to have known, that the pound note was of full value, when it was in reality depreciated 20 per cent. He borrowed pound notes worth 18s. and he was called upon to repay pound notes worth 20s."

17. After developing these ideas still further, he said that in currency *quantity* was everything; for, if forty millions of notes were in circulation at one time, and eighty millions at another, while the transactions of the country remained the same, then two notes would be required to do the duty that one had formerly done; and, therefore, the currency would become depreciated; but if transactions doubled, then the same quantity of currency would represent the same amount of transactions, and its value would not be altered. He said—

"Economy of money was, by contrivances to spare the uses of it, according to the description of his right honourable friend, by substitutions for the precious metals, in the shape of voluntary credit. Every new contrivance of this kind—and every one improved—had that tendency. *When it was considered to how great an extent these contrivances had been practised in the various modes of* VERBAL, BOOK, AND CIRCULATING CREDITS, IT WAS EASY TO SEE THAT THE COUNTRY HAD RECEIVED A GREAT ADDITION TO ITS CURRENCY. THIS ADDITION TO THE CURRENCY WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS IF GOLD HAD BEEN INCREASED FROM THE MINES."

Lord Titchfield then pointed out how an excessive quantity of paper caused a depreciation of it, which was exactly the same thing as a depreciation of the coinage from a deficiency of weight; but he afterwards fell into the extraordinary error of

saying, "The Bank notes were depreciated, and became, therefore, in the situation of clipped or debased guineas, which state of the circulation prevailed from 1797 to 1819."

18. This allegation of the great depreciation of the paper currency during the whole interval from 1797 to 1819 is the only one that can afford the smallest ground for attack upon the Act of 1819; but we have shewn, by such overwhelming evidence, that such an idea was the greatest delusion that could be conceived. The Bank note sustained no sensible depreciation for several years after the Restriction Act, and it was not till the great mercantile speculations of 1808-9, that it became seriously so. It did not continue longer than five or six years, and rose so nearly to par in 1816-17, that its depreciation was insensible. If, therefore, Parliament, in 1819, had gone back to the depreciated standard of 1813-14, it would have been the most unjustifiable robbery recorded in history. It would have been infinitely worse than the bankruptcy of any continental nation, such as Austria, Russia, or France, because, when they declared themselves bankrupt, their paper was at a hopeless and irredeemable discount, and they had not the remotest prospect of ever bringing it back to par. Their conduct, therefore, was the result of sheer necessity; they were driven to bankruptcy only when they were irretrievably insolvent, but they did not deliberately cheat their creditors *after* their currency was restored to par. The motion was rejected by a majority of 96 to 27, and was the last attempt to tamper with the measure of value.

19. The harvest of 1823 was deficient, both in quality and quantity, and prices rose considerably in the beginning of 1824, old wheat being then at 78s.; later in the year, however, they declined; but the harvest of 1824 being also inferior, they rallied again. The Bank had for some years been accumulating treasure to meet the anticipated deficiency of the country issues expected to follow the suppression of the £1 notes. When the unhappy change in the policy of the Government took place, this great amount of bullion was rendered comparatively useless, and the country banks began to extend their issues in 1824, and in 1825 they were beyond what they were in 1818.

In January, 1824, the bullion in the Bank amounted to £14,200,000. During the preceding year, an adjustment of rents to meet the altered state of prices had taken place, and the old stocks having been gradually worked off, the energy of the people began to revive. The enormous amount of cash in the Bank, for which there was no immediate use, enabled the Government to carry through a great financial operation, the reduction of the interest upon nearly a quarter of the national debt. The Navy 5 per cents. were reduced to 4 per cent. and the 4 per cent. stock to 3½. This vast operation had a very considerable influence in curtailing the incomes of many persons who could ill afford it, to a very inconvenient extent, and prepared them to look out for more profitable investments for their money. Notwithstanding the unhappy and severe distress to the agricultural portion of the community, Mr. Tooke says that the trading and manufacturing interests had never before been in a more regular, sound, and satisfactory state than in the interval from 1821 to 1824. At the close of the Session of 1823, the King congratulated Parliament on the flourishing condition of all branches of our commerce and manufactures, and the gradual abatement of agricultural distress.

20. At the close of 1824 the seeds of the disasters which ensued in the end of 1825 were sown. The Royal speech opened Parliament with the same strain of congratulation as had closed the preceding Session, and the same congratulations were used at the close of the Session of 1824. Towards the end of that year it became visible that in some of the leading articles of consumption the supply was falling short of the demand, which gave rise to a spirit of speculation, and, as in all similar cases, a few early purchases, which were successful, induced extensive imitation; and at the end of 1824, and beginning of 1825, this had amounted to positive infection, numbers of persons being induced to go out of their own line of business to speculate in articles with which they had no concern whatever, but induced by representations of their brokers to do so in the hopes of realising great and immediate gains.

21. Just at this period occurred one of those events which have so frequently lured the commercial world to their destruc-

tion. The long contest between Spain and her South American colonies had now finally terminated in favour of the colonies. We have already noticed the great commercial catastrophe brought about in 1810, by the extravagant speculations on the opening of the Brazils to British trade. Precisely the same course occurred in 1824. The recognition of the independence of the South American States and Mexico opened out a boundless field for speculation, and the consumption of British manufactures; and this spirit of speculation was aggravated to the utmost by the visions of countless wealth which was to be extracted from the gold and silver producing countries, and immense schemes were formed for working the mines with British capital. However, the long struggle for independence had inspired the British people with much sympathy for the juvenile republics, and when they wanted to borrow money to support their public credit, the British were only too eager to lend it. It is alleged that £150,000,000 of British capital was sunk in different ways in Mexico and South America.

22. Although the symptoms of a coming mercantile catastrophe were plainly evident in the beginning of 1825, the speech put into the King's mouth declared the utmost gratification at the continuance and the progressive increase of the public prosperity. "There never was a period," it said, "in the history of this country, when all the great interests of the nation were at the same time in so thriving a condition, or when a feeling of content and satisfaction was more widely diffused through all classes of the British people." The speech of Lord Dudley and Ward was exactly in the same strain. After contrasting the sufferings the nation had gone through, during the last 30 years, he said it was his good fortune to ask their lordships to carry to the foot of the throne their unmixed, and, he hoped, their unanimous congratulations, upon a state of prosperity, such as he believed was unequalled in this country, and had never been surpassed in any age or nation. And yet, though the whole debate was in this strain, no sooner was it ended, than the Lord Chancellor called the attention of the House to the dangerous extent to which the mania for joint stock companies had gone, and said he would move for leave to bring in a bill to restrain the system. Within seven weeks after that Lord

Landerdale called the attention of the House to the "fury for joint stock companies which had taken possession of the people," and said that the schemes already subscribed for amounted to £200,000,000.

23. The following extract from the Annual Register of 1824 contains a sufficient description of the rising of the Joint Stock Company mania. After stating that the "mines of Mexico" was a phrase which opened visions of boundless wealth to the imagination, and how the mania spread from foreign enterprises to home ones, it says—

"In all these speculations, only a small instalment, seldom exceeding 5 per cent., was paid at first, so that a very moderate rise in the price of the shares produced a large profit on the sum actually invested. If, for instance, shares of £100 on which £5 had been paid, rose to a premium of £40, this yielded on every share a profit equal to eight times the amount of the money which had been paid. This possibility of enormous profit, by risking so small a sum, was a bait too tempting to be resisted. All the gambling propensities of human nature were constantly solicited into action, and crowds of individuals of every description—the credulous and the suspicious—the crafty and the bold—the raw and the experienced—the intelligent and the ignorant—princes, nobles, politicians, placemen, patriots, lawyers, physicians, divines, philosophers, poets, intermingled with women of all ranks and degrees—spinsters, wives, and widows, hastening to venture some portion of their property, in schemes of which scarcely anything was known except the name."

As a specimen of the madness of the speculations, we may quote the prices of mining shares. The Anglo-Mexican, on which £10 was paid, were at £43 on December 10th, 1824, on the 11th January, 1825, they were at £150. The Real del Monte, with £70 paid, were at £550 in December, and at £1,350 in January, and others in similar proportions. The prices of most other commodities doubled and tripled.

24. Now, what was the conduct of the Bank of England during this period? The bullion which stood above £14,000,000 in January, 1824, was reduced to £11,600,000 in October, 1824. The exchange on Paris had been falling ever since the close of

1823. The last time it was above par was in June, and since then the fall had been continuous. The decrease in bullion had been steady, uniform, and rapid ever since March. Now, when it was known that immense sums were leaving the country, and the exchange falling lower, what did the Bank do? It *increased* its issues. During the month of October, 1824, they were increased £2,300,000. When every consideration of common sense and prudence, demanded a rapid *contraction*, when the speculative fever was plainly declared, instead of doing what they could to check it, they added fuel to the flames. But the Directors seemed determined to set all the principles of the Bullion Report at defiance; and the drain upon them proceeded with increased severity. In April, 1825, the bullion was diminished by upwards of £4,000,000, and their issues were £3,600,000 higher when they had only £6,650,000 of bullion than when they had £14,000,000.

25. The speculative fever was at its height in the first four months of 1825, when it had spent its force and came to an end in the natural course of things. Vast numbers of persons who had embarked in these wild schemes, with the hope of selling out of them before the inevitable crash came, were now called upon for their subscriptions. Vast quantities of capital having been already absorbed, had the inevitable effect of raising the rate of interest. Successive calls compelled the weaker holders to realise, and, while the calls for ready-money were immediate and pressing, the prospect of returns was distant and uncertain. Accordingly, after May and June, the decline was rapid. The South American loans, and the Mexican mining schemes, proved almost universally total losses. In the meantime, that *slack water*, which Mr. Tooke observes, always precedes a great turn in the tide of prices, took place. The increase of commodities which speculation had caused, could no longer be kept from being realised, prices fell as rapidly as they had risen. The obligations of the speculators now became due, and the sale of the commodities had to be forced to meet them. Universal discredit now succeeded, goods became unsaleable, so that stocks which are usually held in anticipation of demand, were wholly unavailable to meet the pecuniary engagements of the holders. Merchants, who had accepted bills for only half the value of the

goods consigned to them, were unable to realise even that half, or even obtain advances, on security of the bills of lading, and even the advances already made were peremptorily called in. The usury laws, which limited interest to 5 per cent., greatly aggravated the distress; nobody would lend money at 5 per cent. when its real value was so much greater; hence, numbers who would gladly have paid 8 or 10 per cent. interest, were obliged to sell goods at a difference of 30 per cent. for cash compared with the price for time.

26. The bankers in the country had followed exactly in the steps of the Bank of England. While the fever was raging they had increased their issues and liabilities, by speculative advances on commodities. The persons to whom these advances had been made, had no means of repaying them, but the "promises to pay" the bankers had lent them, still remained in circulation, and must be met. The bankers foresaw the coming storm, and endeavoured to provide funds to meet it. The Bank of England itself had its eyes open to the suicidal career it was following in May, and then endeavoured violently to contract its issues. This sudden change of policy, only aggravated the general feeling of discredit. During the autumn everything portended the approach of the impending catastrophe. The following table shews the progressive decrease in the bullion in the Bank, during 1824 and 1825—

1824.				1825.			
Jan. 31	£13,527,850	Jan. 29	£9,490,420
Feb. 28	13,800,390	Feb. 26	8,857,730
March 27	13,871,280	March 26	8,152,340
April 24	13,405,550	April 30	6,659,780
May 29	12,887,840	May 28	6,131,300
June 26	12,809,140	June 25	5,482,040
July 31	11,814,720	July 30	4,174,830
Aug. 28	11,763,550	Aug. 27	3,626,570
Sept. 25	11,811,500	Sept. 24	3,496,690
Oct. 30	11,433,430	Oct. 29	3,150,360
Nov. 27	11,323,760	Nov. 26	3,012,150
Dec. 24	10,721,190	Dec. 31	1,260,890

27. The inevitable *contre coup* of the undue expansion of credit in the spring began to press heavily on the country banks in the autumn of 1825. It gradually became severer during the

month of November. On the 29th November it was announced in the London papers that Sir William Elford's—a large bank at Plymouth—had failed, and that was immediately followed by the fall of Wentworth and Co., a great Yorkshire firm. By the 3rd December, the panic had fairly set in, and the whole city was thrown into the most violent state of alarm and consternation. On that day (Saturday) some of the directors were informed that the house of Pole, Thornton, and Co., one of the leading city banking houses, was in difficulties, and at a hurried meeting held on the following day it was decided to place £300,000 at their disposal upon proper security. During that week the utmost attention was paid to the position of that house which fought it through the following week, though it was privately known to the governor that, if the storm did not abate, they must fail on the Monday morning. Instead of abating, however, it became more furious than ever on Monday; and Pole and Co. stopped payment, and the ruin of forty country banks which were connected with them was expected.

28. The fall of this great banking house was the signal for a general run upon all the London bankers, and three or four more gave way, and spread universal consternation among the country banks, sixty-three of which succumbed to the crisis, though a considerable number paid 20s. in the pound, and eventually resumed business.

29. From Monday, the 12th, to Saturday, the 17th December was the height of the crisis in London. Mr. Richards, the Deputy-Governor of the Bank at that time, said—

“On Monday morning the storm began, and till Saturday night it raged with an intensity that it is impossible for me to describe; on the Saturday night it had somewhat abated. The Bank had taken a firm and deliberate resolution to make common cause with the country, as far as their humble efforts would go, and on Saturday night it was my happiness, when I went up to the Cabinet reeling with fatigue, to be able just to call out to my Lord Liverpool, and to the members of His Majesty's Government then present, that all was well; that was, I believe, on the evening of Saturday, the 17th December. Then in the following week things began to get a little more steady,

and by the 24th, what with the £1 notes that had gone out and other things, people began to be satisfied, and then it was for the first time in a fortnight, that those who had been busied in that terrible scene could recollect that they had families who had some claim on their attention."

30. As the crisis was evidently approaching at the end of November, the papers discussed the probable policy of the Bank, and it was generally anticipated that it would continue to contract its issues, and let the evil work its own cure by the fall of those houses which had been imprudent in their speculations, and this was the course adopted by the Bank, and to which they adhered as matters grew worse, and they were supported in it by public opinion. On the day after Pole and Co. fell another house of equal magnitude fell, Williams, Burgess, and Co. The panic then became universal, and, as the directors thought that they would certainly have to stop payment, they sounded the Government as to a Restriction Act, but the Government absolutely declined it, and it was resolved that the Bank should pay away its last sovereign. The Mint was kept constantly at work day and night, but it could not supply coin with sufficient rapidity, so that it kept constantly diminishing. On the Saturday the coin in the Bank vaults scarcely exceeded one million, but, by a happy circumstance, when the Saturday evening came the tide receded, and the directors were able to assure the Ministry that all danger was over.

31. The great pressure had produced the effect which necessarily results from such circumstances. The great increase in the value of money here, had turned the exchanges in favour of the country, the directors expected remittances from Paris, and they fortunately came sooner than was expected. On the Monday following the 19th, about £400,000 came from France, and the demand having sensibly abated, the supplies from the Mint fully equalled the sums drawn out of the Bank—or rather exceeded them.

32. Mr. Huskisson said afterwards, in the House of Commons, that, during forty-eight hours (Monday and Tuesday, December 12 and 13), it was impossible to convert into money to any ex-

tent the best securities of the Government. Persons could not sell Exchequer bills, nor Bank stock, nor East India stock, nor the public funds. Mr. Baring said that men would not part with their money on any terms, nor for any security. The extent to which the distress had reached was melancholy to the last degree. Persons of undoubted wealth and real capital, were seen walking about the streets of London, not knowing whether they should be able to meet their engagements for the next day. By this time, however, the exchange had decidedly turned in favour of the country, and on Wednesday, the 14th, the Bank totally changed their policy, and discounted with the utmost profuseness. They made enormous advances on Exchequer bills and securities of all sorts. Mr. Harman said—

“We lent it by every possible means, and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock as security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances on Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount; in short, by every possible means, consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not, on some occasions, over nice; seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our power.”

This audacious policy was crowned with the most complete success, *the panic was stayed almost immediately*. On Friday evening, the 16th, the *Courier* said—“We are happy to think that the worst is over, though there are still great demands upon the Bank, particularly from the country.” The same paper, on the next day, the 17th, said—“Although public confidence is on the return in the metropolis, and things are resuming their usual course, yet, as might be expected, this has not yet communicated itself to the country.” In fact, the London panic was completely allayed in this week by the profuse issue of Bank notes. Between the Wednesday, the 14th, and the Saturday, the 17th, the Bank issued upwards of £5,000,000 of notes.

33. The waves of discredit, however, were propagated through the country, and throughout the following week the demand still continued great from the London bankers for their country correspondents. During the course of it, it came to the remembrance of some of the directors that there was a chest

of their £1 notes which had never been used. As soon as this was discovered, it occurred to them that they might be used to stay the panic in the country districts, and the discredit of the country bank notes. Upon communicating this idea to the London bankers, it was eagerly approved of, and the sanction of the Government was asked for the experiment. The Government consented, and the notes were sent off to the country bankers without delay, and produced instantaneous relief. At Norwich, when the Gurneys shewed upon their counter so many feet of Bank notes of such a thickness, it stopped the run in that part of the country. By the 24th December the panic was completely allayed all over the country, and the amount of the £1 notes the Bank issued was under £500,000, and by the beginning of 1826 the credit of the banking world was completely restored.

34. The circumstances of this famous crisis are the most complete and triumphant examples of the unquestionable truth of the principles of the Bullion Report, and of Sir Francis Baring, already quoted in Chapter VIII. When the drain of treasure from the Bank was severe and unceasing, and notoriously for exportation, on account of foreign loans, the Bank, with infatuated obstinacy, had increased their issues instead of contracting them, in defiance of the clearest warnings of the Bullion Report. When, after six months' continuance in this fatal policy, they at last reversed their course, and contracted their issues. In the course of the autumn the drain for the exportation ceased, but continued for internal purposes; the demand for gold was entirely to support the tottering credit of the country bank notes. Now, as the country bankers were only too glad to withdraw their own notes, and substitute gold for them, there was not the slightest danger of an increase of Bank of England notes adding to the general amount of paper currency in the country, but just the reverse; consequently, it was just the precise case in which Sir Francis Baring and the Bullion Committee said that it was the duty of the Bank of England to *extend* its issues to support general credit. There was not the smallest danger that an extension of issues would, under such circumstances, turn the foreign exchanges against the country. The character of the demand was declared in the

most unmistakeable manner. On Thursday, the 15th, a meeting of merchants and others took place at the Mansion House, when it was stated that Sir P. Pole and Co. had a surplus of £170,000 after payment of all claims against them, besides large landed property belonging to Sir Peter Pole, and about £100,000, the private property of other members of the firm. Williams and Burgess had enough to pay 40s. in the pound. Now, if the course which was adopted on the Wednesday had been adopted on the Monday, the whole of that terrific crisis would have been saved. Mr. Vincent Stuckey, one of the most eminent country bankers in the kingdom, says—

“My opinion was that the crisis at that time was brought on by excessive issues; but, when the panic came, country bank paper was brought in for Bank of England, and, therefore, all that was immediately wanted was an EXCHANGE OF PAPER. I stated, in a letter I wrote upon the subject to the Bank on the 14th of December, 1825, that they would not have to increase the sum total of circulation, but that all they would have to do was to exchange A for B; and in my letter I recommended them to issue a million a day, which they did; for, otherwise most of the Banks in London, as well as the country, must have stopped.”

And, accordingly, they did issue, and all contemporary evidence proves that it was this profuse issue £5,000,000 of paper in a few days that stayed the panic. If they had persevered in the restrictive policy for three days longer, the total and entire destruction of commercial credit would infallibly have ensued. In short, if they had followed the precedents of 1793 and 1797, so strongly condemned by the Bullion Report, all credit would have been destroyed; they followed the principles laid down in the Bullion Report, and the country was saved.

35. When the causes of this terrible calamity came to be discussed, there were not wanting many who laid the whole blame to the excessive issues of the Bank, as well as the excessive issues of the country banks. But though it is indisputable that the Bank acted on the most unsound principles, in not contracting its issues when the great drain of bullion for exportation was going on, it is a mere delusion for men to attribute the consequences of their own wild and extravagant mania to the Bank

of England, or to any bank. The errors of all the banks put together were trivial compared to the outbreaks of speculative insanity which seized upon all classes. It was not the issues of some Bank notes more or less which originated the calamity, but the insatiable thirst for growing suddenly rich, that seized upon so many persons, and led them to embark in the maddest schemes totally out of their line of business. Was it the issue of Bank notes that led a respectable bookselling firm to risk £100,000 on a speculation in hops?

36. The Bank had committed many errors before, as serious as those of 1825, without leading to any such disaster. In fact, it was the nature of the speculations which men had rushed headlong into that must inevitably have brought about a most terrible calamity if there had not been a Bank note in existence. The speculative mania of 1694 took place before the Bank was in existence; the great South Sea bubble mania took place when there were no country banks at all, and no one accused the Bank of England, or the London bankers, of having made too profuse issues of notes then; and the great railway mania of 1845-6 took place after it was supposed that the Act of 1844 had effectually secured the country against the recurrence of similar calamities.

37. The bold policy of the Bank of England in that terrible week, in entire accordance with the principles laid down by Sir Francis Baring and the Bullion Report, not only saved a multitude of commercial houses, both banking and trading, but certainly preserved itself from bankruptcy. Though several banks did succumb, the distress was slight, compared to what it would have been if the Bank had persevered in adhering to the policy of 1797. Many houses, it is true, that were aided by the Bank, were only enabled to stagger on for a short time longer, and subsequently failed when their obligations became due; but delaying their fall even for a short time, till the panic had subsided, was of considerable service.

38. The worthless character of a great portion of the country paper had greatly aggravated the intensity of the calamity; in fact, it began with them, and the great commercial failures did

not take place until after the banking panic had subsided. The Government and the Bank, at last learning wisdom from these repeated convulsions, which seemed to recur periodically, became sensible that it was imperatively necessary to provide a currency of a more solid description for the country, and that the frightful evils of the monopoly of the Bank of England must come to an end.

39. Parliament met on the 3rd of February, 1826, and six paragraphs of the speech from the Throne were occupied with the commercial catastrophe, and it said that part of the remedies to be applied consisted in placing the currency and circulating credit of the country on a more firm foundation. Lord King said that the causes of the calamity were partly to be attributed to the Government, in a greater degree to the country banks, and in a still greater degree to the Bank of England monopoly. There was no period of distress during the last thirty or forty years, in which the conduct of that establishment had not been injurious, and in every case aggravated it. It was a most faulty machine. It was impossible that a Bank so incorporated could do good. If the purpose was to erect an establishment to do mischief, they would erect it on the very principles of the Bank. They would give it a monopoly, remove from it all fear of rivalry, and connect it with the Government. He lamented that the pressure of the country gentlemen and the country bankers had been too powerful to be resisted by the Ministry in 1822, and had forced them to continue the issues of £1 and £2 notes to keep up prices and encourage speculation. The Earl of Liverpool chiefly blamed the excessive issues of the country banks, and said that the small notes must be gradually withdrawn, and a metallic currency substituted. He said that he was perfectly satisfied, and had entertained the conviction for years, that the country had grown too large, that its concerns had become too extensive to allow of the exclusive privilege of the Bank of England. Its privileges had operated in a most extraordinary and, as he thought, unfortunate manner for the country. Any small tradesman, a cheesemonger, a butcher, or a shoemaker, might open a country bank, but a set of persons, with a fortune sufficient to carry on the concern with security, were not permitted to do so.

40. The Ministry took upon themselves to prohibit any more stamps being issued to the country banks for £1 and £2 notes. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that those notes were to be deprecated as an infringement of the Act of 1819, which no man could deny was passed, if ever any Act was, with the unanimous approbation of all the parties of which Parliament was composed: an Act which had been solemnly resolved upon as the only measure which could enable the country to meet any future danger, by placing the circulating medium on a permanent and stable footing. No man could insinuate that that Act was not the result of the deliberate conviction of almost every individual of every party in that House. He then detailed the continual evil and insecurity of the small notes, and said that he always had regretted, and still regretted, the step taken by Parliament in 1822, which permitted them. The intention of the Government was, therefore, to suppress them as soon as possible in England, and subsequently in Scotland and Ireland. He moved a resolution, that no fresh notes were to be issued by country bankers in England under £5, and that those printed before the 5th of February, 1826, might be issued, re-issued, and circulated, until the 5th April, 1829, and no longer.

41. The opinions expressed in Parliament and the country were, of course, most conflicting, as to the causes of this great catastrophe, but the great preponderance of opinion was adverse to the small note issues. Mr. Baring, who defended the country bankers from the accusations levelled against them, said that their small notes were bad as a permanent system, and they ought to be called in. Even although they might sometimes be of almost indispensable use to the country, still, if the misery which had been caused by their use, among the poorer classes, was taken into consideration, it was a sufficient reason why the nuisance should be abated; and it was his opinion that the House had not got rid of this deluge of paper at the time when it had the power to do so, and that it had not resisted, as it ought to have resisted, the importunity of the country bankers. That these small notes should be abolished as soon as practicable.

42. Mr. Huskisson described the frightful nature of the panic during 48 hours (Monday and Tuesday, December 12 and

13), and said that it had been truly observed that the Bank, by its prompt and efficacious assistance, had put an end to the panic, and averted the ruin, which threatened all the banking establishments in London, and, through them, the banking establishments and monied men all over the country. The conduct of the Bank had been most praiseworthy, and had, in a great degree, saved the country from a general convulsion. The Bank, through its prompt, efficacious, and public-spirited conduct, had had the countenance, advice, and particular recommendation of the Premier and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He admitted that the commercial distress in Scotland was very great, but that did not prove that the system of Scotch banking did not afford greater securities than the English system, and that it was desirable to introduce it into this country. He then described the wild spirit of speculation which had seized the country, which produced a rise of prices so rapid as had never been equalled. He might mention, as an instance, the price of nutmegs, which rose in one month from 2s. 6d. to 12s. 6d. a lb., and speculation in other spices caused a corresponding rise in their prices. The mania extended equally to other articles of consumption; merchants, traders, shopkeepers, clerks, and apprentices partook equally of the frenzy of vying with each other in their endeavours to secure a monopoly of each article. And this state of things took its rise, not among the wild, insane, and bedlamite schemers, but among those who were considered the sober, steady, merchants and traders of the metropolis. And all this took place at a time when money was rapidly leaving the country. Now, if, when it was leaving the country so rapidly, it was still hawked about at a greatly lowered rate of interest, that showed there must be something wrong in the currency. And to what would any sober man say such a state of things must come to at last? The Bank, at last, was obliged to provide for its own safety, by narrowing its issues, which checked the spirit of speculation, and as a necessary result, those country banks which had been most rash and immoderate in aiding these speculations by advances, were ruined. The ruin of these bad and unstable banks had affected even the stability of the most solvent ones. A general panic ensued, and seven or eight hundred country banks had asked for assistance from the Bank of England. She had 700 or 800 drains for gold suddenly opened

upon her. Was this a safe or proper condition to leave the country in? Certainly not. It was his opinion, an opinion not hastily formed, but the result of long and anxious observation, that a permanent state of cash payments, and a circulation of one and two-pound notes could not co-exist. If there were in any country a paper and a coin currency of the same denomination, the paper and the coin could not circulate together, the paper would drive out the coin. Let crown notes be made, and a crown piece would never be seen, make half-crown notes, and no half-crowns would remain in circulation. Allow one-pound notes to circulate, and we should never see a sovereign. One of the great evils they were called on to correct was the excessive issue of paper. This had been the cause of the greatest distress, it had caused the ruin of thousands of innocent persons. Nothing but disgrace and danger could attend the deviation from the true principles of currency, which Parliament had solemnly recognised. If they wished to prove the value of a steady unchangeable currency, they had it in the example of France, which had twice been invaded by a foreign army, her capital had been taken, and she had been obliged to pay a large sum to foreign countries for corn, but she had a steady metallic currency, and, however much the great contractors might have suffered, the great body of the people had remained uninjured. This was due to the excellent footing upon which the currency of that country was established. If this measure was adopted, every country banker would be obliged to have as great a regard to the exchanges as the Bank of England, and be compelled to provide for his own safety, without leaning upon the Bank in times of danger. Now was the time to withdraw these small notes, when the bankers were smarting under the consequences of their over-issues. They had at present a large amount of gold and bank notes; if they allowed the favourable time to pass by, the small notes would soon be issued again. They had now got the gold in their coffers, and now was the time to provide that it should not be exported again. It would be advantageous to the public to have chartered joint stock banks, established under a proper system, with only a limited liability. This would, no doubt, induce many persons, of great fortune and credit, to take shares in them, but the Bank objected to the extension of limited liability, and had stipulated that the Banks

of Scotland and Ireland should not have this privilege. Some thought that the currency should be even more purely metallic than was now proposed, and that notes of a higher denomination should be suppressed. For himself, he entirely differed from Mr. Ricardo, as to the true basis of the currency, and he believed that if Mr. Ricardo, ingenious as he was, had been sole Director of the Bank of England, it would before now have stopped payment. He thought Mr. Ricardo's view of the currency quite erroneous.

43. Sir John Newport, as a banker himself, considered the issue of small notes to be most injurious to all connected with them, as affording the most dangerous facilities for extravagant speculation. It had been said that a considerable part of the commerce of the country could not be carried on if these notes were abolished. He was quite willing to accept that alternative, and abandon a portion of our commerce, rather than continue them. He did not believe that such would be the case. Now was the best time to abolish this pernicious system, when so many of the country bankers had failed.

44. Mr. Secretary Peel was convinced that the root of the evil lay in the monopoly of the Bank of England, and that if in the year 1793 a set of banks had existed in this country on the Scotch system it would have escaped the danger it was then involved in, as well as the calamity which had just occurred. In 1793 upwards of 100 banks had failed. In seven years, from 1810 to 1817, 157 commissions in bankruptcy were issued against country bankers; in the crisis which had just occurred 76 failures had taken place. But, from the different ways of making compositions, etc., the number of failures should probably be estimated at four times the number of the commissions of bankruptcy. What system could be worse, or more prejudicial to every interest in the country, than one which admitted of such an enormous amount of failures? Contrast what had been the case in Scotland, under a different system. Mr. Gilchrist, a manager of one of the Scotch banks, had been asked by the committee of 1819 how many failures there had been in Scotland within his recollection, and he said there had only been one, that the creditors had been paid 14s. in the pound im-

mediately, and finally the whole of their claims. These facts were a strong presumptive proof that the Scotch system, if not quite perfect, was at least far superior to the one existing in England. The present system of country banking was most prejudicial in every point of view. He then described the terrible misery caused by the failure of the country banks. He trusted that the institution of Joint Stock Banks would place the currency on a firmer footing. He most sincerely trusted that the great obstacle to the proposed institutions, the want of a charter, would be removed. He hoped the directors of the Bank of England would seriously consider what advantage they would derive from refusing charters to these banks. He himself could not imagine what benefit they would derive from it; they no doubt had the right to prevent such charters being granted, but he hoped they would refrain from exercising their right. He enlogised highly the conduct of the directors during the late crisis; he could not conceive it possible for any body of men to have acted better, or to have exercised more judgment, discretion, and liberality than they had done—of which he hoped they would give a further instance by not opposing the grants of charters to the proposed new banks. He fully concurred with Mr. Huskisson, that it was impossible to maintain coin in circulation if paper of the same denomination were allowed to circulate along with it. Now was the most favourable opportunity of getting rid of the small notes. It would be impolitic and unsafe to wait the moment of returning prosperity, as the country bankers would be more reluctant to agree to it, and more able to oppose it. To stand gazing on the bank in idle expectation, now that the river was passable, would be an irreparable mistake. The ministerial propositions prevailed by a majority of 222 to 39, and a motion to continue the small notes of the Bank of England was rejected by 66 to 7.

45. The chief provisions of the Act (Statute 1826, c. 6) for prohibiting small notes in England are as follows—

1. The Act repealing the Act (Statute 1777, c. 30) which prohibited promissory notes and bills under 20s. was repealed, thereby reviving the former Act; but all notes of private bankers stamped before the 5th of February, 1826, or of the Bank of England stamped before the 10th of October, 1826,

were exempted from its operation, and were permitted to be issued, re-issued, and negotiated until the 5th of April, 1829.

2. Any person after that date making, issuing, signing, or re-issuing any note or bill under £5, was subject to a penalty of £20.

3. Any person who published, uttered, or negotiated any promissory or other notes, or any negotiable or transferable bill, draft, or undertaking in writing, for the payment of 20s., or above that sum and less than £5, or on which such sum should be unpaid, should forfeit the sum of £20.

4. These penalties were not attached to any person drawing a cheque on his banker for his own use.

5. All promissory notes under £20, made payable to bearer on demand, were to be made payable at the Bank, or place where they were issued; and as many more places as the issuer pleased.

46. When the Government determined on suppressing the small note issues in England, they said that it was their intention to extend the measure in a short time to Scotland and Ireland. However much Scotland may have suffered from commercial overtrading, as every commercial country must occasionally do, no banking panic had ever occurred such as those which had so frequently desolated England. As soon as the ministerial intentions were known in Scotland, a great ferment was excited. Sir Walter Scott published three letters on the subject, under the name of "Malachi Malagrowther," which tended much to fan the public enthusiasm, and such an opposition was organised, that the Ministry were obliged to consent to appoint committees of both Houses on the subject. These committees sat during the spring of 1826, and investigated the whole subject of Scotch banking at great length, which had been very little understood in England before that time; and the result was so eminently favourable to the Scotch banking system, that the Ministry abandoned their intention of attempting to alter it. The evidence and reports of these committees will be noticed further on.

47. The year 1827 is memorable as the era when the principles of the Bullion Report were at length acknowledged to be

true, and professedly adopted by the Bank. Mr. William Ward stated in 1832 that there was not a single person in the Bank but who admitted that its issues should be regulated by the foreign exchanges and the bullion market, or disposed to act in opposition to it. That in 1819 the directors had forwarded a resolution to the House of Commons, denying that the exchanges were to be regarded in regulating the issues. Subsequently, however, to that year, opinions became changed, and they found the merits of the case such as they really were. He himself had always been convinced of the truth of Mr. Horner's principle, and, from his being connected with the exchanges, had many opportunities of observing the practical truth of it. The Bank Directors, however, were not convinced of it, because they found in practice, that the exchanges did not follow the issues of the Bank. But the truth was, that they neglected to consider the country issues, and it was only in 1819, that they obtained a correct account of the issues of country banks; when that was got, it was found that, taking the Bank and the country issues together, the principle was shown to be quite correct. The observation of these facts had gradually convinced the Directors, and, in 1827, he thought the court ripe for expunging the resolution of 1819, and it had accordingly been done. And in 1832 there was not a single director who disputed its truth.

48. Although the Act of 1775 had forbidden notes under £5 to be issued in England, it did not prohibit the circulation of the Scotch £1 notes in England, and they had always circulated in the districts adjacent to Scotland, and even as far south as York. When the English £1 notes were suppressed, it seemed naturally to follow that the circulation of the Scotch notes in England should be forbidden. But the districts in which they had always circulated, were as unanimous as Scotland itself against the measure. In 1828, the Ministry brought in a bill to restrain the circulation of Scotch bank notes in England. Sir James Graham presented a petition from the borderers, deprecating, in the most earnest terms, the withdrawal of the Scotch notes to which they had been so long accustomed. For seventy years, they said, they had possessed the advantage it was now sought to deprive them of—the advantage of the Scotch

currency. Seven-eighths of the rents of estates were paid in the paper currency of Scotland, and no loss had been sustained in consequence of it. After a debate of two nights, the motion was carried by 154 to 45. The Act (Statute 1828, c. 65) provided that after the 5th of April, 1829, no corporation or person whatever should publish, utter, negotiate, or transfer in any part of England, any promissory note, draft, engagement, or undertaking in writing, payable to bearer on demand, for less than £5, or upon which less than £5 remained unpaid, which should have been made or issued, or purport to have been made or issued, in Scotland or Ireland, or elsewhere out of England, under a penalty of not less than £5, or more than £20. The same exemption as to cheques as in the former Act.

49. In 1832, during the crisis of the Reform Bill, a run upon the Bank took place, which lasted for about a fortnight; but, as it was merely from political feeling in London, and did not extend into the country, no serious result ensued.

50. The Bank charter expired at the end of one year's notice, to be given after the 1st August, 1832, and this time the Bank had done no such services to the Government as to be in a position to demand from it a renewal of its monopoly several years before it expired. Moreover, these exclusive privileges, as Lord Liverpool said in 1825, were out of fashion. Many great monopolies were now on the eve of breaking up, and the public mind was more roused and enlightened on the subject of banking, from the discussions caused about the severe distress of 1825. Before taking any steps towards a renewal of the charter, the Government determined to have an inquiry before a Secret Committee of the House of Commons, which was appointed on the 22nd of May, 1832, and consisted of the following members—

Lord Althorp, Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, Mr. Goulburn, Sir James Graham, Mr. Herries, Mr. Poulett Thompson, Mr. Courtenay, Colonel Maberley, Sir Henry Parnell, Mr. Vernon Smith, Mr. John Smith, Mr. Roberts, Sir M. W. Ridley, Mr. Attwood, Sir J. Newport, Mr. A. Baring, Mr. Irving, Mr. Warburton, Mr. G. Philips, Lord Morpeth, Mr. Morrison, Mr. Heywood, Lord Ebrington, Sir J. Wrottesley, Mr. Lawley, Mr.

Cavendish, Alderman Wood, Mr. B. Carter, Mr. Strutt, Mr. Stanley, Alderman Thompson.

51. The Committee was appointed during the height of the political excitement attending the passing of the Reform Bill, and sat for some months, and did not make any report till the end of the Session. The inquiry was extremely incomplete. Many of the most interesting subjects connected with it were scarcely touched upon. But the close of the Session made them report the evidence to the House as far as it had gone. It was expected that a new committee would have been appointed in the new Parliament to continue the inquiry, but the Government in the meantime made up their mind as to the changes they intended to make in the Bank monopoly, and dispensed with any further inquiry.

52. Although the inquiry was left in a very incomplete state as to many branches of the subject, the evidence given embraced many interesting points. The most important of which were, the rules adopted by the Bank for regulating their issues—the expediency or the contrary of publishing their accounts—the expediency or the contrary of establishing Joint Stock Banks, or of having one or more Banks of Issue in the metropolis—the causes of the panic of 1825, and the action of the Bank during that period—the advantages, or the contrary, of making Bank notes legal tender, and the effects of the usury laws on commerce.

53. The great truths regarding the regulation of a paper currency, which had been approved of by the Bullion Committee were now unanimously recognised by the directors, and Mr. Horsley Palmer, the Governor of the Bank, being asked by what principle, in ordinary times, the Bank was guided in the regulation of its issues, said, that in a period of full currency, and, consequently, with a par of exchange, the Bank considered it desirable to invest two-thirds of its liabilities of all sorts in interest-bearing securities, and one-third in bullion. The circulation of the country being then regulated by the action of the foreign exchanges, the Bank was extremely desirous to avoid using any active power of regulating the

circulation, but to leave that entirely in the hands of the public. The action of the public was fully sufficient to rectify the exchanges without any forced action on the part of the Bank in buying or selling securities. He thought it desirable to keep the securities very nearly at the same amount, because then the public could always act for themselves in returning notes for bullion for exportation when the exchanges were unfavourable, and if there was a great influx of gold, the Bank could always re-assume its proportion by transferring part of the bullion into securities. He considered that the discount of private paper was one of the worst means which the Bank could adopt for regulating its notes, as it tended to produce a very prejudicial extension of their notes. He condemned strongly the practice of the Bank during the restriction with respect to the extensive discounts of mercantile paper at 5 per cent. when the market rate was much higher, which necessarily led to an excessive issue.

54. The great majority of the witnesses were in favour of a publication of the accounts of the Bank, as tending to inspire greater public confidence than the mystery in which they were then enveloped, and also acting as a check upon the directors themselves. Almost all the witnesses were against the establishment of joint stock banks in London, as they would tend to injure the private bankers. Considering the ideas of the age, when class interests were supreme, we need not be surprised at this unanimity of feeling; nor that it rather escaped the attention of the witnesses that it was not the interests of the private bankers, however respectable they were, that was the paramount consideration, *but what was best for the public good*. And still more decidedly were the witnesses opposed, with scarcely an exception, to the establishment of any new joint stock banks of issue in London. There was a very prevalent feeling that Bank of England notes should be made legal tender, as a means of allaying a drain on the country bankers for gold during a panic.

55. It was at this time that we may date the first prominent appearance of the great modern heresy, that bills of exchange and cheques form no part of the circulating medium or currency. As this unhappy doctrine, however, was much more emphatically

pronounced a few years later, we may defer considering it to that period. The committee pronounced no opinion of their own on the various points brought out in the evidence.

56. The harvest of 1832 was unusually abundant, which caused a great depression of the price of all sorts of agricultural produce towards the end of 1832, followed, of course, by "agricultural distress." This was brought before the notice of Parliament in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Session of 1833, and a committee was appointed to inquire into it. This distress afforded the irreconcilable enemies of the Act of 1819 another opportunity of attacking it. Mr. Attwood moved for a committee to inquire how far the present distress was connected with the monetary system. Lord Althorp immediately met the motion by an amendment, that any change in the monetary system which would have the effect of lowering the standard of value was inexpedient, which, after a debate of three nights, was carried by a majority of 304 to 49.

57. On the 31st May, 1833, Lord Althorp moved a series of resolutions for the renewal of the Bank Charter, one of which was, that so long as the Bank was bound to pay its notes in gold, Bank notes should be declared legal tender, except by the Bank itself. Several members wished for further delay to consider the resolutions, as the Session was nearly at an end; but Sir Robert Peel was decidedly of opinion that the House would be abandoning its duty if it consented to postpone the question. He was of opinion that it was desirable to continue the privileges of the Bank, and that there should be but one bank of issue in the metropolis, in order that it might exercise an undivided control over the issue of paper, *and give facilities to commerce in times of difficulty and alarm*, which it could not give with the same effect if it were subject to the rivalry of another establishment. He resisted, at great length, the proposition for making Bank notes legal tender, as a departure from the principle of the Act of 1819, and the true principles that should govern a paper currency. It was decided, by a majority of 316 to 83, to proceed with the consideration of the resolutions. The plan of making Bank notes legal tender gave rise to much difference of opinion, but was carried by 214 to 156.

58. We have already seen that the public had attempted, at various times, to form rival banking companies to the Bank of England, and in 1709 and 1742, the Bank Acts had been framed to stop up various loop-holes which had been successively discovered. In 1742, the phraseology used had been supposed to be quite effectual for that purpose. At that time, the custom of giving *notes* payable to bearer on demand to their customers in return for deposits, was considered so essentially the fundamental idea of banking, that to prohibit the giving of these notes was deemed an effectual bar upon carrying on the business of banking. But in process of time—about 1793—the London bankers discontinued issuing notes payable to bearer on demand. The Act of 1742 was considered to be so effectual a bar upon establishing banking companies in general, that for a long time it escaped public observation that the method of doing business by way of cheques enabled banking companies to elude the wording of the Act of 1742. In 1796, when, in consequence of the restrictive measures of the Bank of England, much distress was felt in London from the want of a circulating medium, an association of merchants and bankers was formed, for the purpose of providing a circulating medium which should not infringe the privileges of the Bank; the question was considered by them, in what the Bank's privileges of exclusive "banking" did consist, and they determined, "The privilege of exclusive banking enjoyed by the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, as defined by the Acts of Parliament under which they enjoy it, seems to consist in the power of *borrowing, owing, or taking up money on their bills or notes payable on demand.*" About the year 1822, some writers detected this flaw in the monopoly of the Bank, and maintained that a joint stock bank of deposit was no infringement of the Charter, and that such banks might be formed, and carry on a very successful business without issuing notes at all, but by merely following the practice of the London bankers by adopting cheques. Though this idea was much discussed in pamphlets at that period, no practical result ensued.

59. It is somewhat remarkable that the discovery should have been allowed to lie unfruitful for so long a period. When the Government first entered into negotiation with the Bank in 1833,

concerning the terms of the renewal of the Charter, they were persuaded, as well as the whole mercantile community, that the monopoly forbade banks of any description whatever, with more than six partners, being formed. In the course of the negotiation, however, this was brought under the notice of the Government, who took the opinion of their law officers on so important a point. The opinion of the Crown lawyers was that the clause did not prohibit joint stock banks of deposit being formed. The directors and proprietors of the Bank were much disturbed at finding this flaw in their monopoly, and requested the Government to have it rectified; but Lord Althorp said that the bargain was that their privileges should not be diminished, but he would not agree to any extension of them. In order to remove all doubts upon the subject, the Solicitor-General brought up a clause, by way of rider, declaring the right to form such banks. He said that the basis of the contract with the Bank was, that they were to enjoy whatever monopoly they already possessed, but nothing beyond it. He had examined the case with the utmost care, and there was no pretence for saying that such banks were an encroachment upon the monopoly of the Bank. The Bank, as originally founded, was a *bank of issue*, and the monopoly first granted in 1697 must be held to refer only to banks *ejusdem generis*. Such had been the uniform language of all the subsequent Acts. The clause upon which their monopoly rested was strictly confined to the issue of paper money. Banks of deposit were lawful at common law, and it rested with those who said it was forbidden to point out the Act which prohibited them.

60. The chief provisions of the Act were as follows (Statute 1833, c. 98)—

1. The Bank was continued as a Corporation, with such exclusive privileges of banking as was given by the Act, for a certain time, and on certain conditions, during which time no society or company exceeding six persons should make or issue in London, or within sixty-five miles thereof, any bill of exchange or promissory note, or engagement for the payment of money on demand, or upon which any person holding the same may obtain payment on demand. But country bankers might have an agency

in London for the sole purpose of paying such of their notes as might be presented there.

2. For the purpose of removing any doubts that might exist as to what the exclusive privilege of banking which the Bank of England enjoyed consisted in, it was enacted that any body politic or corporate, or society or company, or partnership, of whatever number they consisted, might carry on the business of banking in London, or within sixty-five miles thereof, provided that they did not borrow, owe, or take up in England any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof, during the continuance of the privileges of the Bank of England.

3. All the notes of the Bank of England, payable on demand, which should be issued out of London, should be payable at the place where they were issued.

4. Upon one year's notice, to be given within six months after the expiration of ten years from the 1st day of August, 1834, and repayment of all debts due by Parliament to the Bank, its privileges were to cease and determine at the end of the year's notice.

5. So long as the Bank paid its notes on demand in legal coin, they were declared to be legal tender of payment, except by the Bank itself, or any of its branches. No notes not made specially payable at any of the branches were liable to be paid there; but the notes issued at all the branches were to be payable in London.

6. Regulations about publishing its accounts, and exemptions of bills and notes not having more than three months to run, from the usury laws—these being altered now, need not be detailed.

7. The public were to pay off one-fourth part of the debt due to the Bank, and the proprietors might reduce the capital stock of the Bank by that sum if they chose.

8. In consideration of these privileges, the Bank was to give up £120,000 a year, from the sum they received for managing the public debt.

61. For several years after the renewal of the Bank Charter the harvests were unusually abundant, which caused all sorts of agricultural produce to be ruinously depressed. Wheat fell

continuously through 1834 and 1835, till, in the last week in December, 1835, its price was 36s. the imperial quarter. As all agricultural contracts were framed on the expectation that wheat would not be much less than 70s. the quarter, this long-continued depression produced the most severe distress. At the same time, however, all the manufacturing interests were in a state of unexampled prosperity from the abundance and cheapness of food. The long-continued low price of corn caused less to be sown in 1835, and the spring of 1836 was unfavourable. These causes combined to raise the price of wheat in 1836, and the harvest time being wet and cold, caused the price to rise to 61s. 9d. in the autumn.

62. The state of extraordinary prosperity enjoyed by the commercial interests during 1833-4-5, gave rise to an immense amount of speculation and dabbling in foreign loans, as if people seemed incapable of learning wisdom from the experience of 1825. The unexpected success of the first railway gave rise to a considerable amount of speculation in the formation of railways. An immense extension of the joint stock banking system economised capital to a great degree, and afforded the means of the most fatal extension of credit. On the 14th August, 1834, Lord Wharncliffe called the attention of the Ministry to the prodigious extension of joint stock banks and their branches, and the insufficient capital they were trading with. The important subject of joint stock banking was brought before the House of Commons in 1836, and a Committee was appointed to inquire into it. The Committee sat during the Session and made two reports, which will be noticed in a subsequent chapter. This fever of speculation reached its acme in the spring of 1836. Mr. Poulett Thompson, President of the Board of Trade, said in the House of Commons on the 6th of May, 1836—

“It is impossible not to be struck with the spirit of speculation which now exists in the country, but I believe that there is a great difference in the state of things and what took place in 1825. The spirit of speculation was then turned to foreign adventure of the most extraordinary description; but now speculation is directed to home objects, which, if pushed too far, may be very mischievous, though the consequences may not be quite so mischievous as in 1825. But, really, on turning to any

newspaper, or any price current, and observing the advertisements of joint stock companies upon every possible subject, however unfit to be carried on in the present state of society, every man must be struck with astonishment at the fever which rages at this moment for these speculations. I felt it my duty some time ago to direct a register to be kept, taking the names merely from the London and a few country newspapers, of the different joint stock companies, and of the nominal amount of capital proposed to be embarked in them. The nominal capital to be raised by subscription amounts to nearly £200,000,000 and the number of companies to between 300 and 400. . . . The greater part of these companies are got up by speculators, for the purpose of selling their shares. They bring up their shares to a premium, and then sell them, leaving the unfortunate purchasers, who are foolish enough to invest their money in them, to shift for themselves. I have seen also, with great regret, the extent to which joint stock banks have sprung up in different parts of the country. I believe, indeed, that great good has arisen from joint stock banks, but the observations I have made with regard to other companies, are equally applicable to many of the joint stock banks that are springing up in different parts of the country, and the existence of which can only be attended with mischief."

63. We have seen, that since the Bank of England had adopted the principles of the Bullion Report in 1827, the method they adopted of carrying them into effect, was to keep their "securities" as nearly as possible even, and to keep their bullion and cash equal to one-half the "securities;" the bullion, cash, and securities being together equal to their "liabilities." Having got the Bank into this position while the exchanges were at par, to throw any action either of increase or decrease of their issues of notes entirely upon the public, either by means of the foreign exchanges, or by an internal extra demand for gold. The Bank was got into this normal condition in October, 1833, when its "liabilities," *i. e.*, the issues and the deposits, were £32,900,000, the "securities" were £24,200,000 and the bullion £10,900,000. Some transactions with the East India Company and speculations in South American stock occurred to derange these proportions in 1834,

and caused an export of specie ; but in 1835, the foreign exchanges became favourable and the drain was arrested. But in the meantime the Bank had totally lost all power of preserving the proportion between the bullion, securities, and liabilities it had professed to adhere to. The following table, taken at intervals, will exhibit this very clearly—

Liabilities.		
1 Oct., 1833, £30,937,000 ...	{	Securities, £22,640,000 Bullion, £10,527,000
11 Mar., 1834, £31,372,000...	{	Securities, £24,777,000 Bullion, £8,901,000
15 July, 1834, £37,554,000...	{	Securities, £31,735,000 Bullion, £8,298,000
9 Sept., 1834, £31,058,000...	{	Securities, £26,643,000 Bullion, £7,010,000
13 Jan., 1825, £33,071,000...	{	Securities, £29,165,000 Bullion, £6,608,000
5 May, 1835, £29,417,000...	{	Securities, £26,179,000 Bullion, £5,951,000

This was the lowest point which the amount of bullion reached, and the drain was arrested. The above table shews how totally deranged the proportions were to what the directors considered to be a proper position for the Bank. From that time bullion continued to flow in, till, in March, 1836, it slightly exceeded eight millions ; but, even then, the securities were three times the bullion, instead of twice, as they ought to have been.

64. The amount of bullion in the Bank was at its height in March, 1836, and then began steadily to decline again ; in the middle of July it had fallen below six millions, when the Bank thought it was necessary to endeavour to stop it, and it raised the rate of discount to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.. This had no effect, however, in stopping the demand for discount. In September the bullion barely exceeded five millions, and the Bank raised the rate of discount to 5 per cent. Now the bubbles blown in the preceding year and spring of 1836 were fast bursting on all hands.

65. The drain on the coffers of the Bank proceeded at a rapid rate, both from external and internal causes. President

Jackson had determined that the Charter of the National Bank of the United States, which expired in 1836, should not be renewed, and that the currency of that country should be placed on a sounder footing than it had hitherto been, by forming a sound metallic basis. Operations to effect this purpose soon commenced. Immense quantities of American securities of all sorts were imported into England, and negotiated for the purpose of remitting the specie to America. The improperly low rate of discount in this country, favoured by the inordinate multiplication of Banks, enabled a great quantity of these securities of various descriptions to be realised in England, and the cash was remitted to America.

66. The joint stock banks had been blowing the bubble of credit to the utmost tenuity, by re-discounting most of the bills which they discounted. This practice largely increases the proportion of paper currency compared to the metallic basis, and, of course, adds to any peril in times of discredit. The Bank of England, at length, but too tardily, as has almost invariably been the case, awoke to the impending danger, and determined to strike a blow at the distended state of credit. It not only raised the rate of discount to five per cent. in August, but absolutely refused to discount any bills indorsed by any joint stock bank of issue. This was a great blow at the great amount of American securities afloat in the country, as most of those bills had been purchased by the joint stock banks, and re-issued with their indorsement upon them.

67. In the autumn of 1836, the symptoms of the coming storm were very apparent, especially in Ireland. One very large joint stock bank, the Agricultural and Commercial, was known to be in difficulties early in the autumn, and it made several applications to the other joint stock banks in Ireland, and England, and Scotland, for assistance, which they all refused. It also made a call upon its shareholders, which was not responded to. The other Irish banks, foreseeing a stoppage of the Agricultural and Commercial, had been laying in a stock of gold, to meet the run which would necessarily follow the failure of a bank with so many ramifications. The sum in gold which the Irish banks laid in, to provide for the run, was estimated to be not less than

£2,000,000, all of which came from the Bank of England. Much of this was required on account of the extraordinary differences of opinion that were given by the most eminent Irish counsel, as to whether the Bank of England notes were legal tender in Ireland. Three very eminent lawyers held that they were legal tender, and three equally eminent held that they were not. The Bank of Ireland itself thought they were not, and was still less inclined to make the experiment when there was such a difference of opinion among the lawyers. The other banks followed the example of the Bank of Ireland, and provided gold.

68. The catastrophe that had been foreseen took place on the 14th of November, when the Agricultural and Commercial Bank stopped payment, which was immediately followed by a general run upon all the Banks in Ireland; but it was well met, from the care which had been previously taken to provide specie. So great was the state of discredit, that even Bank of England notes were at a heavy discount in Dublin. The Bank of Ireland would only take them in very small quantities from their customers, at a discount of 2s. 6d. each. During all this time, the diminution of bullion in the Bank of England was going on rapidly. At the beginning of October, it had £5,035,000 in bullion, to meet £29,869,000 of liabilities; at the end of November its liabilities were £30,941,000, and its bullion £3,640,000. During December its bullion slightly increased, and in January diminished again. In November, the Northern and Central Bank, with its head office in Manchester, and thirty-nine branches in the manufacturing districts, became seriously embarrassed, and applied to the Bank of England for assistance, which the Bank at first refused; but, upon consulting the leading bankers in London, their opinion was that the stoppage of so extensive a concern in the manufacturing districts would very probably bring on a general panic. The Bank, therefore, determined to advance the sum of £500,000, to enable it to meet its engagements, which, upon subsequently discovering that these were much more extensive than had at first been represented, was further increased to the sum of £1,370,000. Early in January, a London banking house applied for assistance to the Bank, and, on the other London bankers giving their

guarantee to the Bank of England, it made advances sufficient to enable that house to meet its engagements. The difficulties attending the American houses, both in London and Liverpool, became now so pressing, that they also were obliged to apply to the Bank. Persons were appointed to look into their affairs, who represented that, if assistance were given them to meet their outstanding engagements, they would ultimately prove solvent. As an additional reason for granting this assistance, it was stated that if these American houses were permitted to stop payment, their concerns were so vast, and so extended throughout the north of England, that a general destruction of credit would ensue. After full consideration, the Bank determined to attempt to carry these houses through their embarrassments, and for this purpose, it advanced the enormous sum of £6,000,000. This great operation was, however, successful, though the final liquidation of the account was retarded by the great prostration of American credit in 1839. The advances made to the banking interests in England were all repaid, principal and interest, with one very trifling exception. The Bank thus followed, for a second time, the principles laid down by the Bullion Report and there can be no doubt averted a calamity only second in magnitude to the catastrophe of 1825.

69. The assistance of the Bank was only intended to be of a temporary nature, to give time for the gradual withdrawal of the great mass of unsound paper from circulation. This having been effected to a large extent, the result followed which always has been the case, and always must be the case—a great influx of gold, to fill the vacuum caused by the great annihilation of this paper currency. During the whole of 1837 bullion rapidly flowed into the Bank; and in December it reached the sum of ten millions and a half. The position of the Bank on the 13th of March, 1838, was as follows—

Liabilities.	
£31,573,000	{ Securities.....£21,046,000
	{ Bullion.....£10,527,000

Thus, after a long period of nearly five years, the Bank was at length brought back again into what the directors had laid down for themselves as the normal position; and it enabled credit to

pass through a crisis which would have been tenfold more severe— if it had not been met by that “judicious increase of accommodation” which the Bullion Report declared was the proper remedy for a temporary failure of credit.

70. From 1832 to 1837 there had been a series of seasons of remarkable abundance. For several years a series followed of extreme scarcity. The crop of 1838, was the worst that had been known since 1816; that of 1839 was scarcely, if at all, better. This great deficiency rendered it necessary to import foreign corn to the value of £10,000,000, a considerable portion of this required to be remitted in specie. But, just at this period, a number of other concurrent causes happened to create a great demand for gold for foreign countries. During the preceding years America, France, and Belgium, had carried the extension of paper credit to most extravagant lengths. In America, the fatal system of issuing Bank notes upon “property” and “securities” had been carried to a length almost worthy of Law. In France and Belgium joint stock banks had been extensively formed. This great extension of paper currency had the very same effect as the over issue of paper had in England; it drove bullion out of these countries, and was one of the causes which, together with the fortunate destruction of the extravagant paper credit in England in 1837, caused such an influx of gold in this country up to March, 1838. But in this latter year these bubbles burst. In the autumn of 1838 the Bank of Belgium failed, and a severe run upon the Banks at Paris took place. This revulsion of credit, and extinction of paper issues in those countries, caused a current of bullion to set in towards them which came from the Bank of England.

71. In the beginning of 1838, when the bullion in the Bank had been rapidly increasing for several months, the commercial world thought it was time for the Bank to make use of the treasure in its vaults. It accordingly reduced the rate of discount from 5 to 4 per cent., and was induced to send over one million of sovereigns to America, the exchanges being favourable to that country in consequence of the destruction of paper, to assist the American banks to resume payments in cash.

72. The bullion in the Bank kept a pretty even amount till December, 1838. On the 18th of that month the liabilities were £28,120,000, the securities £20,776,000, and the bullion £9,794,000. From this date a rapid and steady drain set in, which continued with unabated severity till October, 1839. When the Bank lowered its rate of discount to 4 per cent. in February, 1838, the market rate had fallen still lower, and in summer was about 3 per cent. From that time forward it began to rise, and at the end of the autumn was level with the Bank. While everything was symptomatic of an impending drain of bullion, the Bank on the 29th of November, suddenly lowered its rate to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for advances upon bills of exchange, East India bonds, Exchequer bills, and other approved securities. The market rate of interest was now decidedly higher than that of the Bank, and the consequence was an immediate pressure for accommodation on the Bank. The securities which, in December, 1838, were £19,536,000, mounted up in January, 1839, to £27,594,000, and the bullion fell from £9,522,000 to £8,826,000. The following table will exhibit clearly the progressive diminution of bullion—

	Liabilities.	Securities.	Bullion.
18 Dec. 1838	£28,120,000	£20,776,000	£9,794,000
1 Jan. 1839	28,156,000	22,377,000	9,048,000
15 Jan. „	30,305,000	24,529,000	8,336,000
12 Feb. „	26,939,000	22,628,000	7,047,000
12 March,,	26,088,000	22,143,000	6,580,000
9 April „	29,039,000	22,173,000	5,213,000
30 April „	26,475,000	24,536,000	4,455,000
14 May „	25,711,000	24,098,000	4,117,000

73. Up to this time the Bank seemed to have been struck with actual paralysis. Notwithstanding the continuous rise in the market rate of interest, and the unmistakeable drain of bullion that had set in, they, on the 28th of February, issued a notice continuing the same rates on the same securities as in the previous November. And it was not until the 16th May that they suddenly raised it to 5 per cent. The above figures show how completely the directors had belied their own principles of keeping their bullion at one-third of the liabilities. The market rate had advanced considerably more rapidly, so that the Bank was

yet below it. The drain still continued. On the 28th May the bullion stood at £3,910,000, and the liabilities upwards of twenty four millions and a half; but the Directors seemed so utterly blind that, on the 30th May, the time of shutting the books for the dividends, they still offered advances at 5 per cent. till the 23rd July on the same securities as have been last mentioned. However, on the 20th June, they at last became alarmed, and issued notices that the rate of discount would be $5\frac{1}{2}$ and no securities would be received except bills of exchange.

74. On the 16th July the liabilities were £28,860,000, the securities £28,846,000, and the bullion £2,987,000. The Directors at last awoke to the fact that the Bank was rapidly drifting into bankruptcy. On the 13th July they gave notice that they would be ready to receive tenders for the purchases of some terminable annuities, but the minimum price they fixed was so high that no sale took place.

75. Besides raising the rate of discount in May, the Bank sold public securities to the amount of £760,000, and it authorised bills upon Paris to be drawn to its account to the amount of £600,000. These measures had the effect for a short time of arresting the drain. But when these bills came to maturity the Bank was in no better position to meet them, and it then became necessary to create a larger credit in Paris to meet the first. The position of the Bank was, of course, well known to all the foreign dealers in exchange, and in June it was generally expected abroad that the Bank could not maintain payments in specie. In consequence of this, all long-dated bills upon this country were sent over for immediate realisation, and the values withdrawn as speedily as possible. To counteract this drain, as well as to meet the payments of the first credit which had been created on behalf of the Bank, it was obliged, in July, to organise a measure of a much larger nature. Messrs. Baring entered into an agreement with twelve of the leading bankers in Paris, to draw bills upon them to the amount of upwards of £2,000,000; and as each of them had only a fixed credit at the Bank of France, that Bank agreed to honour their acceptances in case they should be presented there and exceed their usual limits. An operation of a similar nature to the amount of £900,000 was

organised with Hamburg. As soon as any bill was drawn on account of one of these operations, the Bank transferred an equal amount of the annuities it had offered for sale in July to two trustees, one for the drawers and the other for the acceptor. Out of this second credit the bills which fell due from the creation of the first credit were paid. This measure had the effect of gradually arresting the drain of bullion, which reached its lowest point in the week ending the 2nd September, 1839, when it was reduced to £2,406,000. From that time it began slowly to increase; and in the last week of the year it stood at £4,532,000, the liabilities being £23,864,000, and the securities £22,098,000. The operations ensuing from this foreign credit extended over nine months, from July, 1839, to April, 1840, and the highest amount operated upon was in November, 1839, when it was £2,900,000.

76. The figures we have quoted, shewing the proportions between the bullion and the liabilities of the Bank, are sufficient to shew either that there was some natural impossibility in adhering to the rule the directors had laid down for their guidance in 1832, or that they had not sufficient firmness to contract their securities in time of pressure to maintain it. The flagrant disproportion which these figures had assumed, which would scarcely be safe in an ordinary banking house, but which were to the last degree perilous in the Bank of England, which was known to be the last resource of every bank in the kingdom in times of difficulty, turned the attention of writers to devise some plan, by which, if possible, the Bank should be compelled to maintain the proper proportions between bullion and liabilities. Colonel Torrens appears to have been the originator of the idea, which was eventually adopted, of dividing the Bank into two distinct departments, independent of each other; one for the purpose of issuing a regulated amount of notes, and the other for carrying on the business of banking. This plan was first started in 1837, and was much canvassed and discussed by several eminent writers on the subject, such as Mr. Tooke, Mr. Norman, and others; and we shall see was afterwards one of the most prominent features in Sir Robert Peel's Act of 1844, and we shall reserve to its proper place the account of the plan which was ultimately adopted. The great commercial and monetary

crisis the country had passed through, within the few preceding years, attracted much public attention, and several petitions were presented to Parliament; and in March, 1840, the Government determined to institute an inquiry into the whole system of paper issues. On the 10th of that month the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved for a Committee for that purpose. He reminded the House that the Bank Charter would terminate in 1844, and he thought it expedient that they should not postpone inquiry into the subject till the last moment. That whatever might be the difference of opinion among the most intelligent men, as to what part of the difficulties they had gone through were to be attributed to the Bank of England, or other Banks, still they were very strongly of opinion that the present system required revision and alteration. Leaving out of consideration former transactions, the difficulties and embarrassments which the country had gone through, within the last few years, had led the most important bodies, and the largest of the manufacturing towns, to make complaints—in calm and temperate language—and to express an anxiety that the House should institute an investigation into their complaints, and endeavour to provide adequate remedies. The chief points of interest connected with the report and evidence are—

1. That the principle propounded in 1832 for the management of the Bank, for the purpose of conforming with the principles of the Bullion Report, was totally condemned.

2. The great modern heresy, that bills of exchange form no part of the circulating medium, or currency, which was first asserted before a Parliamentary Committee in 1832, was now maintained by the great majority of the commercial and banking witnesses.

3. This seems to have been the first adoption by mercantile men of the theory, which is the reigning banking fallacy of the present day, which is now known by the name of the "Currency Principle." The principle shortly stated is this—*That when Bank notes are permitted to be issued, the number in circulation should always be exactly equal to the coin which would be in circulation if they did not exist.* The advocates of this principle maintain that it is the only true mode of regulating a paper currency, and preserving the paper of equal value with the gold coin. This theory sounds remarkably specious and plausible

and, from the eminence of the persons who have been converted to it, has acquired much importance. Nevertheless, we affirm that there never was a greater delusion palmed off upon the credulity of mankind, and that it never could have emanated from, or be believed in by, any one who had the slightest knowledge of banking accounts.

77. The rule for managing the Bank so as to conform to the principles of the Bullion Report, which had been considered as the acme of wisdom by all the witnesses before the Committee of 1832, was thus spoken of by Mr. S. J. Loyd, now Lord Overstone—"The rule of keeping a fixed amount of securities, it is true, has been suggested by the Bank herself for her guidance: but the folly has consisted entirely in the suggestion of such a rule, and not in the departure from it." (Q. 2904.) And again (Q. 2907)—"First for the simple and exclusive purpose of regulating the circulation of the country, it leaves us without any rule whatever: and accordingly we find by the published returns that no fixed relation exists between the amount of bullion and the amount of circulation. Second, the circulation may decrease while the bullion is increasing, or it may increase whilst the bullion is decreasing. We have had practical examples of each kind within the last few years. Third, the bullion, *through the demands of the depositors may leave the Bank coffers in large amounts; IN FACT IT MAY BE WHOLLY DRAINED OUT WITHOUT ANY CONTRACTION OF THE CIRCULATION, and, therefore, without any effect being produced on prices or foreign exchanges, by means of which the drain may be checked.*"

This passage deserves the closest attention, because the Bank Act of 1844 was expressly devised for the purpose of preventing such a thing, and we shall see shortly how far it was effectual for this purpose.

78. Nothing can be more wearisome than to read through the enormous mass of heterogeneous questions heaped upon one another, without aim or drift, tending to no result, and capable of producing none. Nothing can be more humiliating than the contrast between the Bullion Committee of 1810 and the Committee of 1840. The Bullion Committee were masters of the science; they knew how to govern the direction of the

inquiry, to cross-examine the witnesses, and make them expose their own fallacies, by involving them in contradictions and inconsistencies. And, when the witnesses had given their opinions, the Committee were able to judge and decide upon the value of the testimony, and the result was the complete demolition of the opinions of the great majority of the witnesses. But, in the Committee of 1840, the want of a presiding mind is painfully conspicuous. They were totally destitute of any knowledge of the principles of the science of banking; and after having protracted the inquiry through two Sessions, they were obliged to come to the humiliating confession of their own incompetence to frame a report on the evidence given, and to suggest to Parliament the expediency of appointing a commission for that purpose!

79. From 1838 there ensued a dismal series of four bad harvests in succession, which were attended with much suffering to the people; high prices of corn, and, as a natural consequence, large importations of foreign corn, and a very low amount of bullion in the Bank. In fact, the alleged rule of 1832 was a complete dead letter, and it was not till the 27th of August, 1842, that these proportions were again attained, when the liabilities stood at £29,022,000, and the bullion at £9,729,000. The crops of 1842-3-4 were prodigiously abundant—the latter more so than any for ten years preceding. The consequences of this, as well as other circumstances which happened at that time to economise the capital of the country, produced a cycle of years of great apparent prosperity, but which ended in the great revulsion of 1847. This latter part is beyond the limits of this Chapter. The bullion in the Bank continued steadily and rapidly to accumulate until, in December, 1843, it reached a higher limit than it had ever done before, being £14,982,000, and continued to increase after that until the passing of the Act of 1844.

CHAPTER X.*

FROM THE BANK ACT OF 1844 TO THE PRESENT TIME.

1. On the 6th May, 1844, Sir Robert Peel moved a resolution of the House, that it was expedient to continue for a limited time certain of the privileges then enjoyed by the Bank of England, subject to any conditions that might be passed by any Act for that purpose. In bringing this resolution forward, he gave a preliminary sketch of the evils of the paper currency as it then stood, and the methods he proposed for placing it on a sounder footing. After dwelling on the importance of a metallic standard, and exposing the absurdity of the theories which were so prevalent during the Restriction Act, and the advantage of having a single standard of value, he addressed himself to the more immediate subject for consideration—the state of the paper circulation of the country, and the principles which ought to regulate it—"I must state, at the outset, that, in using the word money, I mean to designate by that word the coin of the realm, and promissory notes payable to bearer on demand. In using the words paper currency, I mean only such promissory notes. I do not include in these terms bills of exchange, or drafts on bankers, or other forms of paper credit. There is a natural distinction, in my opinion, between the character of a promissory note payable to bearer on demand, and other forms of paper credit, and between the effects which they respectively produce upon the price of commodities, and upon the exchanges. The one answers all the purposes of money, passes from hand to hand without indorsement, without examination, if there be no suspicion of forgery; and it is, in fact, what its designations imply it to be, currency, or circulating medium. . . . I think experience shews that the paper currency, that is, the promissory notes payable to bearer on demand, stands in a certain relation to the gold coin and the foreign exchanges, in which other forms of paper credit do not stand. There are striking

examples of this, adduced in the Report of the Bullion Committee of 1810, in the case both of the Bank of England and of the Irish and Scotch Banks. In the case of the Bank of England shortly after its establishment there was a material depreciation of paper in consequence of its excessive issue. The notes of the Bank of England were at a discount of 17 per cent. After trying various expedients, it was at length determined to reduce the amount of Bank notes outstanding. The consequence was an immediate increase in the value of those which remained in circulation, the restoration of them to par, and a corresponding improvement in the foreign exchanges. In the case of Ireland, in 1804 the exchange with England was extremely unfavourable. A Committee was appointed to consider the causes. It was denied by most of the witnesses from Ireland that they were at all connected with excessive issues of Irish notes. . . . In the spring of 1804 the exchange of Ireland with England was so unfavourable, that it required £118 10s. of the notes of the Bank of Ireland to purchase £100 of the notes of the Bank of England. Between the years 1804 and 1806 the notes of the Bank of Ireland were reduced from £3,000,000 to £2,410,000, and the effect of this, taken in conjunction with an increase of the English circulation, was to restore the relative value of Irish paper, and the exchange with England to par. In the same manner an unfavourable state of the exchange between England and Scotland has been more than once corrected by a contraction of the paper circulation of Scotland. In all these cases the action has been on that part of the paper credit of the country which has consisted of promissory notes payable to bearer on demand. There had been no interference with other forms of paper credit, nor was it contended then, as it is now contended by some, that promissory notes are identical in their nature with bills of exchange, and with cheques on bankers, and with deposits, and that they cannot be dealt with on any separate principle."

2. There is no need now of saying anything more regarding the unhappy heresy with which Sir Robert Peel was then infected, that nothing but Bank notes are paper currency, because we have nothing new to say. But it is impossible to imagine anything more inaccurately stated as historical evidence

to support his ideas. In the first place, he committed the immense error of omitting to consider that, in the English and Irish cases, these things happened when the English and Irish Bank notes were *not* payable to bearer on demand, when they were, in fact, inconvertible. In his statement regarding the Bank of England he relied upon the Bullion Report. Now, we have shewn, by the most incontrovertible evidence, in Chapter VIII., that this passage of the Bullion Report is the most amazing mass of chronological error and confusion that can be imagined. It was not the profuse issues of Bank notes that depressed the exchanges, but the *badness of the coin*; it was not taking Bank notes out of circulation that brought the exchanges to par, but the *restoration of the coinage*, and the exchanges were brought to par nine months before the Bank note was brought to par. Hence, in this case, the statement that the excessive issues of Bank notes caused the exchanges to fall, and the withdrawal of them restored them to par, has not a shadow of a foundation in truth. Hence, there is no truth whatever in saying that the action was upon the Bank notes—the action was simply and solely on the *silver coinage*. The Irish case is equally inapplicable, because the notes were then inconvertible, and they were the medium in which payment of bills of exchange was made; and then, unquestionably, an excessive quantity of them depressed the exchanges prodigiously; but how does such a case apply to notes strictly convertible? The Scotch case is equally inapplicable—which will be explained in the following chapter, for the notes were *not* payable to bearer on demand, but six months after demand. Consequently, of these three examples, the first is wholly inaccurate, and the other two are wholly inapplicable to the case he had in hand.

3. He then proceeded to expatiate on the evils of unlimited competition of issues—

“Are the lessons of experience at variance with the conclusion we are entitled to draw from reason and from evidence? What has been the result of unlimited competition in the United States? In the United States the paper circulation was supplied, not by private bankers, but by joint stock banks, established on principles apparently the most satisfactory. There was every precaution taken against insolvency, unlimited responsibility of

partners, excellent regulations for the publication and audit of accounts, immediate convertibility of paper into gold. If the principle of unlimited competition, controlled by such checks, be safe, why has it utterly failed in the United States? How can it be shewn that the experiment was not fairly made in that country? Observe this fact, while there existed a central Bank (the United States Bank) standing in some such relation to the other banks of the United States as the Bank of England stands to the banks in this country, there was some degree (imperfect, it is true) of control over the general issues of paper. But when the privileges of the central Bank ceased, when the principle of free competition was left unchecked, then came, notwithstanding professed convertibility, immoderate issues of paper, extravagant speculation, and the natural consequences, suspension of cash payments, and complete insolvency. Hence I conclude, that reason, evidence, and experience, combine to demonstrate the impolicy and danger of unlimited competition in the issue of paper."

4. It is impossible to say which is the more remarkable in this extract—the evidence Sir Robert Peel omitted, or the evidence he adduced. The first thing that strikes us is—What was the need of crossing the Atlantic in search of an example of joint stock banks, with unlimited competition of issues? Why did he not cross the Tweed? On the north side of the Tweed there had existed joint stock banks, with unlimited issues, for 150 years, and no central bank to control the others; the principle of free competition was left unchecked, and the natural consequences, "suspension of cash payments, and complete insolvency," had never occurred. But Sir Robert Peel carefully avoided saying one word about that case, and the reason was that it militated against the theory he was determined to carry at all hazards, *that of one Central Bank of Issue.*

5. But the evidence he adduced was as great a misrepresentation of historical fact as what we have quoted in Section 2. The American Banks, indeed, established on principles the most satisfactory! why John Law was the parent of American banking! They were a formal adoption of the wild theories of Law. However, we cannot fully expose the fallacy of Sir Robert

Peel's views of American banking until a subsequent chapter; but as to the fact of the Central Bank of the United States exercising any due controlling influence over the other Banks, we will only quote a passage from President Van Buren's message to Congress, 1839—

“I am aware it has been urged that the control (over the operations of the local Banks) may be best attained and exerted by means of a National Bank. *The history of the late National Bank, through all its mutations, shews that it was not so.* On the contrary, it may, after a careful consideration of the subject be, I think safely stated, that at every period of banking excess it took the lead; that in 1817 and 1818, in 1823, and in 1833, and in 1834, its vast expansions, followed by distressing contractions, led to those of the State institutions. It swelled and maddened the tides of the banking system, but seldom allayed or safely directed them. At a few periods only was a salutary control exercised, but an eager desire, on the contrary, exhibited for profit in the first place; and if afterwards its measures were severe towards other institutions, it was because its own safety compelled it to adopt them. It did not differ from them in principle or in form; its measures emanated from the same spirit of gain; it felt the same temptation to over-issues; it suffered from, and was totally unable to avert, those inevitable laws of trade, by which it was itself affected equally with them, and at least on one occasion, at an early day, it was saved only by extraordinary exertions from the same fate that attended the weakest institution it professed to supervise. In 1837 it failed equally with others in redeeming its notes, though the two years allowed by its charter had not expired, a large amount of which remains at the present time outstanding.”

Such was the language held by the Government regarding that institution to whose abolition Sir Robert Peel attributed the destruction of American credit! and if we were to descend from the evidence of the Executive to that of the most eminent private commercial writers, such as Mr. Galatin, Mr. Lee, Mr. Appleton, and others, we shall find that the most reckless mismanagement was the chief characteristic of that Bank. So much for the value of it as an argument in support of Sir Robert Peel's views.

6. Sir Robert Peel then said that some contended—and he ^{was} not prepared to deny the proposition—that if we had a ^{new} state of society to deal with, the wisest plan would be to ^{claim} for the State the exclusive privilege of the issue of promissory notes, as we have claimed for it the exclusive privilege of coining. They considered that the State is entitled to the whole profits ^{to} be derived from that which is the representative of coin, ^{and} that if the State had the exclusive power of issuing paper, ^{there} would be established a controlling power which would ensure, ^{as} far as possible, an equilibrium in the currency. Is it necessary to point out the gross and ludicrous fallacy of Sir Robert Peel in this sentence? It is the height of incorrectness to say ^{that} the State has the exclusive power over the coinage, or at least, that she has reserved it to herself. Ever since the reign of Charles II., every private person has the right to have bullion coined at the Mint; formerly both gold and silver, to an unlimited extent. Since 1816 this privilege is confined to gold coin. At this moment all persons are entitled to have as much gold bullion as they please coined at the Mint; the only thing the State reserves to itself is the privilege of *coining* it so as to insure its being of a certain weight and fineness. But in what way is this analogous to the issue of promissory notes? The only duty of the State is to take measures that those who issue notes shall be in a condition to fulfil their promise of payment on demand. He then stated it was the intention of the Government to increase as much as possible the power of a single bank of issue, and that bank should be the Bank of England. The Bank was, therefore, to continue its privileges of issue, but it was to be divided into two departments, the one for the purpose of issuing notes, and the other for the ordinary business of banking. But the Bank was to be deprived, once for all, of the power of unlimited issues. These were to take place in future on two foundations only: 1st, a fixed amount of public securities; and 2ndly, bullion. The amount of issues upon public securities was permanently fixed at £14,000,000; every other note was to be issued in exchange for bullion only, so that the amount of the notes issued on bullion should be governed solely by the action of the public. Although Sir Robert Peel wished that there should only be a single bank of issue, yet existing interests were to be regarded; and those banks which were at that time

awfully issuing their own notes might remain banks of issue ;
but their amount was to be strictly limited to a certain definite
average. There were other details concerning joint stock banks
which we shall reserve.

7. On the 20th of May, Sir Robert Peel introduced his further resolutions, and proposed that, in the event of any country banks of issue failing, or withdrawing their notes voluntarily from circulation, the Bank might, with the consent of the Crown, increase its issues to a definite proportion of the notes thus withdrawn. And further, that the Bank should be obliged to buy all gold bullion presented for purchase at £3 17s. 9d. per ounce (the Bank had been giving only £3 17s. 6d.), and a certain proportion was allowed to be on silver bullion, as the export of that was a proper remedy for the inconvenience of our standard differing from that of other nations. It was, therefore, of great importance to ensure such a stock of silver in this country, as might meet the wants of merchants, and prevent them having to send to the Continent for it. He proposed that the silver bullion upon which the Bank might issue notes should not exceed one-fourth of the gold bullion.

8. It was impossible for Sir Robert Peel not to see the inconsistency of his measure of 1844, with his expressed sentiments in 1819 and 1833, that it was inexpedient to limit the issues of the Bank to any fixed amount, because there were times of commercial difficulty, when an increased issue of notes might be the proper remedy. There is no doctrine more strenuously insisted on by the Bullion Report, by the statesmen of 1819, as well as by the Government in 1833, and Sir Robert Peel himself, at both these periods, than that it was impossible to fetter the discretion of the Bank in its issues. Sir Robert Peel knew that he was now taking away this power from the Bank altogether, and, accordingly, he was obliged to meet this objection. He said—

“It is said that the Bank of England will not have the means which it has heretofore had of supporting public credit, and of affording assistance to the mercantile world in times of commercial difficulty. Now, in the first place, the means of supporting credit are not means exclusively possessed by banks. All

who are possessed of unemployed capital, whether bankers or not, and who can gain an adequate return by the advance of capital, are enabled to afford, and do afford, that aid which it is supposed by some that banks alone are enabled to afford. In the second place, it may be a question, whether there be any permanent advantage in the maintenance of public or private credit, unless the means of maintaining it are derived from the *bonâ fide* advance of capital, and not from a temporary increase of promissory notes, issued for a special purpose. Some apprehend that the proposed restriction upon issue will diminish the power of the Bank to act with energy at the period of monetary crisis and commercial alarm and derangement. But the object of the measure IS TO PREVENT (so far as legislation can prevent) the recurrence of those evils from which we suffered in 1825, 1836, and 1839. IT IS BETTER TO PREVENT THE PAROXYSM than to excite it, and trust to desperate remedies for the means of recovery."

Sir Robert Peel, therefore, deliberately took away the power of the Bank to act on extreme occasions, under the impression that his Act would prevent these extreme occasions from arising. We shall see how his hope was fulfilled.

9. Sir Charles Wood followed Sir Robert Peel, travelling over the same ground, and giving the same caricatured description of American banking as he had done; moreover, he also was infected with what is known by the name of the "currency principle"—

"It is not enough, then, to enact that the Bank notes shall be convertible. The paper circulation must not only be convertible, but must vary in amount from time to time as a metallic circulation would vary. A system, therefore, of paper circulation is required, which will attain this object, and insure a constant and steady regulation of the issues on this principle. This, and this alone, affords a permanent security for the practical convertibility of the notes at all times, and for the consequent maintenance of the standard."

10. The bill was read a second time, after a feeble opposition, by a majority of 185 to 30. It passed through the House of Lords with a very short debate, and no division. Lord Radnor

alone protested against it, and it received the Royal Assent on the 19th of July, 1844.

11. The chief provisions of this Act are as follows (Statute 1844, c. 32)—

1. That, after the 31st August, 1844, the issue of Bank notes by the Bank of England should be kept wholly distinct from the general banking business, and be conducted by such a committee of the directors as the Court might appoint, under the name of the "Issue Department of the Bank of England."

2. That, on the same day, the Governor and Company should transfer, appropriate, and set apart, to the issue department securities to the value of £14,000,000, of which the debt due by the public to the Bank was to be a part; and also so much of the gold coin and gold and silver bullion as should not be required for the banking department. The issue department was then to deliver over to the banking department an amount of notes exactly equal to the securities, coin, and bullion so deposited with them. The Bank was then forbidden to increase the amount of securities in the issue department; but it might diminish them as much as it pleased, and increase them again to the limit defined, but no further. The banking department was forbidden to issue notes to any person whatever, except in exchange for other notes, or such as they received from the issue department in terms of the Act.

3. The proportion of silver bullion, in the issue department, on which notes were to be issued, was not at any time to exceed one-fourth part of the gold coin and bullion held at the time by the issue department.

4. All persons whatever, from the 31st August, 1844, were to be entitled to demand Bank notes in exchange for standard gold bullion, at the rate of £3 17s. 9d. per ounce.

5. If any banker who, on the 6th May, 1844, was issuing his own notes, should cease to do so, it should be lawful for the Crown, in Council, to authorise the Bank to increase the amount of securities in the issue department to any amount not exceeding two-thirds of the amount of notes withdrawn from circulation.

6. Weekly accounts in a specified form were to be transmitted to Government, and published in the next *London Gazette*.

7. From the same date the Bank was relieved from all stamp duty on their notes.

8. The annual sum payable by the Bank for their exclusive privileges should be increased from £120,000, as settled in 1833, to £180,000. And all profits derived by the Bank from the increase of their issues above the £14,000,000, as prescribed by the Act, shall go the public.

9. After the passing of the Act, no person other than a banker who was lawfully issuing his own notes on the 6th May, 1844, should issue Bank notes in any part of the United Kingdom.

10. After the passing of the Act, it was forbidden to any banker *to draw, accept, make, or issue, in England or Wales, any bill of exchange, or promissory note, or engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand, or to borrow, owe, or take up in England or Wales, any sum or sums of money, on the bills or notes of such banker, payable to bearer on demand,* except such bankers as were on the 6th May, 1844, issuing their own Bank notes, who were allowed to continue their issues in such manner, and to such extent, as afterwards provided. The rights of any existing firm were not to be affected by the withdrawal, change, or addition of any partner, provided the whole number did not exceed six persons.

11. Any banker who ceased to issue his own notes from any reason whatever, after the Act, was not to resume such issues.

12. All existing banks of issue were forthwith to certify to the commissioners of stamps and taxes, the place, and name, and firm, at and under which they issued notes during the twelve weeks next preceding the 27th April, 1844. The commissioners were then to ascertain the average amount of each bank's issues, and it should be lawful for such banker to continue his issues to that amount, provided that on an average of four weeks they were not to exceed the average so ascertained.

13. If any two or more banks of issue had become united during that twelve weeks, the united bank might issue notes to the aggregate amount of each separate bank.

14. The commissioners were to issue in the *London Gazette* a statement of the authorised issues of each bank.

15. If two or more banks afterwards become united, each of less than six partners, then the commissioners might authorise them to issue notes to the amount of their separate issues. But

if the number of the United Bank exceeded six, their privilege of issuing notes was to cease.

16. If any banker exceeded his authorised issues he was to forfeit the excess.

17. Every bank of issue was to send a weekly account of its issues, which was to be published in the *London Gazette*.

18. The mode of taking the average was laid down, and bankers were to permit their books of account to be inspected by a Government officer properly appointed, and to make a return to Government once every year, within the first fortnight in January.

19. The Bank of England was allowed to compound with private banks of issue, to withdraw their own notes, and issue Bank of England notes, for a sum not exceeding one per cent. per annum, up to the 1st August, 1856.

20. All banks whatever in London, or within 65 miles of it, were allowed after the passing of the Act, to draw, accept, or indorse bills of exchange, not being payable to bearer on demand.

21. The privileges of the Bank were to continue till twelve months' notice, to be given after the 1st August, 1855; and repayment of the public debts, and all other debts whatever.

12. Such are the leading provisions of Sir Robert Peel's Act, which was meant to carry out a particular theory of currency, which we have no hesitation in affirming is one of the most stupendous delusions on the subject that any one ever conceived. A theory as opposed as possible to the opinions of all the greatest authorities on the subject, during the great discussions on the currency in 1804, 1811, and 1819, which we have already abundantly quoted in the former part of this volume. But the most remarkable circumstance is that the Act authorises the most flagrant violation of the principle it is intended to enforce; for the issuing of notes upon the public funds is the most vicious principle possible. It is the theory of John Law, which we shall more fully consider in a subsequent chapter. Indeed, so utterly blind was one of the most distinguished advocates of this theory to the true nature of monetary science, that he boasted that, "practically considered, fluctuations in the rate of interest, and in the state of commercial credit, so far as

they can result from alteration in the value of the currency, may, under the operation of the proposed system, be taken ~~at~~ nihil."¹

13. The avowed object of the Act of 1844 was to take the regulation of the currency out of the hands, or even the power, of the directors of the Bank of England. The incorrigible mismanagement of that body had, in the opinion of every body, aggravated every crisis. The authors of the Act of 1844 flattered themselves that for every five sovereigns that left the country, a five-pound note must be withdrawn from circulation. We shall see hereafter how this expectation was fulfilled. In the meantime, Sir Robert Peel himself and all the supporters of the Act, gave out that it was the complement of the Act of 1819, though we confess we do not clearly see the meaning of the phrase. If, however, they mean to say that it was in the spirit of the Act of 1819, or of the statesmen of that period, we wholly deny such to be the fact, and to suppose so, only argues the most profound ignorance of the doctrines of the authors of the Act of 1819.

14. The issues of notes, then, of the Bank of England, are founded upon two of the most fatal delusions that ever prevailed on the subject of the paper currency; the one the theory of John Law, and the other the "Currency Principle," which came into fashion about thirty years ago.

15. We have observed, in the last chapter, that, owing to the good harvests of 1842-3-4, the Bullion in the Bank accumulated very rapidly during these years, and a very large quantity of money, which the nation must otherwise have spent in food, was set free for commercial purposes. Other circumstances occurred at the same time to liberate a large quantity of the capital of the country from its accustomed use, and to render it applicable to commercial purposes, which have been very clearly and abundantly pointed out by Mr. James Wilson. He shews that the rapidity and certainty of conveyance reduces very greatly the amount of stock it is necessary at all times to keep on hand when communications are slow and uncertain. That the amount of

goods in transit is much larger with a slow conveyance than a quick one. For example, when Manchester supplies London with manufactured goods—if it takes seven days by canal for these goods to reach London, it is clear that there must always be seven days' consumption of goods on the way. If the same transit is accomplished by railway in one day, it is only necessary to have one day's consumption on the way; and the capital employed in producing the other six days' consumption is liberated, and may be employed in promoting other commercial operations. When we consider the enormous economy of capital required in the transaction of the same amount of business which was effected by the introduction of more rapid modes of communication, whether by railways or steamboats, we shall understand how greatly they increased the national resources. There can be no doubt that the economy of national capital effected by the extension of railways far exceeded the losses which occurred from unsuccessful speculation in them. Now, these operations were beginning to have their full effect in saving the national capital, simultaneously with the good harvests of 1842-3-4, and helped to swell the quantity of disposable capital to an unprecedented extent.

16. An attentive consideration of these circumstances is absolutely necessary, because they shew, if anything were necessary to shew it, the gigantic error committed by many writers, who think that the prices of goods must vary exactly with any increase or decrease of the amount of the currency, whereas there is no necessary relation between the two whatever. The particular methods of doing business have the most important influence on the quantity of capital necessary to carry it on; and a clumsy or more ingenious method of transacting business may make the most important changes in the quantity of money necessary to circulate any given amount of commodities without causing any alteration in the price of those commodities.

17. The Act of 1844 having placed an absolute limit upon the discretion of the Bank in issuing notes, Sir Robert Peel said that he thought that banking business could not be too free and unrestrained. The extraordinary accumulation of capital, arising

from the circumstances we have just detailed, lowered the market rate of discount to $1\frac{3}{4}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$, on the best bills, and the Bank of England immediately conformed to the market rate on the passing of the Act, and reduced its rate from 4 per cent. to $2\frac{1}{4}$ for the best bills. The day the Act came into operation, indeed, the whole of the discounts were done at $1\frac{3}{4}$, and they continued at that rate for a fortnight, when some were done at 2 per cent.; and up to the 26th October a considerable portion was done at $2\frac{1}{4}$. From this date, however, up to October, 1845, the rate was $2\frac{1}{2}$. In November, 1845, the rate was suddenly raised to $3\frac{1}{2}$, and continued at that figure till August, 1846, when it was lowered to 3 per cent. These rates being governed by the flow of bullion, which diminished from $15\frac{1}{2}$ millions when the Act of 1844 passed, to $13\frac{1}{2}$ millions in November, 1845; after which it increased again to above 16 millions in August, 1846, and then began steadily to decline till it reached its minimum in the great crisis of October, 1847.

18. The first failure of the potato crops in Ireland in 1845, and the railway mania of that year, must be too fresh in the recollection of most persons to need repetition here; nor had they anything to do properly with the management of the Bank, whose sole proper duty was to look to its own affairs, and preserve its own stability. The calamity of 1846 was far more severe and extensive than that of the preceding year. It was absolutely certain that an immense quantity of bullion would require to be exported in payment of the grain it would be necessary to import. Accordingly, from the middle of September, 1846, a steady and continuous drain of bullion set in, *but the Bank made no alteration in the rate of discount* until the 16th January, 1847, when the bullion had fallen to £13,949,000 it raised the rate of discount to $3\frac{1}{2}$, and on the 23rd, the bullion having been further diminished by £500,000, it raised the rate to 4 per cent. Henceforth the drain continued rapidly, but the Bank still continued to make no alteration until the 10th April, when its treasure being reduced to £9,867,000, the rate of discount was raised to 5 per cent. Here we have the same inveterate blunder committed by the Bank as on so many previous occasions—an immense drain of bullion, and yet none but the most feeble, inefficient, and puerile means taken by the Bank to

raise the value of money here. But the operation of the Bank at this time is an excellent example of the self-acting nature of the Act of 1844. We need only observe, that the Banking Capital of the Bank of England is £14,000,000 of notes, based upon public securities, together with notes representing as much bullion as there is in the issue department. Consequently, the notes held in reserve must always be equal to the difference between the notes in circulation, or held by the public, and the sum of £14,000,000 added to the quantity of bullion. Now, we have seen that the intention of the framers of the Act of 1844 was, that, as the bullion diminished, the notes in the hands of the public should be diminished, in conformity with the "currency principle." Let us now see, 1st—How the Bank was inclined to act on the principle; and, 2ndly—Supposing they were disinclined to do so, how far the Act, by its self-acting principles, compelled them to do so. The following figures speak for themselves—

1846.	Bank Notes.		Total Amount of Bullion.	Minimum Rate of Discount Per Cent.
	Held by the Public.	Held in Reserve by the Bank of England.		
August 29	20,426,000	9,450,000	16,866,000	3
October 3	20,551,000	8,809,000	15,817,000	"
November 7	20,971,000	7,265,000	14,760,000	"
December 19	19,549,000	8,864,000	15,163,000	"
1847				
January 9	20,837,000	6,715,000	14,308,000	"
— 16	20,679,000	6,546,000	13,949,000	3½
— 30	20,469,000	5,704,000	12,902,000	4
February 20	19,482,000	5,917,000	12,215,000	"
March 6	19,279,000	5,715,000	11,596,000	4
— 20	19,069,000	5,419,000	11,232,000	"
April 3	19,855,000	3,700,000	10,246,000	"
— 10	20,243,000	2,558,000	9,867,000	5

These figures shew the utter futility of the idea that, as the bullion diminished, the Act could compel a reduction of notes in the hands of the public, for the notes in circulation were within an insignificant trifle as large in amount when the bullion was only £9,867,000, as when it was £16,866,000. Consequently,

nothing could be a more total and complete failure of the Act of 1844, on the very first occasion its services were required.

19. Now, let us recall our readers' attention to what Mr. S. J. Loyd had pointed out as the fatal defect of the Bank rule of 1832, which we have given in § 77 of the preceding chapter. He said that under it *the whole bullion in the Bank might be drained out without any contraction in the circulation*, and it was supposed that the Act of 1844 had especially provided against this defect. In fact, the whole theory of the framers of the Act was that for every five sovereigns which left the country a £5 note should be withdrawn from circulation: and that if the Directors failed to do so of their own accord, the "mechanical" action of the Act would compel them to do so. But what was the actual result? The Bank had lost £7,000,000 of treasure, and its Notes in circulation were only reduced by £200,000; the whole of the reduction had been thrown upon its own reserves. Hence the Bank Act was open to exactly the same charge as the Bank rule of 1832!

Mr. F. T. Baring, ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, who maintained that the Act had been successful on several points, allowed that it had completely failed on this point¹—"I find that the amount of bullion in the Bank on September 12, 1846, was £16,354,000, and on April 17, 1847, it was reduced to £9,330,000, being a diminution of £7,024,000. Now, I take the same dates with respect to the circulation of notes, and I find that on September 12, 1846, the amount was £20,982,000, and on April 17, 1847, it was £21,228,000, being an increase of £246,000. . . . I must say that I never entertained the idea that it would have been possible under the operation of this bill to have shewn such a set of figures. . . . I believe, if we look back we shall find that *the operation of the deposits and the question of the reserve was not sufficiently considered* either by those who were favourable or those who were opposed to the bill. I cannot find in the evidence before the Committee of 1840 more than a few sentences leading me to suppose that danger arising from such a cause was contemplated or referred to: yet this was a most important consideration, for it was *by the reserve the Bank was enabled to do what was contrary to the spirit of the bill—when gold was running out, not to reduce their circulation by a single pound.*

¹ Hansard. Parl. Debates, Vol. 95, p. 615.

do not think that the system works satisfactorily in this respect: and, in fact, the point did not receive anything like a sufficient consideration. Perhaps it was impossible before the bill was in practical operation to see how the reserve of notes would operate: but it certainly never entered into the contemplation of any one when considering the subject *that £7,000,000 in gold should run off, and yet that the notes in the hands of the public would rather increase than diminish.*"

20. The number of notes held in reserve in the Banking Department, under the new system of 1844, corresponded in effect, very much to the amount of the bullion held by the Bank before its division. When, therefore, the public saw that the whole banking resources of the Bank were reduced to £2,558,000, a complete panic seized both the public and the directors. The latter adopted measures of the most unprecedented severity to check the demand for notes. The rate was not only raised to 5 per cent., but this was only applicable to bills having only a few days to run, and a limit was placed upon the amount of bills discounted, however good they might be. Merchants who had received loans were called upon to repay them without being permitted to renew them. During some days it was impossible to get bills discounted at all. These measures were effectual in topping the efflux of bullion, and a sum of £100,000 in sovereigns, which had been actually shipped for America, was re-landed. During this period, the rate of discount for the best bills rose to 9, 10, and 12 per cent. During all this time, the price of wheat continued steadily to rise, notwithstanding the monetary pressure; and at the close of May, the price on one occasion reached 131s. in Windsor Market. The foreign exchanges, which had been adverse to the country during the latter part of 1846 and the beginning of 1847, from the immense quantity of foreign corn which was imported, became favourable at the middle of April, partly owing to the great monetary pressure.

21. The pressure passed off after the first week in May, having lasted about three weeks, and bullion began to flow in after the 24th of April, until, at the end of June, it amounted to £10,526,000, the notes in circulation being £18,051,000, and the notes in reserve £5,625,000.

22. The conduct of the Bank, in keeping down the rate of discount when a rapid drain was going on, and the foreign exchanges were unfavourable, was the exact counterpart of what it had done on so many previous occasions, and excited much comment and adverse criticism by the whole commercial community of London. The market rate rose decidedly above it, so that a rush for discounts was made to the Bank, which were no sooner granted than the gold was immediately drawn out.

23. On the 27th of May, the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought the subject of the monetary pressure before the House, and stated that he had numerous deputations to him respecting a suspension of the Act of 1844, which the Government were not prepared to adopt. However, he meant to assist the Bank so far as to dispense with the aid the Government usually had from the Bank at Quarter day. With this view, he intended to raise the interest on Exchequer bills, which were then at a greater depreciation than any other species of Government security, to 3d. per day. On the 10th he brought in a resolution, to allow all persons who had subscribed to the eight million Irish loan a discount of 5 per cent. on any instalment paid in before the 18th of June, and 4 per cent. if paid in before the 10th of September.

24. The enormously high price of grain, which had no parallel since 1812, had the natural effect of tempting a great number of houses to enter into speculations for the import of grain, far beyond their power to support. The enormous importations in May, June, and July, coupled with the very favourable appearance of the harvest, caused a heavy and continuous fall in the price of grain, and the reports of the potato crop being favourable, the price of wheat fell to 49s. 6d. in September. But the tremendous fall in the price of wheat had been attended with ruin to the houses which had speculated in it. Moreover, that hideous nuisance which always flourishes with noxious luxuriance in times of speculation—accommodation paper—was extensively prevalent. The failures in the corn trade began in August, which engendered a great discredit in that and other branches of commerce. On the 7th of August, the minimum rate of discount was raised to $5\frac{1}{2}$; but this only

referred to very short-dated paper, as the greater part of the paper discounted was charged at much higher rates, even up to 7 per cent., which were maintained up to the 9th October.

25. On the 9th August, the first of the frightful catalogue of failures began. Leslie, Alexander, and Co. stopped payment, with liabilities amounting to £500,000. On Wednesday, the 11th, Coventry and Sheppard stopped for £200,000, and King, Melville, and Co., also for £200,000, and several other minor firms made the total failures in the first week amount to £1,200,000. In the next week, Giles and Co. failed for £100,000, and the total in the second week was £300,000. In the following week, Robinson and Co. failed for £110,000, the senior partner of which firm was the Governor of the Bank of England. In three weeks, the failures were £3,027,000. Week after week followed, each one increasing in severity, until at last the total exceeded £15,000,000. In the middle of September Saunderson and Co., the eminent bill brokers, stopped payment, being much involved with the great houses in the corn trade. The exchanges, which had been brought to par in April by the monetary pressure in that month, were, in consequence of the increasing severity of the crisis, become decidedly favourable, and, on the 25th of September, bullion began to flow in. During the whole of September the commercial calamities were falling fast and thick.

26. Almost all the firms connected with the Mauritius, such as Reid, Irving, and Co., failed, principally from having their funds locked up in sugar plantations. This was accompanied by immense failures in the India trade; the credit commonly given in that trade being of unusual length, which affords dangerous facilities for stretching it to too great a length. The railway works which had been sanctioned in the session of 1845-6, were now in full operation, causing an immense demand for ready money. Almost every tradesman in the kingdom, from Land's End to John O'Groats, was deep in railway speculations. The extravagant delirium of prosperity in 1845-6, had caused great numbers of them, not only to live far beyond their means themselves, but to trust their customers beyond all the bounds of ordinary credit. We have heard it said, that in numberless

instances, their bills for goods furnished in 1845 were unpaid in 1847. There can be no doubt whatever but that commercial credit of all sorts and descriptions, among all classes of traders, was in probably a more unhealthy state than it had ever been before, and that an unprecedentedly large portion of the community were entangled in obligations, of which there was no prospect of their ever working themselves free. Sharp and severe, therefore, as the remedy was, it unquestionably was the very best thing that could happen, that this unhealthy superstructure should be cleared away, and that commerce should be reconstructed upon an improved and renovated basis. The extreme pressure may be considered to have begun on the 23rd of September, when the Bank adopted more stringent measures for curtailing the demand upon its resources. Ever since the 26th of June, the diminution of bullion had been going on rapidly; on the 2nd of October it was reduced to £8,565,000, the notes in circulation being £18,712,000, and the reserve, £3,409,000. This rapid diminution of their resources shewed the directors that the time had come when they must think of their own safety; and on that day they gave notice that the minimum rate on all bills falling due before the 15th of October would be $5\frac{1}{2}$; and they refused altogether to make advances on stock or Exchequer bills. This last announcement created a great excitement on the Stock Exchange. The town and country bankers hastened to sell their public securities, to convert them into money. The difference between the price of consols for ready money, and for the account of the 14th of October, shewed a rate of interest equivalent to 50 per cent. per annum. Exchequer bills were sold at 35s. discount. Everything became worse and worse day by day. On the 16th of October, the Bank rates of discount varied from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 9 per cent. At this time the bullion was £8,431,000; the notes in circulation, £19,359,000; and in reserve, £2,630,000. The following week, from Monday, the 18th, to Saturday, the 23rd, was the great crisis. On that Monday the Royal Bank of Liverpool, with a paid up capital of £800,000, stopped payment, which caused the funds to fall 2 per cent. This was followed by the stoppage of the North and South Wales Bank, also of Liverpool, the Liverpool Banking Company, the Union Bank of Newcastle, heavy runs on the other banks of the district, and

other bank failures at Manchester, and in the West of England. As the whole of the commercial world knew that the resources of the Banking department were being rapidly exhausted, a complete panic seized them. A complete cessation of private discounts followed. No one would part with the money or notes in his possession. The most exorbitant sums were offered to and refused by merchants for their acceptances.

27. The continued and ever-increasing severity of the crisis caused deputation after deputation to be sent to the Government, to obtain a relaxation of the Act, and; on Saturday, the 23rd of October, the final determination of the Ministry to authorise the Bank to issue notes beyond the limits prescribed by the Act was taken, and communicated to the Bank, who immediately acted upon it, and discounted freely at 9 per cent. The letter itself was not actually sent till Monday, the 25th. It stated that the Government had expected that the pressure which had existed for some weeks would have passed away like the one in April, had done, by the operation of natural causes; that, being disappointed in this hope, they had come to the conclusion that the time had come when they ought to attempt, by some extraordinary and temporary measure, to restore confidence to the mercantile community. That, for this purpose, they recommended the directors of the Bank of England, in the emergency; to enlarge the amount of their discounts and advances upon approved security; but that, in order to restrain this operation within reasonable limits, a high rate of interest should be charged, which, under the circumstances, should not, they thought, be less than 8 per cent. That if such a course should lead to any infringement of the law, they would be prepared to propose to Parliament, on its meeting, a Bill of Indemnity. This letter was made public about 1 o'clock on Monday, the 25th, and no sooner was it done so than the panic vanished like a dream! Mr. Gurney stated that it produced its effect in ten minutes! No sooner was it known that notes *might* be had, than the want of them ceased! Not only did no infringement of the Act take place, but the whole issue of notes, in consequence of this letter, was only £400,000; so that, while at one moment the whole credit of Great Britain was in imminent danger of total destruction, within one hour it was saved by the issue of £400,000.

28. The extraordinary and disastrous state of public credit at this period may be judged of by the aid afforded by the Bank of England to different establishments, from the 15th of September to the 15th of November, as follows—

1. It advanced £150,000 to a large firm in London, who were under liabilities to the extent of several millions, on the security of debentures of the Governor and Company of the Copper Miners of England, which prevented them stopping payment.

2. It advanced £50,000 to a country banker, on the security of real property.

3. It advanced £120,000 to the Governor and Company of the Copper Miners, which prevented them stopping payment.

4. It advanced £300,000 to the Royal Bank of Liverpool, on the security of bills of exchange, over and above their usual discounts; but this was inadequate, and the bank, having no further security to offer, stopped payment.

5. It advanced £100,000 to another joint stock bank in the country.

6. It advanced £130,000, on real property, to a large mercantile house in London.

7. It advanced £50,000 to another mercantile house, on the security of approved names.

8. It advanced £50,000, on bills of exchange, to a joint stock bank of issue, which soon after stopped payment.

9. It advanced £15,000, on real property, to another mercantile house in London.

10. It saved a large establishment in Liverpool from failing, by forbearing to enforce payment of £100,000 of their acceptances falling due.

11. It assisted another very large joint stock bank in the country, by an advance of £800,000 beyond its usual discount limit.

12. It advanced £100,000 to a country banker, on real security.

13. It advanced to a Scotch bank, £200,000, on the security of local bills, and £60,000 on London bills.

14. It assisted another Scotch bank, by discounting £100,000 of local and London bills.

15. It advanced £100,000 to a large mercantile house in London, on approved personal security.

16. It assisted a large house in Manchester to resume payment, by an advance of £40,000 on approved personal security.

17. It advanced £30,000 to a country bank on real property.

18. It assisted many other houses, both in town and country, by advances of smaller sums on securities not usually admitted; and it did not reject, in London, any one bill offered for discount, except on the ground of insufficient security.

The far larger portion of this assistance was given before the 23rd of October.

29. A general election had taken place in the autumn of 1847, and the Ministry, having taken upon themselves the responsibility of authorising the Bank of England to violate the Act of 1844, lost no time in calling a meeting of the new Parliament. It met on the 18th of November, and, after a few preliminary days were occupied in swearing in the members, the speech from the throne was delivered on the 23rd. The first paragraphs stated, as a reason for calling them together, that the embarrassments of trade were so alarming that the Queen had authorised the Ministry to recommend to the Bank of England a course which might have led to an infringement of the law. Happily, however, the power given to infringe the law, if necessary, had allayed the panic.

30. On the 30th of November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved for a Committee to inquire into the causes of the recent commercial distress, and how far it had been affected by the Act of 1844. He spoke of the panic in the spring. He said that he had seen no reason to change the opinion he had then expressed, that it was mainly owing to the imprudence of the Bank, which, having full warning of the various demands it would have upon it, was too tardy in raising the rate of discount, and had lent out, over the period when the dividends became payable, the money they had provided for that purpose; so that they were not in possession of adequate funds when they were required. The low state of their reserve then excited consternation. The Bank then took the severe step of reducing the amount of discounts; they pulled up as suddenly as they had unwisely let out their reserve before. With respect to the panic of October, he said that the severe pressure in the Money

Market had abated when the bank failures in Liverpool and the North of England took place, which renewed the alarm. After describing the great pressure on the banks in the country, he said—

“The Bank of England were pressed directly for assistance from all parts of the country, and indirectly through the London bankers, who were called upon to support their country correspondents. The country banks required a large amount of notes, to render them secure against possible demands; not so much for payment of their notes as of their deposits. Houses in London were applying constantly to the Bank for aid. Two bill brokers had stopped, and the operations of two others were nearly paralysed. The whole demand for discount was thrown upon the hands of the Bank of England. Notwithstanding this, as I before said, the Bank never refused a bill, which it would have discounted at another time, but still, the large mass of bills which, under ordinary circumstances, are discounted by bill brokers, could not be negotiated. During this period, we were daily, I may say hourly, in possession of the state of the Bank. The Governor and Deputy-Governor at last said they could no longer continue their advances, to support the various parties who applied to them; that they could save themselves, that is, they could comply with the law; but that they could not do so without pressing more stringently on the commercial world. At this crisis, a feeling as to the necessity of the interposition of Government appeared to be generally entertained; and those conversant with commercial affairs, and least likely to decide in favour of the course we ultimately adopted, unanimously expressed an opinion, that if some measure were not taken by the Government to arrest the evil, the most disastrous consequences must inevitably ensue. Evidence was laid before the Government, which proved, not only the existence of severe pressure from the causes I have stated, but also that it was aggravated in a very great degree by the hoarding, on the part of many persons, of gold and Bank notes, to a very large extent, in consequence of which an amount of circulation, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been adequate, became insufficient for the wants of the community. It was difficult to establish this beforehand, but the best proof of the fact is in what occurred after we interfered. As soon as the letter of the 25th

October appeared, and the panic ceased, thousands and tens of thousands of pounds were taken from the hoards, some from boxes deposited with Bankers, although the parties would not leave the notes in their Banker's hands. Large parcels of notes were returned to the Bank of England cut into halves, as they had been sent down into the country; and so small was the real demand for an additional quantity of notes, that the whole amount taken from the Bank, when the unlimited power of issue was given, was under £400,000. The restoration of confidence released notes from their hoards, and no more was wanted, for this trifling quantity of additional notes is hardly worth notice. . . . Parties of every description made application for assistance to us, with the observation, 'We do not want notes, but give us confidence.' They said, 'We have notes enough, but we have not confidence to use them; say you will stand by us, and we shall have all that we want; do anything, in short, that will give us confidence. If we think that we can get Bank notes, we shall not want them. Charge any rate of interest you please, ask what you like—(*Mr. Spooner*, No! no!) I beg pardon of the honourable gentleman, but I may be permitted to know what was actually said to me. I say, that what I have stated, was the tenor of the applications made to me. Parties said to me, 'Let us have notes, charge 10—12 per cent. for them; we don't care what the rate of interest is. We don't mean, indeed, to take the notes, because we shall not want them; only tell us that we can get them, and this will at once restore confidence.' We have been asked what was the change of circumstances which induced us to act on Saturday when we declined acting a day or two before. I reply, that the accounts which we received on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, were of a totally different description from those which had been previously brought us. It was on Saturday, and not before, that this conviction was forced upon us, and it was not till then that we felt it necessary to sanction a violation of the law."

The persons applying generally said that it was necessary to place a limit on the amount to be authorised, which they proposed should be £2,000,000 or £3,000,000, but the Government thought that the limit should be placed on the rate of interest, and, accordingly, this was the method adopted.

31. Sir Robert Peel felt particularly called upon to come forward and defend the Act of 1844. After defending himself from some minor charges, he protested against singling out individual members of Parliament, and making them responsible for the acts of the whole Legislature. He said that some persons alleged that the Act of 1844 had been passed without due inquiry, but he recounted the committees that had sat for five years, and had asked, on the whole, upwards of 14,000 questions—questions and answers without end, but with no practical result from those apparently interminable investigations. The last committee had closed its labours without any practical results. At last, the Ministers determined to bring forward a measure on their own responsibility, which had been carried by extraordinary majorities; but, nevertheless, if it could be shewn that the Act of 1844 could be amended, that it ought to be done.

“There has been some misrepresentation respecting the objects of this Act. I do not deny that one of the objects contemplated by the Act was the prevention of the convulsions that had heretofore occurred in consequence of the neglect by the Bank of England to take early precautions against the withdrawal of its treasure. I did hope that, although there was no imperative obligation on the Bank of England to take those precautions, that the experience of 1825, 1836, and 1839, would have induced that establishment to conform to principles which the directors of the Bank acknowledged to be just, and which they had more than once professed to adopt for their own regulation. Sir, I am bound to say, that in that hope, that in that object of the bill, I have been disappointed. I am bound to admit, seeing the extent of commercial depression which has prevailed, and the number of houses which have been swept away, some of which, however, I think, were insolvent long before the bill came into operation, and others of which became insolvent in consequence of the failure of those who were connected with them, and were imprudent in their speculations, I am bound to admit that that purpose of the bill of 1844, which sought to impress, if not a legal, at least a moral obligation on the Bank, to prevent the necessity for measures of extreme stringency by timely precautions, had not been fulfilled. Sir, I must contend, that it was in the power of the Bank, if not to prevent all the evils that have arisen, at least, greatly to diminish their force. If the Bank had

possessed the resolution to meet the coming danger by a contraction of its issues, by raising the rate of discount, by refusing much of the accommodation which they granted between the years 1844 and 1846—if they had been firm and determined in the adoption of those precautions, the necessity for extrinsic interference might have been prevented; it might not then have been necessary for the Government to authorise a violation of the Act of 1844. . . . The bill of 1844 had a triple object. Its first object was that in which I admit it has failed, namely, to prevent, by early and gradual, severe and sudden contraction, and the panic and confusion inseparable from it. But the bill had at least two other objects of at least equal importance—the one to maintain and guarantee the convertibility of the paper currency into gold; the other to prevent the difficulties which arise at all times from undue speculation being aggravated by the abuse of paper credit in the form of promissory notes. In these two objects my belief is that the bill has completely succeeded. My belief is that you have had a guarantee for the maintenance of the principle of convertibility such as you never had before; my belief also is, that, whatever difficulties you are now suffering from a combination of various causes, those difficulties would have been greatly aggravated if you had not wisely taken the precaution of checking the unlimited issues of the notes of the Bank of England, of joint stock banks, and private banks.”

32. Sir Robert Peel then entered into a most able description of the true evils the country was suffering under, which arose from the enormous destruction of capital by the dearth of food, and the unusual absorption of capital in one channel of commerce, the construction of railroads, which were not yet remunerative. He shewed the absurdity of expecting to have cheap money while capital was scarce. The whole of his remarks are so admirable, that we regret that their length prevents us from giving them entire. He cordially approved of the course the Government had taken in not issuing the letter sooner than they did, and in doing it when they did. The true remedy for the state of things under which the country was suffering was individual exertion, the limitation of engagements, the cessation of all demands which could be postponed; an earlier issue of the

letter would have relaxed these necessary exertions. But to that pressure a panic succeeded, which could not be provided against or foreseen by legislation, which could not be reasoned with, and which could only be met by a discretionary assumption of power by the Government suitable to the emergency. Whether any modification in the Act of 1844 was desirable, was a question for future consideration. His own opinion was in favour of the maintenance of the great principles of that measure. If the identical restrictions were not imposed upon the Bank as were then in force, still there must be some restrictions; for, after the experience of 1825, 1836, and 1839, he for one would not be content to leave the regulation of the monetary concerns of this country to the uncontrolled discretion of the Bank. In 1844 the general conviction was that it ought not to be so left, and he for one knew no better mode of imposing restriction than that which was devised by the Act of 1844." Fully agreeing with Sir Robert Peel on the necessity for a restriction, we think that the restriction devised by the Act of 1844 is not the true one, and that it leaves open the door to the Bank for the most fatal mismanagement. We shall endeavour to shew, in a future chapter, that one may be devised which must be effectual.

33. The Committee appointed by each House began to sit in February, 1848. The Governor, Mr. Morris, and the Deputy-Governor, Mr. Prescott, were examined at great length before each Committee, and expressed their unqualified approbation of the Act of 1844, and the manner it had worked. The object of the Act was to place the circulation of this country exactly in the same position as it would have been if the currency had been entirely metallic.

"Your opinion is, then, that with regard both to the contraction of the currency and the expansion of the currency, they would both have taken place precisely in the same mode, and to the same degree, had the currency been purely metallic?"

Mr. Morris—"Yes, I have not the slightest doubt upon the subject."

They said that its object was to secure the convertibility of the note, which it had effectually done. That the Bank acted erroneously in the spring of 1847 in not raising their rate of

discount sooner, which much contributed to the monetary pressure in April. They said that the Government letter of the 25th October was not sought for by them, nor issued in any way at their instance, that they had no fear whatever for the Bank, and that it was not required to maintain the solvency of the Bank; but, nevertheless, it had the best effects in allaying the commercial panic. That the panic would inevitably have occurred even without the Act of 1844, but that Act brought it on sooner, and probably made it less severe. That the great merit of the Act was, that when the pressure did come, the Bank was in possession of £8,000,000 of treasure; that if the Bank had been left free it would probably have followed the course of dangerous liberality which it had done on so many previous occasions. That, though the Government letter did relieve the panic, it would probably have passed away without it. They earnestly deprecated any alteration of the Act, except that they thought the permission to issue notes upon silver bullion too limited.

34. Mr. S. Gurney agreed in blaming the management of the Bank during the first three months of 1847, and said, that if the Bank had commenced restrictive measures much earlier, the pressure of April would have been mitigated. He said, that in October the rapid diminution of the reserve caused a very general distrust among the public as to how they were to obtain circulating medium. The wealthy and more powerful took care very largely to over-provide themselves, infinitely beyond the necessities of the case. The consequence was, that the notes in the hands of the public amounted to nearly £21,000,000, of which he had no doubt that four or five millions were locked up and inoperative in consequence of the alarm and fear of not being able to get Bank notes at all. In illustration of this, he said that his own house was largely called upon for money on Saturday, the 22rd, not from distrust of the house, but from doubt that Bank notes were to be had at all. They applied to the Bank for discount to a large amount, which was agreed to, but they were told the rate must be 10 per cent.; upon remonstrating with the Governor, and saying that it would have the worst effect if it became known that their house was paying 10 per cent. for money, the rate was finally agreed upon at 9 per

cent. At this rate they took £200,000. On Monday, the 25th, however, the demand was again very heavy, and they applied for £200,000 more. It was a case of difficulty with the Bank under its reduced reserve and the limitation of the Act, and a final decision was postponed till two o'clock. At one o'clock, however, the letter from the Government was announced, authorising the relaxation. Its effect was immediate. Those who had sent notice for their money in the morning sent word that they did not want it, and that they had only ordered payment by way of precaution. After the notice, they only required £100,000 instead of £200,000, the alarm passed off, and by the end of the week they had to ask the Bank, as a favour, to be allowed to repay the money they had taken. Mr. Gurney stated, that the experience of the last two years had altered his opinion respecting the Act, and that he thought it necessary there should be a relaxing power somewhere.

35. Lord Overstone was of opinion that the Act of 1844 had no effect whatever in aggravating the pressure in April; that the course pursued by the Bank from January to April was extremely erroneous and detrimental to the public interest, and was only stopped by the positive provisions of the Act; and, if that system of procedure had not been so stopped, it must have ended in the most disastrous consequences.

36. Mr. George Carr Glynn had been of opinion before the Act passed that the division of the Bank into the issue and banking departments was a desirable experiment, but, after the experience of the preceding year, considered that it had decidedly failed.

37. The Committee of the Commons, presented their report on the 8th June, 1848. It entered into no philosophical examination of the correctness, or the contrary, of the opinions of the witnesses; it aspired to and attained to no higher function than acting as a kind of preface to the mass of evidence, but concluded by stating the opinion of the Committee that it was not expedient to make any alteration in the Act of 1844. The Report of the Committee of the Lords was presented in July, and was a much more elaborate production. It not only examined the evidence at considerable length, but pronounced an opinion of

its own, and recommended that the Act should be so far amended as to introduce a discretionary relaxing power, which was only to be exercised during the existence of a favourable foreign exchange.

37. On the 22nd of August Mr. Herries moved that the House would, early next Session, take the Report into consideration, which motion was negatived. In the next Session he made another attempt to induce Parliament to alter the Act, but without avail.

38. After the severe medicine the body commercial had been subjected to by the great crisis of 1847, which there can be little doubt was of great service, by removing houses that had been insolvent for years, the commerce of the country was established on a sounder basis, and had gone on, generally speaking, with great prosperity up to the autumn of 1857. The chances of war led to a great demand for shipping, and, of course, much speculative dealing in that property. This occurred especially at Liverpool in the autumn of 1854, and led to some very extensive failures. The revelations which ensued from these failures disclosed that the same inveterate and abominable practices of accommodation paper were again rampant. Fictitious bills to an enormous amount were fabricated among persons who were in the same species of business, and were negotiated all over the kingdom. Other parties resorted to practices even more disgraceful still, if possible. These great failures, which are too well known to require naming here, gave credit a very serious shock; in addition to which, a considerable number of persons who were engaged in extravagant over-trading in Australia suffered severe losses. There is nothing to call for special remark, except that a great drain of bullion began from the Bank of England at the end of June, and continued rapidly and steadily till the middle of October. On the 23rd June it stood at £18,169,000, including the coin and bullion in both departments; and by the 13th of October it was reduced to £11,752,300. The causes of this great outflow are not sufficiently ascertained, for us to reason upon them with accuracy. Some attributed it to the purchases of corn which the high price of wheat here caused to be made for importation—some to operations of the Bank of France,

Time will probably furnish us with more satisfactory and accurate information. What the causes were is of comparatively slight moment. We are happy to say that the Bank of England acted, in this case, with a promptitude and decision most favourably contrasted with its former errors. The rate of discount was rapidly raised, to enhance the value of money. On no former occasion had the rise been so frequent and extensive in so short a time; but the effect produced was most salutary.

39. The following table, taken at intervals, shews the bullion in the Bank, and the rate of discount—

1855.		Bullion in the Issue Department.	Rate of Discount.
January	4	£ 13,180,835	5 per cent.
"	20	11,880,560	"
February	22	12,313,230	"
March	22	13,479,975	"
April	12	14,392,500	4½ per cent.
May	3	14,791,785	4 "
"	17	15,336,510	"
"	31	16,337,685	"
June	14	17,056,945	3½ per cent.
"	28	17,429,435	"
July	19	16,631,890	"
August	9	15,601,590	"
September	6	14,368,010	4 per cent.
"	13	13,668,005	4½ per cent.
"	27	12,695,250	5 per cent.
October	4	12,368,255	5½ per cent.
"	18	11,205,855	6 per cent. for bills not longer than 60 days.
November	8	10,741,320	7 per cent. for bills not longer than 95 days.
December	6	10,580,570	"
"	27	10,369,595	"

REFORM OF THE CLEARING HOUSE IN 1854. 179

For several preceding weeks the *Economist* reported the Money Market to be as tight as it could well be. But on the 29th of December, it said—

“The Money Market continues as stringent as it can well be, and no bills can be discounted under the Bank rates. Paper at long dates cannot be discounted on any terms. The great extent of our trade, as indicated by the returns for November, confirms the suspicion awakened by the continued demand for money, *that trade has received no serious check from the advance in the rate of discount*, and is still more extensive than prudence warrants, or in the end will be justified.”

40. This most judicious conduct on the part of the Bank, which merited nothing but the most unqualified commendation, excited a great clatter amongst a certain number of people who think that money is to be created *ad libitum* by writing “promises to pay” on bits of paper, when there is no money to pay them with, and who think it possible to send one’s money abroad and also to have it at home. The papers were filled for weeks with letters and articles exhibiting all the rank follies which were once prevalent on the subject of the price of corn, and which have been so admirably exposed by Adam Smith. But in this respect a most marked and healthy change has been of late years most manifest in the majority of public writers. The great majority now understand that the rate of discount is the true regulating power of the paper currency, and, instead of assailing the Bank with howls and execration when it does its duty in raising its rate, they, with a few exceptions, now universally commend it. This is great, real, and sound progress in the spread of true Economic science.

41. At the end of this year the Queen exercised the power reserved in the Act of 1844, to enable the Bank of England to extend its issues to not more than two-thirds of the amount of those of any banks of issue that might cease to issue notes. From the passing of the Act up to this period forty-seven banks, whose authorised issues amounted to £712,623, ceased to issue their own notes, and, on the 13th December, 1855, the Queen in Council issued an order authorising the Bank of England to increase its issues to the amount of £475,000 upon public securi-

ties. But this is not the *bonâ fide* increase to the issuing power of the Bank. For in the year 1854 the Clearing House was organised on a better plan, and whereas before that an average amount of £200,000 of bank notes was required to adjust its transactions, by the new system these were totally dispensed with, and no notes at all are now required. Moreover, by the admission of the joint stock banks to the Clearing House, they are saved from keeping an enormous amount of notes to meet the "bankers' charges," which may safely be calculated at £500,000. These notes, therefore, are now available to the Bank to use for commercial purposes, and, consequently, are to be considered as so much additional power of issue to the Bank, which has thus in reality acquired an increased power of issue to the amount of £1,175,000 since the Act of 1844. Up to February, 1857, seven other banks, whose aggregate issues amounted to £111,020, have ceased to issue notes, but no further power was granted to the Bank to extend its issues until 1866.

42. For several months after the beginning of 1856, the Money Market continued in a state of great "tightness," and the bullion in the Bank scarcely varied. The lowest was on the 26th April, when it stood at £9,081,675; after that it gradually rose, and the rate of discount fell in summer to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{3}{4}$, but in October the bullion fell very considerably again, and discount rose to 7 and 8 per cent., and a pressure followed of about the same severity as in 1855, and continued with very little variation to the end of the year.

The Crisis of 1857.

43. The crisis we have just been considering was the inevitable termination of a multiplicity of derangements of the proper course of commerce. No one conversant with commercial history could fail to foresee that the entanglements of so large a portion of the public with railway speculations, and the losses caused by the failure of the harvest must produce a crisis. We have seen that this crisis gave a fatal blow to the prestige of the Bank Act of 1844, which was enacted in express contradiction to the opinions of the most experienced authorities of former times, whom it professed to follow. They had always protested

against imposing a numerical limit on the issues of the Bank. The experience of the crisis of 1847, amply confirming that of 1793, 1797, and 1825, shewed that such restrictions cannot be maintained in the paroxysm of a great crisis without endangering the existence of the whole mass of commercial credit.

The crisis we are now going to describe was of a very different nature. It burst upon the world in the most unexpected manner. It gave no premonitory symptoms which were apparent to any but very watchful and experienced eyes; and, when it did come, it revealed a depth of rottenness in the commercial world which appalled every one, and proved to be of much severer intensity than that of 1847.

44. The supporters of the Act were much crestfallen by its failure in 1847, but they took courage again after the Crimean war. The Act had been subjected to the test of a great commercial crisis and had failed. It was now subjected to the test of a war, and many of its opponents predicted that it would fail again; but it did not. Its effects during the Crimean war were probably salutary; but the war did not proceed to such a length as to test its powers severely. Peace was restored before the resources of the country were in any manner strained.

We have said above that the rate of discount in the Autumn of 1856 was 7 and 8 per cent. It was gradually reduced, and on December 4th it was $6\frac{1}{2}$, and on the 18th, 6 per cent., and continued so till the Autumn of 1857.

These rates were, of course, very much higher than the average ones of former times, and they were one ground of accusation brought by many against the Act. But, in truth, they were its very merit. The directors had now learnt from experience, and it was these very variations which preserved the security of the Bank.

In August nothing seemed amiss to the public eye. "Things were then pretty stationary," said the Governor of the Bank—"the prospects of harvest were very good; there was no apprehension that commerce at that time was otherwise than sound. There were certain more far-seeing persons who considered that the great stimulus given by the war expenditure, which had created a very large consumption of goods imported from the East and other places, must now occasion some collapse, and

still more those who observed that the merchants, notwithstanding the enhanced prices of produce, were nevertheless importing as they had done successfully in the previous years. But the public certainly viewed trade as sound, and were little aware that a crisis of any sort was impending, far less that it was so near at hand."

The bullion at this time was £10,606,000, the reserve £6,296,000, and the minimum rate of discount $5\frac{1}{2}$, when on the 17th August the Bank entered into a negotiation with the East India Company to send one million in specie to the East.

45. Things were in this state when, about the middle of September, news came of a great depreciation of American railroad securities. It was found that for a long time they had been carrying on an extravagant system of management, and paying dividends not earned by the traffic. The system had at last collapsed, and, of course, an enormous depreciation of their stock followed, to the amount of nearly 20 per cent. It was supposed that as much as eighty millions of this stock was held in England, and that the effects of this fall would be very serious. On the 25th August the *Ohio Life and Trust Company*, with deposits to the amount of £1,200,000, stopped payment. The panic spread throughout the Union. Discount rose to 18 and 24 per cent. On the 17th October news came that 150 banks in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Rhode Island had stopped payment. The drain was then beginning to be severe on the Bank of England. On the 8th the bullion was £9,751,000, the reserve £4,931,000, and discount was raised to 6 per cent. On the 12th the rate at Hamburg was $7\frac{3}{4}$, and bullion was flowing towards New York; discount was then raised to 7 per cent. About this time rumours strongly affecting the Western Bank of Scotland were abroad. On the 19th discount was raised to 8 per cent. The commercial disasters were increasing in America. In one week the Bank of France lost upwards of a million sterling. The bullion in the Bank had sunk to £8,991,000, and the reserve to £4,115,000. Discount was raised to $7\frac{1}{2}$ in Paris, and to 9 per cent. at Hamburg. On the 26th a deputation from the Western Bank of Scotland applied for assistance, but the Bank was afraid to undertake so enormous a concern. The Borough Bank of Liverpool was also

in difficulties, and after some time the Bank agreed to assist them to the amount of £1,500,000 on condition of their winding up. But the arrangements fell through in consequence of the Liverpool Bank closing its doors before it was completed.

46. On the 13th October a general run took place on the New York banks, in consequence of the severe measures of restriction they were obliged to adopt to protect themselves. Eighteen immediately stopped, and soon afterwards, out of 63 banks, only one maintained its payments. This immediately reacted on Liverpool and Glasgow, which were much involved with American firms. By the 19th October the failures began to be numerous in this country. Uneasiness greatly increased in London. On the 28th the principal discount house applied to the Bank for an assurance that they would give them any assistance they might require. On the 30th an express came for £50,000 (sovereigns) for a Scotch bank, part of £170,000, and £80,000 for Ireland. On the 5th November discount was raised to 9 per cent. The great house of Dennistoun, with liabilities of nearly two millions, stopped payment on the 7th, and the Western Bank of Scotland closed its doors on the 9th. Failures in London were rapidly on the increase. Purchases and sales of stock were enormous, much beyond what they had ever been before. The bullion in the Bank had sunk to £7,719,000, and the reserve to £2,834,000. On the 9th discount was raised to 10 per cent. On the 10th November a large discount house applied to the Bank for £400,000. The Bank of France raised its rates to 8, 9, and 10 per cent. for one, two, and three months. Another English bank was assisted. The City of Glasgow Bank then stopped. On that day the discounts at the Bank were £1,126,000. On the 10th and 11th upwards of one million sterling in gold was sent to Scotland, and there was a great demand from Ireland. On the 11th Sanderson and Co., the great bill brokers, stopped payment, with deposits of $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions. On the 12th the discounts at the Bank were £2,373,000. On the 11th, in consequence of these sudden demands for Scotland and Ireland, the bullion was reduced to £6,666,000, and the reserve to £1,462,000.

47. As the failures in London became more tremendous, discounts became more and more contracted. The stunning

news of the stoppage of so many banks created a banking panic. Private banks stopped discounting altogether. The only source of discount was the Bank of England. The public, however, and the directors knew that the precedent of 1847 must be followed, and, though they made no direct application to the Government for the suspension of the Act, they laid the state of the Bank continually before them, and continued to discount as if they knew the Act must be suspended. At last private persons, being unable to obtain discounts, began to make a run for their balances. When universal ruin was at last impending, the Government, on the 12th November, sent a letter to the Bank to say, that if they should be unable to meet the demands for discounts and advances upon approved securities, without exceeding the limits of their circulation prescribed by the Act of 1844, they would be prepared to propose to Parliament a Bill of Indemnity for any excess so issued. In order, however, to prevent the temporary relaxation of the Act from being extended beyond the necessities of the case, the rate of discount was not to be reduced below their present rate, 10 per cent.

48. The issue of this letter immediately calmed the public excitement. But, on the evening of the 12th, the total banking reserve of the Bank and all its branches was reduced to £581,000. Truly, said the Governor of the Bank, to the question 132, "Supposing the letter in question had not been issued on that day, would the Bank, on the morning of the 13th, have been in a condition to continue its discounts?—*No; certainly not.*

"133. Would it not have been compelled to announce it could not discount any more commercial paper?—Yes, or nearly so.

"138. Is it not likely that the announcement of the cessation of discounts at the Bank of England would have increased the alarm of the mercantile public in London?—*Materially.*

"139. Would not an increased alarm on the part of the mercantile public have naturally led to an increased demand upon the bankers?—It would have led to immediate failures, and would so far have lessened the quantity of bills coming for discount by the number of bills which were actually rendered unavailable.

"140. Without reference to bills, do you not think it likely that there would have been increased demands upon the bankers,

which would have compelled them to withdraw a portion of their deposits from the Bank of England?—I think certainly that in part there would have been.”

To shew the state the Bank was reduced to, the Governor gave in a paper to the Committee with the following figures, shewing its reserve on the 11th and 12th November—

On Wednesday, November 11th, the reserve consisted of—

			£	£
Notes in London	375,005	
„ at Branches	582,705	
				957,710
Gold coin in London	310,784	
„ at Branches	97,665	
				408,449
Silver coin in London	44,046	
„ at Branches	51,948	
				95,994
Total Reserve			...	£1,462,153

On Thursday, November 12th, at night, the reserve consisted of—

			£	£
Notes in London	68,085	
„ at Branches	62,545	
				130,630
Gold coin in London	274,953	
„ at Branches	83,255	
				358,208
Silver coin in London	41,106	
„ at Branches	50,807	
				91,913
Total Reserve			...	£580,751

That is to say, the total reserve in London on the evening of the 12th was £384,144. Such were the resources of the Bank of England to commence business with on the morning of the 13th! Truly, said the Governor, it must have entirely

ceased discounting, which would have brought an immediate run upon it; and the bankers' balances alone were £5,458,000. It is easy to see that the Bank could not have kept its doors open an hour.

49. The Governor of the Bank said that the panic of 1857 was not so great as that of 1847, but the real commercial pressure was more intense. This is proved by the fact, that while in the former year the issue of the letter immediately allayed the panic, and by that means stopped the demand for notes, and there was only required an issue of £400,000 in notes to surmount all difficulties, which did not exceed the statutory limits; in 1857 the issue of the Government letter produced no cessation of the demand for advances. The statutory limit was £14,475,000 of notes issued on securities, and there were issued in excess of these—

	£		£
Nov. 13	186,000	Nov. 23	397,000
„ 14	622,000	„ 24	317,000
„ 16	860,000	„ 25	81,000
„ 17	836,000	„ 26	243,000
„ 18	852,000	„ 27	342,000
„ 19	896,000	„ 28	184,000
„ 20	928,000	„ 30	15,000
„ 21	617,000		

On the meeting of Parliament an Act was passed permitting a temporary suspension of the Bank Act till February 1st, 1858, provided the directors did not reduce their discount below 10 per cent. On the 24th December they reduced it to 8 per cent., thereby reviving the operation of the Act.

In 1858 the inevitable consequence followed from the great crash of 1857. The enormous mass of false trading being cleared away money naturally flowed into the Bank, and the quantity of bullion gradually and steadily increased up to the end of the year. The Bank now learnt to adopt much higher rates of discount than formerly. In 1847 it kept the rate at 5 per cent. while the bullion was under £10,000,000; in 1858 the rate of 5 per cent. was maintained till the bullion exceeded £15,000,000—a great advance in sound principle.

50. In our *Dictionary of Political Economy*, Art. *Banking in England*, § 254, published not long after this great crisis, we said—"This year (1858) passed away in great tranquillity, persons not yet having forgotten the lesson of 1857. But we cannot doubt, judging from all former experience, that an uneasy spirit will soon be abroad again; we cannot doubt that the brood of speculators are now anxiously casting about to see if they can plant the seeds of the next crisis, and it is the duty of those who are now at the head of monetary affairs to be on the watch to counteract all such attempts as they can detect; and, in the meantime, the most interesting question at the present time, in a banking point of view, is—What is to be the next mania?"

Time has given an answer to this question. There is nothing special to arrest our attention during the next few years. The rates of discount continued generally moderate through 1859 and 1860. In February, 1861, it rose for a short time to 8 per cent. but soon subsided again. The unhappy civil war in America then being imminent, created natural apprehension as to our cotton supplies, and most persons could foresee that this would lead to monetary complications. These, however, were for the future. Through 1861 and 1862 the Money Market was, generally speaking, extremely easy, the issue of paper money by both the belligerent Governments having the inevitable effect of driving bullion over to this country; consequently trade flourished amazingly, and the price of money was very easy.

51. And so things went on till October, 1863, when every one began to foresee a disturbance in the Money Market. In the first place, the rapid rise in the price of cotton, from the failure of the supply from the Southern States of America, forced up the price to a great height. The world had to be searched to produce the supply. Immense quantities came from the East Indies, from Egypt, and from the Brazils, besides other quarters. This vast trade being suddenly created, had to be paid for in cash, as we have explained in the chapter on Exchanges. Consequently a great drain of silver began towards the East, which was obtained from Paris and Hamburg, the great marts for silver, as London is for gold. The Italian Government, too contracted a loan at this period.

The law of limited liability began to operate at the same time, and the number of new companies being formed under it inspired uneasiness. The Bank of France lost great quantities of specie. The Bank of England raised its rate twice in one week, from 5 to 6, and then to 7. The Bank of France also raised its rate to 7, and spoke of issuing 50 franc notes ; on the 2nd of December the Bank raised its rate to 7, and on the 3rd to 8. At the same time a great fall took place in the Russian Exchange, in consequence of certain Government measures not having succeeded. In consequence of these circumstances, the reserves of the Bank were considerably strengthened after a short time. But in January, 1864, a fresh export of specie began and continued with great severity till the middle or end of May, so that discount varied from 8 to 7, and 6, and again up to 9. In May the Bank again raised its rate twice in one week to 9. With a few fluctuations this great pressure continued all through the summer. Having fallen to 6 per cent in June, it gradually rose again to 9 in September. After that it gradually fell to 3 per cent. in June, 1865.

52. Already in March, 1864, the numbers of new companies formed under the limited liability principle gave great uneasiness. Up to that time it appeared there were 263 companies formed with a nominal capital of £78,135,000, out of which 27 were banks, and 14 discount companies. In August, 1864, the long-dated acceptances of the new financial companies began to press on the market, and lay the foundations of the crisis of 1866. In April the Bank of England joined the Clearing House, thereby still further economising the use of Bank notes.

On the 8th of September the Bank raised its rate to 9 per cent., and this measure stopped the foreign drain, lowered the price of foreign commodities, and strengthened their reserves. The price of cotton was greatly lowered owing to the expected peace in America, and this rise in the rate of discount, striking on a falling market, produced an immense curtailment of business in all directions.

The Great Crisis of May, 1866.

53. On the 20th June, 1865, the rate of discount reached its minimum, 3 per cent. On the 5th August it was raised to 4,

and then gradually and continuously, with very slight fluctuations, till it culminated in the crisis of May, 1866.

In November a strong foreign drain began, the exchange fell, and, this growing stronger in January, 1866, the Bank raised its rate on the 6th to 8. This had some effect in arresting the drain, but it did not bring in fresh supplies from abroad. At this period the National Provincial Bank began to bank in London, and, in consequence, were obliged by law to give up their issues, which amounted to £442,371. Several other banks having ceased to issue, since the Bank of England had been last authorised to increase its issues, it was now permitted to increase its issues on securities to £15,000,000. The high rate of interest here caused a good deal of foreign money to be invested in long-dated bills.

Towards the end of January the difficulties began, which brought on the panic in May. In consequence of there having been no Parliamentary inquiry, as might have been expected, the circumstances of this panic have never been fully explained. But it may be stated generally that these Finance and Discount Companies had advanced enormous sums of money to promote great enterprises, such as railways, and other schemes, which could never repay their cost until completed, which might take years to do. The first company that went was the Joint Stock Discount Company in February. This spread a general feeling of alarm, as the doings of this Company were merely a type of a large amount of business which was known to have been engaged in by numerous other companies. In March Barmen's Bank at Liverpool stopped payment, with liabilities of upwards of 8½ millions. Several great railway contractors suspended, involving in discredit the companies with whom they were known to have "financed."

54. On the 3rd of May the Bank raised its discount to 7 per cent. Every one now felt that the long-dreaded crisis was at last come. The air was thick with rumours. Every one knew now that it was merely a question of weeks, perhaps of days, when the storm should burst. On the 8th of May the Bank raised its discount to 8 per cent. The advocates of the Bank Act, in their usual strain, proclaimed that on no account whatever must the Act be suspended. Such a thing was not to be thought of.

Credit was then tottering and received a blow from the report of a speech of the Emperor Napoleon III., said to have been addressed by him to a meeting at Auxerre, in which he expressed his detestation of the treaties of 1815. This, in the feverish political state of the Continent, was held to mean that he was determined on war.

It is possible that this excitement might have passed off, as the Bank had a fair reserve in the banking department, and abundance of bullion in the issue department. On the 9th of May the Bank raised the rate of discount to 9 per cent. On this day, however, occurred the event which it is probable produced the great panic. The Mid-Wales Railway Company had accepted bills of exchange to the amount of £60,000, which were held by three parties—Bateman ; Overend, Gurney, & Co. ; and the National Discount Company. The Company had dishonoured the bills, and actions had been brought against them by the three parties above named. As ill fortune would have it, judgment in these actions was delivered on the 9th of May, in the very height of the excitement. The Court of Common Pleas held unanimously that the Railway Company had no authority whatever to accept such bills, and, consequently that they were absolutely invalid, and so much waste paper. For some time back it was known that Overend, Gurney, & Co. were very deep in with contractors and other parties ; moreover they held forged bills to a large amount of another firm. Their shares had been pressed on the market, and were going down. This fall in their shares produced a steady withdrawal of their deposits. The judgment in the case of the Mid-Wales Railway converted this into a complete run ; and, on the afternoon of Thursday, May 10th, the terrible news spread through London that the great establishment of Overend, Gurney, & Co. had stopped payment, with liabilities exceeding £10,000,000—the most stupendous failure that had ever taken place in the City. This news only spread about after banking hours, but every one could foresee what the effects would be next morning. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said next evening in the House that the oldest inhabitants of the City declared that the excitement was without a parallel. Early in the evening he was questioned as to whether Government had authorised the Bank to issue notes in excess of the legal limit. The Chancellor replied that he had not yet done so, but that he had

received a deputation from the private bankers, and was expecting one from the Joint Stock Banks, on the subject. Very soon afterwards this came, and the Members of the Cabinet, having retired to a committee room and consulted, the Chancellor, later in the evening, announced, amidst the loudest cheers from all parts of the House, that the Government, following the precedents of 1847 and 1857, had informed the Bank that, if they thought proper to make advances beyond the limit, the Government would bring in a Bill of Indemnity. He also stated that the Bank had advanced £4,000,000 that day.

55. The announcement of the suspension of the Bank Charter Act produced the best effects next morning. The Bank raised its rate to 10 per cent., and everything calmed down, and though subsequently to this some other stoppages took place, yet the knowledge that the Bank had power to make advances on good securities abated the panic. On the 18th of May the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the Bank had advanced £12,225,000 in five days. The sum that was paid away during the panic can probably never be known, but it was something perfectly fabulous. It has been said, though, of course, we know not on what authority, that one great bank alone paid away £2,000,000 in six hours. The establishments that stopped payment were as follows, with their liabilities, according to their last published balance-sheet, though, of course, these were greatly diminished during the panic—

	Paid-up Capital.	Reserve.	Liabilities.
Overend, Gurney, & Co.....	£1,500,000	—	£11,000,000
English Joint Stock Bank	150,000	£6,000	not stated.
Oriental Commercial Bank.....	375,000	49,500	—
New Zealand Banking Corpor..	80,000	16,000	136,000
Hallet, Ommañney, & Co.	—	—	238,000
Imperial Mercantile Credit	500,000	—	not stated.
Commercial Bank of India	1,000,000	238,802	—
European Bank	644,490	31,393	2,112,838
Robinson, Ceryton, & Co.	—	—	—
Alliance Financial Company ...	20,000	—	—
Bank of London.....	400,000	802,324	4,335,877
Consolidated Bank.....	600,000	71,808	3,817,999
Agra and Masterman's.....	1,500,000	500,000	15,582,002

Besides these stoppages, several other banks connected with the East confessed to enormous losses. Thus, the Bank of

Hindustan, China, and Japan stated its profits at £23,485, and its losses at £87,796, with a further expected loss of £70,000 ; the Asiatic Banking Company stated its profits at £61,494, and its losses at £142,000 ; the Bank of Queensland stated its profits at £10,373, and its losses at £42,071. What losses the other banks made, we, of course have no means of knowing, but they were probably heavy.

56. We have already noticed in Chapter VII., § 15, that on this occasion the Rule that a high Rate of Interest will attract bullion from foreign countries seemed for a short time to be at fault, which caused a good many persons to deny its truth altogether. The remarks given in that passage were written at the very time of that crisis, and shew that the Law did not fail as was alleged, but that its effects were for a short time counteracted by other causes. We are happy to say that the truth of our remarks is corroborated by a distinguished banker, Mr. Fowler—"I have heard it said that whatever may have been the case in times past, on this occasion, the exaction of a high rate of interest failed to bring gold to the Bank, and thus restore the equilibrium of the currency. We have here to deal with a question of fact, and as I write, bullion is flowing in from all quarters, just as on former occasions, with this distinction, that a longer period was required in order to produce the required effect on the exchanges than had been found needful in other cases. It is not the fact that the usual results have not been experienced, but it is the fact that the operation has been more tedious than usual. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that we received a very large amount of specie from America at the very moment it was most needed, and partly, if not mainly, in consequence of the news of the panic in London having arrived in New York. But, important as is this consideration, there is no doubt that owing to the discredit which fell on all English securities in consequence of the failure of Overend, Gurney, & Co., and other great houses, supplies which would otherwise have been attracted from the continent by a 10 per cent. rate, were delayed, if not altogether withheld, and as a natural result, the recovery from the panic, and the replenishment of the circulation, took place far more slowly than might have been expected."¹

¹ *The Crisis of 1866. By Wm. Fowler, p. 42.*

Thus we see that true science is vindicated by experience, and the history of banking since 1866 has amply confirmed the truth of this principle, which was first demonstrated in the first edition of this work in 1856, and since then has made its way to universal acceptance by all competent persons. The Usury Laws in France were modified in order to enable the Bank of France to adopt it, and by a sedulous attention to this principle the Notes of the Bank of France, which are inconvertible, circulate exactly at par with specie ; and, in fact, every bank in the world is now managed on this principle.

Having brought the history of Banking up to this point, we do not think it necessary to give any further details of events since then. The primary object of the history we have given is to establish PRINCIPLES. We have given an exact history of the different doctrines which have been held as to managing the Bank and the Paper Currency, until at last scientific reasoning and practical experience have equally demonstrated that the true method of controlling Credit and Paper Currency is by means of the RATE of DISCOUNT. We have given ample details of the steps by which this great doctrine gradually established itself in the Banking and Mercantile world. To pursue the subject further would not bring out any new principles, it would only give superfluous illustrations of a principle which is now as firmly established among all competent persons as the Newtonian Law of Gravity is among men of science : and, therefore, prolonging an account would only occupy space without any good object.

CHAPTER XI.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF BANKING IN SCOTLAND.

1. The Bank of Scotland is the first instance in the world of a private joint stock bank, formed by private persons, for the express purpose of making a trade of banking, dependent on their own private capital, and wholly unconnected with the State. It differed in kind from any of the other banks existing at that time. The successful institution of the Bank of England led to a project being formed to establish a Bank in Scotland. A merchant of London, Mr. John Holland, was the author of the scheme, and he got eleven Scotch merchants to join him. They obtained an Act of the Scotch Parliament on the 17th July, 1695, authorising the Crown to grant them a Charter of Incorporation. The principal provisions of this Act are as follows¹—

I. The joint stock was to be £1,200,000 Scots, or £100,000 sterling, and authorises certain persons to receive subscriptions for not less than £1,000 Scots (£83 6s. 8d.), nor more than £20,000 Scots (£6,666 13s. 4d.) for each person, with a deposit of 10 per cent.

II. They were allowed to lend on real or personal security, at not more than 6 per cent.; and, on failure of payment, to sell or dispose of the security publicly.

III. They were allowed to transfer their stock freely, or by will.

IV. No dividend to be made, but by consent of general meeting.

V. The joint stock to be free from all taxes affecting money for 21 years from that date.

VI. It was declared to be illegal for any other Company to set up banking for 21 years.

¹ *Acts of the Parliament of Scotland*, vol. ix., p. 494.

VII. Various legal privileges were granted for the more speedy and effectual recovery of debts due to the bank.

VIII. Prohibits any sum to be withdrawn from the joint stock.

IX. Prohibits the Company, directly or indirectly, from using or employing the joint stock of the Bank, or any of its profits, in any other trade or commerce, except the trade of lending and borrowing money upon interest, and negotiating bills of exchange.

X. Prohibits the Company from purchasing land, or heritages, or advancing money to the Government, upon the anticipation of any sums to be granted by Parliament, except only those particular ones upon which a credit of loan should be authorised by Parliament, under the penalty of forfeiting triple the amount, of which one-fifth to the informer.

XI. All foreigners who subscribed to the joint stock, were *ipso facto* naturalised to all intents and purposes. It was also provided that two-thirds of the stock must always belong to persons residing in Scotland. The Scotch subscription of £800,000 Scots (£66,666) was begun in November, and filled up at the end of December, 1695. The English subscription of £400,000 Scots (£33,333) was taken up in one day in London, a great part by Scotchmen. As the Scotch at that time were supposed to know nothing about banking, it was also provided that for a certain number of years the Governor and twelve Directors should be English, and the Deputy-Governor and twelve Directors should be Scotch. However, it was soon found that the Scotch were such good managers, that this arrangement was changed, and all the Directors were Scotch, and thirteen trustees were chosen to manage the English business and affairs in London.

2. No sooner was the Bank fairly established, than, in 1696, the African Company attempted to set up the trade of banking, in defiance of the Bank's privilege. This was the celebrated Darien Company, which was organised by William Paterson, who was one of the founders of the Bank of England. Mr. Holland was Governor of the Bank, but so little was it thought of, that it did not venture to vindicate its privileges against the African Company, for which there was a national phrenzy, and

which afterwards ended so sadly. The Bank was obliged to content itself by strengthening its position by calling up two-tenths of its capital.

The African Company soon, however, burnt its fingers with banking, as, in order to rival the Bank, they advanced their notes with great imprudence to several of their own shareholders and others, and sustained great losses, which made them stop. The Bank then began the business of exchanges, but, finding that they could not compete with private merchants, gave it up. In 1696, they opened branches at Glasgow, Aberdeen, Dundee, and Montrose; but not finding them to pay, withdrew them. In May, 1698, the rivalry of the African Company being at an end, the directors repaid the two-tenths of capital last called up, as being more than necessary for their business.

8. The Bank at first received no deposits from the public; its business consisted in circulating its own notes upon the credit of the subscription that was paid in. These notes were for £100, £50, £20, £10, and £5. It is disputed when they began to issue £1 notes, for, while a pamphlet, published in 1728 on their behalf, says that they began to issue them in January, 1699-1700, Mr. Kinnear, a director of the Bank, stated to the Committee of the House of Commons that, though many proposals were made to them to circulate "tickets" or "tokens" of £1, they had always hesitated to adopt so novel an experiment till 1704. Which authority is right we have no means of deciding. In 1701 a great fire destroyed the Parliament Close, in which the bank was, but the cash and all the effects were safely removed into the Castle by the Earl of Leven, who was Governor of both.

In December, 1704, soon after, as it would appear by one account, that they had issued £1 notes, a rumour was spread all over the kingdom that the Privy Council were going to raise the value of the coin, which caused a run upon the Bank, and at last it was obliged to stop payment. A meeting of the proprietors was held, who declared that all their notes should bear interest until they were paid. The directors also requested the Privy Council to appoint a Committee to examine their books. They reported that the Bank was in the most sound and flourishing condition, and their notes then passed without de-

preciation. The directors made a call of one-tenth, and in less than five months paid off all their notes with interest.

By the Act of Union between England and Scotland, it was stipulated that the coinage of Scotland should be reduced to uniformity with that of England, and the loss or deficiency to private individuals made good out of the Equivalent fund. (Art. xv.) The Bank assisted this operation by receiving all the old money and giving their own notes, or new money, in return, receiving a commission of half per cent. This was successfully accomplished without any disturbance.

In September, 1715, the rebellion broke out, which immediately caused a run upon the Bank, the directors themselves urging it on, that the money might not fall into the hands of the insurgents. They then stopped, retaining all the money belonging to the Crown, which was about £30,000, which they lodged in the Castle. They then gave notice that all their notes should bear interest, as had been done in 1704. In May, June, and July, 1716, they were all called in and paid. In this year the monopoly of banking granted by their charter expired, and no steps were taken to renew it.

It appears that up to this time the profits of the Bank were enormous. A rival pamphlet states that the dividend was 35, 40, and 50 per cent., and, accordingly, as we may well suppose, these profits attracted rivals. A cry was got up against them, that they were too niggardly in advancing loans, that they exacted too high interest, and that the concern was altogether too small.

4. In December, 1719, proposals were made to them to unite with the proprietors of the Equivalent fund, to the amount of £250,000, so as to increase the capital to £350,000, and share the annual grant of £10,000 (being four per cent. on the amount) in the proportion of two-sevenths and five-sevenths. But, as the Bank had only one-tenth paid up, the proprietors of the Equivalent fund were to draw out of the Bank, as might be agreed upon, nine-tenths, or £225,000, in notes, so that there might then be a capital of £35,000 to bank upon.

The bank replied that—1st, They had no power by their Act to amalgamate with the Equivalent, as they were limited to £100,000 sterling; 2ndly, That they would not unite at par

with the Equivalent at four per cent., while their own stock was worth at least ten per cent.; 3rdly, That the stock of the Bank was large enough for the country; and, if they wanted it enlarged, they could do it themselves by calls on their proprietors. They also gave other calculations, shewing the absurd nature of the proposals.

No sooner were the advances of the Equivalent proprietors repulsed, than another set of persons began another rough wooing, to thrust themselves into a union with them. The *Edinburgh Society*, formed on a pretended plan of insuring against fire, tried to force a junction with them, and, being defeated in this, they tried to get up a run upon them. They got together £8,400 of their notes, and spread a report of a run. This, however, failed; and shortly after the Bubble Act passed, by which the society found that they were an illegal company, and were obliged to dissolve themselves. The London Assurance Company then "proposed" to them, but met with a similar refusal.

5. At the time of the Union, a considerable number of persons, both civil and military, were creditors of the State, and the Equivalent sum stipulated in the Act of Union was not sufficient to discharge their claims. In 1714, they obtained an Act of Parliament, constituting their debts, but no Parliamentary provision was made to pay it till 1719, when £10,000 was set apart for that purpose, to be paid annually, in preference to all other claims. The Act of 1719 empowered His Majesty, by letters patent, to incorporate the proprietors of this debt into a body politic and corporate—a MONTE—with powers to do and perform all matters appertaining to them to do, touching or concerning the said capital sum; and the yearly fund, payable in respect thereof, as His Majesty, by the said letters patent, should think fit to grant. In pursuance of this act, the proprietors, who included persons in all ranks of the State, were incorporated in 1724; and, by the same letters patent, the King agreed and covenanted with the corporation that he would, from time to time, grant them such other powers, privileges, and authorities, as he lawfully might.

This was the body of persons whom we have seen attempt to force themselves on the Bank of Scotland. When they were repulsed by that body, they determined to apply to the King to

grant them powers of Banking in Scotland, in pursuance of his agreement to grant them any powers that he lawfully might. They accordingly petitioned him to grant them powers to bank in Scotland, limited to such of the company as should on or before Michaelmas, 1727, subject their stock to the trade of banking. This petition came to the knowledge of the Bank in 1726, and, of course, they did everything they could to oppose it. A cry was got up against them that they were hostile to the House of Hanover—that they charged too high interest for their loans—that they were too particular in the securities they required—that they would not lend on their own stock, and other things. To all these various charges, they, or a friend for them, elaborately replied, and they said that such a thing as two banks in one country was never heard of—that if Scotland had two England should have ten. By this time they had called up 3-10ths of their stock, or £30,000, and they alleged that that was sufficient to circulate all the credit that could be required in Scotland. They had some sound views on the subject—“For the quota of credit in a banking company must be *proportioned to the stock of specie in the nation*, learned and understood by long experience, and not extended to a capital stock subscribed for, which cannot in the least help to support the company's credit if the specie of the nation decay.”

The call that had been made was partly paid up in the Bank's own notes, just as we shall see that the subscription to the new stock of the Bank of England was partly paid in its own depreciated notes. An outcry was made about this, but it was well answered—“But the objectors do not at all consider this point. For the payments are many of them made in specie, and bank notes are justly reckoned the same as specie when paid in on a call of stock, *because, when paid in, it lessens the demand on the Bank.*” He also says—“A certain stock of specie circulating in the country is needful for currency of payments in markets, and amongst the meaner sort of people, bearing a due proportion to what is running on paper credit upon the faith of the Banking Company.” Excellent doctrines, in strict accordance with the principles which made the Parliament of Scotland reject the plausible and delusive schemes of Dr. Chamberlen and John Law, for issuing paper based upon land.

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Bank of Scotland, the

charter, with powers of banking, was granted to the Equivalent Company on the 31st May, 1727. The King's death on the 11th June following delayed it for a short time, but it was sealed on the 8th July. The Company took the name of the ROYAL BANK, and commenced business on the 8th December, 1727, with a capital stock of £151,000.

Granting that all the charges against the old bank were futile and groundless, we may well rejoice that the monopoly of the Bank of Scotland was not permitted to subsist. A writer, who professes to be independent of either bank, touched the right point in reply to the statement put forth on behalf of the old bank—"The power of monopolies is, I believe, an exploded doctrine. . . . Did ever any nation make an exclusive bank perpetual, or for longer than twenty-one years? Or, if such an instance can be given, was the measure right? . . . If the old bank should reply—We are in possession, what have we done to deserve to have our possession disturbed? The answer upon that abstract question is plain by another question—*What have we, the other subjects, done to be secluded? or by what law are we secluded from the advantages you enjoy?*" The writer then says, after comparing the rival companies—"The obvious reflection which arises from comparing these two is, that these candid and fair dealers have also dealt profitably for themselves (as it is but reasonable that they should), they have taken very good payment for all the services they have done to the nation, and *what title they, or any other set of men, have to an hereditary or indefeasible monopoly of banking is hard to understand.* . . . As ready as our Parliament was at the Union to accommodate petitioners, *a perpetual monopoly of banking was a thing so manifestly pernicious, that no private men could have the assurance to aim at it, far less could any Parliament be so unthinking as to grant it.*" On the south of the Tweed there was found a Parliament so unthinking as to grant a monopoly of banking to a single company for upwards of 130 years, and the consequences fully justified the opinions of the sagacious Scot.

The directors of the company were authorised to make calls upon the proprietors, to the amount of one-half of their stock, but there were no means given of enforcing the calls beyond retaining the accruing dividends until the call was satisfied.

They got, however, great assistance by having £20,000 deposited with them by the Crown. This was sent down by the Government to be placed out at interest, to assist the fisheries and manufactures, and several of the directors of the Royal Bank, being among the trustees for managing the fund, voted that it should be placed in their own bank. Their charter also granted them unlimited powers of issue. The alarm and jealousy created by the establishment of a new bank happily soon wore off, as it was discovered that, so far from injuring it, the inevitable consequence followed that enlarged experience in commerce would enable us to predict; it increased the prosperity of both of them, so that the stock of the Bank of Scotland rose to 400 per cent., and that of the Royal Bank also very high.

The Royal Bank had only been in existence two years, when it invented a further development of the system of banking, which, by the unanimous testimony of all persons who know that country, has done more to develop its resources, and promote its agricultural and commercial prosperity, than any other cause whatever. This is the system of *Cash Credits*, or *Cash Accounts*. This system deserves the most attentive consideration, because it is entirely of the nature of *Accommodation Paper*, which has fallen into such disrepute in England, from the enormous abuse of it that has taken place. We have already, in Chapter VI., given an account of Cash Credits. In 1731, the Bank of Scotland tried again to establish branches at Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Dundee, but, after a trial of two years, was obliged to discontinue them, and the plan was not tried again till 1774.

6. The unlimited power of issuing "promises to pay," placed in the hands of two hostile parties, must naturally have led to great over-issues, before they acquired sufficient experience. To protect themselves from the consequences of these over-issues, as well as from the attacks of each other, the Bank of Scotland in 1730 introduced a clause into their notes making them payable, at the option of the directors of the Bank, at the end of six months, with a sum equal to the legal interest from the time of demand to that time. This practice was adopted by all the other banking companies, for the manifest advantages of banking were so strikingly displayed, that after the expiry of the monopoly of the Bank of Scotland, banking companies started up in all direc-

tions, and inundated the country with notes. When the holders of the notes demanded payment for them, the directors of the companies threatened that they would take advantage of the optional clause, unless the demanders would content themselves with a part of what they wanted. Moreover, as there was no restraint upon the amount of their notes, many of the companies issued notes for 10s., 5s., and even lower than that. In Perthshire there were notes for 1s., and even for 1d., and the Perth Banking Company was founded partly to put an end to this nuisance. The inevitable consequence followed; these paper notes drove all the gold and silver out of the country, and the exchange with London fell. Adam Smith says—"While the exchange between London and Carlisle was at par, that between London and Dumfries would sometimes be 4 per cent. against Dumfries, though this town is not thirty miles distance from Carlisle. But at Carlisle bills were paid in gold and silver, whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank notes, and the uncertainty of getting those bank notes exchanged for gold and silver coin had thus degraded them 4 per cent. below the value of that coin." And this was at the time when, owing to the degraded state of the English coin, the foreign exchanges were adverse to England, and the market price of gold was £4 per ounce, so that the whole depreciation of the note was about $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Thus we see at this time, when the Scotch bank notes were at a discount, they were, in fact, *inconvertible*, or only payable six months after demand, a circumstance of great importance, and one which must be especially observed, as this was one of the instances alluded to by Sir Robert Peel in introducing his Bank Act of 1844.

The manifest consequence followed. All the gold left the country, as it always does from the excessive paper issues, and the banks were all obliged to employ agents in London constantly collecting money for them, at an expense of seldom less than one-and-a-half to two per cent. Adam Smith says—"This money was sent down by the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an additional expense of three quarters per cent., or 15s. on the £100. Those agents were not always able to replenish the coffers of their employers so fast as they were emptied. In this case the resource of the banks was to draw upon their correspondents in London bills of exchange

to the extent of the sum they wanted. When those correspondents afterwards drew upon them for the payment of this sum, together with the interest and commission, some of those banks, from the distress into which their excessive circulation had thrown them, had sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught but by drawing a second set of bills either upon the same or upon some other correspondents in London, and the same sum, or rather bills for the same sum, would in this manner make more than two or three journeys, the debtor bank always paying the interest and commission upon the whole accumulated sum. Even those Scotch banks which never distinguished themselves by their extreme imprudence, were sometimes obliged to employ this ruinous resource.

"The gold coin which was paid out either by the Bank of England or by the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over and above what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being likewise over and above what could be employed in that circulation, was sometimes sent abroad in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and sent abroad in the shape of bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold to the Bank of England, at the high price of £4 an ounce. It was the newest, the heaviest, and the best pieces only, which were carefully picked out of the old coin, and either sent abroad or melted down at home, and while they remained in the shape of coin, those heavy pieces were of no more value than the light, but they were of more value abroad, or when melted down into bullion at home." This passage well illustrates the quotation we have given from Aristophanes, and is admirably illustrated by what took place in France during the existence of the Assignats, and in England during the suspension of cash payments.

At this period the Scotch Banks had got themselves into a very alarming position, from their ignorance of the true principles of regulating a paper currency, as well as of the effect of an excessive issue of paper in depressing the exchanges, and causing an export of gold, and not perceiving that, while in this state, bringing gold into the country was like pouring water into a sieve, or like the toil of the Danaides. They had been far too prodigal in granting cash credits, and allowing them to be converted into dead loans, without observing the rules that were

especially applicable to them. And everything seemed to show that matters would get worse, as the annihilation of the last Jacobite rebellion in 1746 had freed the country for ever from the fear of internal disturbances, and numerous other companies were forming to add to the currency, which was already superabundant.

United in a common danger, the two principal banks agreed to combine their influence, and obtain an Act to remedy this, and the Statute 1765, c. 49, was passed, suppressing all notes under 20s., and prohibiting those to be issued with the optional clause, and enacting that all such notes should be payable to the bearer on demand. The banks also curtailed their cash credits very extensively, and called up fresh capital. Owing to these combined measures, silver immediately returned into circulation, the value of the Scotch currency was restored to par, and from that time to the present, although the issue of bank notes was absolutely free until 1845, the Scotch currency HAS NEVER VARIED FROM PAR.

7. The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank continued to be the only chartered banks till 1746, when the British Linen Company was incorporated, for the purpose of carrying on the linen manufacture, and banking in connection with it. This Company soon found it expedient to discontinue the linen part of their business and confine themselves to banking, and it has since become one of the most powerful and wealthy of the Scotch banks, but it did not introduce any new feature into Scotch banking.

This is the first occasion, that we are aware of, on which that abominable system of accommodation paper, which is the sure precursor of mercantile convulsion, was fully manifested. The Scotch banks seem to have learnt a very wholesome lesson, and contracted their issues more within the bounds of prudence. This was a source of prodigious annoyance to a vast number of speculators and adventurers. The prudence which the banks exercised in discounting, not only alarmed, but enraged these projectors to the highest degree. "Their own distress," says Adam Smith, "of which this prudent and necessary reserve of the banks was no doubt the immediate occasion, they called the distress of the country; and this distress of the country they said

was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillanimity, and bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a sufficiently liberal aid to the spirited undertakings of those who exerted themselves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country. It was the duty of the banks, they seemed to think, to lend for so long a time, and to as great an extent, as they might wish to borrow. The banks, however, by refusing in this manner to give more credit to those to whom they had already given a great deal too much, took the only method by which it was now possible either to save their own credit, or the public credit of the country.

“In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was established in Scotland, for the express purpose of relieving the distress of the country. The design was generous, but the execution was imprudent; and the nature and causes of the distress which it meant to relieve, were not, perhaps, well understood. This bank was more liberal than any had ever been, both in granting cash accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange. With regard to the latter it seems to have made scarce any distinction between real and circulating bills, but to have discounted all equally. It was the avowed principle of this bank to advance, upon any reasonable security, the whole capital which was to be employed in those improvements of which the returns are the most slow and distant, such as the improvements of land. To promote such improvements was even said to be the chief of the public-spirited purposes for which it was instituted. By its liberality in granting cash accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange, it no doubt issued great quantities of its bank notes. But those bank notes being, the greater part of them, over and above what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ, returned upon it, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they were issued. Its coffers were never well filled. The capital, which had been subscribed to this bank at two different subscriptions, amounted to £160,000, of which 80 per cent. only were paid up. This sum ought to have been paid in at several different instalments. A great part of the proprietors, when they paid in their first instalment, opened a cash account with the bank; and the directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their own proprietors with the same liberality with which they treated all other men, allowed many

of them to borrow upon this cash account, what they paid in upon all their subsequent instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer what had the moment before been taken out of another. But, had the coffers of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive circulation must have emptied them faster than they could have been replenished by any other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London, and, when the bill became due, paying it, together with interest and commission, by another draught upon the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very ill, it is said to have been driven to this resource within a very few months after it began to do business. The estates of the proprietors of this bank were worth several millions, and by their subscription to the original bond, or contract of the bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements. By means of the great credit which so great a pledge necessarily gave it, it was notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to carry on business for more than two years. When it was obliged to stop, it had in circulation about £200,000 in bank notes. In order to support the circulation of those notes, which were continually returning upon it, as fast as they were issued, it had been constantly in the practice of drawing bills of exchange upon London, of which the number and value were continually increasing, and, when it stopped, amounted to upwards of £600,000. This bank, therefore, had, in little more than the course of two years, advanced to different people upwards of £800,000 at 5 per cent. Upon the £200,000, which it circulated in bank notes, this 5 per cent. might perhaps be considered as clear gain, without any other deduction besides the expense of management. But upon upwards of £600,000, for which it was continually drawing bills of exchange upon London, it was paying, in the way of interest and commission, upwards of 8 per cent., and was, consequently, losing more than 3 per cent. upon more than three-fourths of all its dealings.

“The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects quite opposite to those which were intended by the particular persons who planned and directed it. They seem to have intended to support the spirited undertakings, for as such they considered them, which were at that time carrying on in different parts of the country, and at the same time, by drawing the whole banking business to themselves, to supplant all the

other Scotch banks, particularly those established at Edinburgh, whose backwardness in discounting bills of exchange had given some offence. This bank, no doubt, gave some temporary relief to those projectors, and enabled them to carry on their projects for about two years longer than they could otherwise have done. But it thereby only enabled them to get so much deeper into debt, so that, when ruin came, it fell so much heavier both upon them and upon their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore, instead of relieving, really aggravated, in the long run, the distress, which those projectors had brought both upon themselves and upon their country. It would have been much better for themselves, their creditors, and their country, had the greater part of them been obliged to stop two years sooner than they actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank afforded to those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to the other Scotch banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which those other banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this new bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks were enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves, without incurring a considerable loss, and perhaps, too, even some degree of discredit.

“In the long run, therefore, the operations of this Bank increased the real distress of the country, which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved from a very great distress those rivals whom it meant to supplant.

“At the first setting out of this Bank, it was the opinion of some people that how fast soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish them, by raising money upon the securities of those to whom it had advanced its paper. Experience, I believe, soon convinced them that this method of raising money was much too slow to answer their purpose; and that coffers, which were originally so ill-filled, and which emptied themselves so very fast, could be replenished by no other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing bills upon London, and, when they became due, paying them by other draughts upon the same place, with accumulated interest and commission. But though they had been able by this method to raise money as fast as they wanted it, yet, instead of making a profit, they must have

suffered a loss by every such operation ; so that, in the long run, they must have ruined themselves as a mercantile company, though perhaps not so soon as by the more expensive practice of drawing and re-drawing. They could still have made nothing by the interest of the paper, which, being over and above the circulation of the country could absorb and employ, returned upon them, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they issued it ; and for the payment of which they were themselves continually obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expense of this borrowing, of employing agents to look out for the people who had money to lend, of negotiating with those people, and of drawing the proper bond or assignment, must have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss upon the balance of their accounts. The project of replenishing their coffers in this manner, may be compared to that of a man who had a water pond, from which a stream was continually running out, and into which no stream was continually running, but who proposed to keep it always full by employing a number of people to go continually with buckets to a well at some miles' distance, in order to bring water to replenish it.

“ But, though this operation had proved not only practicable but profitable to the bank, as a mercantile company, yet the country could have derived no benefit from it ; but, on the contrary, must have suffered a very considerable loss by it. This operation could not augment in the smallest degree the quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a sort of general loan office for the whole country. Those who wanted to borrow, must have applied to this bank, instead of applying to the private persons who had lent it their money. But a bank which lends money, perhaps, to 500 different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its debtors, than a private person who lends out his money among a few people, whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal conduct, he thinks he has good reason to confide. The debtors of such a bank as that whose conduct I have been giving some account of, were likely, the greater part of them, to be chimerical projectors, the drawers and re-drawers of circulating bills of exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertak-

ings, which, with all the assistance that could be given them, they would probably never be able to complete, and which, if they should be completed, would never repay the expense which they had really cost, would never afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal to that which had been employed about them. The sober and frugal debtors of private persons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money borrowed in sober undertakings, which were proportioned to their capitals, and which, though they might have less of the grand and the marvellous, would have more of the solid and the profitable, which would repay with a large profit whatever had been laid out upon them, and which would thus afford a fund capable of maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than that which had been employed about them. The success of this operation, therefore, without increasing in the smallest degree the capital of the country, would only have transferred a great part of it from prudent and profitable to imprudent and unprofitable undertakings."

8. This bank, to which this long extract refers, was the celebrated Ayr Bank, which was founded to remedy the alleged distress caused by the niggardly conduct of the existing banks. It was started by a company which comprised the Duke of Hamilton and many other landed proprietors of immense wealth, and it was based on the fatal delusion that, because the capital and property of its proprietors was undoubted, it might therefore issue notes to any amount without depreciation. This was exactly John Law's theory of money, and this bank is a pregnant instance of its fallacy. The pamphlet we have already quoted from, relating to the Bank of Scotland, had already seen and denounced this fallacy, for it said, with perfect truth and wisdom, *that no matter what the capital of a banking company is, the Paper Credit, in the shape of Notes, which it can circulate, bears a certain proportion to the existing specie in the country, and this can only be ascertained by experience.* Now, this, strikes at the root of John Law's whole theory, because that is based upon the fallacy that bank notes only *represent* property, and, therefore, may be multiplied to the extent of any existing property without depreciation—a theory whose results may be seen in the history of the Assignats; whereas the real truth and fact is, that bank notes do not *represent* any pro-

perty whatever, but are themselves independent entities, and can only maintain their value, like any other independent entities, by bearing a certain proportion to the specie. Nor is Adam Smith correct in what he says, that the operations of banking do not increase the capital of the country; there is no more delusive fallacy than this in Economics; it is just because banking *does* increase capital so rapidly that it is so dangerous. It is just for the very reason that bank credits, whether in the form of promissory notes, or entries and cheques, perform exactly the same functions, and are in all respects equivalent to the creation of so much additional capital, that they so fatally depreciate the value of the existing specie, if they are multiplied too rapidly. The fatal error of the Ayr Bank, and of Law's theory is this, *not* that capital might be increased by banking, but in not perceiving the *true natural limits to the increase*—and in not seeing that the true limits were to be found in its maintaining an equality of value with gold and silver. This unfortunate concern was supposed to have been insolvent within a fortnight after it commenced business. Its mistaken course inflated speculation; the accommodation bill system, which has been the cause of every commercial crisis from that time to this, promoted by this bank and other speculators, formed the exact antetype of the proceedings of the Western Bank, and its herd of adventurers in 1857. The exports of 1771 and 1772 rose to a height they had never done before, and which they did not again equal till 1787. While commerce was in this apparently prosperous, but in reality bloated and diseased condition, the puncture of a pin was sufficient to make it collapse. On the 10th June, 1772, a partner of one of the greatest firms in London, Neale & Co., decamped with £300,000, having been deeply engaged in speculation in funds. This man, named Fordyce, was a Scotchman, and had a large Scotch connection; these were blown upon by the failure of their London agent, and a complete commercial panic began. The Ayr Bank had branches in Edinburgh and Dumfries, and a run began upon it on the 17th June, 1772, in Edinburgh, and it stopped payment on 25th, along with a crowd of speculators. The whole of Scotland was shaken to its foundations. The paper of the Ayr Bank in circulation amounted to £800,000. There had been no disaster similar to it since the Darien scheme, and there has been none since like it, until the

failure of the Western Bank. The credit even of the other banks was almost gone. Besides the three Public Banks, only three of the private ones survived. The person who was the immediate cause of the collapse of the rotten bubble of credit being a Scotchman, the London papers teemed with tirades of abuse of everything Scotch.

A writer in one of the papers says that the accommodation bill system first sprung up then. In the *Public Advertiser*, July 8th, 1772, it says in a letter—"Banking companies have appeared in almost every corner of the kingdom, and bills of exchange have been multiplied by a new method called *Swivelling*, without any solid transactions." Adam Smith, however, places it earlier. Speaking of the refusal of the banks to discount to the extent the speculators wished, he says—"Some of those traders had recourse to an expedient, which for a time served their purpose, though at a much greater expense, yet as effectually as the utmost extension of bank credits could have done. This expedient was no other than the well-known shift of drawing and re-drawing; the shift to which unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse when they are upon the brink of bankruptcy. *The practice of raising money in this manner had long been known in England*, and, during the course of the late war, when the high profits of trade afforded a great temptation to over-trading, is said to have been carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought to Scotland, where in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the very moderate capital of the country, it was soon carried on to a much greater extent than it ever had been in England. The practice of drawing and re-drawing is so well known to all men of business, that it may perhaps be thought unnecessary to give an account of it." And yet a respectable witness, Mr. Latouche, deputed by the private bankers of Dublin to give evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1858, says that the accommodation bill system "arose from a new element, which, when the Act of 1844 was made, did not exist at all, and that was the immense amount of deposits in the hands of Joint Stock Banks paying interest!!"

9. We may also notice a fact that was asserted at this time, especially as it was brought up again in the crisis of 1857, in Scotland. It was generally, if not universally supposed in

Scotland that three of the chartered banks, the Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank, and the British Linen Company, were banks with limited liability. It is even positively stated so in the Reports of both Houses of Parliament, in 1826. Recently, however, this has been called in question with regard to the two latter banks. Mr. Hodgson, a Director of the Bank of England, in giving evidence before the late Committee, says, Q. 3,575—“The only bank existing in Scotland with limited liability, is, I believe, the Bank of Scotland; there is, I believe, a very great doubt about the Royal Bank of Scotland, and the British Linen Company, having a limited liability; I believe that the Bank of Scotland has a perfect charter, as perfect as that of the Bank of England; I believe that, though the other two banks, which I have named, have charters conferring certain privileges, it is very much doubted whether in those privileges limited liability is included. *Mr. Cayley*—Is there not a general impression in Scotland that they are banks of limited liability?—There has been that impression not only in Scotland, but in England, and amongst their own customers; but of late that opinion has been very much shaken, and I believe that the opinion of the Lords of Session now is, that those banks have not limited liability.” However, there is, in the *Public Advertiser* of the 22nd June, 1772, a letter from an apparently well-informed person, *stating that the proprietors of the Bank of Scotland are fully liable for all its debts, and that their property is worth several millions*, and urging that as a strong reason why the Bank of England should come forward to their assistance. Now, if this be so, it will certainly be a great surprise to common opinion. May it be long before the question in respect to either bank has any practical importance.

In 1774, by the Statute of that year, c. 32, the Bank of Scotland was authorised to double its capital stock, and the limit which any shareholder might hold was raised to forty shares. In this year the bank began successfully to establish branches, which has since become so marked a feature in Scotch banking. In 1784, by the Statute of that year, c. 12, the capital of the bank was raised to £300,000, and all restrictions as to the amount of stock any proprietor might hold taken off. In 1792, by the Statute of that year, c. 25, the capital was raised to £600,000, and by Statute, 1794, c. 19, to £1,000,000, and by

Statute, 1804, c. 23, to £1,500,000, of which £1,000,000 has been called up, and at which it still remains.

10. The next great commercial crisis was in 1793. This also extended to Scotland. This was attributed by the best contemporary writers to the inordinate multiplication of the country bankers, and the commencement of the revolutionary war. This crisis was most severely felt in Glasgow. Numbers of the most wealthy firms, both commercial and manufacturing, failed. The Glasgow Arms Bank, one of the three oldest in the city, stopped on the 14th March. Three-fourths of the country bankers in England were greatly shaken. The Bank of England refused all assistance, in spite of all solicitations made to it, for which it is severely blamed by Sir Francis Baring and the Bullion Report. When the Bank adopted this perverse course, universal failure seemed imminent. Sir John Sinclair remembered the precedent of 1697, when Montague had sustained public credit by an issue of Exchequer bills, and thought that a similar plan might be followed in this crisis. Mr. Pitt desired him to propose a scheme for the purpose, which he presented on the 16th April. A Committee of the House of Commons was immediately appointed. In the meantime a director of the Royal Bank of Scotland came up, with the most alarming news from Scotland. The public banks were wholly unable, with due regard to their own safety, to furnish the accommodation necessary to support commercial houses, and the country bankers. That, unless they received immediate assistance from Government, general failure would ensue. Numerous houses, who were perfectly solvent, must fall, unless they could obtain temporary relief. Mr. Macdowall, M.P. for Glasgow, stated that the commercial houses and manufactories there were in the greatest distress, from the total destruction of credit. That the distress arose from the refusal of the Glasgow, Paisley, and Greenock Banks to discount, as their notes were poured in upon them for gold. This panic was allayed by the Government consenting to issue small Exchequer bills, and by the activity of Sir John Sinclair in getting money sent down to Glasgow in anticipation of these Exchequer bills.

An idea of the great severity of this crisis may be formed from the interesting memoirs of Sir William Forbes, of the

history of that house. He says, p. 80, speaking of deposit receipts—

“In ordinary ‘times, the number paid and granted are pretty much the same.

“Amount paid above granted, in December, 1792, £10,670			
“	“	“	January, 1793, 16,916
“	“	“	February, “ 11,561
“	“	“	March, “ 52,961
“	“	“	April, “ 105,075
“	“	“	to 23rd May, “ 66,541

£263,724

“The diminution on current account balances was in proportion, that is, nearly as much more.”

11. The news of the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England reached Edinburgh by express on the 1st of March. An immediate run on the banks took place. The managers of the public banks waived all etiquette, and met at Sir William Forbes's to consider what was to be done. It was agreed to follow the example of the Bank of England, and suspend all payments in specie. A meeting of the principal inhabitants was called by the Lord Provost, and attended by the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the Lord Advocate, and the Sheriff of Edinburgh. The meeting came to a unanimous resolution to support the credit of the banks, and to receive their notes as specie. This resolution was advertised in the papers, and expresses sent off to the principal towns in the kingdom to inform them of it.

The suspension of cash payments gave rise to terrible scenes of confusion and uproar. The doors of the banks were besieged by crowds, clamouring for gold and silver in exchange for notes. The demand for small change by the lower classes was most urgent. They adopted the plan of dividing the £1 notes into halves and quarters. Spanish dollars, stamped by the Mint, were issued at 4s. 6d., and quarter guineas were coined. An Act was speedily passed, to allow those banks which had been in the habit of issuing notes, to issue 5s. notes for a limited period. The panic was allayed, and confidence quickly returned. The notes were received as readily as ever, though the banks refused

to cash them ; and, what was somewhat remarkable, no attempt was ever made by the people to compel them to pay specie, and not a single action was brought against them, although they were entirely unprotected by any Act of Parliament, and in a short time business proceeded more prosperously than ever.

12. The next occurrence that we may mention, as it was regarded as a political event, was the foundation of the Commercial Bank in 1810. This was at the time when the high Tory *regime* was in its highest and palmiest state, and the banks were alleged to carry their politics into their business. The Liberal party then determined to found an opposition bank, which was named the Commercial, which has attained as great an eminence as any of the older ones in public estimation. Its capital, as yet paid up is £1,000,000, which, its directors very recently gave the satisfactory assurance to its shareholders, is perfectly intact, and in addition to that, it has £400,000 of accumulated profits as a reserve fund. This bank subsequently obtained a charter, but the liability of its shareholders is specially declared unlimited.

In 1818, it being found that many foreigners availed themselves of the privileges of naturalisation, by purchasing stock in the Bank of Scotland, this clause in their original Act was repealed.

13. The long and dreadful catalogue of banking failures in England, chiefly owing to the monopoly of the Bank of England, and which were attributed to the issues of the £1 notes of the country bankers, made the Ministry of 1826 desirous to abolish them in Scotland and Ireland, at the same time as they did those of England. But this raised such a ferment in the country, that the Government consented that Committees of both Houses should be appointed to inquire into the matter. The result was so eminently favourable to the Scotch banking system, that no further interference was attempted. "With respect to Scotland," says the report of the Lords, "it is to be remarked that during the period from 1766 to 1797, when no small notes were by law issuable in England, the portion of the currency of Scotland in which payments under £5 were made, continued to consist almost entirely of notes of £1 and £1 1s., and that no incon-

venience is known to have resulted from this difference in the currency of the two countries. This circumstance, among others, tends to prove that uniformity, however desirable, is not indispensably necessary. It is also proved, by the evidence, and by the documents, that the banks of Scotland, whether chartered or joint stock companies, or private establishments, have for more than a century exhibited a stability which the Committee believe to be unexampled in the history of banking; that they supported themselves from 1797 to 1812, without any protection from the restriction by which the Bank of England, and that of Ireland, were relieved from cash payments; that there was little demand for gold during the late embarrassments in the circulation; and that in the whole period of their establishment there are not more than two or three instances of bankruptcy. As during the whole of this period a large portion of their issues consisted almost entirely of notes not exceeding £1, or £1 1s., there is the strongest reason for concluding that, as far as respects the Banks of Scotland, the issue of paper of that description has been found compatible with the highest degree of solidity; and that there is not, therefore, while they are conducted upon their present system, sufficient ground for proposing any alteration, with the view of adding to a solidity which has so long been sufficiently established." The report of the Commons was also adverse to any legislative interference with Scotch banking.

14. No interference with Scotch banking took place till 1845, when Sir Robert Peel, having carried his Bank of England Charter Act and Joint Stock Banking Act with scarcely a breath of opposition, determined to regulate those of Scotland and Ireland as well. The principal provisions of this Act, Statute 1845, c. 38, are as follows—

I. All persons had been prohibited by the Statute 1844, c. 32, from commencing to issue notes after the 6th May, 1844, in the United Kingdom, and all such persons in Scotland as were lawfully issuing their notes between the 6th May, 1844, and the 1st May, 1845, were to certify to the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes the name of the firm and the places where they issued such notes.

II. The Commissioners were to ascertain the average number

of such bankers' notes in circulation during the year preceding the 1st May, 1845.

III. Such bankers were authorised to have in circulation an amount of notes, whose average for four weeks was not to exceed the amount thus certified by the Commissioners, together with an amount equal to the average amount of coin held by the banker during the same four weeks. Of the coin three-fourths must be gold, and one-fourth silver.

IV. In case the bank exceeds the legal amount, it is to forfeit the excess.

V. If two or more banks unite, they are authorised to have an issue of paper to the aggregate amount of issues of the separate banks, as well as the amount of the coin held by the united bank.

VI. Notes of the Bank of England not to be legal tender in Scotland.

The reader will see that there are some striking points of difference between the restraints laid upon the English and Scotch banks, for, while the former are bound down to an absolute fixed limit of issue, the latter are permitted to issue to any amount, provided they hold an equal amount of coin above their authorised amount. Moreover, if any number of banks unite, they may have an aggregate authorised issue, equal to that of the separate banks; but in England, if the number of partners of the united bank exceeds six, they forfeit their power of issuing notes altogether. This absurd restriction as to the number of partners in a bank never had any force in Scotland.

15. The year 1857 was remarkable for a calamity, to which there had been no precedent except the Ayr Bank, namely, the suspension of two very large joint stock banks, the Western Bank and the City of Glasgow Bank. The latter, indeed, has resumed business, and, on an investigation of its affairs, it appeared that, out of a capital of above £800,000, it had lost about £70,000; having thus a very large paid up capital intact, it resumed business, and, we may hope that after having received this severe lesson, its business will be conducted on better principles in future. But the Western Bank was found to have lost not only the whole of its paid-up capital, £1,500,000, but nearly as much more besides. This Bank was founded in 1832, so that,

in the course of twenty-four years, it lost £3,000,000 of money. The Ayr Bank, in two years and a half, lost £400,000, to that, of the two, the latter is proportionably the more severe calamity. The failure of the Western Bank, however, has called forth the most bitter attacks upon the general system of Scotch banking, which we shall find to be totally unmerited, because it is clearly proved, in the evidence given before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1858, *that during the whole course of its career, it pursued a system which was diametrically opposed to the usual course of the other Scotch banks.*

The Western Bank began business in 1832, and in the next year had a paid up capital of £209,170, which was increased year by year, till, in 1849, it amounted to £1,792,850, at which it continued till 1852, when a number of shares having fallen into the Bank's hands by bankruptcy and insolvency, they were written off against the capital, which was thus reduced to £1,500,000, at which it continued till the closing of the bank. The mode of business adopted by this Bank, from the beginning, was not according to the usual plan of Scotch banking, for while, as explained by the witnesses before the Committee of 1858, one very important feature of it is to keep very large reserves in London, either at their bankers, or in Government securities, the Western Bank invested its means chiefly in local accommodation, and kept very insufficient reserves in London, so much so that, in 1834, its London agents, Messrs. Loyd & Co., dishonoured its drafts. It appears that upon this, the other Scotch banks refused its notes, and remonstrated with it for its mismanagement. On the 30th October, 1834, the directors, in answer to these remonstrances, notified to the other banks that they had resolved to invest, in marketable securities, a sum amply sufficient to prevent such a thing happening again. They promised to commence the necessary operations in the following January, and complete them in April, if not earlier. They also engaged to lessen their discounts, and to continue to do so, in order to have sufficient funds at its command. Upon this promise of better conduct in future, the three chartered banks advanced the Western Bank £100,000 to enable them to purchase these securities forthwith. But the Western directors very soon broke their engagement, and reverted to their former mode of business. In 1838 they applied to the Board of Trade for a grant of letters

patent, when a number of the other Scotch banks presented a joint memorial against it. They said that they should be wanting in their duty to the public, as well as their own constituents, if they sanctioned, by their silence, such an application—"The fact is well known to you, that while there have occurred, during the past fifty years, periodical convulsions among the banks in England, which have led to the failure of several hundreds, Scotland has, for the most part, maintained a state of general tranquillity, and there have, in the same time, occurred only three or four failures, and those of a very minor character. The cause of this is notoriously owing, first, to the large capital employed in the Scotch banks, and second, to the system of administration adopted. Capital alone, as has been recently experienced in England, by extending the scale of operations, may only increase the mischief. In the like manner, a numerous proprietary, constituting a protection to the public against eventual loss, may, by adding to the credit, add to the power of such an institution for evil. The safeguard of the Scotch system has been the uniform practice adopted of retaining a large portion of the capital and deposits invested in Government securities, capable of being converted into money, at all times, and under all circumstances. This requires a sacrifice, because the rate of interest is small, and, in times of difficulty, the sale involves a loss, but it has given the Scotch banks absolute security, and enabled them to pass unhurt through periods of great discredit.

"It is not then unreasonable that the managers of the Scotch banks should look with favour on a system which, notwithstanding their close connection with England, has exempted them from these calamities, and, in the doubt that exists on banking theories elsewhere, it is at this moment sufficient to say that the system established in Scotland has worked well, and ought not to be disturbed there.

"The Western Bank was established in the year 1832, and the principle on which it has avowedly acted has been to employ as much as possible of its capital and assets in discounts and loans, retaining only the cash necessary to meet its current engagements.

"As this is a more profitable investment than Government securities, there is always a strong temptation to speculative or inexperienced persons to adopt this course, and if the conse-

quences were to affect themselves alone, it would be of small moment, but, unfortunately, in banking, this cannot be. The whole system depends upon credit, and the failure of an ill-regulated establishment, affects those differently constituted. Such a body, in prosperous times, boldly extends its business, and, from seeing the readiness with which in such seasons commercial paper is discounted, comes to the conclusion, that it is the best and most convertible description of investment that could be found.

“Prudent banks, knowing the delusive nature of this expectation, are compelled to increase their own reserve to meet the consequences of this unwise expansion; and, when the difficulty comes, they must either assist their rival to prevent an explosion, or must make a heavy sacrifice by selling their securities at a loss.

“The Western Bank, acting on this principle, allowed their London transactions to assume such an irregular shape, that their London agents, the respectable house of Jones, Loyd, and Co., took alarm, and in 1834 dishonoured their drafts. The Bank of Scotland, Royal Bank, and British Linen Company were compelled to come to their assistance, and made them considerable advances. These circumstances occurring in a time when the Money Market was perfectly tranquil, shewed the extreme danger of the practice. The Edinburgh banks insisted on a better system of management being adopted, and that the Western Bank should have invested in Government securities a sum amply sufficient to meet emergencies. The Directors, after much discussion, at length, by a resolution dated 30th October, 1834, distinctly assented to the requisition, but, as they had so engaged the assets of the Bank, as to render it impossible immediately to procure the funds, the Edinburgh banks lent them £100,000 for the purpose. *For some time the Western Bank may have acted on this agreement, but the temptation of profit appears to have got the better of their prudence, and they now repudiate their engagement.*

“It will be quite apparent that a bank that can employ its whole funds in this manner, is enabled either to divide a larger share of profits than its competitors, or to do business on more favourable terms; and we repeat, that if the only consequence of this was to increase or diminish the dividends of the rival establish-

ments, it would be of comparatively small importance, but in its result it endangers the existence of every bank in the country, and the fortunes of a large portion of the community. We feel that, if letters patent shall be granted to this Bank, after what has passed, *it will be a public sanction and countenance of a new and mischievous principle, opposed to the Banking system of Scotland.*

"The question is not, in this instance, whether Government will interpose new restraints on banking companies, but whether they will encourage a violation of the old system, by granting distinction and privileges to a company which, having pledged itself to their observance, now disowns them in its practice, and under these circumstances applies for a charter." This memorial was signed by the Bank of Scotland, the British Linen Company, the Commercial and National Banks; and the Charter, if applied for, never was granted.

This system of keeping such small reserves in London produced the consequence foreseen in the preceding memorial. In 1847 the Western Bank was in difficulties, and received assistance from the Bank of England to the amount of £300,000 in November and December, 1847, which it repaid in March, 1848. From this time forward till 1852, when a change in the management took place, a rather more cautious course was pursued, but they did what we believe was totally contrary to the usual practice of the other Scotch banks—they rediscounted. The following figures shew the amounts of discounts and rediscounts from 1847 to 1852—

	Discounts.		Rediscounts.
In 1847	£15,711,488	£656,077
„ 1848	12,088,648	374,707
„ 1849	10,522,022	249,957
„ 1850	12,048,669	290,813
„ 1851	13,322,753	588,247
„ 1852	13,525,332	407,143

At this time the Bank had £356,000 of overdue bills, besides other very heavy locks-up of capital, in one case amounting to £120,000, which was covered with insurances on the lives of the obligants, on which it had paid £33,512 as premiums when it stopped. "But even at this time," says Mr. Fleming, "it had a cluster of those people who had manufactured accommodation

bills, doing business with them." So that in this year, he says, the Bank was not in a satisfactory state.

In 1852 a new management commenced, and to shew how the practice of rediscounting increased, we give the following figures—

	Discounted.		Rediscounted.
In 1853	£14,987,740	£1,682,320
„ 1854	18,596,704	4,856,292
„ 1855	19,835,781	4,969,669
„ 1856	20,410,884	5,407,363
„ 1857 till Nov. 9	20,691,415	4,881,221

Thus we see the enormous increase of this most perilous practice during these years, a practice which places the existence of any institution that depends upon it to any great extent, at any moment at the mercy of the will, the caprice, or any accident that may happen to the purchaser of its bills.

But this was by no means the only instance of reckless management. Over and above all the other embarrassments, there were four accounts particularly to which the subsequent calamity was due; we will shew the state of these accounts in 1852 and 1857—

1852.	Discounts.		Overdrawn Account.
	£		£
Macdonald & Co.	107,116	...	—
Menteith & Co.	83,779	...	3,523
Wallace & Co.	18,144	...	—
Pattison & Co.	89,678	...	1,154
	<u>£188,717</u>		<u>£4,677</u>

Shewing that these four firms were under obligations to the Bank in 1852 to the amount of £193,394. The following was the state of the same accounts in 1857—

	Discounts.	Overdrawn Account.	Overdue Bills.
Macdonald	£408,716	£5,636	£8,526
Menteith	376,799	67,635	93,129
Wallace	227,464	—	—
Pattison	336,996	67,253	11,571
	<u>£1,349,975</u>	<u>£135,524</u>	<u>£113,226</u>

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Being a sum total of £1,608,725 to these four houses alone, when they failed. And, to shew the character of the bills discounted for these firms, of £402,716 bills of Macdonald's current at the time of their failure, £398,349 were dishonoured at maturity; of Menteith's, £376,699 current at their failure, £269,726 were dishonoured at maturity; of Wallace's, of £226,741 current, there were dishonoured £209,534; and of Pattison's, of £336,996 current, there were dishonoured £150,749.

Soon after the general meeting of June, 1857, the directors requested another person to examine the Bank's books, who, after doing so, and allowing all the current business of the Bank to be good, including the above four firms, found that bad debts to the amount of £573,000 were kept on the books as good, which, after deducting the rest and guarantee fund, amounting to £246,000, made a loss of £327,000 in the capital of the Bank, and the advances to the shareholders, holding 7,626 shares in the Bank, amounted to £988,487. In the month of September, 1857, Mr. Fleming, the person whom the directors had requested to assume the temporary management of the Bank, began seriously to inquire into the nature of these immense accounts, and on the 7th the Wallaces acknowledged that they were dealing in accommodation bills, and he saw that the Macdonalds must be doing the same thing, as the two houses were drawing on the same names. It was found that the Macdonalds drew upon 124 acceptors, only 37 of whom had been inquired about, and of these, reports on 21 were extremely bad. But there were 60 or 70 persons whom they drew upon, who made it a regular trade to accept bills for a small commission; in fact, it appeared that they engaged a man in London to procure them accommodation acceptances. As soon as the true nature of these accounts was ascertained, there was no resource but to stop them. The failures of Menteith and Macdonald, which were the first that became notorious, created a panic on the Stock Exchange on the 10th October, and the price of stock rapidly fell, it being commonly reported that the whole capital of the Bank had been engaged in enabling these parties to carry on their business for a series of years. These rumours created a run on the Bank, to a slight extent, on the following Tuesday, which continued for two or three days, and during that week, ending the 17th of October, the Bank paid away about £36,000 in coin, but this was the only

run for gold of any amount on the Bank, for during the following week it only paid away £4,000, and in the week after that about £2,000; and the whole paid away in coin between the 10th of October and the 7th of November, the Saturday before it stopped, was only £44,000. But, during this period, the total *deposits* demanded were £1,280,000, and, except the sum above mentioned as paid in coin, *the whole of these deposits were paid in the Bank's own notes, which were immediately taken and lodged in the other banks.*

This dreadful catastrophe deserves to be minutely detailed, because it is strenuously asserted by a very influential party, that the small note circulation of Scotland tends to increase a panic among its holders. But in this case, the Bank's notes in circulation did not in any way increase the panic. Mr. Fleming says—"I may say that there was no run for the payment of notes all through. There may have been a few notes presented, but I should certainly limit the demand for gold in exchange for notes to £5,000 or £6,000. I do not think it would exceed that. *Mr. Wilson:* In point of fact, the whole pressure upon the Bank at any time was in respect of its deposits, and not in respect to its circulation?—*Decidedly, there was no pressure in respect to its circulation;* so much so, that during the last two days for which the Bank was in operation, I do not think £1,000 was paid away in gold at the head office. The whole money withdrawn was taken away in notes, and the consequence was that on the afternoon of the 9th of November, when the Bank stopped, there was a very large amount of notes in circulation, something about £720,000. Then the depositors became uneasy about the security of their deposits, went to the Bank, and took the Bank's notes?—Yes. Did they pay them immediately into other banks?—Yes. . . . Was there much drain in the provinces upon the balances?—Not a very large amount, certainly; a wonderfully small amount, in proportion to the total deposits, was withdrawn from the country.—I think you said that at the branches there was very little demand for gold; almost none?—*Almost none.*"

At the same time a very heavy blow fell upon them from another quarter. The Bank, instead of keeping its funds well in hand in London, engaged in exchange operations with America. They had an agent in New York, though, perhaps, not openly

and avowedly in that character, who granted letters of credit upon them, in favour of persons who wished to raise money, such parties arranging with the agent, the securities to be lodged to meet the Bank's acceptances. These credits were not by any means always paid at maturity, but were renewed to a large extent. By this operation, a very considerable portion of the Bank's funds were locked up in America, instead of being in London as they ought to have been. At the time of its suspension, its acceptances current, and its obligations to accept, amounted to £317,000, in two months' bills, which, multiplied by six, gives the amount of the year's transactions. The amount of funds locked up in America by their agent there, appears to have been £376,520, against which he held railway bonds and current bills. Mr. Fleming said, Q. 5510—"It appears to me in many cases, the credits established by Lee upon the Western Bank, have been modes of raising money for the purpose of constructing American Railways, and for speculation in stocks, in New York." "The two banks, *i. e.*, the Western and the City of Glasgow," said Mr. Robertson, the cashier of the Royal Bank, "were in the habit of accepting four months' inland bills drawn from London, Liverpool, and Glasgow, in respect of these credits, *which was quite condemned by the Bank of England, and all the other banks in Scotland.*"

The general stoppage and failure of American credit at this time rendered the expectations of any remittances hopeless from there. And Mr. Fleming, who undertook the duty of manager on the 15th October, told the directors it was absolutely essential to make provision for a contingent drain upon the deposit money, and also for the American acceptances becoming due. On the 17th October, the directors resolved to apply to the Bank of Scotland. On the 21st, a written application was made to that Bank for assistance, and on the 23rd a meeting having been held of all the Edinburgh banks, they declined to assist, until application had been made to the Bank of England. This application was refused. This refusal being telegraphed down to Edinburgh, a meeting of the banks was held the same evening, and they agreed to advance £500,000, on condition that the directors should dissolve and wind up the concern. After some days' negotiation the Edinburgh banks agreed to forego the compulsory winding up, as the directors of the Western said that they had no power

to do so, and advanced the money without this condition. This sum was accordingly advanced on the 29th October, on the promissory notes of the Western Bank, at six months' date, for £510,000, the terms being that the Western Bank should be bound to replace the Edinburgh banks in Consols, at the price of the day. In addition to the loan so advanced by the Edinburgh banks, the Clydesdale Bank advanced £100,000 on a note of the Bank's at six month, with the individual guarantee of the directors, which was discounted at the current rate of 8 per cent.

The withdrawal of the deposits from the Bank, which was almost entirely among the small depositors, had greatly abated, and, whatever might have been the ultimate result which might have been necessitated in consequence of the examination of the Bank's affairs that was then in progress, there was no *immediate* danger of a catastrophe; when, on the 29th October, the City article of the *Times* announced that the Edinburgh banks had resolved to carry the Western Bank through its difficulties, on condition that it should wind up. The *Times* reached Scotland on the morning of the 30th, and immediately a fresh pressure commenced on the Bank. But this time it was of a different character from the previous one. The first pressure had been among the small depositors, the second consisted of the traders who kept large accounts, who, seeing that the Western Bank was going to close, made haste to transfer their balances to the other banks and open accounts with them, and it was this pressure which continued and made the Bank close its doors on the 9th November, *not from a demand for gold, but because the balances of these accounts being withdrawn in the Bank's notes, and paid into other banks, the Western Bank was unable to provide for the purchase of Exchequer bills from the other banks, to rectify this balance by a draft on London.*

To shew how mischievous this publication of the terms proposed was, we quote from Mr. Fleming's letter to the Bank of Scotland of 31st October, 1857—"The application made a fortnight ago by the Directors of this Bank to the other Scotch banks, for a credit to the extent of £500,000, was based on my calculation that £350,000 or £400,000 would keep our London finance in perfect order, and that the remainder would be a sufficient reserve to meet any probable withdrawal of deposits.

This calculation, I still believe, would have proved correct, *had the assistance required been given promptly, quietly, and free from any condition as to winding up.*

"But the demands made upon us have considerably exceeded my calculation, from two causes; first, the notoriety of our financial embarrassment, created by the delay in acceding to our application, and the course which the negotiations took from our having been referred to the Bank of England; and second, the condition as to winding up, which the other banks sought to impose, and the publicity given by the *Times* to this condition.

"It is not easy to say in figures to what extent these causes have respectively operated in inducing withdrawals, or to estimate to what extent they may still operate. But as to the past, my own observation here, and the reports from our branch agents, all convince me that the second has been immeasurably more mischievous than the first. *Deposits on receipts have been withdrawn to a very limited extent indeed, but balances on current accounts kept by the trading community have been removed to other banks to a considerable extent.* The reason is natural and obvious. If this Bank is to wind up, traders know that we cannot give them accommodation, and they take the earliest opportunity of arranging for that accommodation elsewhere, and withdraw their balances.

"I am hopeful that the mischief already done is not irreparable. That we retain still a measure of public confidence, is proved by the fact *that no fixed deposits of any large amount have been withdrawn, and nothing like a run has taken place, and gold has scarcely ever been demanded.*

"I have already said that there has been no demand made upon us for gold, *all sums withdrawn having been taken in our own notes, and, consequently, the other banks have got the deposits.*"

The Western Bank then asked a further loan from the Edinburgh banks, which, having been discussed for some days, was unanimously refused.

On Saturday, the 7th November, there was, from the heavy withdrawal of deposits in the Bank's notes, and their lodgment with the other banks, a heavy adverse balance on the exchange of that day. The Edinburgh banks were immediately informed that the Western Bank was unable to provide for this adverse

balance on the following Monday. On the Sunday they resolved as soon as this inability to pay the balance should be declared, to instruct their agents to refuse the Western's notes. *And it was beyond all question shewn that it was this injudicious line of conduct that chiefly brought on the subsequent run for gold.*

The Exchange being heavily against the Western on Saturday, it made a final proposal to the Edinburgh banks, and sent a scheme for an amalgamation with the Clydesdale Bank, to be discussed by them on Monday morning, the 9th, and kept its doors open till 2 o'clock, to learn their final decision. This being a decided refusal to entertain the terms proposed, the Western Bank shut its doors at 2 p.m., on Monday, the 9th November. Another Bank, the City of Glasgow, it was also known, had been engaged in transactions of the same nature as the Western, in America, and had also been equally negligent in keeping due reserves in London. This bank, too, required the assistance of the Edinburgh banks, though it is not stated how much they received. On the evening of the 9th a run commenced on the saving's bank branches of this bank. "On the Tuesday morning," says Mr. J. Robertson, the manager of the Union Bank, "when the doors of the banks were opened, a great number of parties appeared with deposit receipts demanding gold; in fact, the office of our own establishment was quite filled with parties within a quarter of an hour of the opening of the doors. I think at half-past 9. The *Chairman*: You are now speaking of the Union Bank?—I am speaking of most of the banks; I speak of the Union Bank particularly. Were the Western Notes at that time current, or were they refused?—*They were not current, unfortunately.* Was there any deputation from Glasgow to Edinburgh on the subject of the other banks agreeing to take the Western Bank's notes?—This run, as you may call it, or panic, increased so much, that *the continued refusal of the notes of the Western Bank added very much to the excitement.* Those people who came for money would not take the notes of any bank, it did not matter what bank it was; they refused everything but gold. We thought that it would allay the excitement if we were to take the Western Bank's notes; there being no danger of ultimate payment. We were so much impressed with that feeling, that two of the banks sent a deputation to their directors to Edin-

burgh to confer with the managers of the Edinburgh banks on the subject, and to induce them to rescind their order. They failed in that; the notes of the Western Bank were refused the whole day on the Tuesday."

The run of Tuesday exhausted the City of Glasgow Bank, and it did not open on Wednesday, the 11th. The state of Glasgow was so alarming that the magistrates sent for troops, and did all in their power to allay the excitement; they issued a proclamation advising the people not to press the banks for payment, and to take the notes of all the banks. They issued an order to all the rate collectors in the city to take all notes presented to them, including those of the two suspended banks. *But the demand for gold was almost entirely confined to the depositors, very few noteholders coming forward.* On Wednesday and Thursday large remittances of gold from London arrived about 10 o'clock in the morning, and were taken in waggons to the banks, escorted by strong bodies of police. But the run entirely ceased about 2 o'clock on Wednesday. At half past two, says the same witness, there were not half-a-dozen people in the establishment. The panic, as the witness said, only lasted one whole day and part of the next.

In fact, the refusal to take the Western Bank's notes was one of the chief causes of the run for gold; and, as soon as the other banks agreed to take them, the panic ceased. Mr. Lawrence Robertson was asked, "What was it which first caused the panic to cease?—When the stoppage of these banks took place, the other banks were not precisely informed of their position, and hesitated a little in taking their notes; after further consideration, the other banks resolved to take all the notes as they came forward, and when that was done the thing subsided. As soon as it became known that the notes of the Western Bank would be received by the general body of the banks in Scotland, the panic with regard to the notes of the Western Bank, came to an end?—*Entirely.*"

The same witness also said, that there was no run upon any of the Glasgow banks before the stoppage of the Western Bank. "Were those parties who drew out gold over the counter in exchange for notes, or by cheques on their deposits?—It was chiefly in the case of small deposit receipts. And not for any considerable amount?—No. Do you think that it exceeded £1,000?—

It is difficult to fix upon a sum ; I never looked at that. It was not of sufficient importance to call your attention to it?—No.” The City of Glasgow Bank resumed payment in about a month, but the Western Bank had lost not only its whole paid up capital of £1,500,000, but as much more again.

16. The details of this great catastrophe well deserve our closest attention, because it is the first instance of a *banking* panic in Scotland, and even that was confined to one town. The commercial failures were confined exclusively to the herd of adventurers who had been fostered and supported by the mismanagement of the Western Bank. There was but one house of any magnitude connected with Glasgow which suspended payment during this period, Dennistoun & Co., who were more a Liverpool and London house than a Glasgow one, and whose temporary stoppage was brought about by other causes. But this calamity has been seized hold of by persons who are hostile to the Scotch system of banking in general, and also to the £1 note currency of Scotland, to condemn them. But, when we come to investigate the true facts, we shall find that they lend no support to these charges. For, with respect to the first, it is distinctly proved by the most unanswerable evidence, that from the commencement to the close of its career, the Western Bank pursued a system of business that was totally opposed to the well-recognised system of Scotch banking, and unanimously condemned by all the well-conducted banks. That, during its whole course, it was a subject of terror and alarm to the other banks. That its locking up its funds in America was totally condemned by the Bank of England, and all the other Scotch banks. And the directors themselves, when, however, it was too late, acknowledged their own misconduct, for, in their first application for assistance to the Bank of Scotland, on the 21st October, 1857, the directors say—“On the part of the board of direction, it is right that *we should frankly say, that they are fully alive to the recklessness of the past management of the Bank; that its credit has been strained to the extreme point; and that, in the attempt to make large profits for the proprietary, unwise and undue risks have been run.* Feeling all this, the directors have entered on a course of management, which (although the present commercial crisis renders curtailment difficult of speedy

accomplishment) will eventuate in the establishment, on a secure basis, of a business of a safer *and a more legitimate, though certainly of a more limited description, than has for many years been conducted by the Western Bank of Scotland.*" *Habemus ipsos confitentes reos.* The directors themselves acknowledged that their course of business was *not* in accordance with the usual Scotch banking system. What possible reflection, then, can it be on the recognised system that a bank, which went right in the teeth of it, failed? The very same remarks apply, only, of course, in a lesser degree, to the City of Glasgow Bank. This Bank too, was guilty of speculating in America, instead of keeping its reserves in London; and it, too, paid the penalty by a temporary suspension.

The second charge, too, is equally groundless against the small note circulation. For it is said that these small notes aggravate a panic, and that a panic is most likely to commence amongst their holders. But, in this case, the evidence most decisively negatives the supposition that any part of the panic was due to the small notes, and not only that, *but it decisively proves that the demand for gold was greatly lessened on account of the notes.* Mr. Fleming says, Q. 5532—"I may say there was no run for payments of notes all through. There may have been a few notes presented, but I should certainly limit the demand for gold in exchange for notes to £5,000 or £6,000. I do not think it would exceed that. *Mr. Wilson:* In point of fact, the whole pressure on the Bank at any time was in respect to its deposits, and not in respect to its circulation?—Decidedly, *there was no pressure in respect to its circulation;* so much so, that during the last two days for which the Bank was in operation, I do not think £1,000 was paid away in gold at the head office. The whole money withdrawn was taken away in notes, and the consequence was, that on the afternoon of the 9th November, when the Bank stopped, there was a very large amount of notes in circulation, something about £720,000. *Mr. Wilson:* Then the depositors became uneasy about the security of their deposits, went to the Bank, and took the Bank's notes?—Yes. *Mr. Wilson:* Did they pay them immediately into other banks?—Yes. *Mr. Wilson:* They thereby indirectly obtained payment through the other banks?—Precisely so; they transferred their deposits from one bank to the other. *Mr.*

Wilson: Did many of the depositors demand gold?—Almost none; during the week, after the 10th October, there was a slight demand for gold, and in the country, I believe, there was a very slight demand for gold.” Mr. Fleming then gave the figures, shewing that the total demand for gold during the whole month, from the 10th October to the 9th November, was only £44,000, of which more than £6,000 was in exchange for notes, but the total demand for deposits and balances on account was £1,280,000; from which it follows, of course, that the total pressure on the Bank was this—

For gold in exchange for notes	£6,000
For deposits taken in gold	38,000
For deposits and balances taken in Bank's notes	1,236,000
	<hr/>
	<u>£1,280,000</u>

Now, if the Bank had not issued notes, how would this last item have been demanded? *Of course, in gold.* So that it is quite clear that the power of the Bank to issue notes saved and lessened the demand for gold to that extent. And we have already shewn that it was not any run for gold which made the Bank stop, but its inability to provide for payment of the adverse balance of exchange. But it may be said—See what followed the next morning. There was undoubtedly a run for gold next morning on some of the other banks. *But then there would have been the very same run if there had been no notes at all.* And that very run was greatly aggravated, if, indeed, it was not chiefly due to the most unfortunate decision of the other banks to refuse the Western Bank's notes. *As soon as the other banks agreed to take the Western's notes, the panic immediately subsided, even though a second bank stopped the same morning.* Now, what is the effect we might naturally have expected from a second bank's stopping in the midst of a panic? Clearly that that panic would have been greatly intensified. But in this case it was not so. The City Bank did not open on the Wednesday morning, and yet the whole panic was over by two o'clock that day. The whole demand on the Royal Bank for gold did not exceed £1,000.

Now, without prejudicing the question in any way, whether

the Scotch £1 notes should be suppressed, there is no dispassionate man who can, after reading the details of this crisis, come to the conclusion that they had anything whatever to do with this panic. The great wonder is, that after the unprecedented circumstance of two great banks stopping payment, the panic was so short, and so slight as it was. Does any man who knows London think that, if a similar case had happened there, the consequences would have been so comparatively trifling? The two London banks of most nearly equal magnitude with the Glasgow ones that stopped, are the Union and the London and County. Let us imagine that the Union Bank of London was to stop payment, and two days after the London and County. Does any man who knows London suppose that in such a case the panic would be limited to one day and a half. No man in his senses would think so.

Nor can there, we think, be any reasonable doubt that the refusal of the Edinburgh banks to take the notes of the Western Bank was a most unfortunate one. When the Ayr Bank failed, all the other banks immediately gave notice that they would take its notes at par, because they knew very well that its proprietors were perfectly well able to discharge all the claims upon them. It was perfectly well known that the proprietors of the Western Bank were worth many millions of money, and that there was no possible danger of any ultimate loss. Yet the banks on this occasion decided to refuse their notes, which decision they were afterwards obliged to rescind. And this is a very good proof that it was wrong from the first; and immediately that the notes were taken the panic ceased.

In the years of the great speculations in railways, numbers of persons wished to carry on the game of speculation by buying shares, and then raising money upon them from bankers. The old banks prudently declined this sort of business, and a number of banks were got up, principally for this business—if, indeed, it can be called business at all—as it was, in fact, pure gambling. After a short time, the railway shares went down as fast as they had risen, and all these banks, which were called Exchange Banks, were ruined, some of them under the most disastrous circumstances.

We have said that one of the principal features of the Scotch banking system is to have a small number of very large banks,

with a great number of branches to each. To shew how the system has a natural tendency to become concentrated among a few great establishments, we may compare the existing number of separate institutions, at different periods. In 1826, there were 32 independent banks, of which 18 had less than 10 partners, 10 had less than 100, and the remaining 9 had more than 100. Fourteen of these had no branches, 17 had not more branches than 5, and the highest number that any bank had was 30, which was the Commercial Bank. The total number of offices was 159. In 1848, there were 391 branches; in 1855, there were 462 branches and 17 principal offices; in 1857, there were the same number of head offices, with 666 branches; and in 1859, there were 14 separate banks—one, the Union, having 4 head offices—and 597 branches, making, altogether, 615 offices.

The following table exhibits the banks at present existing in Scotland, upon which we shall make some remarks in a future chapter—

Statistics of the Scotch Banks in 1874.

Founded	Branches.	Capital Paid-up.	Rest.	Authorised Circulation.	Average Circulation, '73-74.	Coin held, '73-74.	Deposits.
1695	Bank of Scotland ...	£1,000,000	£355,000	£343,418	£664,970	£413,389	£10,153,828
1727	Royal Bank ...	2,000,000	500,000	216,451	713,035	614,142	10,063,483
1746	British Linen Co. ...	1,000,000	350,000	438,024	533,358	219,955	7,703,458
1810	Commercial Bank ...	1,000,000	394,000	374,880	767,218	506,111	9,267,766
1825	National Bank ...	1,000,000	380,000	297,024	583,103	432,177	10,419,897
1830	Union Bank ...	1,000,000	380,000	454,346	784,145	467,445	9,404,811
1825	Aberdeen Town & Co.	252,000	115,000	70,133	194,474	150,035	1,624,510
1836	North of Scotland ...	320,000	100,000	154,319	312,328	190,613	2,464,704
1838	Clydesdale ...	1,000,000	500,000	274,321	534,538	349,268	6,491,316
1839	City of Glasgow ...	1,000,000	435,000	72,921	668,314	657,602	8,162,155
1838	Caledonian ...	125,000	63,531	53,434	102,388	67,244	1,042,876
		9,697,000	3,572,531	2,749,271	5,857,871	4,067,981	76,798,804

CHAPTER XII.

ON SOME THEORIES OF CURRENCY.

1. It now becomes our essential and most important duty to investigate some Theories of Currency, which have acquired great celebrity, not only from their historical interest, as having led to some of the most extraordinary and heartrending public calamities on record, but because they are still extensively believed in at the present day. It is of essential importance not only to lay the true foundations of monetary science, but also to point out the fundamental fallacies upon which some specious, but fatally delusive, theories rest, which have brought the most disastrous consequences upon those nations which have adopted them, as will always be the case when the eternal laws of nature are systematically and perseveringly violated.

2. The first of these theories we shall designate as LAWISM, not because John Law was the original deviser of it, but because he was the first who wrote the most formal treatise on it, and he had the opportunity of carrying it out on the most extensive scale. His name, therefore, must always be most prominently associated with it; and it is one so specious, but so dangerous, and so widely prevalent at the present time, that it requires to be branded with a distinctive name, and to be combated with all the power of argument that can be brought against it.

3. The question shortly stated is this. All persons, except those who advocate an inconvertible paper currency, agree that a paper currency must represent some article of value, and bullion has been generally chosen for that purpose. Now, the idea has occurred to a great many persons—If it is only necessary that a paper currency should represent some article of value, why should it not represent any or all articles of value, such as land, corn, silk, or any other commodities, and, among others, the public funds? And this has actually been tried in several

instances, yet they have universally failed, and in many cases have been attended with the most dreadful calamities. Now, as this has uniformly happened, and, as we shall shew further on, it must happen, it necessarily follows that there must be some radical error in the principle, and that it must violate some great law of nature. And this is beyond all comparison the most momentous problem in Economics—Why is it improper to issue a paper currency on any other basis than that of bullion? All the most eminent British statesmen have instinctively resisted such proposals, although repeatedly pressed to do so. No doubt it has been a most fortunate instinct for the country; but all their reasonings on the subject, if only pursued to their legitimate consequences, tend to that result. The Bank Act of 1844 was the first occasion on which a small bit of this theory was introduced, which, if only followed out to its legitimate conclusion, would produce in this country the horrors of the Mississippi scheme in France. But though the British Parliament, by a blind, unreasoning instinct, has always, with the exception just named, resisted such fatal advice, this will not satisfy the demands of science. Science imperatively demands a reason *why* such a plan is wrong; she will not be satisfied with a simple dogmatic assertion that it is wrong, even though that dogma may be right, but she must know the reason why; and, until a true, scientific, reason is given why such plans are fatal, there will be a constant demand for them.

4. It is, moreover, the thing which has brought the name of Law into such unhappy notoriety. Law has, in many respects, very great merit as a writer. In many respects he had clearer, and sounder views on monetary science; he had infinitely more practical insight and scientific knowledge of what he was writing about, than the most eminent of modern political economists. In his various writings is to be found the refutation of all the absurd follies of the Government and of the Bank of England in 1811. But all this was marred by a single defect. He was the great advocate of what is now the popular cry—basing a paper currency upon any article of value beside bullion. The only difference between him and our greatest statesmen is that he carried out their arguments to their legitimate conclusion. He had the opportunity of carrying this theory

into effect, and the result has been to obscure all his other merits, and brand him for ever as a charlatan. What, then, was his error?

5. Upon sifting his theory to discover his error, we shall obtain one of the most beautiful triumphs of pure reasoning to be found in any science. We shall find that the plausible scheme, which we shall designate by his name, is founded upon a direct contravention of the fundamental conception of the nature of a Currency which we have established in this work, and the proposition which directly flowed from it, viz., *that where there is no DEBT, there can be no CURRENCY*. We shall find that these awful monetary cataclysms which have shaken nations to their foundations, producing calamities more fell than famine, tempest, or the sword, have been brought about by attempting to carry into practice a philosophical fallacy which involves a contradiction in terms.

6. It is impossible to say who first invented the theory we are going to notice; in fact, it must have sprung up indigenously among almost any people who began to form theories of Paper Currency. Several persons about the same time seem to have hit upon it. The earliest we know of was a certain Mr. Asgill, a Member of Parliament, who paid much attention to commercial questions. The most notorious precursors of Law were Dr. Hugh Chamberlain, who brought forward a rival scheme to the Bank of England in 1693, and Mr. Briscoe, one of the chief promoters of the Land Bank in 1696. Chamberlain's ideas will be noticed a little further on. He strongly accused Law of having stolen his ideas from him, which Law strenuously repudiates, and points out the distinction between them, and it must be allowed that Law's ideas were not so extravagant as Chamberlain's. Law first published his theory in a tract, called "Money and Trade considered," at Edinburgh, in 1705. He was the son of a goldsmith, and of dissipated habits, but of an extremely acute intellect; and, up to a certain length, his views are sagacious and correct—much more so, indeed, than those of many writers of the present day. He observed the extreme poverty and barbarousness of Scotland, which he thought might be cured by bringing an additional quantity of money into the

country; and, as silver was scarce, he attempted to devise a scheme for providing a substitute for it.

7. He begins by many very sound and acute remarks on the value of commodities, and the causes of their change of value. He describes the qualities which fitted silver to be used as money, above every other commodity. He attributes the very inconsiderable trade of Scotland to the small quantity of money she possessed. This is the first fundamental fallacy, because the fact was, it was just the reverse; Scotland had little money *because* she had little trade. He, however, perceived the fallacy of lowering interest by law. He then goes on to consider the various means which have been employed to increase the quantity of money. He says that some countries have raised money in the denomination; some have debased it; some have prohibited its export under the severest penalties; some have obliged traders to bring home bullion in proportion to the goods they imported. But he says that all these measures have been futile and vain, and none of them have been found to increase or preserve money. He then says that the only effectual method hitherto discovered for the increase of money, was the erection of banks. He then describes various banks. Some made it a principle to issue no more notes than they had of actual bullion. He then mentions the Bank of England, and the superiority of its notes over those of the goldsmiths. He then describes the Bank of Scotland, and says that it issued notes to four or five times the value of the money in the Bank, which he very justly says were equivalent to so much additional money. He then points out the absurdity of supposing that raising the denomination of the money added to its value, that if the shilling was raised to 18d., it paid debts by two-thirds of what was due, but did not add to the money; "for it is not the sound of the denomination, but the value of the silver is considered." The wonderful philosophers of 1811, no doubt, looked down with prodigious disdain upon Law, but they might have studied him with advantage. He then points out, with much detail, the fraud and inutility of tampering with the currency. He describes the additional effect which credit may give to money; but says that credit which promises a payment of money, cannot well be extended beyond a certain proportion it ought to have with

the money. Nothing can be more judicious and sound than his remarks upon credit—that it must always vary in proportion to the metallic basis it is built upon; and up to this point, his sagacity and penetration are in advance of the doctrines of a century later; but here is the boundary, after which he plunges into that fatal and delusive fallacy, which is the distinctive feature of what we denominate **LAWISM**.

8. Thinking that money was so scarce in Scotland that any credit that could be built upon it would be insignificant, he says—

“It remains to be considered, whether any other goods than silver can be made money with the same safety and convenience.

“From what has been said about the nature of money, it is evident that *any other goods which have the qualities necessary in money*, MAY BE MADE MONEY EQUAL TO THEIR VALUE with safety and convenience. There was nothing of humour or fancy in making silver to be money; it was made because it was thought best qualified for that use.

“I shall endeavour to prove that another money may be established with all the qualities necessary in money in a greater degree than silver.”

9. He then proceeds to shew at great length that silver had some peculiarities that disqualified it from being the best substance to form money of; that it varied in value; that it had increased much faster in quantity than the demand for it, and had, therefore, fallen much in value. In fact, he tries to prove that silver had varied in value more than any other kind of goods, within the last two hundred years; that goods would always maintain a uniformity of value, because they only increased in proportion to the demand; that land would always rise in value, because the quantity would always remain the same, but the demand would continually increase; but that silver would always fall in value, as the quantity increased faster than the demand.

10. Law then proceeds to deny that he had taken his ideas from Chamberlain, of which the latter had accused him; and it

must in candour be admitted, that his ideas were many degrees less mad than those of Chamberlain. Law asserts that he had formed his schemes many years before he had seen any of Chamberlain's papers—"Land, indeed, is the value upon which he founds his proposals, and 'tis upon land that I found mine; if for that reason I have encroached upon his proposal, the Bank of Scotland may be said to have done the same. There were banks in Europe long before the doctor's proposal, and books have been written on the subject before and since. The foundation I go upon has been known so long as money has been lent on land, and so long as an heritable bond has been equal to a quantity of land."

11. The difference between Chamberlain's theory and Law's was this. Chamberlain maintained that if land was mortgaged for 100 years, it was a good security for 100 times its annual value: so that, if a man had landed property worth £1,000 a-year, and if he mortgaged it for 100 years to the State, the State might issue notes to him to the amount of £100,000, which were to be declared equal to value in silver, and made legal tender for their nominal value. Now, if this theory be true, there is no good reason why land should be pledged for only 100 years; why not for one million years? which would do the thing on a somewhat more magnificent scale. But what need of stopping there? Why not pledge it to all eternity? And then every inch of land might be covered with paper notes, and they might be piled high enough to reach the moon, where the deviser of this scheme would probably find his lost wits. Law properly points out that the fallacy of this theory was, that Chamberlain assumed that the value of £100 to be paid 100 years hence is, still £100. He says—"No anticipation is equal to what already is; a year's rent now is worth fifteen years' rent fifty years hence, because that money lent out at interest by that time will produce so much." But, says Lord Macaulay—"On this subject Chamberlain was proof to ridicule, to argument, even to arithmetical demonstration. He was reminded that the fee simple of land would not sell for more than twenty years' purchase. To say, therefore, that a term of 100 years was worth five times as much as a term of twenty years, was to say that a term of 100 years was worth five times the fee simple; in other words, that a

hundred was five times infinity. Those who reasoned thus were refuted by being told they were usurers; and it should seem that a large number of country gentlemen thought the refutation complete."

12. Law's theory was to calculate the value of the fee simple of the land at twenty years' purchase and to coin notes to the value of that amount, and advance them to the owner of the land. This plan, therefore, had a limit, however absurd it was. It was bounded, in the first instance, by the value of the land expressed in silver money, but Chamberlain's had positively no limit at all to carry it out to its full length; the advance might be made to infinity; consequently, in mathematical language, we should say that Chamberlain was *infinitely* more mad than Law.

13. Law shewed that notes issued upon Chamberlain's plan would immediately fall to a heavy discount; but yet he says, that though £500 of these notes were only equal to £100 in silver, yet the nation would have the same advantage by that £500 in notes, as if an addition of £100 had been made to the silver money.

*"So far as these bills fell under the value of silver money, so far would exchange with other countries be raised."*¹ And if goods did not keep their price, *i. e.*, if they did not sell for a greater quantity of these bills, equal to the difference betwixt them and silver, goods exported would be undervalued, and goods imported would be overvalued.

"The landed man would have no advantage by this proposal, *unless he owed debt*, for, though he received £50 of these bills for the same quantity of victuals, he was in use to receive £10 silver money; yet that £50 would only be equal in value to £10 of silver, and purchase only the same quantity of home or foreign goods.

"The landed man who had his rent paid him in money, would

¹ This is the first occasion that we are aware of on which the great principle, that a depreciation of the paper currency would produce a fall in the foreign exchanges, which was so ardently contested in 1811, and subsequent years, is asserted. And it has all the more merit, that it is a *prediction* and not an *observation*.

be a great loser, for, by as much as these bills were under the value of silver, he would receive so much less than before.

"The landed man who owed debt, would pay his debt with a less value than was contracted for, but the creditor would lose what the debtor gained."

Oh! that the philosophers of 1811 had only pondered over this extract from John Law.

14. Law then shews that—

"Notwithstanding any Act of Parliament to force these bills, they would fall much under the value of silver; but allowing that they were at first equal to silver, it is next to impossible that two different species of money shall continue equal in value to one another.

"Everything receives a value from its use, and the value is rated according to its quality, quantity, and demand. Though goods of different kinds are equal in value now, yet they will change their value from any unequal change in their quality, quantity, or demand.

"And as he leaves it to the choice of the debtor to pay in silver money, or bills, he confines the value of the bills to the value of silver money, but cannot confine the value of the silver money to the value of the bills, so that these bills must fall in value as silver money falls, and may fall lower, may rise above the value of these bills, but these bills cannot rise above the value of silver."

15. Law succeeds, with great skill and acumen, in exposing the wild insanity of Chamberlain's plan, and truly predicts the results which would follow from it, or at least some of them, for there are many important ones he has omitted. The exact consequences which he predicted were manifested in Ireland and England a century later; and the sentences we have quoted, if we did not know their origin, might have been supposed to have been written to rebuke the folly of the Directors of the Banks of Ireland and England, and the mercantile witnesses of 1804 and 1810. But having demolished Chamberlain, he comes to his own proposal, which he says is "*to make money of land equal to its value, and that money to be equal in value to silver money, and not liable to fall in value as silver money falls.*"

He then says—"ANY GOODS THAT HAVE THE QUALITIES NECESSARY IN MONEY, MAY BE MADE MONEY EQUAL TO THEIR VALUE. Five ounces of gold is equal in value to £20, and may be made money to that value; an acre of land, rented at two bolls of victual, the victual at £8, and land at twenty years' purchase, is equal to £20, and may be made money equal to that value, for it has all the qualities necessary in money."

16. In this sentence is concentrated the whole essence of that eternal delusion, so specious and plausible, and so fatal, which we designate as LAWISM. It is, indeed, nothing but the stupendous fallacy *that money represents commodities, and that paper currency may be based upon commodities*. This delusion is deeply prevalent in the public mind at the present day, and probably there are few persons, except those who have studied the true philosophical principles of Political Economy, whose views are not deeply tainted with this infection. No man who does not thoroughly understand the great fundamental doctrine established by Turgot and others, *that money does not represent commodities*, can ever have sound ideas on this subject. MONEY DOES NOT REPRESENT COMMODITIES AT ALL, BUT ONLY DEBT, OR SERVICES DUE, WHICH HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THEIR EQUIVALENT IN COMMODITIES. Now, the views of Law are much more extensively prevalent than is generally supposed. All those who think that there is any necessary connection between the quantity of money in a country and the quantity of commodities in it are influenced by them. Take the case of a private individual. Is there any necessary relation between the quantity of money he retains, and the quantity of commodities he purchases? The quantity of money he has, is just the quantity of debt—of services due to him—which he has *not yet* parted with for something else. It is the quantity of power of purchasing commodities he has over and above what he has already expended. And the quantity of money a nation possesses is simply the quantity of accumulated industry it possesses over and above all commodities, but they have no relation whatever to each other. Now, money does not represent commodities, but it represents that portion of a man's industry which is preserved for future use. Whatever a man earns is the fruit of his industry, money included; and none of these separate items *represents*

anything else, though it may be *exchanged* for other things. Now, the value of money depends upon its relations to what it represents, namely, debt, and not to commodities. If money, or currency, increases faster than debt, or services due, it immediately causes a diminution of its value. If debt increases faster than money or currency, then the value of money is raised. The infallible consequence, therefore, of an increase of currency, without a corresponding increase of debt, is to change the existing proportion between debt and currency, and to cause a depreciation of the latter commensurate to the changed proportion. The necessary and inevitable consequence, then, of issuing vast quantities of paper currency on the assumed value of property, is simply to cause a total subversion of the foundation of all value and of all property, and to plunge every creditor into irretrievable ruin.

17. In fact, a moment's consideration will shew that the theory of basing a paper currency on commodities, involves this palpable contradiction in terms, **THAT ONE CAN BUY COMMODITIES AND ALSO HAVE THE MONEY AS WELL.** When a man buys commodities with money, he gives either a portion of his own industry represented by that money, or a portion of some one else's industry who gave him the money. But it is quite clear *that he cannot buy the commodities and keep his money as well.* It is exactly the same with a nation. A nation cannot buy commodities and have the money it bought them with as well which is the principle necessarily involved in issuing paper currency as the representative of commodities. But the money of the nation is the mode and form in which the accumulation of industry which has not yet been spent in commodities is preserved; and if a nation wants other commodities besides what it has got, it must pay for them either with money, or with the goods it has already. The idea of basing paper currency upon commodities is just as wild and absurd as if England were to sell her cotton goods to America for coin, and then demand back her cotton goods. The only result of such an attempt carried out into practice must be the most tremendous convulsions, and destruction of credit and all monetary contracts.

18. Law, as we have seen, immediately saw through it, and exposed the ridiculous absurdity of Chamberlain's proposal.

His own was that the value of all the land in Scotland should be estimated at 20 years' purchase, and that a parliamentary commission should be appointed with power to issue an inconvertible paper currency to that amount. He says—"The paper money proposed will be equal in value to silver, for it will have a value in land pledged equal to the same sum of silver money that it is given out for. . . . This paper money will not fall in value, as silver money has fallen or may fall."

19. We must, therefore, be careful to be just to Law. He was no advocate of an unlimited inconvertible paper currency. Quite the reverse. But seeing that a convertible paper currency could only be based upon bullion to a certain limited extent, preserving its equality in value with bullion, his idea was to base a paper currency upon some other article of value. And he thought that it might preserve its equality in value to silver on an independent basis. His idea was, that it is only necessary to have it represent some article of value. But this attempt was contrary to the nature of things. His paper currency, though avowedly based upon things of value, had exactly the same practical effects as if it had been based upon silver. It became redundant, and swamped everything. And the reason is plain. It was a violation of that fundamental principle we have obtained—"Where there is no debt there can be no currency." And the fresh quantities of currency issued on such a principle only represent the previously existing amount of debt, and then suffer a necessary diminution in value. The necessary and inevitable consequence, then, of issuing vast quantities of paper currency on the assumed value of property, is simply to cause a total subversion of the foundation of all value, and of all property, and to plunge every creditor into irretrievable ruin.

20. To give a full account of Law's banking career in France, would far exceed our limits, and to give an imperfect one would be of no use. We must, therefore, content ourselves with referring those of our readers who want information on the subject to our *Dictionary of Political Economy*, Art. *Banking in France*, where a full account of Law's scheme is given. It may be sufficient to say that his career, like his writings, is divided into two distinct portions. His writings are on Banking and PAPER

CREDIT, and his scheme for PAPER MONEY, which are quite distinct from each other. Nothing can be sounder, or more judicious than the first. He clearly saw that paper credit must be limited by specie—his scheme was to create a PAPER MONEY, beyond the limits of Paper Credit based on specie, which he expected would maintain an equality of value with specie. Multitudes of people have thought the same, and multitudes of people believe in it to the present hour. In 1705 the Parliament of Scotland fortunately turned a deaf ear to Law's specious proposal of creating Paper Money based upon land. In 1855 the representatives of commerce in the same city which had rejected Law's plan 150 years before memorialised the Government, and "do most emphatically object to the plan of restricting the security (upon which the paper currency is based) to the possession of gold alone," which is simply Lawism.

Nothing could be more extraordinary than the restoration of prosperity caused by the foundation of Law's Bank in 1716. It is probably one of the most marvellous transitions from the depths of misery to the height of prosperity in so short a space of time in the annals of any nation. And, if Law had confined himself to that he would have been one of the greatest benefactors any nation ever had. It was only when after three years, he had attained the very pinnacle of success, that he determined to carry out his scheme of PAPER MONEY, which was the famous Mississippi scheme.

The next example of Lawism was the Ayr Bank. The proprietors of this Bank were enormously wealthy, and, because they were so, they thought that their known wealth would sustain the credit of any amount of paper issues. But, alas! their experience too fully and fatally verified the sagacity of the directors of the Bank of Scotland, who, in 1727, in answer to proposal for enlarging their credit, said—"For the quota of credit in a banking company *must be proportionate to the stock of specie in the nation*, learned and understood by long experience, and not extended to a capital stock subscribed for, which cannot in the least help to support the company's credit, if the specie of the nation decay." This doctrine contains the refutation of many wild schemes, and the true plan of regulating a paper currency, is simply to discover how a certain proportion shall be maintained between specie and credit.


21. The third great outburst of Lawism took place in the same country that witnessed his first exploits. In preparation for it, Law's "Money and Trade Considered" was translated into French in 1789, as if all the memory of the great catastrophe sixty-nine years before had perished. The National Assembly had confiscated the property of the Church, but, instead of yielding a revenue, it cost the nation £2,000,000 a year more than it produced, and in a few years augmented the public debt by £7,000,000. The property seized was valued at £80,000,000. The expense of management required that it should be sold, but no purchasers could be found; for all persons in that terrible political earthquake wished to have their property in as portable a shape as possible, and few were willing to trust to a revolutionary title. In this dilemma, the municipalities agreed to purchase a considerable portion of it, in the first instance, and resell it in smaller portions to individuals. But, as there was not specie enough to complete the sale, they issued their promissory notes to the public creditor, to pass current until the time of payment came; but, when they became due, the municipalities had no means of discharging them. To meet them, the Assembly, in the spring of 1790, authorised the issue of £16,000,000 of assignats on the security of the land. In September, further issues to the amount of £32,000,000 were authorised. The additional issues were warmly opposed by Talleyrand and other leaders, who predicted their depreciation; but Mirabeau strongly supported them, denying the possibility of their depreciation, saying—

"It is vain to assimilate assignats secured on the solid basis of these domains to an ordinary paper currency possessing a forced circulation. They represent real property, the most secure of all possessions, the land on which we tread. Why is a metallic circulation solid? Because it is based upon subjects of real and durable value, as the land, which is directly or indirectly the source of all wealth. Paper money, we are told, will become superabundant; it will drive the metallic out of circulation. Of what paper do you speak? If of a paper without a solid basis, undoubtedly; if of one based on the firm foundation of landed property, never. There may be a difference in the value of a circulation of different kinds; but that arises as frequently from the one which bears the higher value being run after, as from the one which stands the lower being shunned—from gold being

in demand—not paper at a discount. There cannot be a greater error than the terrors so generally prevalent as to the over-issue of assignats. It is thus alone you will pay your debts, pay your troops, advance the revolution. Re-absorbed progressively, in the purchase of the national domains, this paper money can never become redundant, any more than the humidity of the atmosphere can become excessive, which descends in rills, finds the river, and is at length lost in the mighty ocean.”

22. Although these assignats bore 4 per cent. interest, they had become depreciated in June, 1790; by June, 1791, they had lost one-third of their value. In September, 1792, further issues were decreed. The two preceding Assemblies had authorised assignats to the amount of 2,700,000,000 francs, equal to £130,000,000, to be fabricated, of which only 200,000,000 francs remained unspent. On the 11th of April, 1793, the Convention decreed six years' imprisonment in chains to any one who bought or sold assignats for any sum in specie different to their nominal value, or made any difference between a money price and a paper price in payment of goods. Vain effort! In June, the assignat had fallen to one-third of its value, and in August to one-sixth. The exchange with London fell exactly in a corresponding ratio with the depreciation of the assignat at home. In June, 1791, it fell to 23; in January, 1792, to 18; in March, 1793, to 14; in June, 1793, to 10; on the 2nd of August it was as low as $4\frac{1}{2}$; on the 18th of October it had risen to 8; but after that it ceased to be quoted at all. Cambon, the Minister of Finance, proposed a further immediate issue of 800,000,000 of francs, equivalent to about £33,000,000, in addition to the quantity already issued. The public domains he calculated at £350,000,000. Hence upon the Theory of Law and Mirabeau, there was an ample margin, and the assignats should not have been depreciated below the value of silver; and, in fact, according to them, it was impossible they should. Wonderful commentary upon the wisdom of the philosophers, who maintain that if a paper currency only represents *value*, it cannot be depreciated!

23. We must refrain from detailing the terrible misery caused by the forcible issue of assignats, which were legal tender at



their nominal amount, the destruction of debts, the famine from the scarcity of provisions, the laws of the maximum, the penalty of death enacted against all who should keep back their produce from the market. All specie disappeared from the country and from circulation; those who possessed any, not deeming it secure from revolutionary violence, exported it to London, Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Geneva. But many persons stoutly maintained in pamphlets, that it was not the paper which was depreciated but the specie which had risen.

24. The intolerable misery caused by this state of things induced the Government which succeeded the Reign of Terror to make an attempt to withdraw a portion of the assignats from circulation, by *demonetizing* them, that is, depriving them of their quality of money, and forcing their holders to receive payment in land for them. But when a man wanted to buy food to eat, what was the use of giving him land? The report that a portion of the assignats were going to be demonetized sent down their value still lower, and a decree against it was obliged to be passed to appease their holders. All sorts of plans were devised to withdraw them from circulation; lotteries, tontines, a land bank, where they were to be lodged and bear 3 per cent. interest. But the constant issue of them, required for the necessary payments of the State, rendered all such attempts useless.

25. In January, 1796, the assignats in circulation amounted to forty-five milliards, or about £2,000,000,000, and the paper money had fallen to one-thousandth part of its nominal value. The Government then determined to issue *territorial mandates*, at the rate of 30 assignats to one mandate, which were to be exchangeable directly for land, at the will of the holder, on demand. The certainty of obtaining land for them made them rise for a short time to 80 per cent. of their nominal value; but necessity compelled the Government to issue £100,000,000 of these mandates secured upon land, supposed to be of that value. This prodigious issue sent the mandates down to nearly the same discount as the assignats were, and, consequently, as one mandate was equal to 30 assignats, the latter had fallen to nearly the thirty-thousandth part of their nominal value. At length on the 16th of July, 1796, the whole system was demolished at a blow.

A decree was published that every one might transact business in the money he chose, and that the mandates should only be taken at their current value, which should be published every day at the Treasury. Two days afterwards it was decreed that the national property remaining undisposed of should be sold for mandates at their current value. As a matter of course, the public creditors received payment of their debts in the same proportion.

26. No sooner, however, was this great blow struck at the paper currency, of making it pass at its current value, than specie immediately re-appeared in circulation. Immense hoards came forth from their hiding places; goods and commodities of all sorts being very cheap from the anxiety of their owners to possess money, caused immense sums to be imported from foreign countries. The exchanges immediately turned in favour of France, and in a short time a metallic currency was permanently restored. And during all the terrific wars of Napoleon the metallic standard was always maintained at its full value.

27. One thing, however, we cannot help noticing. When describing the history and effects of the assignats, nothing can be more clear and correct than the narrative of Sir Archibald Alison. He sees clearly that a difference in value between the assignat and specie was truly a discount, or fall in the value of paper. Thus he says¹—

“They for some time maintained their value on a par with the metallic currency. By degrees, however, the increasing issue of paper currency produced its usual effect on public credit; the value of money fell, while that of every other article rose in a high proportion, and at length the excessive inundation of fictitious currency caused a universal panic, and its value rapidly sank to a merely nominal ratio. Even in June, 1790, the depreciation had become so considerable as to excite serious panic.”

Again, speaking of 1791, p. 305—

“Public and private credit had alike perished amidst the general convulsions. Specie had disappeared from circulation. The assignat had *fallen* to a third of its value—[This is not quite

¹ *History of Europe, Vol. II., p. 219, 7th Edit.*

correct. At this time the assignat had lost one-third of its value, not fallen to one-third of it.]—and occasioned such an amount of ruin to private fortunes, that numbers already wished for a return to the ancient *regime*.

“While the unlimited issues of assignats, at whatever *rate of discount* they might pass, amply provided for all the present and probable wants of the Treasury.

“The vast and increasing expenditure of the Republic could only, amidst the total failure of the taxes, be supplied by the issue of assignats; and this, of course, by rendering paper money redundant, lowered its value in exchange with other commodities, and occasioned a constant and even frightful rise of prices.

“All the persons employed by Government, both in the civil and military departments, were paid in the paper currency at par; but as it rapidly fell, from the enormous quantity in circulation, to a tenth-part, and soon a twentieth of its real value, the pay received was merely nominal, and those in receipt of the largest apparent incomes, were in want of the common necessaries of life. Pichegru, at the head of the army of the North, with a nominal pay of 4,000 francs a month, was in the actual receipt, on the Rhine in 1795, of only two hundred francs, or £8 sterling of gold and silver.

“The funds on which the enormous paper circulation was based embracing all the confiscated property in the kingdom in land, houses, and moveables, were estimated at fifteen milliards of francs, above £600,000,000 sterling; but, in the distracted state of the country, few purchasers could be found for such immense national domains; and, therefore, the security for all practical purposes was merely nominal. The consequence was that the assignat fell to one-twelfth of its real value; in other words, an assignat for 24 francs was worth only two francs; that is, a note for a pound was worth only 1s. 8d.

“Foreign commerce having begun to revive with the cessation of the Reign of Terror, sales being no longer forced, the *assignat* was brought into comparison with the currency of other countries, and its enormous inferiority precipitated still further its fall.

“By no possible measure of finance could paper money, worth nothing in foreign states, from a distrust of its security, and

redundant at home from excessive issue, be maintained at anything like an equality with gold and silver. The mandates were, in truth, a reduction of assignats to a thirtieth part of their value; but, to be on a par with the precious metals, they should have been issued at one-thousandth part, being the rate of discount to which the original paper had now fallen.

"The excessive fall of the paper at length made all classes perceive that it was in vain to pursue the chimera of upholding its value. On the 16th July, 1796, the measures, amounting to an open confession of a bankruptcy which had long existed, were adopted."

28. We have quoted these passages for the purpose of shewing how completely Sir Archibald Alison, when he is speaking of the paper currency in France, acknowledges the great principle that the value of the paper currency is only to be estimated at the value it will purchase in specie, that the measure of that difference between the real and the nominal value is its *depreciation*, and that a payment in coin at the current value of the paper currency is a NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY. Yet, such is the amazing inconsistency of this writer, that when he comes to speak of the paper currency of England, which exhibited exactly the same phenomena, only on a smaller scale, he resolutely denies that it was depreciated. When the French assignat had lost one-third of its value compared to specie, in 1791, he acknowledges that it was *depreciated*; when the Bank of England note in 1811 had lost one-fourth of its value compared to specie, it was not the note which had fallen, but gold which had risen!! When assignats were made legal tender in France at their nominal value, specie disappeared from circulation. When Bank of England notes were substantially legal tender in England, and had lost a quarter of their nominal value, specie disappeared from circulation. Sir Archibald Alison estimates the depreciation of the assignat by the difference between the current and the nominal value of the assignat; but when the Bullion Committee estimated the depreciation of the Bank note by the difference between its nominal and its current, or market value, he reads a homily to them upon their ignorance and folly, talks of the "general delusion which so long had prevailed upon the subject, when it is recollected not only that the true principles

of this apparently difficult, but really simple, branch of national economy, which are now generally admitted, were at the time most ably expounded by many men both in and out of Parliament, but that, in the examination of some of the leading merchants of London before the Parliamentary Committee on the subject, the truth was told with a force and precision, which it now appears surprising any one could resist." This truth, which was told with such irresistible force and precision, was, that twenty-seven was equal to twenty-one! He then acknowledges that it was a national bankruptcy of the French Government to pay its notes with a less amount of specie than their nominal value; but nothing can exceed the bitterness of his invective against the Currency Act of 1819, which provided that the Bank of England should pay its notes at their full nominal value in specie. Just as if it was less a *bankruptcy* to pay 15s. in the pound than to pay 1s. in the pound. He sees clearly that in *France* the paper currency is to be estimated by the value of gold; but in *England* he maintains that gold is to be estimated by the value of the paper currency!! Just as if the eternal truths of science are different on different sides of the Channel; or that they are reversed according to the language they are expressed in!

29. Sir Archibald Alison's doctrines, when he speaks of English and the French inconvertible paper currency, are clearly inconsistent. He fully allows that any difference between the nominal and the current value of the assignat was a *depreciation* of the assignat. He never dreams of saying that the paper assignat was the standard, and that the *coin* had risen in value. But when he discusses the question of—What is a pound? he says—"In truth, a pound is an abstract measure of value just as a foot or a yard of length, and different things have at different periods been taken to denote that measure, according as the convenience of men suggested. It was originally a pound weight of silver, and that metal was, till the present century, the standard in England, as it still is in most other countries. When gold was made the standard, by the Bank being compelled by the Act of 1819 to pay in that metal, the old word denoting its original signification of the less valuable metal was still retained. During the war, when the metallic currency dis-

appeared, the pound was a Bank of England pound note—the standard was the paper—for gold was worth 28s. the pound, from the demand for it on the Continent.” It is scarcely necessary to point out the ridiculous absurdity of this passage. The pound an *abstract* thing indeed! Our ancestors had very few abstract ideas at all, and certainly an *abstract* idea of a pound was not one of them. They meant nothing abstract, but, on the contrary, a very substantial *pound weight of silver bullion*, and nothing else. To say that a paper pound was the standard during the war, is a misconception of the fact. Instead of a “promise to pay” on demand, the Bank note during the war was a “promise to pay specie six months after peace.” It is not true that gold during the war was worth 28s. paid in *silver money*, but only in depreciated *bank notes*. But Sir Archibald Alison admits that an excessive issue of paper would have depreciated the Bank note, but he, of course, denies that the issues were excessive. Now, as a depreciation from an excessive issue could only be manifested by a continuous rise of gold above 28s. the pound, it would be difficult to understand where the turning point would be at which the depreciation would commence. At what figure should we have to reverse our expression—at what figure are we to say that gold has ceased to rise, and paper begun to fall?

30. Such is a plain statement, founded upon incontrovertible facts, of the results of the greatest experiment the world ever saw of issuing a paper currency secured upon commodities or property—the most complete example of LAWISM. When the issues of assignats were at their height, they were certainly not anything equal to the value of the fee-simple of France expressed in silver money. And, according to the predictions of Law and Mirabeau, it was a matter of impossibility that they should ever become depreciated, and what was the result? Even though the experiment was not carried out to its fullest extent, the value of the paper assignat sank to one 30,000th part of its value in silver! There were 2,400 millions of promises of mandates issued against property valued at 3,785 millions, and yet, in July, 1796, the note for 100 livres was only 5 centimes! Such was the inevitable consequence of basing a paper currency upon property or securities, and such it must ever be, because, if such

issues are once begun, there is no legitimate conclusion whatever, until all the property in the country is coined into notes. Pass the legitimate limits of a circulating medium by one hair's breadth, and there is no logical conclusion but in the French assignats.

81. The next example we shall cite is the Bank of Norway, which was founded on the 14th June, 1816, with its head office at Drontheim, and branches in the provincial towns.¹ Its capital was originally raised by a forced loan or tax upon all landed property, and the landholders became shareholders according to the amounts of their respective payments. This Bank was especially for the purpose of forwarding agricultural improvements, and only discounted mercantile bills and personal securities, as a secondary part of its business. Its principal business consisted in advancing its own notes, upon first securities over land, to any amount not exceeding two-thirds of the value of the property according to a general valuation taken in the year 1812. The borrower paid half-yearly to the Bank the interest of the sum that may be at his debit, at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, and is bound also to pay off 5 per cent. yearly of the principal, which is thus liquidated in twenty years. Mr. Laing bestows great commendation upon this institution, and describes it as well-imagined and well-managed, and there cannot be a better example to test the truth of Law's principle. We must bear in mind that Law expressly declares that on his principle *his paper currency would not fall below the value of silver*. Now, let us mark what took place with regard to the Bank of Norway, which was founded purely on his principles. By the fundamental law of this Bank, it should, after a certain time, have begun to pay its notes in specie, but in 1822 they could only be exchanged at Hamburg for silver at the rate of 187½ dollars in paper for 100 dollars in silver!! That is, in 6 years the notes had fallen to about 45 per cent. discount! Was there ever a more striking or conclusive example of the entire fallacy of Law's predictions than this Bank? In 1822 the Storthing passed a law that the Bank should only be compelled to give 100 silver dollars for every 190 paper dollars, but that the directors might at their own discretion reduce the rate to 175, without a new law. In

¹ *Laing's Norway*, p. 184. *Travellers' Library*.

1824 the value at Hamburg rose to 145; in 1827 it rose to 125; and in 1835, when Mr. Laing wrote, it stood at 112, which could only have been done by a contraction of its issues. Now, it is quite evident that if the Bank had been called upon to pay its notes at par at any moment, it would infallibly have been ruined. This happened in Paris in 1803, when the Land Bank stopped payment, and J. B. Say observes that all Banks founded upon this principle have uniformly failed.

32. The last example we shall cite is the case of America. That country was unhappily deeply bitten with the currency mania of basing issues of paper on "securities." In most of the States the Legislature passed Acts permitting any individual, or any banking associations, to issue notes to any amount, upon depositing with a "public comptroller," securities of equivalent value. These "securities" might be public stock, or mortgages upon improved, productive, and unencumbered lands.¹ Now, as these "securities" remained the property of the vendors, and they might appropriate the revenues from them, as long as payment of the notes was not demanded from the comptroller, people saw that they might derive a profit from the security as well as from the currency which represented its value. There was, accordingly, a prodigious rush to deposit securities—an enormous issue of paper, during the years 1834-5-6. The prices of everything rose immensely. The people of the Western States, with their "pockets full of paper currency, gave very large orders for goods to the merchants of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, who duly executed them. The bills given for the purchases were payable in these eastern cities; and, when the western debtors went to their own bankers for bills of exchange on these places, in return for their own local currency, the bankers discovered that their home customers had bought more from the eastern cities than they had sold; that they had already drawn on the east for every dollar which the east was indebted to them, and could draw no more. The western merchants then sent their own currency notes to the eastern cities in payment, but, unfortunately for them, the merchants there had already paid all they owed to the west, and nobody in New York or

¹ A very graphic account of the currency vagaries of the United States is given in two articles of the *Scotsman*, Nov. 21 and 24, 1855. See also *The Progress of America*, by John Macgregor, Esq., M.P., vol. 2, p. 1768.

Philadelphia wanted western notes for any purpose of use, and nobody was disposed to travel 600 or 700 miles to request the cashiers of the Western States to pay their notes, or in those States in which security had been given, to require the comptroller to sell the pledged securities and pay them the money produce. Moreover, every one knew that it was physically impossible in either case to obtain the amount in money, for there was no currency in which the pledged property when sold could have been paid, except *Bank* notes resting on securities, or on the mere promise of the banker." In the meantime, the usual effects followed, specie disappeared from circulation. The extended paper issues led the Americans to order immense quantities of goods from Europe, and, prices being very high from the bloated paper currency, they could send no goods in return to pay for them. For some time they sent over great quantities of their stock, but this became superabundant, and at last no one in Europe would buy it. It became necessary then for them to pay their debts in specie; but specie there was none. In 1837 all the Banks in America, without exception, stopped payment. The general suspension began at New York on the 11th May, and spread in every direction. In May, 1838, the New York banks resumed specie payments; which were followed by all the New England banks in August, 1838. This was followed by the banks in Philadelphia, and on the 1st January, 1839, the banks throughout the Union professed to do so. No sooner, however, were they set up again than they resumed the same wild operations on credit, and on 9th October, 1839, out of 850 banks in the Union, 343 suspended payment entirely, and 62 partially. On this occasion the New England banks were honourably distinguished; they had gathered wisdom; and out of 198 banks in New York, only four stopped; whereas, in the Southern and Western States, about two out of three stopped. The United States Bank, with a paid up capital of £7,000,000, was found to be utterly insolvent; its shares, which were at 123 dollars on the 14th August, 1838, were at 3 dollars in January, 1842. This was the fifth grand experiment of Lawism, pure and unadulterated, on the most magnificent scale, and such was the result!

33. All ideas, therefore, of basing a paper currency upon property, or commodities, are essentially erroneous, and can have no

other possible termination, if only carried out to their legitimate consequences, that what happened in France in 1796, and America in 1837-9. There is one species of property, however, which, from its being more nearly confounded with money in the public ideas than any other, is supposed by many persons, who would repudiate any imputation of being disciples of Law, to be a sound basis for a paper currency. This property is public stock. A very prevalent idea is, that all banks of issue should give security by purchasing the public funds, and then deposit the stock with a Government officer. But what is this but the wildest, rankest, and most odious LAWISM? The rule that is good for one is good for all. If the public funds are a proper basis for £1,000 of paper currency, they must of necessity be a good basis to their whole extent. If one bank or banker is allowed to issue paper on the security of stock, every other one must be permitted to do the same, until the whole funded debt of Great Britain is coined into paper notes. If £100 of public debt is coined into £100 of notes, we must, by an irresistible conclusion, have £800,000,000 of public debt coined into an equal quantity of notes. The principles of basing a paper currency upon land, and upon the public funds, are absolutely identical, and equally vicious. To permit a man to *spend* his money in buying part of the public debt, and to *have* it as well, in the form of notes, is as rank an absurdity as to permit him to spend it in land, and also have it as notes. The only advantage one has over the other is, that the funds are more easily convertible into money than land is. The same is true of a nation as an individual—that a nation can *spend* its money in destroying its enemies and *have* it too as bank notes, or “currency,” is a wild and mischievous delusion.

34. The drift of these remarks is evident. The whole constitution of the Bank of England is fundamentally vicious. It is as complete an example of pure Lawism as the French assignats, or the American banks. It gave its original capital to Government, and then was allowed to have it in the form of notes. The first public debt was Bank of England stock, and for several of the early additions to its capital, *i. e.*, the public debt, it was allowed to issue notes to the exact amount of its capital, and this permission still continues. Now, if this system had been

Philadelphia wanted western notes for any purpose and nobody was disposed to travel 600 or 700 miles to the cashiers of the Western States to pay their notes those States in which security had been given, to require the comptroller to sell the pledged securities and pay the money produce. Moreover, every one knew that it was impossible in either case to obtain the amount in specie for there was no currency in which the pledged property sold could have been paid, except *Bank* notes resting on the faith, or on the mere promise of the banker." In the meantime the usual effects followed, specie disappeared from circulation. The extended paper issues led the Americans to order large quantities of goods from Europe, and, prices being valued in terms of the bloated paper currency, they could send no specie in return to pay for them. For some time they sent over large quantities of their stock, but this became superabundant and last no one in Europe would buy it. It became necessary for them to pay their debts in specie; but specie there was none. In 1837 all the Banks in America, without exception, suspended payment. The general suspension began at New York on 11th May, and spread in every direction. In May, 1838, New York banks resumed specie payments; which were followed by all the New England banks in August, 1838. This was followed by the banks in Philadelphia, and on the 1st January, 1839, throughout the Union professed to do so. No sooner, however, were they set up again than they resumed the same wild speculations on credit, and on 9th October, 1839, out of 850 banks in the Union, 843 suspended payment entirely, and 62 partially. On this occasion the New England banks were honourably distinguished; they had gathered wisdom; and out of 198 banks in New York, only four stopped; whereas, in the Southern and Western States, about two out of three stopped. The United States Bank, with a paid up capital of £7,000,000, was found to be insolvent; its shares, which were at 123 dollars on 1st August, 1838, were at 3 dollars in January, 1842. This fifth grand experiment of Lawism, pure and unadulterated, on the most magnificent scale, and such was the result!

33. All ideas, therefore, of basing a paper currency on property, or commodities, are essentially erroneous, and can

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carried out to its legitimate conclusion, the National Debt and the capital of the Bank of England would have been the same thing, and the paper notes of the Bank would have been nearly £800,000,000. When it was founded the nation thought they might spend £1,200,000 in destroying the French, and have them too as Bank notes. But, if this principle had been carried out much further, it would have ended in fatal and universal ruin.

35. The fundamental principle of the Bank of England was, therefore, as erroneous as that of the Mississippi scheme, the Ayr Bank, the French assignats, or American banking; but as, in all these cases, the mischief is not developed until the issues exceed a certain limit, the radical vice of the Bank of England has been prevented from producing its inevitable consequences by rigidly restraining it to that single instance. But, then, this vice was kept down by a most unjustifiable monopoly, which was the chief cause of those tremendous banking catastrophes which have desolated England, and which has, until of late years, prevented a sound banking system being founded.

*On the Theory of basing a Paper Currency on the Discount
of Commercial Bills.*

36. We trust that the preceding remarks are absolutely conclusive as to the fundamental fallacy of Lawism of all forms and descriptions, by which we mean, the theory of basing issues of paper on property, or commodities, whether the public funds, or land, or any moveable goods. We must now examine a much more subtle and plausible theory, which was the guiding principle of the Bank of Ireland and the Bank of England during the restriction, and which was adhered to by a large majority of the commercial world; nor are we aware of any refutation of it on philosophical grounds, except the one in the Bullion Report, which we shall quote and comment upon. This theory was first prominently brought forward before the Committee on the Irish Currency in 1804, and we have quoted it elsewhere. The Bullion Committee express it in the following words—

“The Bank directors, as well as some of the merchants who have been examined, shewed a great anxiety to state to your

Committee a doctrine, of the truth of which they professed themselves to be most thoroughly convinced—that there can be no possible excess in the issue of Bank of England paper, so long as the advances in which it is issued are made upon the principles which at present guide the conduct of the directors; that is, so long as the discounts of mercantile bills are confined to paper of undoubted solidity, arising out of real commercial transactions, and payable at short and fixed periods.”

37. The germ of this doctrine is to be found in Adam Smith; who says—“When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange, drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as soon as it becomes due, is really paid by that debtor, it only advances to him a part of the value, which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money for answering occasional demands.” It was first prominently brought forward as a practical rule by the Irish Bank directors in 1804. The Committee of that year did not attempt to deal with this theory; but the witnesses examined before the Bullion Committee re-produced it, and alleged that it was the principle by which the Bank of England regulated its issues during the restriction. The directors of the Bank allowed that, before the restriction, they were compelled to regulate their issues by a drain of gold on them for exportation; when that check was removed, the controlling power was lost; and, indeed, one of the directors stated that, in his opinion, that was one great merit of the restriction; that they were no longer obliged to adhere to their former rules. The Bullion Committee, however, decidedly condemn these opinions. They say, speaking of the consequences of the Restriction Act—

“By far the most important of these consequences is, that while the convertibility into specie no longer exists, as a check to an over-issue of paper, the Bank directors have not perceived that the removal of that check rendered it impossible that such an excess might be issued by the discount of *perfectly good bills*. So far from perceiving this, your Committee have shewn that they maintain the contrary doctrine with the utmost confidence; however it may be qualified occasionally by some of their expressions. That this doctrine is a very fallacious one, your Committee cannot entertain a doubt. The fallacy upon which it

many small debts payable to bearer on demand, while the notes are convertible. The transaction is simply an exchange of debts. At the appointed time it is B's duty to take a quantity of currency to the bank, and discharge his debt. He does this, either in coin, or in the bank's own notes. If he pays his own debt by the bank's notes, it is simply a re-exchange of debts between him and the bank; he extinguishes his own debt to the bank at the same time an equal quantity of the bank's debt is taken out of circulation and extinguished; consequently, the proportion existing previously between the currency and the quantity of debt it represents, remains unaltered. If the merchant discharges his debt partly in coin and partly in bank notes, or wholly in coin, the same result follows; the notes which remain out in circulation still represent the same amount of capital. But let us suppose that the acceptor *fails* to meet his engagement, and cannot pay his debt. Then the debt due *to* the bank is lost and extinguished; but the debt *against* the bank remains; and the bank, whilst the notes are payable to bearer on demand, must pay this debt out of its remaining capital. Still, however, though this is loss of capital to the bank, as the notes are taken out of circulation, the value of the notes remaining in circulation will not be affected. But now let us suppose the notes to be *inconvertible*, then, as before, if the acceptor pays the debt, the notes will be taken out of circulation, and extinguished simultaneously with the debt which they purchased, and the value of those remaining in circulation will not be altered. But suppose that the acceptor fails, and cannot pay his debt, then that debt is extinguished, but the notes which purchased it remain in circulation, and are a mere addition to the circulating medium already existing, without any corresponding addition to the debt or capital which it represents. It would have exactly the same practical effects as if for every good bill of £1,000 the bank were to issue an excess of currency, say £1,500 for example, and when the bill was paid only £1,000 would be taken out of circulation, and the remainder, £500, would remain in circulation. This residuum, as we may call it, would go in diminution of the value of the remainder, exactly in the same way as a constant increase to the gold currency would gradually cause a diminution in its value. Every such operation, therefore, alters the proportion between the currency and the

capital, or the debt it represents; and though, no doubt, a few unsuccessful operations of this sort would not have any sensible effect in changing its value, yet a repeated succession of them must necessarily do so ultimately, just as adding a drop to water in a bucket may not perceptibly increase the height of the water, yet a continued series of drops will at length cause the water to overflow the bucket; so a continued series of such operations under an inconvertible paper currency must necessarily result in a serious diminution in the value of the whole.

40. But it may happen, that even though the merchant pays his debt, and no loss of capital ensues to the bank, yet it may be a loss of capital to him. Thus, when he bought the goods on credit, and gave his acceptance for them, which was purchased by the bank, he meant to employ these goods as *capital*, that is he bought them merely for the purpose of selling them again, with a profit. If he succeeds in this object, and sells them to advantage, he pays his acceptance out of the proceeds realised by the goods, and his capital is increased more or less, according to the greater or less advantage he sells them at. But if he has made a miscalculation, and sells the goods at a loss, he must still make good his debt to the bank, out of his remaining capital: and such a transaction is a loss of capital to him. But every loss of capital to an individual is a loss of capital to the whole community.¹ And the great general result to the community is absolutely the same, whether the loss of capital falls upon the individual or upon the bank. The capital of the nation is diminished, but the currency remains the same. Consequently, every unsuccessful operation in trade alters the proportion between the quantity of the currency and the quantity of the debt, or the capital it represents; and, therefore, every unsuccessful operation necessarily tends to diminish the value of the whole currency, unless some means can be devised by which a quantity of currency can be removed from circulation corresponding to the loss of capital. Now, the diminution in the value of the currency inevitably shews

¹ J. B. Say has also remarked this—"Un mauvais spéculateur est aussi fatal à la prospérité général qu'un dissipateur."—*Traité d'Economie Politique*, p. 445. *Edit. Guillaumin.*

itself in process of time, by a general rise in prices. It may do so gradually and imperceptibly at first—in the hourly variations of prices, it may not, perhaps, be perceived at first; just as when the waves are breaking upon the shore, it is impossible to tell whether the great tide is advancing or receding; but if it continues for any length of time, all traders begin to feel it instinctively. It is impossible, perhaps, to point out the precise influence in any particular transaction; but yet it makes itself felt in commercial operations by a general rise in prices. The fact is, that when the operation was done, and the production exposed for sale, it was expected and calculated that a certain portion of currency would be appropriated to its purchase. But, if people do not want the article, they will not appropriate that portion of currency to its purchase; the producer loses his capital, and the currency remains in circulation. And the increased quantity of it gradually enters into the prices of other commodities, aggravating them, and swelling them up. Now, when this is the case, when the currency is made of a material which has a universally acknowledged value, nature herself provides a remedy. When commodities rise in price in this country beyond their prices in foreign countries, besides the cost of transporting them here, they will be imported, and the extra quantity thrown upon the market diminishes their price, both by altering the ratio of supply and demand, as well as by removing the quantity of currency necessary to pay for them from circulation, until the general equilibrium is again restored between prices, currency, and capital. But, if the currency be made of a material which has no value whatever, like paper, this great restoring process of nature cannot take place. The quantity of currency remains the same, while the debt it represents is diminished. The consequence is a general diminution in value of the whole currency—all the portion of the currency which has value as a material is driven out of circulation: then follows a great rise in the market price of bullion, and, as a necessary consequence, a fall in the foreign exchanges.

41. The foregoing considerations enable us to affix a definite and specific meaning to a phrase which is now in constant use, but which we have never yet seen any attempt to explain. All discussions upon currency are full of misty and vague expressions

about "excessive issues," "over-issues," but we have never seen any attempt to define what an "over-issue" is. Now, "over-issues" in general, must consist of specific instances of "over-issues" in particular cases. Where is the use or the sense of casting vague and indefinite accusations against the Bank of making "excessive issues," unless the person who makes the charge is prepared to point out specifically which issues are excessive, and which are not? Now, the meaning which we affix to an "excessive issue" or an "over-issue," is an advance upon an unsuccessful operation, or the "purchase of a bad debt." Every quantity of currency advanced to promote an unsuccessful operation, or which purchases a bad debt, alters the proportion between the currency and the debt, or the capital it represents. Each specific instance, then, of such an operation, is an "over-issue," and the expression "over-issue," or "excessive issue," has no other meaning.

42. The foregoing considerations also shew the complete fallacy of the theory we have been discussing, of issuing notes upon "good bills." In a banker's sense, a "good bill" means simply a bill which is duly paid by the proper party at maturity. It is not the smallest consequence to him, whether the transaction out of which the bill originated is a profit or a loss to the person who incurred the obligation, as long as he is paid. But if the expression "good bill" be taken in a more extended and philosophical sense, to denote a bill upon which it is safe to issue currency, it is a very different matter indeed, for then a "good bill" can only mean one generated by a successful operation.

43. It is not a little remarkable that Adam Smith adopts both the theories of paper currency, which have imposed so extensively on the banking and mercantile world, and that within a very few pages of each other. The one theory, that which the Bank Directors and merchants adopted in 1810; the other, which is the great currency fallacy of the present day. The two theories are utterly irreconcilable and inconsistent with each other; the one necessarily leads to the most excessive over-issues and depreciation of the paper currency; the other, if carried out

in all its integrity, would be utterly destructive of the business of banking.

44. What, then, is the only true foundation of a paper currency? Every consideration of sound reasoning and science, proves that the only true foundation of a paper currency is that substance which is the legal or universally accepted representative of DEBT, *i. e.*, of services due, whatever that substance be. Now, among all civilised nations, gold or silver bullion is the acknowledged representative of debt. Consequently, gold or silver bullion is the only true basis of a paper currency. Among all civilised nations the *weight of bullion is the acknowledged measure of value*, and, consequently, bullion is the only true basis of the "promises to pay." Many unthinking persons declaim against the absurdity of founding a paper currency upon the *commodity* of gold bullion rather than any other commodity, such as wheat, or silk, or sugar. But it is not as a *commodity* that bullion is the basis of a paper currency, but as the substance which is the accepted representative of *debt*. It would be perfectly possible to make a yard of broadcloth, or a Dutch cheese, the symbol of debt, and the measure of value ; then broadcloth or Dutch cheeses would be the only true basis of a paper currency ; and to issue paper upon the basis of bullion would, in such a case, be as improper as to issue paper on the basis of broadcloth, or Dutch cheeses, under existing circumstances. But all nations are agreed that bullion is better fitted by nature for such a purpose than broadcloth, or Dutch cheeses ; and, consequently, as it seems to be the substance pointed out by nature herself for representing debt, it is the substance which forms the only true basis of a paper currency.

45. Bullion, then, as the symbol of debt, is not only the sole proper basis of a paper currency, but is the only true regulator of its amount. As all paper currency is a "promise to pay" gold or silver bullion at some definite time, it is quite evident that the "promises to pay" floating in a nation must bear some proportion in quantity to the actual quantity of the bullion. It is quite impossible to fix any definite proportion, because that depends upon a multitude of peculiar circumstances. Experience is the only guide on the subject.

46. Specie and credit, or money and promises to pay money, then, form the only true circulating medium or currency, and they are its limits. If the limits of specie and credit are once transgressed, we plunge at once into the dread abyss of Lawism, and there is no logical goal till we arrive at the assignats of 1796, or the issues in America in 1837; and even these did not reach the full limits allowed by the theory. It is impossible to exceed the boundaries of money and credit by a single iota, without involving this absurdity—that *we can buy a thing and keep the price of it as well.*

47. Money and credit, then, must always increase and decrease together. If a man's real capital is reduced from £1,000 to £100, it is quite clear that he cannot safely keep in circulation as many "promises to pay" as when he had £1,000, and if his real capital is leaving him, he must reduce his liabilities in a similar proportion. If he chooses to spend £500 in buying commodities, such as corn, it is quite clear he cannot spend the money, buy the commodity, and have the price as well. Now, what is true of a single individual is equally true of a bank, or of a nation. When an ordinary bank feels a drain upon its bullion, it must reduce its liabilities, its "promises to pay," or else the ruin of that bank is certain. Now, some people think, that though this must be true of private banks, yet it is the reverse of true applied to the Bank of England, and that, as its bullion *decreases* it ought to *increase* its issues. Sir Archibald Alison frequently reminds us of the truism that the same great law regulates the fall of a pebble and the motion of the planets. So we may say that the same great law regulates the relations between the credit and the capital of the humblest individual, the smallest bank, the Bank of England, and the British nation. Some people think that as capital decreases credit should increase. What makes the credit of Great Britain so great? Because her capital is so great. Why is the credit of Russia so low? Because her capital is so small.

48. The operation of reducing "issues" or "advances," is always one which will excite much complaint, and requires to be done with much delicacy; and, indeed, the great problem in regulating the paper currency, is to discover the true mode of

acting upon it, so as on the one hand to maintain always its uniformity in value with the coin it represents, and on the other not to contract it too suddenly and violently, and without giving the public sufficient warning to enable them to reduce their liabilities in proportion.

49. From the amazing confusion of language and thought which pervades almost all treatises on monetary science, the plain and obvious method of controlling the paper currency has almost entirely eluded observation. No person who apprehended the true nature of banking, and expressed it in simple language, could fail to see the natural controller. The main business of commercial banking is discounting mercantile bills—that is, buying debts. Discounting a bill for a merchant is not *lending* him money but *buying* a debt due to him; and the price of such debt must follow exactly the same laws as the price of corn, or any other article. If money is very scarce, and wheat very abundant, the price of wheat must fall; if money is very abundant, the price of wheat will rise. The price of debts obeys the same rules. If money becomes very scarce, the price of debts must fall, *i. e.*, the discount must rise. If specie becomes abundant, the price of debts will rise, *i. e.*, the discount will fall. The price of debts, then, must follow the same great laws of nature that the price of wheat does. Now, does not every man of common sense know that it is the most foolish and insane thing to try to control the price of wheat? As we have shewn in another place, it is not the fluctuation of the price of wheat that is the evil, but it is only the *sign* of evil. The real evil is the change in the proportion of the demand and supply, and the fluctuation of the price is the grand natural corrector of the evil. Does not every one know that a high price of corn is the way to *attract* corn where it is deficient, and a low price the way to *repel* it from where it is already too abundant? Does not every one with common sense know that it is the most fatal folly to force down the price of wheat when there is a real scarcity, and to sell it below the price it would naturally attain? Can any course be more suicidal?

50. Now, apply all the arguments which suggest themselves so irresistibly in the case of wheat to the case of credit, or the

purchase of debts, and the same results follow. The same great law of nature operates to preserve the due proportion between specie and credit and any interference with this great law must necessarily be attended with the same evil consequences as an interference with the natural price of wheat. And yet almost all legislation up to a very recent period, and almost all writers on political economy, and too many of the commercial world, were in a perverse combination to thwart this great law of nature, and attempt to keep the rate of discount, or the price of debts, fixed at a uniform scale !

51. While, therefore, the greater part of commercial complaints are levelled against variations in the rate of discount as the great evil, the truth is, it is only the *sign* of the evil. The real evil is the altered proportion between specie and credit, and a variation in the rate of discount is the grand natural corrector of the evil. To attempt to keep the rate of discount uniform, is to thwart and contravene the laws of nature just the same as an attempt to fix the price of wheat. Like all true laws of nature, the simplicity, beauty, and perfection of its action is marvellous, and it produces a multitude of results which are not perhaps very obvious at first. If specie is leaving the country and becoming scarce compared to credit, every principle of nature shews that the value of money must rise, *i. e.*, the rate of discount must rise ; and this has a tendency to prevent the outflow of bullion, and to attract it from abroad ; on the other hand, if specie be flowing into the country and likely to become too abundant compared to credit, a fall in its value, or a fall in the rate of discount *repels* it from the country. If a nation be visited with a great failure of the crops it can only buy such food from foreign countries with its commodities or its money ; it cannot send its credit in payment abroad. Now, if commodities are too dear, it must pay with money, and credit in this country is the great producing power, and credit *for a time* is a great sustainer of prices by enabling people to withhold their commodities from the market. Now, raising the rate of discount curtails credit, forces sales, and thereby lowers the prices of commodities, and makes it less profitable to export specie, and more profitable to export goods. Moreover, this rise in the value of money here, *i. e.*, the low price of debts and commodities,

tempts buyers from neighbouring countries to bring their money here. It thus causes an inflow of bullion and restores our currency to a uniformity of value, with that of neighbouring countries. Again, if this nation has to spend a great part of its money in buying foreign corn, it is quite clear that it has not got so much to spend in purchasing goods; an over-production of goods, therefore, can only end in a disastrous fall in prices. And here, too, the beautiful action of this great law of nature is manifest. So enormous a proportion of the commodities of this country are produced by the credit system, that a rise in the rate of discount just hits profits between wind and water, as we may say. Consequently, a rise in the rate of discount retards and curtails production in proportion to the diminished consuming powers of the nation, and so prevents such a ruinous fall in prices as would necessarily follow an undiminished production, accompanied by a diminished power of consumption.

52. In fact, when a commercial crisis occurs in a country, it invariably means that more persons are wishing to sell than there are persons to buy, or, at least, at remunerative prices. A commercial crisis invariably arises from a lack of purchasers, which is, in fact, over-production. True prudence, therefore, shews that in all commercial crises, *production should be curbed*. It is much better not to produce at all, than to produce and be obliged to sell at a loss. To produce, and be obliged to sell below the cost of production, is loss of capital. It is better, therefore, not to employ the capital at all than to lose it. Raising the rate of discount, therefore, acts as a timely warning to producers to hold hard. It is necessary to dispose of the stock already produced, before producing more, and if the stream of sale is stopped while production continues, it can only end in a more aggravated fall at last.

53. Now, what is the necessary consequence of an attempt to thwart this great law of nature? In time of scarcity of food, and a necessary export of money to buy it, if the rate of discount be kept unnaturally low, nothing but money will go; commodities are too dear, they will not go. Again, money being kept at an unnaturally low rate here, no one will bring it here from neighbouring countries; consequently, great quantities of

money will go out and none will come in, till at last the circulating medium will be nothing but "promises to pay," and no money to pay them with. Then, at last, violent convulsions, total destruction of credit, every one wishing to sell, and no one wishing or able to buy.

54. On the other hand, if, when specie is flowing in with too great abundance, it be not repelled by a due diminution in the value of money, *i. e.*, a fall in the rate of discount, it will continue to do so until it is so superabundant that a violent fall takes place. Persons who are accustomed to depend on the incomes they derive from the interest of money, suddenly find that their means are seriously diminished. In the year 1824 there was such a plethora of capital in the country that the Scotch banks gave no interest on deposits; after 1824 came 1825. Then wild speculations find favour in the public mind, promising higher profits; and then the community goes through the cycle of bubble speculations, extravagant credit, ending in a commercial catastrophe. We may feel quite certain that if during the various crises this country has passed through, there had been more attention paid to observe the natural rate of discount, instead of thwarting the course of nature, though the variations would have been more frequent, they would have been less violent and extreme. If specie is coming in with too great speed, it is good to lower the rate of discount quickly to prevent it getting lower; if specie is going out too rapidly, it is good to raise the rate quickly to prevent its being higher.

55. Such, however, is the perversity of men, that many think that a uniform and invariable rate of discount is the great thing to be preserved, no matter what nature may say to the contrary, and their ingenuity is racked to devise a plan for always keeping it so, just as if the governor of the steam engine ought always to revolve with uniform velocity. Now, the inevitable consequence of taking these means to thwart nature will be, that when specie is scarce, it will be repelled by a lower rate than the natural one; when it is already too abundant, it will be still further attracted by a rate higher than the natural one.

56. The extreme anxiety of persons to obtain an impossible object, always to have the power of selling debts due to them at

a uniform rate, has led to a very prevalent theory, which seems very innocent and simple. It being desirable always to maintain the currency at a uniform amount, they propose that, as gold goes out, paper should be issued to supply its place. This theory is adopted by Sir Archibald Alison, who says, after condemning the theory that gold and paper must vary together—

“The true system would be just the reverse. Proceeding on the principle that the great object is to equalise the currency, and with it prices and speculations, it would *enlarge* the paper currency when the precious metals are withdrawn, and credit is threatened with a stoppage, and proportionally contract it when the precious metals return, and the currency is becoming adequate without any considerable addition to the paper.”

57. There would be certainly something specious in the idea of issuing bank notes to supply the place of the gold that went out, if, unfortunately, it had not been tried over and over again, and been attended uniformly with a catastrophe. When gold was leaving the country in vast quantities in 1796, the Bank of England still maintained its issues, against its own will, it is true, but yet the *fact* illustrates the *principle*, and the consequence was the suspension of cash payments in 1797. When the Bank had got right again in 1817, a drain for foreign loans began, and the Bank extended its issues in 1818, and the consequence was the second suspension of cash payments in 1819. In 1824, when bullion was departing from the country like a flood, the Bank extended its issues; then, when it saw itself right in the vortex of bankruptcy, it suddenly altered its policy, and the result of all this was the catastrophe of 1825. In 1838-9, a similar drain occurred, the Bank, with marvellous perversity, maintained its rate of discount considerably below the market rate, and the result was the monetary crisis of 1839. In 1847, there was the same error and the same result. Surely these instances are enough to destroy this fatal delusion.

58. In fact, Sir Archibald, and the great body of public writers who share these sentiments, wholly mistake the object to be sought for in so delicate and artificial a machine as a paper currency. The object to be aimed at is not to preserve a uniform rate of discount in this country, but to maintain a uniformity in

the value of the British currency with that of other countries. If money is made artificially cheap in this country, that is, cheaper than it is in neighbouring countries, persons in this country will *export* it to where it is of greater value; they will buy foreign securities, they will import foreign commodities. On the other hand, foreign nations will flood this country with their securities—just as the Americans did in 1839, when the Bank kept down the rate of discount below its proper level—because they can sell them at a better price here than in their own country. If a man wishes to sell a horse, and my neighbour will only give £90 for it, and I will give £96, he, of course, will sell the horse to me, and take away my cash. So, when the Americans wished to sell their debts, and found that in their own country they could only get £90 per cent. for them, whereas they could get £97 per cent. for them in England, as a natural consequence, they sent them to England for sale, and took away the cash. The only way for England to have stopped this would have been to give no more for these securities than the Americans would themselves; in other words, to maintain a uniformity in value between the currencies of the two countries.

59. When the foreign exchanges are unfavourable to this country, the simple meaning of that is, that it is profitable to export gold. Now, where is the gold got from for exportation? From the Bank of England. And how is it got from there? By getting hold of the Bank's "promises to pay" gold on demand. Now, when the Bank of England knows that a multitude of persons are trying to get hold of its "promises to pay," for the purpose of demanding gold for them, to carry out of the country, would it not be the height of folly in the Bank to be multiplying its "promises to pay" in all directions, and selling them cheap? This would be exactly as wise as if the captain of a ship, directly he saw a storm coming on, were to set all his studding-sails and royals. When the captain sees the tempest approaching, he must get down his top-gallant masts and reef his topsails; so, when a commercial tempest is threatened it behoves those who pilot the vessels of credit to *contract* their "promises to pay."

60. The plan proposed by Sir Archibald, and a multitude of unthinking writers, is, that when gold is leaving the country,

commissioners should be appointed to issue an equal amount of inconvertible paper, which is to be withdrawn when gold comes back again. But what is to be done with the convertible paper already in existence? Is it to be declared inconvertible? For, as long as the rate of discount is depressed, there will be a constant demand for gold in exchange for notes, and a corresponding amount of *inconvertible* paper must be issued. Let this wonderful theory be put in practice, and the drain will not cease until every sovereign has left the country; and, moreover, they never will come back again. For, as the avowed intention is to keep down the rate of discount, and to keep up prices, there is nothing to bring the bullion back again. Nothing can bring it back again here, except we can sell our commodities or debts cheaper than other nations. But it is the avowed intention of these issues to prevent that; consequently, no bullion ever will come back.

61. But, moreover, this wonderful panacea of all monetary ills—issuing an inconvertible paper currency, to supply the place of the gold that goes out—is just our old friend John Law's scheme over again, of issuing paper currency based upon commodities. Those who advocate this think that the nation can send its money abroad to buy food, and have it as well in the form of paper money. Just as if a man might go into a shop, spend his money there in buying goods, and then have it again in the form of a "promise to pay." When will this stupendous delusion be eradicated from the public mind? If I have a certain quantity of money in my till, I may safely give a "promise to pay;" or, if I know for certain that money is coming in to me on a certain day, I may give my "promise to pay" at a certain date; but when I have actually spent my money, and it is gone away from me for ever, to think that I could then grant a "promise to pay" worth anything, is an idea which savours little of sanity. In 1696-7, during the re-coinage of the silver, the Bank of England might have issued £1 notes with the greatest advantage and propriety for a temporary purpose, because it knew that it would shortly have the money to pay them with; but when the money is gone from the Bank to buy corn abroad, it would be the most dangerous folly possible to issue notes to supply the place of gold.

62. But there are several other considerations which point out that the rate of discount is the true method of acting upon the paper currency. As soon as the exchange becomes so unfavourable as to make it profitable to export gold, an immense number of bills are fabricated for the purpose of being sold for the sake of the premium; and these will continue to be fabricated as long as the rate of discount is kept below that of neighbouring countries; now, raising the rate of discount strangles all such operations in the birth. If only the *numerical* amount of notes be looked to, and the rate of discount be kept down, these speculators may get their bills passed, while legitimate trade bills may be refused. A moderate rise in the rate of discount will never inflict any real injury on trade at all equal to the refusal to discount trade bills altogether; and that is the result which has always ensued from a perseverance in keeping down the value of money below the natural level.

63. Moreover, when the nation is actually obliged to spend its money in buying foreign corn, or on any other object, such as war, it is quite impossible that it can have so much money to spend upon other things; its consuming powers, therefore, are diminished; it must economise in other things. Now, if the rate of discount is kept below its natural level, it stimulates and encourages production so much beyond the powers of consumption, that it must necessarily terminate in an aggravated fall in prices. A timely raising of the rate of discount is, therefore, a warning to producers to contract their operations gradually. But keeping it unnaturally low lulls them into false security; they maintain their engagements on credit on an undiminished scale, till at last the Bank, for its own safety, is obliged to pull up on a sudden—to bring up all standing. Then follows a total refusal to discount, commercial panic, and ruin.

64. It is, then, an incontrovertible fundamental truth in monetary science, that specie and credit form the circulating medium, and that they must increase and decrease together. An increase of currency, without an increase of debt, has no effect but to diminish the value of the currency. The same thing happens, if, when debt is destroyed, currency is not destroyed with it. If a metallic currency increases faster than debt, nature

provides a remedy—it is immediately exported. But, with an inconvertible paper currency, this cannot happen, and when debt is destroyed, currency remains in circulation; when this goes on for any length of time, or to any extent, the inevitable result is a depreciation of the paper currency, which is shewn by the rise of the market above the Mint price of gold. This was eminently exemplified in England in the years subsequent to 1810. The extravagant speculations were followed by an enormous destruction of capital; but the currency which was issued to represent it remained in circulation, and soon manifested itself in a rapid fall of the value of paper. It was impossible that paper ever should right itself, unless this superfluous currency was destroyed. It is recorded that an Irishman once having taken a dislike to a banker, in order to spite him, collected a number of his notes and burned them. It would have been an excellent thing for the country bankers of England in 1814-15, if some one had done the same kind office for them. The quantity of paper currency was so excessive, compared to what it represented, that nothing could restore it to its par value but the destruction of a large portion of it; and this was brought about by the destruction of the issuers of it; and, when this was done, the value of the remainder rose to par.

65: We have gone over most of the theories of currency which have attained the greatest practical importance. That there are others, is true; but they have generally been confined to a small knot of fanatics. But, as they seem, at last, to have died out, we need not weary our readers' patience by disturbing their peaceful oblivion.

CHAPTER XIII.

ON THE DEFINITION OF CURRENCY.

1. Having in the preceding chapters completed a general survey of the mechanism of Banking and the Foreign Exchanges, we are now compelled to examine the peculiar system of Banking which is at present established in this country ; but, before we do so, we must give a little time to settle the meaning of the word CURRENCY. Most persons engaged in practical business are morbidly averse to discussions on the meaning of words, thinking them to be pure waste of time. But no science was ever yet founded without such controversies, and it is precisely because writers on Economics have systematically despised and neglected the only means by which a science can be founded, and by which every other great science has been created and established, that Economics is at the present moment in such a discreditable state. In the present case this investigation is absolutely indispensable, because the Bank Charter Act of 1844, which now governs the whole monetary system of the country, is expressly founded upon a peculiar *definition* of the word CURRENCY, and is expressly devised to carry out a peculiar Theory of Currency. In this chapter we must therefore investigate and settle the meaning of the word CURRENCY.

A very distinguished statesman has said that the word CURRENCY has driven more people mad than anything except love. Nor, to say the truth, is this very surprising. If we were to assemble a company of purely literary men, and request them to "Differentiate the Equation to a Curve," we have not the smallest doubt but that such a mysterious expression might drive them to despair, whereas any moderately educated school-boy could do it at a glance. It is precisely the same with the word CURRENCY. It is a term of pure Mercantile Law. Any mercantile lawyer can tell in an instant what the word CURRENCY means, and what it includes ; whereas, those who have occupied themselves with discussions on it, know absolutely nothing of Mercantile Law, and have exactly as much chance of settling the meaning of

CURRENCY, as they have of Differentiating an Equation. We have already given a short account of its true meaning,¹ but we must now investigate the question completely.

2. Our Saxon ancestors utterly discountenanced and prohibited the sale or exchange of any goods, merchandise, or cattle by private sale or bargain. It was a matter of fixed policy with them that no sales should take place except in the presence of witnesses. A series of kings made laws to this effect, and as these laws are to this very hour in spirit the Common Law of England, and are very little known, we may give a little space to quote them textually, as constitutional curiosities.

Thus, among the DOOMS, or Laws, which Hlothære and Eadric, kings of the Kentish men, about 688 A.D., established is this²—“16. That if any Kentishman buy a chattel in Lunden-wic (London), let him then have two or three true men to witness, or the king's wic-reeve. If it be afterwards claimed of the man of Kent, let him then vouch the man who sold it to warranty, in the wic at the King's Hall, if he know him, and can bring him to warranty; if he cannot do that, let him prove at the altar, with one of his witnesses, or with the king's wic-reeve, that he bought the chattel openly in the wic, with his own property, and then let him be paid its worth; but if he cannot prove that by lawful averment, let him give it up; and let the owner take possession of it.”

Among the Doms of Ine, King of Wessex (688-725 A.D.), is this³—“25. If a chapman traffic up among the people, let him do it before witnesses. If stolen property be attached with a chapman, and he have not bought it before good witnesses, let him prove, according to the wite, that he was neither privy nor thief, or pay as wite thirty-six shillings.

Among the Doms of Edward the Elder, son of Alfred (901-924 A.D.), is this⁴—“1. And I will that every man have his warrantor, and that no man buy out of port,⁵ but have the portreeve's witness, or that of other unlying men whom one may

¹ Vol. I., p. 80.

² *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England; printed by command of William IV.* p. 14. We quote the official translation of the Anglo-Saxon.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁵ That is Market Overt; in Roman Law, *Portus est conclusus locus quo importantur merces et inde exportantur. Est et statio conclusa et munita.*

believe. And if any one buy out of port let him incur the king's ofer hyrnes." (i. e., contempt, or hearing and refusing to obey, which incurred a penalty of 120s.)

Among the Doms of Æthelstan (925-960 A.D.) is this¹—
 "10. And let no man exchange any property without the witness of the reeve, or of the mass-priest, or of the landlord, or of the hordere, or of other unlying man. If any one so do, let him give thirty shillings, and let the landlord take possession of the exchange."

Among the Doms of Edgar (959-975 A.D.) are these—

"4. To every burh let there be chosen thirty-three as witnesses.

"5. To small burhs, and in every hundred, twelve; unless ye desire more.

"6. And let every man, with their witness, buy and sellevy of the chattels that he may buy and sell, either in a burh, or in a wapentake; and let every of them when he is first chosen as witness, give the oath that he never, neither for money nor for love, nor for fear, will deny any of those things of which he was witness, nor declare any other thing in witness, save that alone which he saw or heard; and of such sworn men, let there be at every bargain two or three as witnesses."

Among the Doms of Ethelred (979-1016 A.D.) is this²—
 "3. And let no man buy or exchange, unless he have burh and witness; but if any so do, let the landlord take possession of, and hold the property, till that it be known who rightfully owns it."

Among the Doms of Cnut the Great (1017-1035 A.D.) is this³—"24. And let no one buy anything above the value of four pence, either living or lying, unless he have the true witness of four men, be it within a burh, be it up in the country. For if it then be attached, and he have no such witness, let there be no vouching to warranty; but let his own be rendered to the proprietor; and the aftergild and the wite to him who is entitled thereto."

"Among the Laws of Edward the Confessor (1043-1066 A.D.) is this⁴—"38. Defensum erat eciam in lege, ne aliquis emat vivum animal vel pannum usatum sine plegiis et bonis testibus

¹ *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, p. 87. ² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

Et si venditor non potest habere plegios, retineatur cum pecunia donec veniat dominus ejus, aut quilibet alius, qui juste possit eum warrantizare. Quod si aliter aliquis emerit, quod stulte emit perdat et forisfacturam."

William the Conqueror (1066-1087 A.D.) continued this law¹—
 "45. Nemo emat vel vivum vel mortuum ad valenciam IIII. denariorum sine IIII. testibus, aut de burgo aut de villa campestri. Quod si aliquis rem postmodum calumpniatus fuerit, et nec testes habuerit nec warrantum, et rem reddat et forisfacturam, cui de jure competit."

Also in a Charter granted by him he says²—
 "10. Interdicimus eciam ut nulla viva pecunia vendatur aut ematur nisi intra civitates, sine fidejussore et warranto. Quod si aliquam rem vetitam, sine fidejussore et warranto. Quod si aliter fecerit, solvat, et persolvat, et postea forisfacturam."

"11. Item nullum mercatum vel forum sit, nec fieri permittatur, nisi in civitatibus regni nostri, et in burgis [clausis] et muro villatis, et in castellis, et in locis tutissimis, ubi consuetudines regni nostri, et jus nostrum commune, et dignitates corone nostre, que constitute sunt a bonis predecessoribus nostris deperire non possint, nec defraudari nec violari, sed omnia rite et in aperto, et per judicium et justiciam fieri debeant."

And so also the *Mirroure of Justice*, which was originally written in French long before the Conquest, says, p. 14—"It was ordained that fairs and markets should be in places, and that the buyers of corn and cattle should pay toll to the lords' bailiff markets or fairs; that is to say, a false penny of six shillings good, and of good, less and of more, more; so that no exceed a penny for one manner of merchandise: and this toll given to testify the contracts, for that every private contract forbidden."

3. And these ancient Doms and enactments, are the foundation of the Common Law at the present hour. It is the established principle of Common Law that if any person steals or finds chattel belonging to any one else, and sells it privately to a person, the true owner may reclaim it from that third person, even though he bought it honestly, and gave full value, had no suspicion that the seller had no title to sell it.

¹ *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, p. 209.

² *Ibid.*

law holds in general that no one can sell what he does not possess himself; and it does not allow that the true owner has lost the property in the chattel or goods, by having accidentally mislaid them, or having them stolen from him.

If, however, the thief or finder manages to sell the goods in *market overt*, then the buyer is by common law entitled to retain them against the true owner.

However, by Statute 24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96, § 100, it is now enacted that if the loser prosecutes the thief to conviction, then the court may grant a writ of summary restitution to the true owner of the property, in whose ever hands it may be, even though he may have bought it honestly, and given full value for it.

In the City of London every day except Sunday is, by ancient custom, market day; and every shop is market overt for the goods which are usually sold there, but for no others. It was held by all the judges¹—"that if plate be stolen, and sold openly in a scrivener's shop on the market day (as every day is a market day in London except Sunday), that this sale should not change the property; but the party should have restitution; for a scrivener's shop is not a market overt for plate, for none would search there for such a thing; *et sic de similibus, &c.* But if the sale had been openly in a goldsmith's shop in London, so that any one who stood or passed by the shop might see it, then it would change the property. But if the sale be in the shop of a goldsmith, either behind a hanging; or behind a cupboard upon which his plate stands, so that one stood or passed by the shop could not see it, it would not change the property; or if the sale be not in the shop, but in the warehouse, or other place of the house, it would not change the property, for that is not in market overt, and none would search there for his goods. So every shop in London is market overt for such things only which by the trade of the owner are put there to sale."

But in country towns only those days are market days which are appointed by law or ancient custom; and those places only are market overt for any goods, merchandise, or cattle, which are expressly appointed for the sale of such articles. And, consequently, all sales of any articles made in any other than such places are void against the true owner, if the articles be not the

¹ *The case of Market Overt*, 5 Co: 83 b., *Hil.*, 28 *Eliz.*

property of the seller. We might, if necessary, illustrate these doctrines by several recent cases, but that would occupy too much space in such a work as this.

4. Such is the law with regard to all kinds of goods, merchandise, and cattle. But with regard to MONEY the case was always different. If a person stole or found money belonging to any one else, the true owner could compel him to give it up, if he could prove the fact, and identify the money. But if the finder or thief paid away the money in the ordinary course of business; as if, for instance, a shopkeeper sold goods to the thief, and took the money in the ordinary course of his business, without knowing that it was stolen, then he could retain the money against the true owner even though he could identify it. That is to say, the property in the money passed along with the honest possession of it in every sale or exchange. And from this peculiarity money was said to be CURRENT, *i. e.*, that the *property* in it passed by delivery. And this was necessary by the very nature of commerce, because no transactions could take place if the seller was bound in every sale to inquire into the right of the buyer to the money. And from this exceptional property of money, the expression arose of the CURRENCY of money, but no one for a very long time ever thought of such a barbarism as to call the money itself CURRENCY.

But when in the course of time Bills of Exchange, and other securities for money, came into use, it was adopted as a custom or usage by the Law Merchant, that the same rule should apply to them as applied to money; that is to say, that the property in them should pass with the honest possession. It would have been a great impediment to all commerce if the vendor of goods had been obliged to inquire into the title of any one who offered a Bill of Exchange or Bank Note in payment of them. Consequently this principle of CURRENCY was applied to all negotiable securities for money. It is so important that the doctrines relating to the Property of Negotiable Instruments should be generally known, that we subjoin them, as laid down in the Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, &c., which we prepared for the Royal Commissioners for the Digest of the Law—

“37. 1. If any negotiable bill, note, obligation, or security

for money be lost or stolen the finder or thief cannot retain it against the true owner, or recover against the parties to it.

Anonymous, 1 Ld. Raym., 788. *Greenstreet v. Carr*, 1 Camp., 551. *Burn v. Morris*, 3 L. J. N. S. Ex., 193.

"2. But if such finder or thief, or if a person holding such security as AGENT (1) for the owner of it, pass it away or pledge (2) it for value, and the transferee is ignorant of the fraud, such innocent holder, or pawnee for value, may retain it against the true owner, and has a right of action against all the parties to it.

Bank Notes. *Anon.*, 1 Ld. Raym., 788. *Miller v. Race*, 1 Burr., 452. *Lovandes v. Anderson*, 13 East, 180. *Beckwith v. Corraill*, 2 C. & P., 261; 11 Moo., 335. *Snow v. Sadler*, 11 Moo., 506, *Raphael v. Bank of England*, 17 C. B., 161,

Cheques. *Grant v. Vaughan*, 3 Burr., 1516. *Carlon v. Ireland*, 5 El. & Bl., 765. *Rothschild v. Corney*, 9 B. & C., 388. *Watson v. Russell*, 3 B. & S., 34; 5 B. & S., 968.

Bills of Exchange. *Peacock v. Rhodes*, 2 Doug., 633. *Lawson v. Weston*, 4 Esp., 56. *Crook v. Jadis*, 6 C. & P., 191; 3 Nev. & Man., 257. *Backhouse v. Harrison*, 3 Nev. & Man., 188. *Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 A. & E., 870. *Uther v. Rich.*, 10 A. & E., 784. *May v. Chapman*, 16 M. & W., 355. *Thiedeman v. Goldschmidt*, 1 D. G. F. & G., 4.

Navy Bills. *Goldsmid v. Gaden*, 1 B. & P., 649.

Exchequer Bills. *Wookey v. Pole*, 4 B. & Ald., 1.

Foreign Transferable Bonds. *Gorgier v. Mievill*, 3 B. & C., 45.

(1.) *Bank of Bengal v. Macleod*; *Id. v. Fagan*, 7 Moo., P. C., 35, 61.

(2.) *Collins v. Martin*, 2 Esp., 520; 1 B. & P., 648. *Jones v. Peppercorne*, 1 John., 430.

"3. But if the transferee knows at the time of taking the instrument that it has been lost or stolen (1), or if he *knows* that the person he takes it from has no authority to sell or pledge it (2), or if it be taken for an illegal consideration (3), he cannot retain it, or recover on it, even though he has given full value for it.

(1.) *Burn v. Morris*, 3 L. J. N. S. Ex., 193.

(2.) *Maclish v. Ekins*, Say., 73. *Treuttel v. Barandon*, 1 Moo., 543. *Foster v. Pearson*, and *Stephens v. Foster*, 1 C. M. & R., 849. *Fancourt v. Bull*, 1 Bing., N. C., 681. *Willis v. Bank of England*, 4 A. & E., 21. *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 C. B., N. S., 248.

(3.) *Wynne v. Callander*, 1 Russ., 293.

"38. But if the instrument be not negotiable, or if the transferor held it as TRUSTEE, or if he acquired or transmitted it by means of a forgery, the innocent holder, or pawnee for

value, has only the equities of the transferor, and cannot retain it against the true owner, or recover on it.

Manningford v. Toleman, 1 Coll. C. C., 235. *Moore v. Jervis*, 2 Coll. C. C., 60. *Lang v. Smyth*, 7 Bing., 284. *Partridge v. Bank of England*, 9 C. B., 408. *Smith v. Mercer*, 6 Taunt., 76. *Hall v. Fuller*, 5 B. & C., 750. *Roberts v. Tucker*, 16 Q. B., 560. *Esdaile v. Lanauze*, 1 Y. & C., 394. *Johnson v. Windle*, 3 Bing., N. C., 225. *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 C. B., N. S., 248."

And so important is this principle of the CURRENCY of all negotiable instruments, that in the Statute respecting the restitution of stolen property, it is expressly provided that it shall not apply to negotiable instruments. It says¹—"Provided that if it shall appear before any award or order made that any valuable security shall have been *bonâ fide* paid, or discharged by some person or body corporate liable to the payment thereof, or being a negotiable instrument shall have been *bonâ fide* taken or received by transfer or delivery by some person or body corporate, for a just and valuable consideration, without any notice or without any reasonable cause to suspect that the same had by any felony or misdemeanour been stolen or taken, obtained, extorted, embezzled, converted, or disposed of, in such case the Court shall not award or order the restitution of such Security."

Thus we see that the law has taken the utmost precaution to preserve as absolutely inviolable the NEGOTIABILITY or CURRENCY of all negotiable instruments under all circumstances whatever. And if such a barbarism be generally accepted as to call money CURRENCY, for precisely the same reason all Negotiable Instruments must equally be called CURRENCY; for they are equally subject to the same rules of Law, from which they derive the name.

5. These doctrines, however, are so important as being at the very basis of the whole of our monetary system; and as they have given rise to so many controversies which are yet raging; and as they have been so misunderstood and misrepresented by literary men who never took the smallest pains to inquire into the law of the subject, that we think it will be more satisfactory to our readers not to rest satisfied with the preceding exposition, but to lay before them the actual decisions of the Courts of Law and Equity establishing them.

¹ 24 & 25 Vict. (1861), ch. 96, § 100.

We shall therefore demonstrate to our readers as matters of pure Commercial Law—(1.) That all Negotiable Instruments are subject to the same Law regarding their transfer and property as MONEY. (2.) That it is from this property exclusively that the name CURRENCY has been derived; and (3) that all Negotiable Instruments are CURRENCY as well as Money.

1. *To shew that all Negotiable Instruments have the attribute of CURRENCY, i. e., are subject to the same Law regarding their transfer as Money.*

BANK NOTES.—(Anonymous, 1 Lord Raymond, 738.) A Bank bill was payable to A or bearer. A gave it to B. B lost it, C found it, and assigned it over to D for valuable consideration. D went to the bank and got a new bill in his own name. A brought trover against D for the former bill. And ruled by HOLT, C. J., at Guildhall, 1698, that an action did not lie against D because he had it for a valuable consideration.

The leading case, however, on the subject is that of *Miller v. Race* (1 Burr., 452). Finney, the true owner of a Bank Note, sent it by post to a friend in the country. The mail was robbed, and on the next day the note came into the possession of the Plaintiff, Miller, for a full and valuable consideration, and in the usual course and way of his business, and without any notice of the robbery. Finney stopped the note at the Bank. A short time after Miller applied to the Bank for payment of the note, and delivered it to Race, the defendant, a clerk in the Bank. Race refused either to pay, or return, the note to Miller; and Miller brought this action to recover possession of the note. Lord Mansfield ruled, with the unanimous concurrence of the Court, that Miller had the right to have the note given back to him as his property, because Bank Notes have the Credit and the CURRENCY of money, to all intents and purposes. An action would lie against the finder; that no one disputed: but *not after* the note had been *paid away in CURRENCY*. Lord Mansfield said that in the preceding case just cited, the action did not lie against the defendant because he took it in the course of CURRENCY; and therefore it could not be followed in his hands. *It never* shall be followed into the hands of a person who *bonâ fide* took it in the course of CURRENCY. A bank note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad, treated as *money*, as *cash*; and it is

necessary for the purposes of commerce, that their CURRENCY should be established and maintained.

So in *Clarks v. Shee* (Cowp., 200), Lord Mansfield said—“Where notes or money are paid *bonâ fide*, and upon a valuable consideration, they shall never be brought back by the true owner; but where they come *malâ fide* into a person's hands, they are in the nature of specific property: and if their identity can be traced and ascertained, the party has a right to recover.” And this doctrine is such firmly established law that there is no need to cite any more cases to support it.

CHEQUES.—In the case of *Grant v. Vaughan* (8 Burr., 1516), Vaughan gave a cash note (i. e., a cheque) upon his banker to B in these words, “Pay to ship ‘Fortune’ or *bearer*.” B lost the cheque. The finder, or the possessor of it, four days afterwards came to Grant's shop, and offered the cheque in payment of some goods he bought. Grant took the cheque in the usual course of business, and gave the balance in cash. Vaughan, hearing that the cheque had been lost, stopped the payment of it. Grant brought an action against him for the amount. Lord Mansfield held that the same rule applied to cheques payable to bearer as to bank notes. WILMOT, J., said that such bills or notes as this are by law negotiable. So also Yates, J., said—“nothing can be more peculiarly negotiable than draughts or bills payable to bearer. . . . It is just the same as a Bank Note.” Hence this case established that Cheques possess the attribute of CURRENCY, exactly in the same way as Bank Notes: and this doctrine is so firmly established that it is needless to quote any more cases.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.—In *Peacock v. Rhodes* (2 Douglas, 633), a Bill of Exchange indorsed in blank was stolen and negotiated. The innocent indorsee for value was held entitled to recover against the drawer. Lord Mansfield said—“The holder of a Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note is not to be considered in the light of an assignee of the payee. An assignee must take the thing assigned subject to all the equity to which the original party was subject. If this rule applied to Bills and Promissory Notes, it would stop their CURRENCY. The law is settled that a holder, coming fairly by a note or a bill, has nothing to do with the transactions between the original parties. I see no difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable

to bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in both cases."

The same doctrine was again enforced in *Collins v. Martin* (1 B. & P., 648), where a banker pledged some of his customer's bills indorsed in blank with another banker, who advanced money on them honestly in the usual course of business. EYRE, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said—"For the purpose of rendering Bills of Exchange negotiable, the Right of Property in them passes with the bills. Every holder with the bills takes the property, and his title is stamped upon the bills themselves. The property and the possession are inseparable. This was necessary to make them negotiable, and in this respect they differ essentially from goods of which the property and the possession may be in different persons." And this rule of law is so firmly established, that we need not quote any more cases in support of it.

FOREIGN BONDS.—In *Gorgier v. Mieville* (3 B. & C., 45), the plaintiff deposited a Prussian bond in the hands of his agent, to receive the interest on it for him. The bond was made payable to any person who at the time should be the holder of it. It was proved that these bonds were sold in the market, and passed from hand to hand daily like exchequer bills. The plaintiff's agent pledged the bond with the defendants. The Attorney General tried to draw a distinction between bank notes, bills of exchange, and exchequer bills, because such instruments constitute a part of the circulating medium of the country, but that rule did not apply to the bond of a foreign country. But ABBOT, C. J., said—"The instrument, in its form, is an acknowledgment by the King of Prussia that the sum mentioned in the bond is due to every person who shall for the time being be the holder of it, and the principal and interest is payable in a certain mode, and at certain periods mentioned in the bond. It is, therefore, in its nature precisely analogous to a bank note payable to bearer, or to a bill of exchange indorsed in blank. Being an instrument, therefore, of the same description, it must be subject to the same rule of law, that whoever is the holder of it, has power to give title to any person honestly acquiring it."

We have now sufficiently established our first point, that all Negotiable Instruments are subject to the same rule as money

will make no difference, if the property in the bill passes by delivery." Best, J., then agreeing with *Collins v. Martin*, cited above, gave his opinion against the plaintiff.

HOLROYD, J.—"It has been long and fully settled that bank notes or bills, drafts on bankers, bills of exchange, or promissory notes, either payable to order and indorsed in blank, or payable to bearer, when taken *bonâ fide*, and for a valuable consideration, pass by delivery, and vest a right thereto in the transferee, without regard to the title, or want of title, in the person transferring them. This was decided as to a bank note in the case of *Miller v. Race*; as to a draft on a banker in *Grant v. Vaughan*: and as to a bill of exchange indorsed in blank, in *Peacock v. Rhodes*. Those cases have proceeded on the nature and effect of the instruments, which have been considered as distinguishable from goods. In the case of goods, the property, except in market overt, can only be transferred by the owner, or some person having either an express or implied authority from him; and no one can, by his contract or delivery, transfer more than his own right, or the right of him under whose authority he acts. But the Courts have considered these instruments, either promises or the orders for the payment of money, or instruments entitling the holder to a sum of money, as being appendages to money, and following the nature of their principal. In the one case they are payable to the person, whoever he may be, who is the bearer or holder of the instrument; and so also in the other case, unless the payment is restrained by a special indorsement." After quoting the judgments in *Peacock v. Rhodes* and *Miller v. Race*, given above, he said—"These authorities shew, that not only money itself may pass, and the right to it may arise by CURRENCY alone, but further, that these mercantile instruments, which entitle the bearer of them to money, may also pass, and the right to them may arise, in the like manner, by CURRENCY or DELIVERY. These decisions proceed upon the nature of the property (viz., money) to which such instruments give the right, and which is itself CURRENT; and the effect of the instruments, which either give to their holders, merely as such, the right to receive the money, or specify them as the persons entitled to receive it. The question, then, is whether these principles apply to the present case, or whether this exchequer bill and the right thereto, follow the nature of goods, which, except in market

overt, can only be transferred by the owner, or under his authority? In order to ascertain that, we must consider the nature and effect of the instrument, both as to the property which it concerns, and as to its NEGOTIABILITY or CURRENCY by law. In its original state it purports to entitle the holder to the sum of £100 and interest; and the original holder may, if he pleases, secure it to himself; but it is payable to the bearer until some name is inserted, and when that is done it becomes payable to such nominee, or his order. But if the original holder parts with it or keeps it in blank, he by that very act, or by his negligence if he loses it, authorises the bearer, whoever he may be, to receive the money; and so if he were to insert his own name, but indorse it in blank, instead of restraining its negotiability, either by not indorsing it at all or by making a special indorsement, he thereby authorises and empowers any person who may be the holder *bonâ fide*, and for value, to receive it: and he cannot revoke that authority when it has become coupled with an interest. The instrument is created by the Statute 48 Geo. 3, c. 1, and is thereby made NEGOTIABLE and CURRENT. By § 2 the Commissioners of the Treasury are to make out exchequer bills, in such manner and form as they shall direct: and after certain things are done to put them into CIRCULATION. By § 5 they may be paid in to the receiver of taxes; and in § 13 are these words—‘And for the better supporting the CURRENCY of the said exchequer bills, and to the end that a sufficient provision may be made for *circulating and exchanging the same for ready money*, during such time as they or any of them are to be CURRENT, the Commissioners of the Treasury are empowered to contract with persons who will undertake to circulate and exchange them for ready money. An exchequer bill is therefore an instrument for the repayment of money originally advanced to the public, purporting thereby to entitle the bearer to receive the money put into circulation, and made CURRENT by law. It is not, therefore, like goods saleable only in market overt, and not otherwise transferable, except by the owner or under his authority, but is in all those several respects similar to bills of exchange and promissory notes, and transferable in the same manner as they are. The case, therefore, stands thus: this exchequer bill was a CURRENT and NEGOTIABLE Instrument for the payment of money. Now money passes from

one person to another by reason of its CURRENCY, and for that reason only, and not because it has no ear-mark, it cannot be recovered from the person to whom it has been passed. The exchequer bill, therefore, seems to me, upon the same principle, to follow the nature of the money for which it is a security. . . . This, like the case of a bill indorsed in blank, is payable to bearer, where the right arises from the instrument itself, and it is not necessary to deduce the title through the intermediate holders."

BAYLEY, J., quite concurred in the doctrine as to bank notes and bills of exchange—"A pawnee of goods or chattels, or a vendor out of market overt, has in general no better title than his pawnor or vendor, and cannot resist the claim of the rightful owner: but bank notes and bills of exchange stand upon a different footing in this respect from ordinary goods and chattels. The holder *bona fide*, and for a valuable consideration of a bank note or bill of exchange, has a good title against all the world; because, in the case of bank notes, they are considered as money, and pass as such, and it is essential for the purposes of trade that delivery should give a perfect title, and because in the case of bills of exchange this is the law and custom of merchants." J. Bayley came to the conclusion that exchequer bills were of the nature of goods, and not of bank notes and bills of exchange.

ABBOTT, C. J., however, agreed with the two former learned judges, and said—"I think this instrument is of the same nature as notes and bills of exchange. . . . Notes and bills have been distinguished from goods in regard to their transfer, for the convenience of trade and commerce, and in regard to their being mercantile and commercial instruments, and by law negotiable. It may be true that exchequer bills are not so frequently negotiated, in fact, as some other bills or notes; but I think we are to regard the negotiability of the instrument, and not the frequency of actual negotiation. . . . Compulsion to receive an instrument in payment is not by any means requisite to give to it the character of a Negotiable Instrument. No man is compelled to take a bill of exchange in payment. . . . For these reasons I am of opinion that exchequer bills are negotiable, and may be transferred in the same manner as bills of exchange: and that in those bills, as in bills of exchange, the

property passes with the possession by every mode of transfer, fraud and collusion apart."

In *Ingham v. Primrose* (7 C. B. N. S., 85), WILLIAMS, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said—"It is, we think, settled law that if the defendant had drawn a cheque, and before he had issued it he had lost it, or it had been stolen from him, and it had afterwards found its way into the hands of a holder for value without notice, who had sued the defendant upon it, he would have had no answer to the action. So if he had indorsed a bill in blank, or a bill payable to his order, and it had been lost or stolen before he delivered it to any one as indorsee. The reason is that such Negotiable Instruments have by the law merchant become part of the MERCANTILE CURRENCY of the country; and in order that this may not be impeded, it is requisite that innocent holders for value should have a right to enforce payment of them against those who, by making them, have *caused them to be part of the CURRENCY*. . . . If an act done with such an intention (*i. e.*, of cancelling it) by the maker of a Negotiable Instrument, does not manifest the intention on the face of the instrument, it can hardly be maintained that the Act would be of any efficacy, because the instrument would nevertheless be apparently a part of the MERCANTILE CURRENCY."

In *Whistler v. Forster* (14 C. B. N. S., 248), ERLE, C. J., said—"According to the law merchant, the title to a Negotiable Instrument passes by indorsement and delivery. A title so acquired is good against all the world, provided the instrument is taken for value, and without notice of any fraud."

WILLES, J.—"The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a better title than he himself possesses; *Nemo dat quod non habet*. To this there are some exceptions: one of which arises out of the rule of the law merchant as to Negotiable Instruments. *These being part of the CURRENCY*, are subject to the same rule as money."

In *Shute v. Robins* (1 M. & M., 133), Lord Tenterden spoke of bankers' paper as being part of the CIRCULATING MEDIUM of the country.

In *Lang v. Smyth* (7 Bing., 284), TINDALL, C. J., said—"The first question was whether the instruments in dispute had acquired from the course of dealing pursued in the City, the character of Bank Notes, Bills of Exchange, Dividend Warrants, Exchequer

Bills, or other Instruments which form part of the CURRENCY of this country."

And this quality of CURRENCY or NEGOTIABILITY is applied not only to Securities for Money of all sorts, but also to Securities for Securities for Money; as Scrip to deliver Bonds of a Foreign Government.

In *Goodwin v. Roberts*,¹ the Plaintiff bought some Scrip of Foreign Governments, through a stockbroker, and allowed it to remain in his hands. The stockbroker pledged it unlawfully with the defendants, *Roberts, Lubbock, & Co.*, who are bankers, as security for a loan of money. The stockbroker became bankrupt and absconded; and the defendants sold the scrip at the market price of the day. The plaintiff sued them for the amount realised by such sale. The Scrip entitled the bearer on due payment to receive definitive Bonds payable to bearer from the Foreign Governments. It was proved at the trial that—"The Scrip of loans to Foreign Governments entitling the bearer thereof to Bonds for the same amount, when issued by the Government, has been well known to, and largely dealt in by, bankers, money dealers, and members of the English and foreign stock exchanges, and through them by the public, for over fifty years. It is, and has been, the usage of such bankers, money dealers, and members of the stock exchanges, during all that time, to buy and sell such scrip, and to advance loans of money upon the security of it, before the Bonds were issued, and to pass the scrip upon such dealings by mere delivery as a negotiable instrument transferable by delivery [*i. e.*, as CURRENCY], and this usage has always been recognised by the Foreign Government or their agents delivering the Bonds when issued to the bearers of the scrip. This usage extended alike to scrip issued by their agents in England, and it extended to the scrip now in question, which was largely dealt in as above mentioned. Such scrip often passes through the hands of several buyers and dealers in succession before the issue of the bonds represented by it."

The Court of Exchequer held that this Scrip possessed the attribute of CURRENCY, or NEGOTIABILITY, exactly the same as the Bonds themselves; and this judgment was affirmed by the

¹ L. R. (1875), 10 *Exch.* 76: *Exch. Ch.* 377. 32 L. T. N. S. *Exch.* 199. 33 L. T. N. S. *Exch. Ch.* 272. 44 L. J. N. S. *Exch.* 57; *Exch. Ch.* 157.

Exchequer Chamber on the last day of its existence, July 7th, 1875.

6. We have thus laid before our readers an authoritative exposition of the true legal meaning of the word CURRENCY, and the subjects which are included in it. We see by a series of decisions which are now the established Commercial Law of the country, that the word CURRENCY means simply NEGOTIABILITY, and nothing else, i. e., that the property and the honest possession of those things which possess this exceptional attribute are inseparable, contrary to the general principles of the common law regarding stolen goods, merchandise, and cattle. And what does this exceptional class of articles include? Why, Money, and all Negotiable Securities to pay money of all sorts and forms, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds of all sorts; in fact, money, and every kind of negotiable engagement to pay money.

It will be seen, then, that in strict legal phraseology the word CURRENCY can only be applied to those rights which are recorded on some material. An abstract Right cannot be lost, mislaid, or stolen and passed away in commerce. But if it be recorded on some material substance, it may then be lost, or stolen, and sold like any other material substance: and the word CURRENCY, then, simply refers to some legal rules relating to the transfer of the property in it, in the case of its being stolen and passed away in commerce. For an obligation to be capable of being CURRENCY in law, it must be recorded on some material so as to be capable of being carried in the hand, or put away in a drawer, and dropped in the street, and stolen from the drawer or from a man's pocket, and carried off by the finder, or thief, and sold like a piece of goods. The word CURRENCY has no reference whatever to any property it has of paying, discharging, and closing debts.

Nothing, therefore, can be more unphilosophical *prima facie* than to designate the articles themselves by the name of CURRENCY, because they possess the attribute of CURRENCY. It is quite common to speak of the Currency of an opinion; but no one ever yet, that we are aware of, thought of calling the opinion itself Currency. It is quite usual to speak of the Currency of the session of Parliament; but nobody ever called the session

itself Currency. This very confusion is also used in speaking of bills of exchange; because it is a common expression to speak of the currency of the bill, meaning the *time* during which it is Current; whereas the bill itself is called Currency because the property in it passes by delivery. It would be just as rational to call a horse a velocity, or a wheel a rotation, as to call money Currency; and we have shewn that in the earlier legal reports no one ever thought of such a barbarism.

Nevertheless, if the force of public usage is too strong to be shaken, and the word CURRENCY is too firmly established as the designation of a certain class of articles to be rejected, we must disregard its literal legal meaning, and observe its philosophical sense; because there is an enormous mass of Credit, or Rights, which is not embodied in any material instrument, and which therefore cannot be lost, stolen, or passed away in commerce without the owner's consent: and, consequently, though these cannot be subject to the legal rules of CURRENCY, they perform a gigantic part in commerce, just in the same way as if they were recorded on paper.

Taking a banker and his customer as the standard case of debtor and creditor, if I have a right of action against my banker for money, it makes not the slightest difference in the nature of the Right whether it is recorded on paper or not. If I wish to transfer the right to some one else, I may do it by means of a bank note or cheque, or a verbal order to my banker to transfer a certain quantity of the credit in my name to some one else's name. We have already shewn that in Roman law, where written instruments were not used, the creditor, the debtor, and the assignee were obliged to meet, and the creditor transferred the debt orally to the assignee. This was a valid transfer. And such a mode of proceeding is a valid transfer in English Law at the present day. But in a vast number of cases this is a very clumsy and inconvenient way of transferring debts. It is infinitely more convenient to do so by writing. But whether the transfer be effected orally or by writing, it can make no possible difference in the nature of the Right. Consequently, if I have a Right against my banker, and if I write a cheque for the purpose of transferring this Right to some one else, this does not affect the nature of the existing Right: it is nothing more than a convenient way of transferring it to some one else. Writing

a cheque does not create a new Right; it merely records on paper an existing Right. And it equally exists whether it is recorded on paper or not. Payment, therefore, by means of a bank note, a cheque, or a bank credit, is absolutely the same. Now, bank notes and cheques are Currency in strict legal phraseology; but bank credits are not Currency, because they cannot be lost, mislaid, stolen, and passed away in commerce without the consent of the owner.

So also of a book credit, or book debt, in a tradesman's books. If I buy goods from a tradesman on credit, that credit has performed exactly the same part in CIRCULATING the goods as money: because we have expressly defined Circulation to be the sale of goods for money or credit, and the credit has been equally the medium of circulation, or sale, whether it is recorded on paper or not; but it is not CURRENCY, because it cannot be dropped in the streets, stolen, and transferred to some one else by manual delivery.

If, then, we are compelled to adopt this barbarism, and employ the word CURRENCY as a philosophical term, it must most manifestly be extended to include bank credits or deposits, book credits, and verbal credits of all descriptions.

And this is exactly what commercial law does. It treats any form of credit payable by a banker on demand, as money or cash, no matter whether it be a bank note, a cheque, or a bank credit. They are all in the eye of the law equally payment: that is, none of them are legal *money*: that is, a debtor cannot compel his creditor to take them in payment of a debt: but if he chooses to do so without objection, they all stand on exactly the same footing as payment. The case of bank notes is so well known that we need not cite any authorities. With regard to cheques, Lord Mansfield said, in *Grant v. Vaughan*, that a cheque is the same thing as a bank note. In *Pearce v. Davis* (1 Moo. & Rob.), PATTESON, J., said that a cheque "operates as payment until it has been presented and refused." So in *Jones v. Arthur* (8 Dowl., 442), COLERIDGE, J., held that tender of payment by cheque is good unless objected to on that account. Also in *Bevan v. Hill* (3 Camp., 381), where a person having accepted a cheque in payment, and lost it, and the banker failed, having funds to meet the cheque, Lord Ellenborough held that the cheque was payment.

the next subject of gift which the plaintiffs deny to be included in the gift of 'moneys,' is as to the balances of the testator at his banker's. The testator seems to have had balances upon a current account, and balances upon a deposit account. Now, the balance upon the current account certainly passed. It is also my opinion that the money, the evidence of which was the deposit notes, also passed under the description of moneys. It has been maintained in argument, that the deposit notes are the vouchers given by the bankers with whom the deposits were made as security for money, and they have been likened to the case of money secured by a bond. It is said that the balance due is simply a debt, and the deposit note is evidence of the debt, just as a bond, which shews a debt, and binds the obligor to the payment of it. But moneys deposited by a testator with his bankers, on a deposit account, the balance carrying interest, is so much money at the disposal of the testator, and is as readily accessible by him as moneys in an ordinary current account. The fact that interest is allowed upon these deposits, is a reason for the depositor more reluctantly drawing upon his deposit account; but in point of fact, there is no distinction at all shewn to me upon the custom of the bankers. The bankers have been examined in this case, and the habit is so notorious on this, that it would not require evidence to shew that where a banker holds money for which he gives a deposit note, it is just as accessible to his customer as if it were held on a current account.

"If a customer having a balance of £10,000 at his banker's, wants £1,000, he must take a piece of paper and deliver it to the bankers before the bankers would pay him the money which they hold for him. Now, with respect to the deposit money, the customer, if he wants that money, or any part of it, must bring the deposit receipt instead of an ordinary cheque; but that does not make it less accessible to him than if the bankers held it liable to be paid on cheques. If the slightest doubt were cast upon the accessibility of a depositor's money which a banker holds on deposit receipts, it would soon put an end to the account altogether.

"My decision proceeds upon this, that as to the deposit notes, as much as to the current account, the relation of banker and customer exists; that the bankers holding money of a customer, whether on a deposit account or a current account, unless there is

some express contract to take it out of the ordinary case of deposit, holds it as money, and as money, so readily accessible to the customer on the relation of banker and customer, that it is held to pass under the description of money generally."

8. The importance and the practical bearing of these investigations and decisions are evident. In modern times private bankers discontinued issuing notes, and merely created Credits in their customers' favour to be drawn against by Cheques. These Credits are in banking language termed Deposits. Now many persons seeing a material Bank Note, which is only a Right recorded on paper, are willing to admit that a Bank Note is cash. But, from the want of a little reflection, they feel a difficulty with regard to what they see as Deposits. They admit that a Bank Note is an "Issue," and "Currency," and "Circulation," but they fail to see that a Bank Credit is exactly in the same sense equally an "Issue," "Currency," and "Circulation."

When a banker, in exchange for money, or in exchange for the purchase of a Bill of Exchange, gives his Notes to his customer, he creates and ISSUES a Right of Action against himself, which the customer may transfer to any one else. But also when a banker in exchange for money, or in exchange for a Bill of Exchange, creates a Credit in his books in his customer's favour, he equally creates and "ISSUES" a Right of Action against himself; and by delivering a cheque book to his customer he thereby engages to pay the Credit to any one else to whom his customer may transfer it. Either form of Credit, therefore, is equally the ISSUE of a Right of Action to the customer. He has exactly the same right to demand payment of his Credit from the banker, and exactly the same right to transfer it to any one else, whether it be by Note or by Cheque.

Unreflecting persons see only so many figures in a book; they are startled at hearing them called Wealth: but, in fact, these figures are only the evidence of so many transferable rights of action in the persons of the bankers' creditors. These Rights are just as much "issued" and in "circulation" as if they were Notes. They are equally liabilities to pay on demand. No doubt it is usual in bank returns to distinguish between Notes and Credits; but suppose they were not so distinguished, but merely called liabilities, would not every one see that they stand on

exactly the same footing? Would any one then make any difference between them?

Thus these Bank Credits, or Deposits, are a mass of Property, just like so much corn or timber; they are *Pecunia, Bona, Res, Merx*; they are now, though, of course, legally only debts, for all practical purposes the current coin of commerce: and the great medium of payment of the country: and specie is now only used occasionally, and as a supplement to payments in Credits of different forms.

Nothing can be more unfortunate or misleading than the expression which is so frequently used that banking is only the "Economy of Capital," and that the business of a banker is to borrow money from one set of persons and to lend it to another set. Bankers, no doubt, do collect sums from a vast number of persons, but the peculiar essence of their business is, not to lend that money to other persons, but on the basis of this bullion to create a vast superstructure of Credit; to multiply their promises to pay many times: these Credits being payable on demand and performing all the functions of an equal amount of cash. Thus banking is not an Economy of Capital, but an increase of Capital; the business of banking is not to lend money, but to create Credit: and by means of the Clearing House these Credits are now transferred from one bank to another, just as easily as a Credit is transferred from one account to another in the same bank by means of a cheque. And all these Credits are in the ordinary language and practice of commerce exactly equal to so much cash or Currency.

9. After the authoritative exposition we have given above of the real meaning of the word CURRENCY, and the judicial decisions of what it includes, it is rather a work of supererogation to cite the opinions of lay writers. The controversies as to the meaning of Currency did not arise until Smith had been several years in his grave; but we think that no one who reads his work can form any doubt but that bills of exchange are necessarily included under his designation of paper money. The question, however, is extremely unimportant, and would take far too much space to examine thoroughly.

The first occasion on which we have met the term Circulating Medium is in the debate on the Bank Restriction Act, 1797,¹ in

¹ *Parliamentary History of England*, Vol. XXXIII., p. 340.

which Mr. Fox said he wished that gentlemen, "instead of amusing themselves with new terms of 'Circulating Medium' and the like," which shews that it must then have been of very recent introduction. Mr. Pitt, in his reply, said—"As so much has been said upon the nature of a Circulating Medium, he thought it necessary to notice that he did not for his own part take it to be of that empirical kind which had been generally described. It appeared to him to consist in *anything* that answered the great purposes of trade and commerce, whether in specie, paper, or any other term that might be used." It is quite evident, therefore, that bills of exchange, cheques, and bank credits would all be included under such a designation, because they all effect the circulation of merchandise.

The first place in which we have met the doctrine that the word Currency, or Circulating Medium, is to be restricted to specie and Bank Notes only, is in a letter of Mr. Boyd, a well known financial agent, to Mr. Pitt. He says, p. 2—"By the words 'Means of Circulation,' 'Circulating Medium,' and 'Currency,' which are used almost as synonymous terms in this letter, I understand always *ready money*, whether consisting of Bank Notes or specie, in contradistinction to Bills of Exchange, Navy Bills, Exchequer Bills, or any other *negotiable* paper, which form no part of the circulating medium, as I have always understood the term. The latter is the circulator; the former are merely objects of circulation." But Mr. Boyd, in his preface, says—"But from the mere return of bank notes (without that of the *balances on the books*, for which the bank is likewise liable, and of the specie in its coffers) no accurate estimate can be formed of the positive difference between the present and the former circulation." Mr. Boyd therefore, expressly includes Bank Credits, or Deposits, under the title Currency, and as his notion of Currency was ready money, it is quite evident that Cheques were also Currency in his opinion, because we have seen that Mercantile Law considers Bank Notes, Cheques, and Bank Credits, as all equally ready money.

Whether this opinion of Mr. Boyd's gained any adherents we cannot say; but, in opposition to this novel doctrine, Mr. Henry Thornton, one of the authors of the Bullion Report, said¹—"A multitude of bills pass between trader and trader in the country

¹ *Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain*, p. 40.

in the manner that has been described ; and they evidently form, in the strictest sense, a part of the Circulating Medium of the country." And in a note on this passage he says—"Mr. Boyd, in his publication addressed to Mr. Pitt on the subject of the Bank of England issues, propagates the same error into which many others had fallen, of considering bills as no part of the circulating medium of the country." After quoting the above passage from Mr. Boyd, he says—"It will be seen in the progress of this work, that it was necessary to clear away much confusion which has arisen from the want of a sufficiently full acquaintance with the several kinds of paper credit, and, in particular, to remove, by a considerable detail, the prevailing errors respecting the nature of bills, before it could be possible to reason properly upon the effects of paper credit."

Certainly no influential person at that time adopted such an opinion, and we may quote a passage from the speech of the Marquis of Tichfield, one of the most distinguished of the rising men of the day, on Mr. Western's motion, in 1822, regarding the Act of 1819. He said—"Economy of money was, by contrivances to spare the use of it, according to the description of his right honourable friend; by substitution of the precious metals in the shape of voluntary credit. Every new contrivance of this kind, and every one improved, had that tendency. When it was considered to how great an extent these contrivances had been practised, *in the various modes of verbal, book, and circulating credits, it was easy to see that the country had received a great addition to its Currency. This addition to the Currency would, of course, have the same effect as if gold had been increased from the mines.*" Here, therefore, we see it explicitly stated that credit, in all its shapes and forms, was independent, exchangeable property, of the value of, and producing the same effects as, gold.

10. A few traces of Mr. Boyd's opinion may be discovered in certain writers after this period; but, as this view was most prominently brought forward before the Committee of 1840, we may pass at once to that.

Mr. J. B. Smith, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester, said that he thought Circulation and Currency were the same (Q. 40); that deposits were Currency, which was, in act, another word for liabilities.

70. *Mr. O'Connell*: There is another description of paper in circulation, namely, bills of exchange; do you include those also in your description of the Currency?—I do not consider bills of exchange as Currency.

71. "What is the difference between a bill of exchange which is passing from hand to hand and commanding property in return for it, and a bank note which is performing the same functions, supposing each to be worth £100?—I consider a bill of exchange to be a debt.

72. "Is not a bank note a debt?—The difference between a bill of exchange and currency would be this, that currency would discharge the debt; the payment of a bill of exchange is not the discharge of a debt till it is due.

78. *Mr. Smith*: "Supposing this case to happen, that the same bill of exchange passed through a banker's hands six times in one day on the account of different persons having accounts with this bank, should you not say that that bill of exchange discharged the functions of currency?—It is a mere transfer, after all, from hand to hand, with, every time it is indorsed, an additional security.

79. "Supposing it not to be indorsed, can you point out the difference between that and a Bank of England note?—The difference between a Bill of Exchange and a Bank of England note in any transaction, is that a Bill of Exchange is a debt, and it continues a debt till it is discharged by a Bank of England note, or by some other Currency, which is a full discharge of the debt.

80. *Sir R. Peel*: What does a Bank of England note profess upon the face of it; is it not 'I promise to pay'?—Precisely so.

81. "Is not that evidence of a debt?—Certainly, but it is legal tender.

82. "Supposing a law were passed permitting a gold circulation to continue, and prohibiting the issue of notes by the Bank, do you not think that the measure which traders would resort to would be to supply the deficiency by Bills of Exchange?—It is probable; it might be so.

83. "Would not they answer the purposes of Currency?—Bills of Exchange do not perform the functions of Currency, but they are instruments by which commodities are exchanged, equally with every other mode of Credit, but requiring money for discharge.

84. "Though there is a difference in the nature of the transactions between the issue of a note, payable on demand, and passing of a bill of exchange, is there any substantial difference in their sensible effect on the Currency of the country?—I do not think that Bills of Exchange affect the Currency, though the Currency has a very important influence on Bills of Exchange.

87. "Do not you recollect, that during the Bank restriction law, there did not remain a circulation of Bank of England notes in parts of Lancashire for the discharge of small payments, but that, in point of fact, the great commercial transactions of Lancashire were carried on by the intervention of Bills of Exchange, performing the ordinary functions of currency by means of promissory notes?—Unquestionably, and a very large amount of these payments are still in existence.

88. "When payments do take place by these means, do not Bills of Exchange answer, in a great measure, the functions of promissory notes, though there is a difference in the character of the transaction between a Bill of Exchange and a promissory note?—Yes, they are a medium for the exchange and distribution of commodities, no doubt.

89. "They are the representatives of commodities?—Yes; they are representatives of transactions in commodities.

90. "Then are they not Currency?—No, I do not think that follows.

91. *Mr. O'Connell*: "What is Currency but an instrument of exchange?—It is an instrument of exchange, but it is an equivalent also for commodities.

92. "A Bill of Exchange performs that function, it assists to exchange commodities?—Yes, a Bill of Exchange assists in the exchange and distribution of commodities.

93. "Then it has that function of Currency?—Yes, it has.

94. "Then, having that function of Currency, which, perhaps, is the only function, can you distinguish that from Currency? What is there in your mind to induce you to say that that is not Currency which performs the functions of Currency?—I have already explained that the difference between a Bill of Exchange and Currency is this, that the one discharges a debt and the other does not.

95. *Mr. Warburton*: "If a party receiving a Bill of Exchange

indorsed, were to give you a receipt in full for the payment of the debt, would not that Bill of Exchange perform precisely the same functions as a bank note does?—Yes, but it would be merely a party consenting to accept a debt due from another person in full discharge of the debt due to himself.

96. *Mr. Herries*: "Is not that a very common proceeding in trade?—I am not aware of that. If I am asked whether parties accept Bills of Exchange for debts, that is a fact, but whether they accept them in full discharge of a debt contracted, I am not aware.

97. *Mr. Gisborne*: "Do you consider a £10 note of a country bank, a joint stock bank, to rank under Currency, or to rank under Bills of Exchange?—Under Currency.

98. *Mr. Grote*: "Suppose there was a seven-day post bill issued by a banker, would you consider that a part of the Currency?—No.

99. *Mr. Labouchere*: "Suppose it was a seven-day post bill issued by the Bank of England?—No, not until discharged.

100. *Mr. O'Connell*: "A cheque on the Bank is Currency in London, is it not?—It performs the function of Currency; it is a transfer of Currency from one to another.

118. *Mr. Wood*: "Will you define what you mean as constituting the entire Currency of the country?—I should define Currency to be gold and silver, or the promises of bankers to pay on demand, which either constitute a legal tender, or which the public are willing to accept in lieu of coin in discharge of debts. I consider the Currency in this country to consist first of coin in circulation; secondly, of Bank of England notes issued against bullion, and of Bank of England notes issued against securities; thirdly, of deposits in the Bank of England, payable on demand, the same as bank notes; fourthly, of notes issued by the country banks; and fifthly, of deposits in country banks in their own notes, which are of the same character as deposits in the Bank of England."

As to the meaning of deposits, and the general confusion as to the way in which they arise, we may refer to the exposition of the Mechanism of Banking given in a former chapter. The witness was further examined at immense length, but the above gives the substance of his opinions.

11. Mr. COBDEN was of opinion that no inflation of the Currency would arise from Bills of Exchange, provided the money of the country were not previously inflated. There is a great distinction between a Bill of Exchange and a bank note. A Bill of Exchange follows the trading transaction, and is merely a voucher for the transaction, in the shape of a transfer of the debt, or an acknowledgment of the debt; but a bank note put into circulation either in the purchase of public securities or in a loan, or in any other way, goes to the artificial creation of commercial transactions, and is not itself necessarily originated by the transaction. Bills of Exchange can multiply only in proportion to commercial transactions, provided the Currency be kept as a metallic currency.

Mr. Cobden said that, with a metallic Currency, there would be no risk of any great extent of accommodation bills; an opinion which we think is scarcely warranted by the reality.

572. *Mr. Smith*: "Inasmuch as Bills of Exchange are used at Manchester as an instrument of exchange, do they not form part of the Currency?—No; I have defined Currency to be money. I cannot call a Bill of Exchange money. It is a promise to pay money at a certain time, and it is a security only for a certain time, after which all securities are forfeited."

Mr. W. R. WARD (674) considered Currency to be coined gold, silver, and copper, and notes payable on demand, issued by the Bank of England and country banks.

Mr. RICHARD PAGE understood Currency to mean the current money of a country, in which debts are discharged and commodities purchased and sold, and consisting of Bank of England notes and gold and silver. Country bank notes he considered only to be money by courtesy. He included deposits in the Bank of England; but, as he gave to the word "deposit" an inaccurate meaning, we do not know what he would have done if he had understood the real meaning.

12. Mr. GEORGE WARDE NORMAN, a Director of the Bank of England, was asked—

1691. "Are there any grounds for considering the deposits of the Bank of England as Currency?—No, I think not.

1692. "Do you consider that any deposits, merely in their character of deposits, can be considered as Currency?—No, I do not.

1693. "Will you state what, in your opinion, forms the distinction between Currency and deposits?—I consider that, looking broadly at deposits and Currency, they are quite distinct; they have little to do with each other. But I conceive that the use of deposits is one of the banking expedients, which is available for economising currency, along with a great many others. I do not consider them as Currency or money. I ought to observe, perhaps, to the Committee, that I employ the words 'money' and 'currency' as synonymous. Deposits are used by means of transfers made in the books of bankers; and these afford the means of adjusting and settling transactions, and *pro tanto* dispense with a certain quantity of money; or they may be set off against each other, from one banker to another, to a certain extent, and thus produce the same effect. Still they possess the essential qualities of money in a very low degree.

1694. "Do you entertain a similar opinion as to Bills of Exchange?—Yes, exactly; I think they are also used to economise Currency. I look upon them as banking expedients for that purpose; but they do not possess fully the qualities which I consider money to possess.

1695. "Will you explain the difference between the functions which money will perform and those which Bills of Exchange or deposits will perform?—To answer that question fully, one must, I am afraid, take rather a wide view; but I look upon it that the three most essential qualities money should possess are that it should be in universal demand by everybody, in all times and all places; that it should possess fixed value; and that it should be a perfect numerator. There are other qualities; but I think these are the most essential. Now, when I look at all banking expedients, I find they do not possess these qualities fully. They possess them in a very low degree; and, therefore, as we see took place in the autumn of 1835, with a very large increase of the deposits of the Bank, the circulation diminished, and there are every appearance of the effects of contraction: there was an increased influx of treasure; and I conceive from that there were lower prices. By a numerator I mean that which measures the value of other commodities with the greatest possible facility. If we look at all these banking expedients, we see that they possess the three qualities which I have mentioned in a very much lower degree.

1696. "Will you state in what respect?—I can only take them one by one. A Bill of Exchange is an instrument commonly payable at some future time, at a certain place, and to some particular individual; it is of no use to any other individual, except it is indorsed to him. A man cannot go into a shop with a Bill of Exchange and buy what he wants; he could not pay his labourers with a Bill of Exchange. The same with a banker's deposit, he can do nothing of that sort with that; he can do with less money than he would otherwise employ, if he has Bills of Exchange, or bankers' deposits; but he cannot, with Bills of Exchange or bankers' deposits, do whatever he could with sovereigns and shillings. By a banker's deposit, I mean a credit in a banker's books; nothing more nor less than that."

18. Mr. SAMUEL JONES LOYD, now Lord OVERSTONE, was asked—

2655. "What is it that you include in the term circulation?—I include in the term circulation, metallic coin, and paper notes promising to pay the metallic coin to bearer on demand. . . .

2661. "In your definition, then, of the word circulation, you do not include deposits?—No, I do not.

2662. "Do you include Bills of Exchange?—No, I do not.

2663. "Why do you not include deposits in your definition of circulation?—To answer that question, I believe I must be allowed to revert to first principles. The precious metals are distributed to the different countries of the world by the operation of particular laws, which have been investigated and are now well recognised. These laws allot to each country a certain portion of the precious metals, which, while other things remain unchanged, remains itself unchanged. The precious metals, converted into coin, constitute the money of each country. That coin circulates sometimes in kind; but, in highly advanced countries, it is represented to a certain extent by paper notes, promising to pay the coin to bearer on demand; these notes being of such a nature in principle that the increase of them supplants coin to an equal amount. Where those notes are in use, the metallic coin, together with those notes, constitute the money or Currency of that country. Now, this money is marked

by certain distinguishing characteristics ; first of all, that its amount is determined by the laws which apportion the precious metals to the different countries of the world ; secondly, that it is in every country the common measure of the value of all other commodities, the standard, by reference to which the value of every other commodity is ascertained, and every contract fulfilled ; and, thirdly, it becomes the common medium of exchange for the adjustment of all transactions equally at all times, between all persons, and in all places. It has, further, the quality of discharging these functions in endless succession. Now, I conceive that neither deposits nor Bills of Exchange, in any way whatever, possess these qualities. In the first place, the amount of them is not determined by the laws which determine the amount of the precious metals in each country ; in the second place, they will in no respect serve as a common measure of value, or a standard, by reference to which we can measure the relative value of all other commodities ; and, in the next place, they do not possess that power of universal exchangeability which belongs to the money of the country.

2664. "Why do you not include Bills of Exchange in circulation ?—I exclude Bills of Exchange for precisely the same reasons that I have stated in my former answer for excluding deposits. There is another passage in the same report which appears to me to shew very clearly that the French Chamber have fully appreciated the distinction between Bills of Exchange and money—'Every written obligation to pay a sum due may become a sign of the money : the sign has acquired some of the advantages of circulating money ; because, like bills of exchange, it may be transmitted by the easy and prompt method of indorsement. But what obstacles there are ! It does not represent at every instant to its holder the sum inscribed on it ; it can only be paid at a distant time : to realise it at once, it must be parted with. If one finds any one sufficiently trustful to accept it, it can only be transferred by guaranteeing it by indorsement. It is an eventual obligation which one contracts one self, and under the weight of which, until it is paid, one's credit suffers. One is not always disposed to reveal the nature of one's business by the signatures one puts in circulation. These inconveniences led people to find out a sign of money still more active and more convenient, which shares, like the Bill of Exchange, the qualities of metallic

money, because it has no other merit but to represent it, but which can procure it at any moment; which, like the piece of money, is transferred from hand to hand, without the necessity of being guaranteed, without leaving traces of its passage. The note payable to bearer on demand, issued by powerful associations formed under the authority and acting under the continual observation of government, has appeared to present these advantages. Hence Banks of circulation.'

2665. "Under similar circumstances, will the aggregate amount credited to depositors in bankers' books bear some relation to the quantity of money in the country?—During temporary fluctuations in the amount of circulation, all other things remaining unchanged, I conceive the amount of deposits will be affected by such fluctuations.

2666. "Is the amount of bills of exchange dependent in some degree on the quantity of money?—I apprehend that it is dependent in a very great degree. I consider the money of the country to be the foundation, and the bills of exchange to be the superstructure, raised upon it. I conceive that bills of exchange are an important form of banking operations, and the circulation of the country is the money in which these operations are to be adjusted; any contraction of the circulation of the country will, of course, act upon credit; bills of exchange, being an important form of credit, will feel the effect of that contraction in a very powerful degree; they will, in fact, be contracted in a much greater degree than the paper circulation.

2667. *Sir Robert Peel*: "What are the elements which constitute money in the sense in which you use the expression 'quantity of money?' What is the exact meaning you attach to the words 'quantity of money—quantity of metallic Currency?'—When I use the words quantity of money, I mean the quantity of metallic coin and of paper notes, promising to pay the coin on demand, which are in circulation in this country.

2668. "Paper notes payable by coin?—Yes.

2669. "By whomsoever issued?—Yes.

2670. "By country banks as well as other banks?—Yes.

2671. *Chairman*: "Would this superstructure, consisting of sums credited to depositors in bankers' books and bills of exchange, equally exist, although no notes payable in coin on

demand existed in the country?—Yes; I apprehend that every question with respect to deposits, and with respect to bills of exchange, is totally distinct from the question which has reference to the nature of the process of substituting promissory notes in lieu of coin, and of the laws by which that process ought to be governed. If the promissory notes be properly regulated, so as to be at all times of the amount which the coin would have been, deposits and bills of exchange, whatever changes they may undergo, would sustain those changes equally, either with a metallic Currency, or with a paper Currency properly regulated; consequently, every investigation respecting their character or amount, is a distinct question from that which has reference only to the substitution of the paper notes for coin.

2672. "There would be no reason why, if there were no notes payable in coin on demand, the amount of this superstructure should be less than it now is, with a mixed circulation of specie and of notes payable on demand?—None whatever. I apprehend that, upon the supposition that the paper notes are kept of the same amount of the metallic money, the question of the superstructure, whether of deposits or of bills of exchange remains precisely the same.

2673. "That answer takes for granted that, in the first case, the metallic Currency, and, in the second case, the metallic Currency, plus the notes payable on demand, are the same in quantity?—Yes.

2674. *Sir Robert Peel*: "You suppose the notes payable on demand to displace an amount of coin precisely equal to those notes?—They ought to be so under a proper regulation of the paper money, otherwise they are not kept at the same value as coin.

2675. *Mr. Attwood*: "Would you consider that the superstructure of bills of exchange, founded entirely upon a metallic Currency, might, at particular times, become unduly expanded?—The answer to that question depends entirely upon the precise meaning of the word 'unduly.' I apprehend, undoubtedly, that it is perfectly possible that credit, and the consequences which sometimes result from credit, viz., over-banking in all its forms, and the over-issue of bills of exchange, which is one important form of over-banking, may arise with a purely metallic Currency;

and it may also arise with a currency consisting jointly of metallic money and paper notes promising to pay in coin; and I conceive further, that if the notes be properly regulated, that is, if they be kept at the amount which the coin otherwise would be, whatever over-banking would have arisen with a metallic Currency, would arise, and to the same extent, neither more or less, with money consisting of metallic coin and paper notes jointly.

2676. "May not over-banking and over-issue of bills of exchange, forming a superstructure based upon money composed of metal and paper notes, derange the certainty of the notes being duly paid in gold?—I apprehend that if the paper notes be properly regulated, according to the sense which I have already attributed to that expression, and if a proper proportion of gold be held in reserve, the solidity of the basis cannot be disturbed; that is, that if there be a proper contraction of the paper notes as gold goes out, the convertibility of the paper system will be effectually preserved by the continually increasing value of the remaining quantity of the Currency, as the contraction proceeds."

About this period, and for a long time preceding, the greatest part of the Circulating Medium of Lancashire were bills of exchange, which sometimes had 150 indorsements on them before they came to maturity. Lord Overstone was asked—

3026. "Does not the principal circulation of Lancashire consist of bills of exchange?—As I contend that bills of exchange do not form a part of the circulation, of course, I am bound, in answer to that question, to say no.

3027. "Is there not a large quantity of bills of exchange in circulation in Lancashire?—Undoubtedly, wherever a large mass of mercantile or trading transactions take place, there will exist a large amount of bills of exchange; and that is the case, to a great extent, in Lancashire.

3028. "Do not the bills exceed to an immense amount, the issue of notes payable on demand in Lancashire?—Undoubtedly they do, to a great amount."

14. Mr. Hume had a long fencing match with Lord Overstone as to the distinction between Bank Notes and Deposits. Lord Overstone admitted that a debt might be discharged either by

the transfer of a Bank Note, or by the transfer of a Credit in the books of the Bank: but he strongly contended that Bank Notes are money, and that Bank Credits, or Deposits, are not.

3148. "Do you consider any portion of the deposits in the Bank of England as money?—I do not."

3150. "Could 20,000 sovereigns have more completely discharged the obligation to pay the £20,000 of bills than the deposits did?—Where two parties have each an account with a deposit bank, a transfer of the credit from one party to the credit of another party, may certainly discharge an obligation in the same manner, and to the same extent to which sovereigns would have discharged that obligation."

3169. "Will not the debt between the two be discharged thereby?—Yes.

3170. "In the one case I have supposed that payment of £1,000 was made by means of notes in circulation; payment was made by the delivery of these notes from one hand to another, and they are transported from place to place: but in the case of a payment made by means of a transfer in the books of the Bank from one account to another, I ask you are not those payments equally valid, and would not the debt be discharged equally in either case?—In the one case the debt has been discharged by the use of money: in the other case the debt has been discharged without the necessity of resorting to the use of money, in consequence of the economising process of deposit business in the Bank of England.

3171. "Can the debt of £1,000 which one person owes to another be discharged, without money being paid, or its value?—A debt of £1,000 cannot be discharged without, in some way or other, transferring the value of £1,000; but that transfer of value may certainly be effected without the use of money.

3172. "Was not the deposit transfer in the Bank of England, to satisfy that debt of £1,000 of the same value as the £1,000 notes which passed in the other case?—A credit in the Bank of England I consider is of the same value as the same nominal amount of money; and if the credit be transferred, the same value I consider to be transferred as if money of that nominal amount had been transferred."

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are undernourished has declined from 1.1 billion to 800 million. The number of people who are malnourished has declined from 1.5 billion to 1 billion. The number of people who are obese has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million.

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can by law compel his creditor to take in payment of a debt.

Lord Overstone further said (3082)—“ When I give a definition of “Currency,” of course it is Currency in the abstract: it is that which Currency ought to be: that definition properly laid down and properly applied, will include paper notes payable on demand, and it will exclude bills of exchange.”

Here again Lord Overstone is absolutely wrong. It will be seen from the judicial decisions given above, that it is perfectly impossible to frame a true definition of Currency which shall include bank notes and exclude bills of exchange: and, moreover, no bank notes in England, except Bank of England notes, are money; because no debtor can compel his creditor to take any Bank Notes in payment of a debt, except Bank of England Notes, and these only so long as the Bank pays them in money on demand. If the Bank were to stop payment, Bank of England Notes would immediately cease to be legal tender: a consideration which will be found of the greatest importance when we come to investigate the mechanism and operation of the Bank Charter Act of 1844.

15. Mr. TOOKE was asked—“ In using the term ‘circulation’ of the Bank of England, what do you include in that term?—I include in that term only the Bank notes in the hands of the public. In order to avoid confusion, perhaps the Committee would allow me to state the meaning which I attach to the different terms ‘Currency’ and ‘Circulating Medium.’ The Currency I consider to be, in strictness of language, according to the apparent derivation of the term, that part of the circulating medium, such as the coin of the realm, and Bank of England notes and country bank notes (although not a legal tender), which pass current from hand to hand, without individual signature, such as appears on drafts or indorsements. I am doubtful whether cheques on bankers might not be included, from their perfect similarity to bank notes, in many of the purposes for which they are employed; at the same time, there is the feature of distinction which I have mentioned, viz., that cheques require the signature of the party passing the draft, and that they do not pass from hand to hand. Bills of exchange I consider as a part of the general means of distributing the

productions and revenues of the country, and, therefore, as constituting a part of the circulating medium. I consider, also that the simple credits by which goods are, in many instances, bought and sold, come likewise under the general description of the circulating medium, in as far as the prices of commodities are in question: because a simple contract of sale, whether any payment eventually passes or not, is commonly entered in the price currents without distinctions from those for which any actual payment is made. I cannot consider that transferable debts constitute circulating medium, but only the actual transfers.

3279. "What do you mean by transferable debts?—The deposits in the hands of bankers, against which the depositors are entitled to pass their drafts.

3280. *Mr. Grote*: "You include, not simply transfers of deposits in the hands of the Bank of England, but also transfers of deposits in the hands of other bankers?—Yes; transfers of deposits generally.

3281. *Chairman*: "Do you then consider a deposit to be a transferable debt owing by the banker to the depositor?—Yes.

3282. "In the use of the term 'Currency' in your future examination, do you propose, in addition to coin, Bank of England notes, and country bank notes, to include cheques upon bankers?—Yes; I think upon the whole the distinction I have mentioned is not sufficient to exclude them, and, therefore, I shall propose to consider them as included.

3283. *Mr. Warburton*: "By cheques, you mean cheques actually drawn, and passing from one person to another?—Yes; that which is current, in fact.

3284. "Will you be good enough to state what you propose to include in the word 'circulation' in the course of your future examination?—I propose to include in the term 'circulation' the notes of the Bank of England, and of country banks, payable on demand.

3285. "What do you mean by 'circulating medium'?—I mean all instruments of interchange by which the productions and the revenue of the country are distributed; everything which serves and is received as a mode of payment, or which constitutes nominal money-price which appears in price currents.

3286. *Mr. Grote*: "There is the Currency, and there are

also certain expedients for economising the use of the Currency; you would call both one and the other of those portions of the circulating medium?—Precisely.

3287. "Do you include, in the word 'Currency,' bills of exchange?—No.

3288. "If you include, in the term 'Currency,' a crossed cheque, payable at a banker's, to be presented, therefore, at the Clearing House, and having, therefore, before presentation not more than seven or eight hours to run, why is it that you do not include in the term 'Currency' a bill of exchange payable also at a banker's, falling due to-morrow, and having, probably, not more than about 24 hours to run?—It is only a question of the general acceptance of the term; there is no essential distinction in the particular case. I may, perhaps, be allowed to say, that the only question as to the employment of different descriptions of circulating medium is referable to the combined considerations of economy, convenience, and security.

3289. "If the cheque, according to the supposition in the former question, be included in the term 'Currency,' will not a bill of exchange, due to-day, payable at a banker's, be entitled also to be included in that term?—It is only a question of convenience in the classification; I am not aware that it is of any importance in practical operation.

3290. "Bills of Exchange having, previous to maturity, one, two, three, four, or more days to run, differ in character by insensible degrees from a crossed cheque, a crossed cheque being that bill which has the shortest time to run?—They differ in character by insensible degrees, and likewise in the trifling difference of convenience from their not being used till maturity, unless under a calculation of discount."

Mr. Tooke then started a theory which, like many others, is true in some cases, and which, we believe, he was the first to notice; but which he pushed to an extreme, which drew out some just strictures from Colonel Torrens.

3292. *Mr. Hume*: "Will you state what part of the Currency, or circulating medium, affects prices, under the definitions which you have now given?—No one part of them affects the prices of commodities more than any of the other parts.

3293. *Mr. Grote*: "Do you mean not more in degree, or not in any different way?—Not more in degree.

3294. "You mean that every portion of that which you have described under the name 'circulating medium' is perfectly equal to every other portion in the effect which it produces upon prices?—Perfectly so.

3295. *Mr. Hume*: "Do you mean that every transaction of purchase or sale by any of the means which you have mentioned, as included in the circulating medium, equally affects prices?—Yes; and that was my reason for caring so little about making a distinction among them. I doubt whether they operate upon prices at all.

3296. *Mr. Grote*: "You mean that none of these items which you have enumerated under the general term 'circulating medium' have in your opinion any effect upon prices?—Yes; I mean that they are not operative causes of prices.

3297. *Mr. Hume*: "What is it, then, which does affect prices?—The cost of production limiting the supply on the one hand, and the pecuniary means of the consumer limiting the demand on the other.

3298. "Will not the variations in the quantity of the circulating medium affect prices?—No.

3299. "Will it not, if abundant, be more at the disposal of individuals for purchases than when it is scarce?—It will be more easily disposable, but it will not be necessarily so disposed of. I believe that the amount of the circulating medium is the effect, and not the cause, of variations in prices."

16. Lastly, we may quote Colonel Torrens, because he was not only one of the most influential of this school, but it was sometimes alleged that he was in reality the author of the scheme which Sir Robert Peel adopted in his Bank Charter Act of 1844. He says¹—"The terms money and Currency have hitherto been employed to denote those instruments of exchange which possess intrinsic or derivative value, and by which, from law or custom, debts are discharged and transactions finally closed. Bank Notes, payable in specie on demand, have been included under these terms as well as coin, because, by law and custom, the acceptance of the notes of a solvent bank, no less than the acceptance of coin, liquidates debts and closes transactions; while bills of

¹ *The Principles and Practical Operation of Sir Robert Peel's Act of 1844, explained and defended*, p. 79.

exchange, bank credits, cheques, and other instruments by which the use of money is economised, have not been included under the terms money and Currency, because the acceptance of such instruments does not liquidate debts. and finally close transactions."

Again he says, in reply to some perfectly just observations of Mr. Fullarton—"It is an obvious departure from ordinary language to say that whether a purchase is effected by a payment in bank notes, or by a bill of exchange, the result is the same. According to the meaning of the term, Money and Credit, as established by the universal usage of the market, a purchase effected by a payment in bank notes is a ready money purchase, while a transaction negotiated by the payment of a bill of exchange is a purchase upon credit. In the former case the transaction is concluded, and the vendor has no further claim upon the purchaser; in the latter case the transaction is not concluded, and the vendor continues to have a claim upon the purchaser until a further payment has been made in satisfaction of the bill of exchange. A bank note liquidates a debt, a bill of exchange records the existence of a debt, and promises liquidation a future day. Mr. Fullarton not only inverts language, but misstates facts, when he says that the transactions of which bank notes have been the instruments must remain incomplete until the notes shall be returned upon the issuing bank, or discharged in cash. A bank note for £100 may pass from purchasers to vendors many times a day, finally closing on the instant, each successive transaction. A bill of exchange may also pass from purchasers to vendors many times a day, but no one of the successive transactions of which it is the medium can be finally closed until the last recipient has received *in coin or in bank notes the amount it represents*.

"Now it is the necessity of ultimate re-payment which constitutes the main point of distinction, which marks the boundary between forms of credit and money. It is a necessity which applies to bills of exchange and cheques, but which does not apply to bank notes; and, therefore, upon Mr. Fullarton's own shewing, upon his own definitions and his own conditions, as to what constitutes money, bank notes come under the head of money: while bills of exchange and bankers' cheques, and such other instruments as require ultimate payments, therefore, and

settlements, do not come under the phrase money. . . . Upon Mr. Fullarton's own shewing money consists of those instruments only by which debts are discharged, balances adjusted, and transactions finally closed : and, therefore, Mr. Fullarton, unless he should choose to continue to contradict himself, must admit that bank notes are, and that bills of exchange, cash credits, and cheques are not, money."

17. We have now given sufficient extracts to shew the chaos of conflicting and contradictory opinions which prevailed. Not a single witness had the remotest idea of the true legal meaning of the word Currency. And we must now point out the necessary logical consequences to which the doctrines of these persons lead.

Mr. NORMAN said that money, or Currency, should possess fixed value, and be a perfect numerator. But how can money, or any thing, possess fixed value, when its value is changing from hour to hour?—An instrument of credit may preserve an equality of value with respect to money, but not with respect to anything else, unless it is expressed to be payable in it. He said that he meant by a numerator that which measured the value of other commodities with the greatest facility. Why does a promise to pay £50 measure the value of things with less facility than £50 itself?

It is not a little amusing to find the celebrated phrase of the Roman Catholic Church—*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, starting up and meeting us in a discussion on Currency. In Lord Overstone's opinion money and Currency are identical, and include the coined metallic money, and the paper notes promising to pay the bearer coin on demand ; and, he says, that the characteristic of their being money is, that they are received equally at "*all times, between all persons, and in all places.*" For the sake of shortness, let us designate this phrase by 3A, from the three alls in it. He excludes Bills of Exchange from the designation of Currency, because "they do not possess that power of universal exchangeability which belongs to the money of the country." This definition is fatal to Lord Overstone's own view. In fact, if it be true, there is no such thing as money or Currency at all. In the first place, it at once excludes the whole of bank notes. The notes of a bank in the remote

district of Cumberland would not be current in Cornwall; *therefore* they are not 3A; *therefore* they are not Currency. Again, the notes of a bank in Cornwall would not be current in Cumberland; *therefore* they are not Currency. Similarly there are no country bank notes which have a general Currency throughout England; *therefore* no country bank notes are 3A; *therefore* no country bank notes are Currency. Till within the last fifty years or so, Bank of England notes had scarcely any Currency beyond London and Lancashire; in country districts a preference was universally given to local notes; *therefore* Bank of England notes were not 3A; they had not a power of "universal exchangeability;" *therefore* they were not Currency. Bank of England notes would, even now, not pass throughout the greater part of Scotland. If, *therefore*, the test of 3A and "universal exchangeability" be applied, the claims of all bank notes to be considered as Currency are annihilated at once. The acceptance of a Baring or a Rothschild, would be received in payment of a debt by a far larger circle of persons than the notes of an obscure and remote country bank.

But the universality of Lord Overstone's assertion is fatal to his argument in other ways. On the Continent, silver is the legal standard of value; in England, silver, like copper, is merely coined into small tokens, called shillings, &c., which are made to pass current above their natural value, and are only legal tender for a very trifling amount, hence it cannot be used in the adjustment of *all* transactions; *therefore* it is not 3A; *therefore* it is not Currency. There are other countries where gold is not a legal tender, *therefore* it fails to satisfy Lord Overstone's test, *therefore* it is not Currency. If, then, the test proposed by Lord Overstone be considered as correct, it is easy to see that there is no substance or material whatever that will not fail under it; and, *therefore*, *there is no such thing as Currency*.

The fact is, that the only difference between a Bill of Exchange and a Bank Note is, that the former is a promise of a deferred payment, and the latter that of an immediate one, and there is less risk in taking the latter than the former. From these circumstances, a Bank Note possesses a greater *degree* of circulating power than a Bill of Exchange. But, in the Midland Counties of England, it used to be quite common for the banks to issue the bills of exchange they had discounted with their own

indorsement upon them. In which respect they were in every way equivalent to Bank Notes; moreover, there is not the same inducement to put a bill into circulation as a Bank Note, because the former increases in value as the day of payment approaches, and it is unprofitable to keep a note idle. But it is to the last degree unphilosophical to maintain that these two obligations are of different *natures*, because they are adapted to circulate in different *degrees*.

18. Every commercial lawyer would at once perceive the fundamental fallacy of the reasons why Colonel Torrens and others maintain that Bank Notes are Currency, and that Cheques and Bills of Exchange are not. They suppose that bank notes pass without indorsement, and that bills of exchange do not. Even if that were true, it would not be any valid ground for the distinction, because such a thing would in no way affect the nature of the instrument. It is wholly untrue to suppose that bank notes and money are the only things which close transactions. By the table given above¹ it is seen that upwards of 95 per cent. of commercial payments and receipts were made by Messrs. Morrison and Co. in instruments of credit, other than bank notes.

But it is a very great mistake to say that bank notes pass without indorsement and bills of exchange do not. At the time the Bank of England was founded, it was supposed to be illegal for any such things as promissory notes to pass by assignment. The negotiability of bank notes had to be provided for by the Act. It was enacted, that all the Bank's bills obligatory and of credit, made or given to any person, might, *by indorsement of such person*, be freely assigned to any person who should voluntarily accept them, and so by such assignees *toties quoties* by indorsement thereon, and all such assignees might sue thereon in their own names.

The assignment of the Goldsmith's notes, or the private bankers' notes, was held to be illegal much later than this. In 1703 it was decided that no promissory notes were assignable or indorsable over within the custom of merchants. In 1704 the Act was passed which allowed promissory notes to be assigned by indorsement like Bills of Exchange. It is true that the

¹ Ch. IV., Sec. 1, § 27.

custom of indorsing Bank of England Notes, and, it is probable, country bank notes too, soon fell into disuse, but that makes no difference in the *law* of the subject.

It is also an error to suppose that Bills of Exchange require an indorsement at each transfer. A Bill of Exchange may be made payable to bearer, and then it requires no indorsement at all. Bills, however, are generally drawn payable to order, and then they require that the payee should indorse them; but he may do that without making himself liable on them, as is done in many cases. After the first indorsement in blank, the Bill is payable to bearer, and may be passed by mere delivery, in all respects like a Bank note. "I see no difference," said Lord Mansfield, "between a note indorsed in blank, and one payable to bearer." "And," says Mr. Justice Byles,¹ "a transfer by mere delivery, without indorsement, of a Bill of Exchange, or Promissory Note, made or become payable to bearer, does not render the transferor liable *on the instrument* to the transferee.

"And it is conceived to be the general rule of the English law, and the fair result of the English authorities, that the transferor is not even liable to refund the consideration, if the bill or note so transferred by delivery, without indorsement, turns out to be of no value by reason of the failure of the other parties to it. For the sending to market of a bill or note payable to bearer without indorsing it, is *primâ facie* a sale of the bill. And there is no implied guarantee for the solvency of the maker, or of any other party.

"If a bill, or note, made or became payable to bearer, be delivered without indorsement, not in payment of a pre-existing debt, but by way of exchange for goods, for other bills or notes, or for money transferred to the party delivering the bill at the same time, such a transaction has been repeatedly held to be a sale of the bill by the party transferring it, and a purchase of the instrument, with all risks, by the transferee. 'It is extremely clear, said Lord Kenyon, 'that if the holder of a bill sent it to market without indorsing his name upon it, neither morality, nor the law of this country, will compel him to refund the money for which he sold it, if he did not know at the time that it was not a good bill.' So, when A gave a bankrupt, before his bankruptcy, cash for a bill, but refused to allow the bankrupt to

¹ *A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange, &c.*, 8th Edit., p. 146.

indorse it, thinking it better without his name, and afterwards, on dishonour of the bill, proved the amount under the commission, the Lord Chancellor ordered the debt to be expunged, observing that this was a sale of the bill. So, if a party discounts bills with a banker, and receives, in part of the discount, other bills, but not indorsed by the banker, which bills turn out to be bad, the banker is not liable. 'Having taken them without indorsement,' says Lord Kenyon, 'he has taken the risk on himself. The bankers were the holders of the bills, and, by not indorsing them, have refused to pledge their credit to their validity; and the transferee must be taken to have received them on their own credit only.' So where, in the morning, A sold B a quantity of corn, and, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, B delivered to A, in payment, certain promissory notes of the Bank of C, which had then stopped payment, but which circumstance was not at the time known to either party, Bayley, J., said—'If the notes had been given to A at the time when the corn was sold, he could have no remedy upon them against B. A might have insisted on payment in money, but, if he consented to receive the notes as money, they would have been taken by him at his peril.' Such seems the general rule governing the transfer by delivery, not only of ordinary Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, but also of Bank Notes. Nor is there any hardship in such a rule, for the remedy against the transferor may always be preserved by indorsement, or by special contract."

While it has always been acknowledged that the delivery of a bill without indorsement, in exchange for a valuable consideration, is a sale of it, it has frequently been said that, if the bill be indorsed, it is only a loan. We have pointed out the ambiguity of the word *loan* already. It is often said that a banker lends his customer money on the security of bills. But this is an inaccurate mode of statement. What the banker does is to buy a debt due to his customer, and, when he indorses the bill, his customer gives him a limited warranty of its soundness. If the banker lent his customer the money, it would be his duty to repay it. But that is not so. It is the acceptor's business to pay the bill, and, if he does not do so, the banker may, by giving his customer immediate notice, and making a demand, make his customer take back the bill, and repay the money. But

if the banker fail in giving immediate notice, his remedy against his customer is gone.

But the *Law of Continuity* shews the fallacy of the doctrine that Bank Notes payable to bearer on demand alone are Currency. Lord Overstone rigorously restricts the term to such notes. But would not notes payable one minute after demand be Currency? or one hour? or two, or three, or four hours? Would not notes payable one day after demand be Currency? or two or three days? Lord Overstone denied that Bank post bills which are issued payable seven days after sight, are Currency. According to this doctrine, if a man deposits money in the Bank and receives in exchange for it a bank note payable on demand—that is Currency; but if he ask, for his own convenience, for a note payable seven days after sight—that is not Currency! But the note becomes payable on demand on the seventh day after sight, and then, by their own definition, it is Currency. What was it before? It used formerly to be the custom for banks in the country to issue notes payable 20 days after demand. These notes circulated and produced all the effects of money. What were they, if they were not Currency? Cheques are payable on demand. How are they not Currency as much as notes? How are Bills of Exchange not Currency on the day they become payable? And, if they are so then, what were they before? It is quite plain that there can be but one answer. They are all species of Currency, though differing in degree, and the distinction between them is untenable.

Nay, according to this doctrine a Bank Note itself is only Currency during about six hours out of the twenty-four: because it is only payable *on demand* during banking hours, say from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. As soon as the clock strikes three the Note is not payable till next day; and, consequently, it is not Currency, and has ceased to affect the foreign exchanges. Therefore, at 5 minutes before three it is Currency, and 5 minutes after three it is not Currency. So at 5 minutes before nine a.m. it is not Currency, at 5 minutes after nine it is Currency. We must leave our readers to judge whether such doctrines are sound philosophy.

Not only are Colonel Torrens's statements of law perfectly inaccurate, but also his statements of fact and the routine of business. He asserts that Bills of Exchange are not Currency

because they are intended to be, and are, ultimately liquidated in coin or bank notes. Such a statement as this shows the most profound ignorance of the ordinary routine business of banking; for comparatively very few bills are ever paid by means of coin or bank notes; in modern times they are almost universally paid by means of Bank Credits: and, consequently, by Colonel Torrens's own definition, these Bank Credits must be money.

19. But we must point out the further conclusions which the doctrines set forth by these witnesses lead to, which may somewhat surprise their advocates.

They say that the fundamental essence of Currency or Money is that it "closes a debt."

Now to this we shall reply as was the fashion in the glorious old days of special pleading—(1) there is no debt to close; and (2) it does *not* close the debt.

1. When money is exchanged for goods no debt arises: and if it be said that the money closes the debt which would have arisen on the sale of the goods, it is perfectly obvious that it may equally be said that the goods close the debt which would have arisen on the sale of the money. It is simply an exchange; and the goods and the money close the debt equally on each side. Therefore, if it be the essence of Currency to "close debt," the goods are Currency for precisely the same reason that the money is.

It is quite common in the City to discharge a debt by stock: now by this the debt is closed, and, consequently, according to this doctrine, the Stock is Currency or Money.

So in innumerable cases it is the custom to discharge a debt by a payment of goods. A baker or a tea merchant becomes indebted to a wine merchant, and for the sake of convenience he may take payment in bread or tea. If he does so, then the debt is closed; and by this doctrine the bread or the tea are Currency or Money.

So in all cases of Barter or Exchange of goods, the goods on each side discharge or close the debt which would have arisen without the exchange; consequently, the goods exchanged on either side are equally Currency or Money.

Furthermore, let us test the doctrine by cases regarding other paper documents.

A merchant, suppose, puts his acceptance into circulation:

another person happens to be indebted to him in an equal amount, and chances to come possessed of his acceptance. The merchant asks for payment of his debt, and the debtor hands over to the merchant his own acceptance. By this means the debt is closed ; and according to this doctrine the merchant's acceptance is Currency or Money.

So a banker, say, issues notes, and discounts a merchant's acceptance. When the acceptance falls due, the merchant collects an equal amount of the banker's notes. Each is then equally indebted to the other ; and in payment of their reciprocal claims, the merchant hands the notes to the banker, and the banker hands the acceptance to the merchant. By this means the debts are mutually closed, and if the Notes are Currency because they have closed the debt, is it not manifest that the acceptance is equally Currency, because it has performed exactly the same function ?

So if two merchants issue their acceptances for the same amount, and they get into each other's hands, each will offer to the other his own acceptance in payment of the debt by him. By these means the debts are mutually closed. And consequently each acceptance is Currency or Money.

Thus we see that the dogmas of these writers are transfixed by darts drawn from their own quiver !

The same doctrine may be extended to other cases. Suppose a man buys a ticket from a Railway Company, the Company is then indebted to him. But when they have carried him to his journey's end, the debt is closed. Therefore, according to this doctrine, the carriage of the passenger is Currency or Money.

So if a person buys an opera ticket, the manager of the theatre is indebted to him. But when he has witnessed the play, the debt is closed ; consequently the performance of the play is Currency or Money.

So if a person buys Postage Stamps, the Post Office is indebted to him : but when he has sent his letters by post, the debt is closed. Therefore the carriage of the letters is Currency or Money. And so on, the same principle may be applied to many other cases.

2. In the next place, we affirm that a payment in Money does *not* close the debt, because all Economists have shewn that

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¹ *Journal de l'Économie*, 4. p. 4. 1862.

But, while we contend that Lord Overstone's criterion of a Currency is fatal to his own view, we are quite willing to accept it. For what is it that exists in all places, in all times, and among almost all persons? DEBT, or SERVICES DUE. And what is it that is universally required to measure, record, and transfer them. *Some material.* But we see that all Currencies are more or less local, none are universal. The idea, or the want alone, is universal. The notes of a country banker, only circulating in his own neighbourhood, are like a country *patois*, each district has its own. A national Currency rises to the dignity of a language. But even that is only local, on a larger scale. The ideas only expressed in the language are universal. We are, therefore, strengthened in our conviction, that the only true idea of a Currency is, that it is the *Representative of Transferable Debt*, and that *whatever represents Transferable Debt is Currency.*

CHAPTER XIV.

ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND; AND ON THE BANK CHARTER ACT OF 1844.

1. We are now, at length, in a position to take a comprehensive survey of the organisation of the Bank of England, and of the Bank Act of 1844. Of all the Acts in the Statute book, there is none which comes home to every man, which so nearly affects every man's interest, as this Act. Few persons are aware of its extremely complicated nature. We hear sometimes of the *principle* of the Act of 1844, as if there were but one principle involved in it! or as if the *object* of it were the same thing as the *principle*; the object it aims at, the same thing as the theory it adopts to obtain that object. Whereas, in truth, it is founded upon a multiplicity of theories—it is a combination of several theories of Currency, and, moreover, devises a particular machinery for carrying them out. When, therefore, we consider its very complicated nature, we see what a boundless field of controversy it may give rise to; for each of the several theories it embodies may be partially or totally erroneous; and even if they be correct, the machinery devised for enforcing them may be imperfect, or erroneous, and insufficient for its purpose. We think, however, that we are now in a position to examine the theories upon which it is founded—to test them by the fundamental principles of monetary science established in the preceding chapters, and to point out those principles—if any—which it violates.

In the first chapter we obtained the great fundamental conception, which is the basis of monetary science, that money is the representative of debt, or services due—THAT WHERE THERE IS NO DEBT, THERE CAN BE NO MONEY. In the preceding chapter we found that the fundamental error of Law's Theory of Paper Money is, that it creates Currency where there is no Debt for it to represent. The consequence of which is, that an additional

quantity of material is poured into the channel of circulation, as it is called; that is, a greater quantity of material is required to do exactly the same duty as a smaller quantity did before; the consequence of which is a depreciation of the whole, which may proceed to any length; and we have given several examples of the practical results of this plausible and wide-spread, but delusive theory.

We must now examine the organisation of the Bank of England, and we shall find that it, too, is based upon Lawism.

But furthermore, we have said that the Bank Act of 1844 is based on a peculiar definition of the word CURRENCY; and is expressly devised for the purpose of carrying into effect a peculiar Theory of Currency. In the last chapter we have examined the meaning of the word CURRENCY, and shewn the entirely erroneous doctrines of those writers from whom the scheme emanated which was embodied in that Act. We have now to examine the THEORY upon which it is founded; and to see how far it really carries out the THEORY it is intended to do; and the consequences it has produced.

2. The Bank was a corporation who advanced £1,200,000 in cash to Government. In exchange for this they received an equal amount of Government stock, with interest at 8 per cent., or an annuity of £100,000 a year.

Now, when they had received this annuity, they had already received an equivalent for their cash. But, *in addition* to that, they were allowed to *create* an amount of notes equal to their capital, to trade with, and it was supposed that the annuity of £100,000 in cash was sufficient to support the credit of these notes.

Now, we at once perceive the essential distinction between the Banks of Venice, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, and the Bank of England. The former banks were examples of the CURRENCY PRINCIPLE. The bullion paid into them was kept, or was professed to be kept, in their vaults, and, as long as it was so, the credit created by them was exactly equal to the bullion paid in. Their function was solely to exchange Credit for Bullion and Bullion for Credit. Hence these banks created no augmentation of the Currency.

But the case of the Bank of England was manifestly wholly

different. The Bank paid over the money to Government, who put it into circulation. The Bank received the annuity, and was *also* permitted to create £1,200,000 in Bank notes, and trade with them, by discounting bills of exchange, or otherwise. Thus the Bank had not only sold its cash to Government, but it was also allowed to have it as well in the form of notes, to trade with and make a profit.

3. Now can any one fail to see that this proceeding *augmented* the Currency by the amount of £1,200,000, and that the Bank made a double profit; first, the interest on the cash paid to the Government, and, secondly, the commercial profit made by trading with the notes?

Therefore, so far as this went, this was clearly an example of LAWISM.

4. In 1697 the Bank was authorised to increase its capital by upwards of a million. Of this sum, above £800,000, was received in Exchequer tallies, then at a discount of 50 per cent., and £200,000 in its own notes, then at a discount of 20 per cent. Both the tallies and the Bank notes were counted as specie at their full nominal value; and upon this augmented capital of tallies and notes they were permitted to *create* an equal amount of new notes to trade with!

Law only proposed to issue paper money based upon the security of land, or some other solid article of value. But the Bank of England was permitted to create paper currency based upon the security of its own depreciated credit!

In 1709 the Bank was allowed to double its capital, and to *create* an equal amount of notes to trade with.

Now, is it not as clear as the sun at noon day, that each of these issues of notes was so much increase of Currency, and an example of Lawism?

5. Now, if the same *principle* had been carried out to the present time, is it not clear that all the public funds would have been Bank stock, and that the Bank notes would have equalled the amount of the National Debt, or about £800,000,000? Some persons even now seem to think that this is a good principle. They seem to think, that if they carry stock to the Bank, they

have a right to have it coined into notes to any amount. It is clear that this principle could never be carried out to its full extent. For, if it were true, Government might go on creating public debt *ad infinitum*, and then the Bank would create an equal amount of notes. If this principle be true, what would be the use of going to California and Australia for gold? Is not this *principle* more mad than any thing Law ever wrote? Law's issues of paper were *limited* by the value of the land, but this plan has positively *no* limits whatsoever.

6. Up to 1711 the issues of the Bank were strictly limited to the amount of their capital; and it was declared that if the Directors exceeded that limit they should be liable in their personal capacity. Afterwards they were released from this limitation, and they were allowed to issue notes to any extent they pleased, provided always that they were payable in specie on demand.

And so the Bank went on till 1797, when it stopped payment, and committees were appointed by Parliament to investigate its affairs, who reported it to be in the most solid and flourishing condition, and that they had a surplus of assets above liabilities of nearly 4 millions, besides the Government debt amounting to £11,686,800.

The reason of this was plain. The notes it had issued were given in exchange for mercantile securities, and, therefore, the Bank had as security for the payment of its notes, both the commercial bills and the Government debt.

This no doubt amply secured the solvency of the Bank and the payment of its notes, but it played utter havoc with the CURRENCY PRINCIPLE.

7. The Bank possessed the power of unlimited issue till 1844. On several occasions it had been most recklessly mismanaged. Proposals had been made to limit its powers of issue; but such a plan had been expressly condemned in the Bullion Report, and among numerous other authorities, by Sir Robert Peel in 1819, in 1826, and in 1833. In 1824 and 1825, in 1837, and 1839 an immense outflow of bullion took place, without the Bank taking any means to stop it. The consequence was that it was brought to the very verge of stopping payment.

8. We have seen that all Banking consists in creating and issuing Rights of action, Credit, or Debts, in exchange for Money or Debts. When the banker had created this Liability in his books the customer might if he pleased have this Credit in the form of the Banker's notes. London bankers continued to give their Notes till about the year 1793 when they discontinued this practice, and their customers could only transfer their rights or Credit by means of Cheques. But it is perfectly manifest that the Liabilities of the Bank are exactly the same whether they give their own Notes or merely create a Deposit.

Soon after the renewal of the Charter in 1833, certain writers of influence adopted the Currency Principle. They maintained the doctrine that Bank notes payable to bearer on demand only are Currency—to the absolute exclusion of all other forms of Paper Credit—and that when Bank Notes are permitted to be issued, they ought to be exactly equal in quantity to the Bullion they displace, which we have shewn elsewhere¹ is a doctrine invented in China, and was the principle upon which the Banks of Venice, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and others were constructed. They maintained that all Paper Currency created in excess of this is a depreciation of the Currency.

These doctrines being maintained by persons of eminence and influence, and aided by the incorrigible mismanagement of the Bank of England, converted Sir Robert Peel, who now entered upon the THIRD state of his opinions upon the Currency question. It is frequently supposed that Sir Robert Peel had only *two* states of opinion upon the Currency question. But this is quite a mistake. In 1811 he repudiated the doctrines of Horner and the Bullion Report, and voted in the majority that 21 was equal to 27. In 1819 he became a convert to the doctrines which he had repudiated in 1811: and he expressly repudiated the doctrine of the Currency Principle and the principle of imposing a numerical limit on the issues of the Bank; which doctrine he held up to 1833. In 1844 he had completely repudiated the doctrines of the Bullion Report, Mr. Horner, and his own of 1819, and formally adopted those of Lord Overstone, Col. Torrens, and others, which maintained the doctrine of the Currency Principle: and naturally and justifiably irritated by the incorrigible misconduct of the

¹ *Principles of Economical Philosophy*, ch. 18.

directors, he determined to impose a *numerical* limit on the issues of the Bank—

“Sic volvenda setas commutat tempora rerum;
Quod fuit in pretio, fit nullo denique honore,
Porro aliud succedit, et e contemptibus exit,
Inque dies magis appetitur, floretque repertum
Laudibus, et miro'st mortaleis inter honore.”

In order to carry out this principle the Bank was divided into two departments—an issue department and a banking department. The Bank was to transfer to the issue department public securities to the value of £14,000,000, of which the original Government debt was to be a part, and also so much of the gold coin and gold and silver bullion as should not be required for the banking department. The issue department was then to deliver over to the banking department an amount of notes exactly equal to the securities, coin, and bullion so deposited with them. The Bank might diminish the securities as much as it pleased, cancelling the notes; and might increase them again, but not so as to exceed the preceding limit. In consequence of the lapsed issues of other banks, the securities upon which it may issue notes are now £15,000,000.

Thus the amount of notes issued by the Bank is strictly limited to £15,000,000 plus the amount of bullion held by the issue department.

9. It was supposed that these provisions secured that the quantity of notes in circulation, *i. e., in the hands of the public*, would be exactly equal in amount to what a Metallic Currency would have been, and that the outflow of bullion would, by its own natural operation, withdraw notes in circulation to an equal amount. Having made these provisions, the framers of the Act supposed that they had taken out of the hands of the Bank all power of mismanaging the currency, and that they might manage the banking department entirely at their own discretion.

To say that the amount of notes should only be equal in amount to what a metallic currency would have been, is a very intelligible proposition, and, as we have before observed, several banks had been conducted on that principle, such as those of Venice, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, *but no Bank conducted on this principle ever did, or by any possibility could do, bank-*

ing business. Those banks were pure banks of deposit, they did no discount business whatever ; and if the Bank of England were forbidden to discount, there is no reason why it should not be reconstructed on this principle.

But if the framers of the Act of 1844 really believed that this Act carried out this theory into practice, no set of men ever committed a more manifest error. It is quite evident that the £15,000,000 of notes issued against public debt and securities are in direct violation of the "Currency Principle." How did the Bank obtain these securities ? By purchase. Now, the purchase-money of these securities is in circulation, and the notes created on their security *as well*. Is it not clear that these 15 millions of notes are an *augmentation* of currency to that amount ? If it be true that these 15 millions of notes are not a violation of the Currency Principle, then the very same argument would shew that the whole National Debt might be coined into notes, and then there would be no more paper in circulation than under a purely metallic currency ! !

It is quite clear that this is pure and simple **LAWISM** ; and, if we may coin the funds into money, we may just as well coin the land into money ; and then where should we be ?

10. Certainly, it is an excellent plan for every one to buy the funds with their cash, and then to be allowed to have it, too, in the form of notes. At all events, so long as this is permitted, let no one laugh at John Law.

But even this does not shew the full extent of the error of those who think that the Bank Act of 1844 enforces the currency principle. The banking department of the Bank does business like any other bank. That is, it purchases or discounts bills of exchange in the first instance, by creating credit in its books ; that is, it increases its liabilities in another form besides notes. This credit is equally in excess of the metallic currency. The reserve of notes and gold being the basis of the Bank's power of creating credit, of course, they must use their own judgment, as to how far they may safely extend this, just as every other banker does. But any one who examines the Bank's returns will perceive that its liabilities payable on demand exceed its notes in reserve and gold many times.

Therefore, it is quite clear that those who seriously maintain

that the Bank Act really carries out the "Currency Principle," must maintain this proposition—

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Twice 15 millions + an indefi-} \\ \text{nite number of millions} \end{array} \quad \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} \text{Twice 15 millions + an indefi-} \\ \text{nite number of millions} \end{array}} \right\} = 15 \text{ millions.}$$

It has been shewn that in Banks constructed on the "Currency Principle," the Credit created is always exactly equal in quantity to the money deposited and kept in the Bank. But how does this matter stand with the Bank of England? Let us test this principle by any one of its published returns taken at random. On the 27th March, 1873, it appears that the Credit created by the Bank amounted to £61,021,187, and the specie held by the Bank amounted to £23,886,372, or about 2·6 to 1. If, therefore, it be maintained that the Bank is constructed on the "Currency Principle," it must also be maintained that 2·6 are equal to 1.

As a matter of pure arithmetic, therefore, it is perfectly manifest that the Bank Act completely fails to carry out the "Principle" it was intended to enforce. In fact, the framers of the Bank Act had a THEORY, and they passed an Act; but they never took the slightest pains to ascertain whether the Act corresponds with the Theory.

11. Now, we say nothing here as to the correctness, or the contrary, of the "Currency Principle," or as to the expediency of carrying it out; but to suppose that the Bank Act does really carry it out is simply one of the most astonishing delusions that ever deceived the public mind. Truly, says Bastiat—

"Etre dupe d'autrui n'est pas déjà très plaisant; mais employer le vaste appareil représentatif à se duper soi-même, à se duper doublement, et, *dans une affaire de numération*, voilà qui est bien propre à rabattre un peu l'orgueil du siècle des lumières."

Every "banker" whatever who discounts a bill of exchange violates the "Currency Principle." There is no mode whatever of carrying out the Currency Principle but by abolishing discount banking altogether; as we have already observed, the banks constructed on this principle did no discount business.

12. Lord Overstone, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, said that it was a fundamental vice of the principle devised by the Directors in 1832, to carry out the

doctrines of the Bullion Report, that the gold might all leave the country without causing any diminution of the amount of Notes in the hands of the public: and we have seen that this assertion was completely verified in 1839.

It was, therefore expressly declared that it was the purpose of the Act that, if any drain should arise after it came into operation, an exact amount of notes should be withdrawn from the hands of the *public*, or from circulation. Having secured that object, as they imagined, they left the directors free and uncontrolled in their banking business. For the first two years after the Act was passed no occasion occurred to test its merits; it was a period of unusual prosperity and accumulation of capital. But when the first season of real trial came in the beginning of 1847, we have seen that the Act wholly failed in its intended effect of causing a withdrawal of notes in circulation, in proportion to the outflow of bullion. The directors pursued exactly the same fatal course as they had done on so many former occasions, and the result was the pressure of April. It was manifestly proved, therefore, that the Act provided no effectual check against mismanagement on the part of the Bank.

And whence did this failure arise? From this very simple circumstance. The framers of the Act supposed that there is only ONE way of extracting gold from the Bank: namely, by means of its Notes: and that if people want gold they must bring in Notes; and, consequently, as the Gold comes out the Notes must go in.

But as a matter of simple banking business there are two methods of extracting gold from the Bank—namely, by Notes and by CHEQUES. Whoever has a Credit in its books may go and present a CHEQUE, and thus draw out gold from the banking department without a single Bank Note being withdrawn from the public.

In fact, instead of withdrawing the Notes from the public, as the framers of the Act intended, the Directors threw the whole effect of the drain of gold on their own reserves. And that happened in this way. The public has two methods of drawing gold from the banking department, namely, by NOTES and CHEQUES; but the banking department has only ONE method of drawing gold from the issue department, namely, its Notes in reserve. And when the Bank felt a drain on its banking de-

partment for gold, it had to replenish it by obtaining a fresh supply from the issue department; at the same time giving up an exactly equal amount of Notes. And thus the whole drain fell on its own reserves.

No legislation can prevent this power of extracting gold from the Bank by means of Cheques, except prohibiting Cheques altogether. And thus is explained the complete failure of the "Mechanical" action of the Act to compel the Directors to carry out the "Currency Principle." The Directors were able to commit, and actually did commit, the very same error, as they had done before the Act—which Lord Overstone had truly said was the fundamental vice of the Bank principle of 1832—and it was powerless to prevent them.

And this simple fact completely upsets the whole theory of the Act.

There are in reality *two* leaks to the ship. The framers of the Act could only perceive *one*; and they only provided against one: and they were utterly astonished to find the ship rapidly sinking from the *other* leak which they had forgotten.

13. Now, as the Act notoriously and manifestly failed on this most important point, which was fully and candidly admitted by Sir Robert Peel, it becomes a natural inquiry to ask why it failed on this point, which it was supposed had been rendered so secure. We reply to this that the Act failed because it *aimed at the wrong mark altogether. It wholly missed the true point in the case.*

In former times it was a mercantile dogma that the Exchanges could only be against the country in consequence of its being indebted to other countries. Nothing can be more striking than the vicious circle in which the Commercial witnesses argued before the Bullion Committee of 1810. They maintained with unflinching perseverance that the Exchanges could only be adverse, because the country was indebted: and as the exchanges were adverse, they maintained that the country *must* be indebted (without the slightest inquiry into the fact) *because* the Exchanges were adverse.

However, the Bullion Committee completely disproved this Commercial dogma; and they demonstrated beyond dispute, that the depreciated paper currency was the cause of the Exchanges

being *apparently* adverse; but that when this depreciated paper currency was reduced to its true value in gold, the Exchange were in reality in *favour* of the country.

The Commercial witnesses maintained that when the indebtedness was paid off, the drain of bullion would cease of itself. But the Bullion Committee proved that with a paper currency so depreciated as Bank Notes then were, the drain would not cease until *all* the specie in circulation had left the country, which was amply verified.

The Bullion Committee thus shewed that there are *two* causes of a drain of bullion—1st, the indebtedness of the country; 2nd, a depreciated paper currency.

But in the first edition of this Work published in 1856 we shewed that there is a **THIRD** cause of a drain of bullion, and an adverse exchange, which, however it might be known among commercial men, had never yet, that we have seen, found its way into any commercial book whatever, and most certainly had never been brought forward prominently before the public in Currency discussions, as a cause of an adverse Exchange, wholly irrespective of any indebtedness of the country, or of the state of the Paper Currency.

The Principle is this—

That when the Rate of Discount between any two places differs by more than sufficient to pay the cost of transmitting bullion from one place to the other, bullion will flow from where discount is lower to where it is higher.

The old mercantile dogma was that Bills of Exchange can only be created to represent debts arising from the sale of merchandise: and if there are no debts, there will be no bills created: and that when all the bills are paid, no more bullion will go.

But, suppose (the state of Credit at both places being assumed to be equally secure) that the Rate of Discount at London was 2 per cent., while the Rate at Paris was 8 per cent., we shewed that bullion dealers would *fabricate* bills—not based upon any previous debts, or any mercantile transactions whatever—but simply for the sake of being discounted; that is, for the purpose of buying gold in London at 2 per cent., and selling it in Paris at 8 per cent., and this operation will infallibly go on, and the drain of bullion will not cease, until the Rates of Discount are so nearly equalised as to destroy the profits to be made by fabricating bills. Hence, if such a state of things, as is just

supposed, arises, the Bank must, as an indispensable measure to preserve its own security, raise its Rate of Discount so as to destroy these profits, and so arrest the drain which is exclusively caused by the difference of the Rates in the two places.

Now, this practice causes no increase of Bank Notes in circulation ; on the contrary, they are not wanted : it is *gold* that is demanded and taken for export, and it steals out of the country noiselessly and unobserved. Also, if bankers in this country will perversely maintain the rate of discount lower here than in neighbouring countries, and, therefore, lower than the natural rate, persons in foreign countries send their debts and securities over here for sale, and the proceeds are remitted abroad. Consequently this practice causes an export of gold without diminishing the notes in circulation. Of all species of property, debts are the most easily transportable. The charges even on the transmission of gold are heavy compared to those on the transmission of debts. Debts to any amount can be transmitted from one country to another at the mere expense of the postage. Consequently, if the Americans can only get £85 per cent. for their debts in their own country, and they can get £96 per cent. in England, of course, they will send them here in vast quantities for realisation. This was eminently and notoriously the case in 1839, when the Bank of England kept its rate so perversely below the natural rate, and it was the cause that aggravated the drain of bullion to so alarming an extent. Hence we have shewn that beyond the causes universally known for an export of specie, namely, payments of genuine debts, there is another and most potent cause, whose importance has only recently been sufficiently recognised—namely, an unnatural depression of the rate of discount, below that of neighbouring countries.

Now, this principle was certainly not generally understood at the time the Bank Act of 1844 was passed ; and in the first edition of this Work (1856) we stated this as a fundamental principle of the Currency—

“AN IMPROPERLY LOW RATE OF DISCOUNT IS, IN ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS, A DEPRECIATION OF THE CURRENCY.”

We therefore shewed that the only true method of striking at this demand for gold is by raising the RATE of DISCOUNT, and

that the true great power of governing and controlling the Paper Currency, or Credit, is by carefully ADJUSTING THE RATE OF DISCOUNT TO THE STATE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES, AND THE STATE OF THE BULLION IN THE BANK.

Now, the weak point in the Act of 1844, is that it takes no notice of this grand principle, it takes no precaution that the Directors of the Bank of England shall recognise it, and counteract it. On the contrary, it leaves them in full power to repeat their oft-committed error of causing a depreciation of the Currency from an unnaturally low rate of discount.

This principle was extremely ill understood in 1856, when our work was published, and was very unpopular; but its truth was soon signally verified, and acknowledged to be true by the most competent authorities. After the great crisis of 1857, a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to investigate its causes, and Mr. G. W. Norman, a Director of the Bank of England, and one of the most prominent and distinguished advocates of the "Currency Principle," and of the Bank Act of 1844, was asked—Q. 8529. "Is it not principally by raising the rate of interest that you check the amount of discount which may be demanded of you?—Yes; we have found, *contrary to what would have been anticipated*, that the power we possess, and which we exercise, of raising the rate of discount, keeps the demand upon us within manageable dimensions. There are other restrictions which are less important. *The rate we charge for our discounts, we find, in general, is a sufficient check.*"

In 1861, Mr. Goschen published his *Theory of the Foreign Exchanges*; in it he says—

"The efficacy of that corrective of an unfavourable state of the Exchanges, on which we have been dilating (*i. e.*, raising the rate of discount) has been most thoroughly tested by late events. Every advance in the Bank rate of discount has been followed by a turn of the Exchanges in favour of England, and *vice versa*, as soon as the rate of interest was lowered, the Exchanges became less favourable."

This is now the acknowledged principle upon which the Bank of England is managed; and after our work was published in 1856, the Usury Laws in France were modified in order to enable the Bank of France to adopt it, and, in fact, it is now universally adopted by every bank in the world.

In former times, when the only communication between different countries was by means of sailing ships and common roads, and therefore very slow, expensive, and uncertain, this principle, though actually true, could seldom be called into action, because the cost and delay of the transport of gold would far exceed any profit to be made in the difference of the Rates of Discount, in quiet times. It was like some mechanical force, which actually exists, but which is overpowered and prevented from producing any visible effect, in consequence of friction. But it did act in times of commercial crisis, when the rate became extreme. In 1799, enormous failures took place in Hamburg; discount rose to 15 per cent., and this rate immediately drew away gold from England.

But in modern times, since communications have been so much accelerated and cheapened, even since the Act of 1844, by means of railroads and steamers, this friction, as we may call it, has been immensely diminished; and this great principle is called into action with a much less difference between the Rates of Discount than at any former period. Bullion would probably take ten days, formerly, to go from London to Paris; it can go now in ten hours, and at probably the tenth part of the expense. A difference of 2 per cent. between the rates of discount in London and Paris, will now draw bullion from one place to the other.

*On the causes which compelled the Suspension of the Bank Act
in 1847, 1857, and 1866.*

14. The monetary pressure which we have been considering passed away for the time, but another much more severe came on in the autumn, which ended in a monetary panic, and on the 25th November, 1847, the Government authorised the Bank to exceed the limits allowed by the Act of 1844, if they considered it necessary so to do to restore commercial confidence. This suspension of the Act was perfectly successful; and on two similar occasions, in 1857 and in 1866, a similar course was followed with similar results. We have given a full narrative of the course of events preceding these panics in a preceding chapter. We must now only examine the reasons which made this course necessary, and why it was successful.

Ever since the enormous development of the Credit system of commerce in modern times, great commercial failures have periodically recurred, producing the most wide-spread distress ; and there have been two conflicting Theories as to what the action of the Bank ought to be in a Monetary Crisis.

1. One Theory maintains that in such a Crisis the Bank should liberally *expand* its issues, to support Commercial Credit. This Theory may be called the **EXPANSIVE** Theory.

2. The other Theory maintains that in such a Crisis the Bank should rigorously restrict its issues to their usual amount, or even contract them. This Theory may be called the **RESTRICTIVE** Theory.

Both these Theories have been tried in practice, and discussed by the most eminent authorities, and we may succinctly examine the results.

The first great monetary crisis in modern times took place in 1763, after the termination of the seven years' war. This great disaster occurred at Hamburg and Amsterdam, where the "Currency Principle" was in full operation, and there was no Banking Credit whatever, except what represented specie. The failures began at Amsterdam among the principal merchants. The Bank had no power to assist them ; and the resources of the private bankers were exhausted. Hearing that the Amsterdam bankers had determined to allow the merchants to fail, the Hamburg bankers wrote to them in the greatest alarm to say that if they did not support the merchants, they would instantly suspend their own payments. But by the time the letter reached Amsterdam, the merchants had already stopped. General failure followed at Hamburg, where no business was for some time transacted but for ready money. The failures were equally general throughout Germany. The Crisis extended to England, and Smith says that the Bank made advances to merchants to the amount of a million.

Thus we see that the "Currency Principle" was no protection whatever against a Monetary Crisis ; and on this occasion the Bank acted on the **EXPANSIVE** Theory.

In 1772 the most severe Monetary Crisis in England since the South Sea scheme took place. On this occasion again the Bank came forward to support Commercial Credit.

In 1782, our unhappy war with America was ended; and the usual results of the termination of a great contest took place. The Bank had greatly extended its issues; and a very alarming drain of specie took place, which at one time threatened to compel them to stop payment. The Directors, however, considered that if they could only restrain their issues for a short period, the returns in specie in payment of the exports would soon set in in a more rapid manner than they went out. They determined, therefore, to make no communication to the Government, *but for the present to contract their issues UNTIL THE EXCHANGES TURNED IN THEIR FAVOUR.* The Bank felt the greatest alarm in May, 1783. They then refused to make any advances to Government on the loan of that year; but they did not make any demand for payment of their other advances, which were between 9 and 10 millions. They continued this policy up to October, when at length the drain had ceased from the country, and money had begun to flow in from abroad. At length, in the autumn, when the favourable signs began to appear, they advanced freely to Government on the loan, although at that time the cash in the Bank was actually lower than at the time they felt the greatest alarm. It was then reduced to £473,000.

The doctrine then stated by Mr. Bosanquet that guided the Directors was this—That while a drain of specie was going on, their issues should be *contracted* as much as possible; but that as soon as the tide began to give signs of ceasing, and turning the other way, it was then safe to extend their issues freely. This policy had been entirely successful, and the credit of the Bank was saved.

15. After the peace of 1782, the commercial energies of the country were greatly developed: to carry on this increased commerce a greatly enlarged currency was necessary; and as the monopoly of the Bank prevented solid banks being founded, innumerable tradesmen started up in every part of the country issuing notes. Burke says that when he came to England in 1750, there were not twelve bankers out of London; in 1792 there were about 400: the great majority being grocers, tailors, drapers, and petty shop-keepers. In the autumn of 1792 very numerous failures took place in Europe and America. In January, 1793, the general alarm was greatly increased by the rapid progress of

the French Revolution. Some great failures occurred in London in February: and soon the panic spread to the banks. Of these 100 stopped payment, and 200 were much shaken. The pressure in London was intense; and this naturally produced a demand on the Bank for support and discounts. But the Bank being thoroughly alarmed, resolved to contract its issues: bankruptcies multiplied with frightful rapidity. The Government urged the Bank to come forward to support Credit, but they resolutely declined.

In the meantime the most alarming news came from Scotland. The public banks were quite unable, with due regard to their own safety, to support the private bankers and commerce. Unless they received immediate assistance from Government, general failure would ensue. When universal failure seemed imminent, Sir John Sinclair remembered the precedent of 1697, when the public distress was allayed by an issue of Exchequer bills. A Committee of the House of Commons was appointed, who reported that the sudden discredit of so large an amount of bankers' notes had produced a most inconvenient deficiency in the circulating medium; and that unless a circulating medium was provided, a general stoppage must take place. They recommended that Exchequer bills to the amount of £5,000,000 should be issued under the directions of a board of commissioners appointed for the purpose, in sums of £100, £50, and £20.

No sooner was the Act passed than the Committee set to work. A large sum, £70,000, was at once sent down to Manchester and Glasgow, on the strength of the Exchequer bills, which were not yet issued. This unexpected supply, coming so much earlier than was expected, operated like magic, and had a greater effect in restoring credit than ten times the sum could have had at a later period.

When the whole business was concluded, a report was presented to the Treasury. It stated that the knowledge that loans might be had, operated, in many instances, to prevent them being required. The applications granted were 238, and the sum advanced was £3,855,624. The whole sum advanced was repaid; two only of the parties assisted became bankrupt; all the others were ultimately solvent, and in many instances possessed of great property. A considerable part of the sum was repaid before it was due, and all the rest with the utmost punctuality. After

all expenses were paid, the transaction left a clear profit to the Government of £4,848.

Contemporary writers all bear witness to the extraordinary effects produced. Macpherson says, that the very intimation of the intention of the Legislature to support the merchants, operated like a charm over the whole country, and in a great degree superseded the necessity of relief by an almost instantaneous restoration of confidence. Sir Francis Baring concurs in this view, and adduces the remarkable success of the measure as an argument to shew the mistaken policy of the Bank. After careful deliberation, the Bullion Report warmly approved of it; censured the proceedings of the Bank; and especially cite it as an illustration of the principle they laid down, that an enlarged accommodation is the true remedy for that occasional failure of confidence to which our system of Paper Credit is unavoidably exposed.

This occasion, therefore, is a most important example of the beneficial effects of the EXPANSIVE Theory in a monetary panic.

16. Towards the end of 1794 the exchanges began to fall rapidly, and in May, 1795, were so low that it was profitable to export bullion. While, however, the exchanges were so adverse, the issues of the Bank were immensely extended, from circumstances which are too long to state at length here, but which we have given already,¹ and which there is no necessity to detail, because the simple fact is enough that the issue of Bank Notes was greatly increased while gold was rapidly leaving the country. The Directors now became seriously alarmed for the safety of the Bank, and took the most rigorous measures to contract their issues. In April, 1796, the exchanges became favourable, and they continued to be so till February, 1797.

The excessive contraction of its issues by the Bank caused the greatest inconvenience to commerce, and a meeting of bankers and merchants was held to devise some means of relief. The failures among the country bankers in 1793 had caused an immense diminution in the country issues, and Thornton says that in the last three months of 1796 the issues of the Bank were no higher than they had been in 1782, with an amount of

¹ *Vol. I., p. 450.*

commerce many times larger than in that year. As the public could not get Notes, they made a steady and continuous demand for guineas: and, *although the exchanges were favourable to the country, and gold was coming in from abroad*, there was a severe drain on the Bank for gold. Political circumstances added to the alarm, and about the middle of February a stoppage of country banks became general. The panic reached London, and a general run began upon the bankers. Before this the Directors had used the most violent efforts to contract their issues. In five weeks they had reduced them by nearly £2,000,000. On the 21st January they were £10,550,830, on the 21st February they were £8,640,250. But even this gave no true idea of the curtailment of mercantile accommodation; for the private bankers were obliged, for their own security, to follow the example of the Bank. In order to meet their payments, persons were obliged to sell their stock of all descriptions, at an enormous sacrifice. The 3 per cents. fell to 51!

On Saturday, the 25th February, 1797, the specie in the Bank was reduced to £1,272,000, with the drain becoming severer every hour. The Directors now felt that they could hold out no longer: and on Sunday a Cabinet Council was held, and an order in Council issued directing the Bank to suspend payments in cash until the sense of Parliament could be taken on the subject. Accordingly, on Monday, the 27th, the cash being then reduced to £1,086,170, the Bank suspended payments in cash, and did not resume them partially till 1816, and completely till 1821.

But immediately this was done, they enlarged their accommodation liberally; within a week they increased their issues by two millions, and the relief was very great. A meeting of 4,000 merchants and bankers agreed to support the credit of the Notes.

The most eminent authorities afterwards severely censured the management of the Bank. Thornton said that the excessive contraction of Notes had shaken public credit of all descriptions, and had caused an unusually severe demand for guineas: that the Bank ought to have extended its issues to supply the place of the country Notes which were discredited. Boyd was clearly of opinion the excessive restriction of Notes was the chief cause of the forced sale and depreciation of the public securities. In 1810

the Governor of the Bank said, that after the experience of the policy of restriction, many of the Directors repented of the measure: and the Bullion Committee explicitly condemned the policy of the Bank, both in 1793 and 1797.

Nothing, in short, could be more unhappy than their regulation of their issues. When the exchanges were violently adverse, so that it was very profitable to export gold, they enlarged them to an extravagant extent: and when the exchanges were extremely favourable, so that gold was flowing in, they contracted them with merciless severity. The issues, which were £14,000,000 when the exchanges were against the country, were reduced to £8,640,250 when they had been for several months eminently favourable. The entire concurrence of the evidence shews that it was this excessive restriction of credit which caused the severe demand for gold.

And now we see the practical results of the two policies: when all commercial and banking credit was on the verge of universal ruin, it was saved and restored by the EXPANSIVE Theory in 1793; in 1797 the RESTRICTIVE Theory was carried out to the bitter end, AND THE RESULT WAS THE STOPPAGE OF THE BANK.

A consideration of all these circumstances induced the Bullion Committee to condemn the RESTRICTIVE Theory in the most emphatic terms; and all the greatest mercantile authorities of that period, including Peel himself, as we have shewn, in 1819, entirely concurred in these doctrines: and they said that no limitation of the Bank's power of issue could ever be prescribed at any period, however remote. That period, however, came in 1844.

The next great crisis was in 1825. Ever since the beginning of 1824 there was a continual drain of bullion, which the Bank took no means to stop. It fell from 13½ millions in March, 1824, steadily and continuously, to barely 3 millions in November, 1825, when every one felt a crisis to be impending. The papers discussed the policy of the Bank, and it was generally expected that it would rigorously contract its issues. The panic began on Monday, the 12th of December, 1825, with the fall of Pole, Thornton & Co., one of the principal city banks, which drew down

with them forty country banks. A general run began upon all the city bankers. For three days the Bank pursued a policy of the most severe restriction. Mr. Huskisson said that during 48 hours it was impossible to convert into money, to any extent, the best securities of the Government. Exchequer bills, Bank Stock, East India Stock, as well as the public funds, were unsaleable. At last, when universal stoppage was imminent, the Bank completely reversed its policy. On Wednesday, the 14th, it discounted with the utmost profuseness. Mr. Harman said—"We lent by every possible means, and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock as security; we purchased Exchequer bills: we made advances on Exchequer bills: we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on deposits of bills of exchange to an immense amount: in short, by every possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not, on some occasions overnice; seeing the dreadful state the public were in, we rendered every assistance in our power." Between Wednesday and Saturday the Bank issued £5,000,000 in Notes, and sent down to the country a large box of £1 notes, which they accidentally found. This bold policy was crowned with the most complete success; the panic was stayed almost immediately, and by Saturday was over.

The circumstances of this crisis are the most complete and triumphant example of the truth of the principles of the Bullion Report, and of the EXPANSIVE Theory: and signally vindicate the wisdom of Peel in 1819, when he refused to adopt the RESTRICTIVE Theory, and impose a numerical limit on the Bank's issues.

The next crisis was in 1837: but the Bank, foreseeing it, judiciously anticipated it, and made the most liberal issues to houses which required it. By thus adopting the EXPANSIVE Theory in good time, nothing more occurred than a severe monetary pressure, which was prevented from deepening into a crisis entirely by the judicious conduct of the Bank.

The Bank Act was passed amid general applause, but, as said above, on the very first occasion on which its powers were tested, in April, 1847, it completely failed to compel the Directors to carry out its principle, and one-third of its bullion ebbed away,

without any appreciable diminution of the amount of its notes in circulation.

But in October, 1847, a far severer crisis took place. The Bank made immense advances to other banks and houses to prevent them from stopping payment. But numerous Banks and Commercial Houses did stop payment, and the resources of the Bank were exhausted. At last, after repeated deputations to the Government to obtain a relaxation of the Act, and with the stoppage of the whole commercial world imminent, the Government authorised the Bank to issue at discretion. And what was the result? The panic vanished in 10 minutes! No sooner was it known that notes might be had if necessary, than the want of them ceased. The whole issue of Notes, in consequence of this letter, was only £400,000, and the legal limits of the Act were not exceeded.

Thus, on this occasion again, the RESTRICTIVE Theory wholly failed; and the EXPANSIVE Theory saved the country, and was the only means of saving the Bank itself from stopping payment.

The next great crisis was in November, 1857, which was far more severe, as regards the Bank itself, than that of 1847. On the 12th November, 1857, the Bank closed its doors with the sum of £68,085 in Notes; £274,953, in gold; and £41,106 in silver; being a total sum of £387,144! Such were the resources of the Bank of England to begin business with on the 13th! Truly said the Governor, it must entirely have ceased discounting, which would have brought an immediate run upon it. The bankers' balances alone were £5,458,000. It is easy to see that the Bank could not have kept its doors open for an hour.

On the evening of the 12th the Government sent a letter to the Bank, authorising them to issue Notes at their discretion, but not at a less rate than 10 per cent.; and next morning the panic, as before, passed away.

Thus on this occasion, again the RESTRICTIVE Theory wholly failed: and the EXPANSIVE Theory saved the country: and was the only means of saving the Bank itself from stopping payment.

The next great crisis was in 1866, which was still more severe. Unfortunately, no investigation was held respecting it, so that there is no reliable account of its circumstances. But speculation

had exceeded all due bounds. On the 10th of May there was a general run upon all the London banks. It was said, but we cannot say with what truth, that one great bank alone paid away £2,000,000 in six hours. After banking hours it became known that the great discount house of Overend, Gurney & Co. had stopped, with liabilities exceeding ten millions—the most stupendous failure that had ever taken place in the city. The result of such a catastrophe was easily foreseen; not another bank could have survived the next day; and that evening the Government again authorised the Bank to issue at discretion, at not less than 10 per cent. The Bank advanced £12,225,000 in five days: but the panic passed away.

Thus again the **RESTRICTIVE** Theory wholly failed: the **EXPANSIVE** Theory saved the country, and was the only means of saving the Bank itself, as well as every other bank, from stopping payment.

Thus we see the entire failure of Sir Robert Peel's expectations. He took away the power of unlimited issues from the Bank, and imposed a rigorous numerical limit on its powers of issue, under the hope that he had prevented the recurrence of panics. But the panics recurred with precisely the same regularity as before; and, therefore, in this sense too, the Act has failed: and when panics do occur, it is decisively proved that it is wholly incompetent to deal with them.

17. It has been seen that it is a complete delusion to suppose that the Bank Act carries out the "Currency Principle." It might be supposed, perhaps, that if it did really carry out the "Currency Principle," it might prevent panics arising. General experience, however, entirely negatives this view. In 1764, the most terrible Monetary Crisis which had up to that time occurred, took place at Amsterdam and Hamburg, where the banks were really constructed on the "Currency Principle."

A decisive example of this took place at Hamburg in 1857. A similar Monetary Crisis took place there, as here, and the Bank being constructed on the "Currency Principle," had no power to issue Notes to support Credit. The Magistrates were obliged to issue City Bonds to support the Credit of the merchants, exactly as the Government had issued Exchequer bills in England in 1793. Here also the **RESTRICTIVE** Theory wholly failed, and it

was found necessary to adopt the **EXPANSIVE** Theory to avert universal failure.

These disasters took place where there was no Currency at all, but what represented bullion: and they are conspicuous examples that panics occur just as readily under a purely Metallic Currency as under a Paper Currency.

The experience of every other country exactly confirms the experience of England. At Turin the bank was constructed on some principle of limitation: but in 1857, during a monetary panic, it was found necessary to suspend its constitution, and allow it to issue Notes to support Credit.

The very same thing was conspicuously proved in 1873. In Austria, in North Germany, and in America, the Banks were all constructed on some analogous principle of limitation on their issues. But in the severe monetary panic in each of these countries, it was found necessary to suspend their constitutions, and authorise them to issue at discretion to support commercial Credit.

Thus universally throughout the world it is proved by abundant experience, that the **RESTRICTIVE** Theory cannot be maintained after a monetary panic has reached a certain degree of intensity; and that it is absolutely necessary to adopt the **EXPANSIVE** Theory to avert universal failure.

18. The supporters of the Act of 1844 strenuously maintain that it is the complement of, and in strict accordance with the principles of the Act of 1819, and the Bullion Report. But such statements are utterly incorrect: and the following are the fundamental differences of principle between them—

I. The Bullion Report declares that the mere *numerical* amount of notes in circulation, at any time, is no criterion whether they are excessive or not.

The Theory of the framers of the Act is that the Notes in circulation ought to be exactly equal in quantity to what the gold coin would be if there were no Notes: and that any excess of Notes above that quantity is a *depreciation* of the Currency.

Is this principle of the supporters of the Act in accordance with the principle of the Bullion Report?

II. The Bullion Report declares, and the supporters of the

Act of 1819 maintained, that the sole test of the depreciation of the Paper Currency is to be found in the Price of Gold Bullion, and the state of the Foreign Exchanges.

Ricardo says¹—"The issuers of paper money should regulate their issues solely by the price of bullion, and never by the quantity of their paper in circulation. The quantity can never be too great nor too little, while it preserves the same value as the standard."

According to the supporters of the Act of 1844, the true criterion is whether the Notes do or do not exceed in quantity the gold they displace.

Is the doctrine of the supporters of the Act of 1844 in accordance with the principles of the Bullion Report, and of the Act of 1819?

III. It was proposed to the Bullion Committee to impose a positive limit on the issues of the Bank, to curb their powers of mismanagement. The Bullion Report expressly condemns any positive limitation of its issues: and Peel in 1819, and in 1833, fully concurred in this condemnation.

The Bank Act of 1844 specially limits the issues of the Bank.

Does the Bank Act of 1844 coincide with the principles of the Bullion Report and the doctrines of Peel in 1819 and 1833?

IV. The Bullion Report, after discussing the most important monetary crises which had occurred up to that time, expressly condemns the RESTRICTIVE Theory in a monetary panic, and says that it may lead to universal ruin: and recommends the EXPANSIVE Theory.

The Bank Act enacts the RESTRICTIVE Theory by Law: and prevents the EXPANSIVE Theory from being adopted.

Does the Bank Act of 1844 agree with the doctrines of the Bullion Report, and of Peel in 1819 and 1833, on this point?

In 1793 the Bank adopted the RESTRICTIVE Theory; and when all commerce was on the brink of ruin, the Government, by issuing Exchequer bills, adopted the EXPANSIVE Theory, and commerce was saved.

In 1797 the RESTRICTIVE Theory was carried out to the end, and the result was the *stoppage of the Bank*.

¹ *Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency*, § 3.

In 1825 the RESTRICTIVE Theory was adopted for three days, and when commerce was again on the brink of ruin, it was suddenly abandoned; the EXPANSIVE Theory was adopted, and commerce was instantly saved.

In 1836 a great crisis was imminent: the Bank, foreseeing it, adopted the boldest measures before it came on, and made immense advances to sustain commercial credit: the policy was successful, and averted a general panic.

Peel, in introducing his measure of 1844, said that we must never again have such discreditable occasions as 1825, 1836, and 1839: but since 1844 we have had 1847, 1857, and 1866. On each of these occasions the RESTRICTIVE Theory was enacted by Law: and on each occasion the Government was obliged to come forward and authorise the Bank to break the Law, to abandon the RESTRICTIVE Theory and adopt the EXPANSIVE Theory. And by so doing universal ruin was averted, and the Bank itself saved from stopping payment.

Experience, therefore, has indisputably proved that the Bullion Report was framed with truer wisdom and scientific knowledge of the Principles of Paper Currency than the Bank Act of 1844. The only deficiency in the Report was that it failed to point out the proper means by which the Paper could be kept at par with gold. But the true principle of controlling the Paper Currency is now well understood to be by adjusting the RATE of DISCOUNT by the Foreign Exchanges, and the state of the bullion in the Bank.

*Examination of the Arguments alleged for maintaining the
Bank Act.*

19. It has now been clearly shewn that the Bank Act has completely failed both in THEORY and PRACTICE. It has been shewn that it is based on a DEFINITION of the word "Currency," which is entirely erroneous in Commercial Law, and in Philosophy—that it professes to adopt a Theory of Currency, which it has entirely failed to enforce—that if the Directors choose, they can mismanage the Bank quite as easily under the Act as before it. Lord Overstone justly pointed out that the radical vice of the Bank principle of 1832 was that the Bank might be completely drained of gold without a single note being withdrawn from the

hands of the public: the Bank Act was expressly framed with the intention of compelling the Directors to withdraw notes from the public exactly as gold was drawn out of the Bank. But it was decisively proved in April, 1847, that the Bank Act had precisely the same radical defect as the Bank principle of 1832; the Directors allowed many millions of gold to be withdrawn from the Bank without withdrawing a single note from the public, and the pretended "Mechanical" action of the Act wholly failed to prevent them doing so—that the Act was expressly framed with the expectation that it would prevent commercial panics, and that it has wholly failed in doing so: and hitherto panics have recurred with the same regularity as before—and furthermore, although the Act is in no sense whatever the original cause or source of these crises, yet when they *do* occur, and they reach a certain degree of intensity, the operation of the Act, by visibly limiting the means of assistance, deepens a severe monetary pressure into a panic, which can only be allayed by its suspension, and a violation of its principles.

In every one of these respects the Bank Act has completely failed: and in regard to these things its credit and reputation is utterly dead and gone. It is, therefore, necessary to examine fairly the arguments alleged in its favour, and the reasons urged why it should still be maintained.

The supporters of the Act, allowing that it has failed in some respects, yet maintain that the Directors having committed the same mischievous errors as they had done before it, it arrested their mis-management much sooner than would otherwise have been the case; and that when the panic did occur, it was only through the Act that the Bank had 6 millions of gold to meet the crisis; and that by this means the convertibility of the Note was secured.

So far as regards the crisis of 1847, it must be admitted that there is much force and truth in this argument. The Directors at that date shewed that they had not yet acquired the true principles of Banking, and it must be conceded that it was entirely owing to the Act that they were checked in their mistaken policy while there was still six millions of gold in the Bank.

But the same ground of censure did not apply to the crisis of 1857. In the interval between 1847 and 1857, the Directors

really at last grasped the true method of controlling the Paper Currency by means of the Rate of Discount. The truth of this principle was probably more enforced upon their attention by the limitation imposed by the Act than it would otherwise have been. It has never been alleged that the crisis of 1857 was in any way due to the Act. But it is a matter of positive certainty that since that date the Bank has fully recognised and adopted the principle of governing the Paper Currency by means of the Rate of Discount. The same rule has been adopted by the Bank of France, and this is now the recognised principle by which every Bank is managed. Certainly since 1857 there has not been a breath of blame on the general management of the Bank. Granting every merit which can fairly be due to the Act, that it has compelled the recognition and adoption of this principle some years earlier than it otherwise would have been, it may be said that the Act has now fulfilled its purpose. It has done all the good that it can do. The Directors now perfectly understand and have for the last 17 years conducted the Bank with the greatest success on sound principles. Having, therefore, accomplished this great purpose, the Act has done its work, and has ceased to be necessary: and its operation at other most important times being proved to be injurious by the most overwhelming evidence, it may now be safely and advantageously repealed—so far at least as regards the limitation of its power of issue. And the reason for the expediency of this change is this—

Under the present system of Commercial Credit, there must be some Source with the power of issuing undoubted Credit to support solvent Commercial Houses in times of Monetary Panic.

It has been conclusively shewn in the preceding remarks, that it is entirely futile to expect that Commercial Crises can be prevented, and that they occur with precisely the same violence in places where there is a purely metallic currency as anywhere else. Hence the illusions in this respect, on which the Act was founded, are now completely vanished.

In all cases, houses which are clearly insolvent should not be supported; they ought to be compelled to stop without any hesitation. To support such houses is a fraud upon their creditors. But under our complicated system of commerce, the Credit of

even the most solvent houses is so interwined and connected with others, that no one can tell how far any house, even of the highest name, is solvent. Consequently, every one is affected by this universal discredit. Many houses which are really solvent, may have their assets locked up in some form which is not readily convertible. Under such circumstances it is absolutely indispensable, to prevent universal ruin, that there should be some source to afford undoubted credit to houses which can prove their solvency. And there are but two sources from which such credit can be issued—the Government and the Bank of England.

In 1793, the Bank resolutely refused to support Commercial Credit, and the Government were obliged to assist solvent houses with Exchequer bills, and this saved the commercial community from ruin. In 1797, the Bank also refused to support commerce, and the result was its own stoppage. After the stoppage, however, it largely extended its issues, and commerce was relieved.

In every commercial crisis since 1797, however sternly the Bank has adopted the RESTRICTIVE Theory at first, it has ultimately been driven to abandon it, and adopt the EXPANSIVE Theory. In 1825, while the Bank persisted in the RESTRICTIVE Theory, some eminent bankers stopped payment with assets worth 40s. in the pound. Two days afterwards the Bank changed its policy, and issued notes with the most profuse liberality, and the panic vanished. If the Bank had adopted this principle at first, and assisted those bankers who were really solvent, they would have been saved from stopping payment.

The very same principle was decisively proved in 1847, 1857, and 1866; the RESTRICTIVE Theory was in those years enforced by law. But no Government could maintain the Act and the RESTRICTIVE Theory to the bitter end, and face the consequences of producing universal ruin in pursuance of a Theory, which the most distinguished authorities of former times had unanimously condemned.

It is, therefore, irrefragably proved by the unanimous opinion of the most eminent commercial authorities, and the clear experience of 100 years, that the RESTRICTIVE Theory in a commercial crisis is a fatal delusion; and that when a commercial panic is impending, the ONLY way to avert and allay it is to give prompt, immediate, and liberal assistance to all houses who can prove themselves to be solvent; at the same time allowing all

houses which are really insolvent to go. Universal experience proves that this is the *only* means of separating the sound from the unsound, and averting general ruin by preserving the former.

20. As a matter of fact it is perfectly well known to all bankers that an excessive restriction of credit *produces* and *causes* a run for gold.

Sir William Forbes, in his interesting *Memoirs of a Banking House*, says of the crisis of 1793—"These proceedings, which obviously foreboded a risk of hostilities, were the signal for a check on mercantile credit all over the kingdom; *and that check led by consequence to a demand on bankers for the money deposited with them*, in order to supply the wants of mercantile men."

The Bullion Report expressly attributes the stoppage of the Bank in 1797 to the merciless restriction of Credit.

In 1857, discounts had ceased at the various banks, and a general run was commencing upon them, when the Treasury letter came: this allayed the panic, and stopped the run.

In 1866, matters were a great deal worse. In consequence of the restriction on Credit, a most severe and general run took place on all the London bankers. The sum paid away during the panic can probably never be known, but it was something perfectly fabulous. And this general run upon the bankers was certainly caused and produced by the excessive restriction of Credit, caused by the Bank Act.

The result of such an Act was most distinctly predicted by Henry Thornton, one of the joint authors of the Bullion Report, in his treatise on the Paper Credit of Great Britain, published in 1802. He says—

"Two kinds of error on the subject of the affairs of the Bank of England have been prevalent. Some political persons have assumed it to be a principle, that in proportion as the gold of the Bank lessens, its paper, or, as is sometimes said, its loans (for the amount of the one has been confounded with that of the other), ought to be reduced. It has been already shewn, THAT A MAXIM OF THIS SORT, IF STRICTLY FOLLOWED UP, WOULD LEAD TO UNIVERSAL FAILURE."

The Bank Act of 1844 was constructed on this precise principle, and Thornton's prediction has been strictly verified.

Seeing, then, that it is a matter of absolute demonstration that

it is indispensably necessary that there must be some source having the power to issue solid Credit to support solvent houses in Monetary Panics, it only remains to consider whether that source should be the Government, or the Bank—and very convincing reasons shew that it ought to be the Bank rather than the Government.

Such a duty is quite out of the usual line of the Government. They must issue a Special Commission to investigate the solvency of those merchants who ask for assistance. Such a Commission would never be appointed until matters had become very severe, and much suffering would be caused by the unnecessary delay.

But such a thing is the ordinary and every day business of the Bank. The merchant simply goes in the ordinary way of business to the Directors, satisfies them of his solvency, gives the necessary security, and receives the assistance without delay.

These considerations, as well as others that might be adduced, shew that the proper source to have this power is the Bank of England and not the Government.

21. Some persons, however, might suppose that such an issue of notes might turn the Foreign Exchanges against the country. It was formerly supposed, and the idea pervaded Sir Robert Peel's speech, that the Foreign Exchanges are mainly influenced by the numerical amount of Notes issued. But in modern times it has been proved that the *Rate of Discount* is an infinitely more powerful method of acting on the Exchanges than the amount of Notes. And this may be said to be a new discovery since Sir Robert Peel's speech ; for there is not a trace of the principle to be found in it. In former times, certainly, when there were multitudes of Banks issuing torrents of Notes, these Notes lowered the Rate of Discount, and drove bullion out of the country. But under the modern system, when these issues have been happily suppressed, all danger on this score has vanished : and under present circumstances no issues are excessive which *do not lower the Rate of Discount*.

The doctrine laid down in the Bullion Report, and by all the most eminent authorities of that period, was, that the true criterion of the proper quantity of Paper Currency was not in its

numerical amount, but the state of the Foreign Exchanges and the Market Price of Gold Bullion. This doctrine was true so far as it went: but unfortunately they never investigated the correct method of keeping the Paper Currency in its proper state. The principal method thought of until after Sir Robert Peel's time, was simply diminishing its numerical amount. It is true that raising the Rate of Discount was reckoned among the subsidiary methods of curbing it, but so little was its true importance understood, that it was not even mentioned by Sir Robert Peel. Since his time, however, it has been demonstrated by argument, and proved by conclusive experience, that it is the true SUPREME POWER OF CONTROLLING THE EXCHANGES and the PAPER CURRENCY, and that all other methods are insignificant compared to it. And since the Directors now thoroughly understand and act upon this principle, they may be entrusted with unlimited powers of issue.

22. Some able authorities, however, are of opinion that the Act should be maintained, as it strengthens the hands of the Directors in carrying out this principle, and enforcing the rule. That without the Act, commercial pressure upon them might sometimes be too strong to resist. Whatever force there may be in this argument, it will be found that the other arguments completely outweigh it; and in fact such an argument naturally leads us to consider the constitution of the Directorate itself.

By a remarkable custom, professional bankers are excluded from the Directorate of the Bank, which is exclusively composed of merchants. It has long been recognised that Commercial Credit and Banking Credit are of two distinct natures, and in many respects essentially conflicting and antagonistic. The same persons should not carry on both kinds of business; great bankers should not be merchants, and great merchants should not be bankers. The DUTY of a banker frequently conflicts with, and is antagonistic to, the INTEREST of a merchant. A banker's duty is to keep himself always in a position to meet his liabilities on demand; and when there is a pressure upon him it is his duty to raise the price of his money. But the INTEREST of a merchant always is to get accommodation as cheap as possible. Hence, as the Directors emanate exclusively from the Commercial body, the INTEREST of the body from which they come, has been frequently

opposed to their DUTY as Directors of the Bank. And, formerly, it cannot be denied that their sympathy for the body to which they belonged has interfered with their proper course of action as Directors of the Bank, and has been the cause of many errors.

The whole principles of the subject have now been brought to strictly scientific demonstration. If, therefore, the Directors find themselves unable to withstand Commercial pressure, and fulfil their undoubted duty, it would seem to raise the question whether some modification of the constitution of the Directorate might not be desirable, and whether a certain portion of them, at least, should not be as unconnected with commerce as private bankers are. There are very good reasons why they should not be *exclusively* taken from the Commercial body.

The overwhelming weight of practical considerations is in favour of restoring the Bank to its original condition, and abolishing the separation of the two departments; which has been shewn was intended to carry out a particular THEORY, but which it wholly fails to do. For while times are quiet, or even during a tolerably severe monetary pressure, the Act is wholly in abeyance, it is utterly inoperative. But when a real commercial crisis takes place, and it totally fails to prevent these, as it was expected to do—and when that crisis has deepened beyond a certain degree of intensity, then the Act springs into action with deadly effect. It prevents by Law the only course being adopted, which the unvarying experience of 100 years has shewn to be indispensable to avert a panic, namely, a timely and liberal assistance to solvent houses: then follows wild panic; and if the Act were rigorously maintained, then universal ruin.

There is also another circumstance of the greatest importance to be observed, but which has not obtained sufficient notice. By the Bank Act of 1833, Bank Notes are made legal tender *only while the Bank pays its Notes in gold on demand*. As soon as it ceases to do so, no one can be compelled to take them, any more than any other bank notes. Consequently, if the Bank were compelled to stop payment in a panic, by enforcing the Bank Act of 1844, to its last extremity, as it most certainly would have done in 1847, 1857, and 1866, its Notes immediately cease to be legal tender by the Bank Act of 1833, and their holders could not compel any one to receive them in payment of a debt.

23. In the debate on Mr. Anderson's motion in the House of Commons, on the 25th March, 1878, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lowe, seemed to turn commercial panics into ridicule. He said that we never hear of military panics, or naval panics; why then should we hear of commercial panics? He seemed to consider English merchants as an inferior breed of men to English soldiers and English sailors. For once the Right Honourable Gentleman's acumen was at fault. The analogy is wholly erroneous. It is the duty of military and naval men to face death; it is their profession. But it is not the duty of commercial men to face ruin with equal equanimity. Under the modern system of commerce, discount is as necessary to commercial existence as air is to the life of the body. When the whole commercial community sees the very means of their existence rapidly diminishing before their eyes, they naturally rush to obtain Notes while they can, and on such occasions no raising of the Rate of Discount can check the demand. If they cannot get Notes, they run for Gold. Such a state of things naturally and inevitably produces, and invariably will produce a panic. The analogy of the Black Hole at Calcutta is much more true. When 150 wretched men were shut up for a whole night, in a tropical climate, in a room less than 20 feet square, with only one small window to admit air, they naturally fought and struggled to get near it to preserve their existence. Under such circumstances there was, and there always would be a panic. So in the commercial world, when they see the very means of their existence rapidly diminishing before their eyes, they naturally fight and struggle to get possession of it, and they always will do so under similar circumstances. If the "Currency Principle," were carried out to the last extremity in a Monetary Panic, the survivors of the commercial community would not be proportionately more numerous than the survivors of the Black Hole of Calcutta.

Mr. Gladstone also, in the same debate, said that the Government would consider the subject, to see if any amendment could be introduced into the Act. But he said that such an amendment would take the Act as its basis of departure, and would be to strengthen and carry out its principle. But no human ingenuity could do that. The Currency Principle is that 1 is equal to 1. If the present constitution of the Bank be supposed to carry out the Currency Principle, then 2·6 must be held to be equal to 1.

There is no possible method of carrying out the "Principle" of the Act, except by taking away all the Bank's powers of making profits.

The true object of the Act is to ensure the convertibility of the Bank Note. But the Principle of the Act, or the machinery devised for that purpose, is merely a means to that end, and it has been proved to be defective. A better means of attaining the object of the Act has been ascertained and demonstrated to be true by the strictest scientific reasoning, as well as by abundant experience, since the passing of the Act, which is acknowledged to be efficacious, and, therefore, the Act is no longer necessary. The necessity of passing the Act was a deep discredit to the Directors of the Bank. It was a declaration that they were not competent to manage their own business. But now that they have shewn that they are perfectly able to do so, it is no longer necessary. It may be sometimes necessary to put a patient into a strait-waistcoat; but when the patient is perfectly recovered, and is restored to his right mind, the strait-waistcoat may be removed—especially as it is found that, under certain circumstances, the strait-waistcoat not only strangles the patient, but scatters death and destruction all around.

24. We thus see that Sir Robert Peel was greatly deceived in his expectation that the limitation of the Bank's power of issue would prevent commercial crises. On this occasion he erred, as so many others have erred, in Economics, by too limited a consideration of facts. It is true that on *some* occasions the Bank had fostered an over-spirit of speculation by too profuse an issue of notes. But commercial crises occur from other causes besides: they have occurred when there was no profuse issue of notes, and in places where there were no notes beyond bullion. Whenever there are expected to be great fluctuations in prices from whatever cause arising—either from great scarcity or from great abundance—from the transition from peace to war, or from war to peace—from the discovery of new profitable openings of every description—from great disturbance in the usual course of trade—the speculative or gambling propensity is sure to be called forth, and lead to a pressure more or less intense. In 1694 the first joint stock mania took place, when there was no excessive credit. In 1720 there was no excessive issue of notes.

In 1763 there was no excessive issue of notes, and the great commercial crisis of that year took place at Amsterdam, where the "Currency Principle" was in full operation. In 1772 there were excessive issues of notes, which greatly conduced to the crisis. In 1783 the crisis seems to have been due to the transition from war to peace. Before 1793 there were excessive issues of notes by the miserable traders whom the monopoly of the Bank permitted to grow up as bankers. Previous to 1797 the Bank itself had made excessive issues, compelled thereto by Pitt. In 1808 the Bank greatly fostered the spirit of speculation. In 1824 and 1825 the Bank was far too long before it contracted its issues. So also in 1836 and 1839. But in 1847, 1857, and in 1866, the great crises were in no way whatever attributable to excessive issues. In 1847 it was excessive railway speculation. In 1857 it was due to a series of causes wholly irrespective of issues, and in that year the severity of the crisis at Hamburg, where the "Currency Principle" is carried out, and was so great that the Government was obliged to come forward to create a solid credit to support solvent houses. In 1866 there were no excessive issue of notes. The most bigoted opponent of the Bank could by no possibility say that the crises of 1857 and 1866 were in any way whatever attributable to the Bank, or could, by any possibility have been averted by any management of the Bank.

The crisis of 1808 was due to the sudden opening of the South American markets. That of 1825 to the anticipated profits on working foreign mines. That of 1836 partly to the rapid extension of Joint Stock Banks. That of 1847 to excessive railway speculations. That of 1857 to excessive trading especially in America. That of 1866 to the too rapid extension of Financial Companies on the limited liability principle. Hence we see that a law made on the supposition that all crises are caused by a single circumstance, and whose operation is only adapted to that cause, must necessarily fail.

Sir Robert Peel was further in error in saying, that during periods of commercial crisis private persons make advances. It may, perhaps, happen that here and there a private person may assist a friend, but, as a general rule, it is wholly without foundation. It was observed, before the passing of the Act,

that in times of commercial pressure there was a general tendency to hoard. This was observed in 1825, in 1836, and in 1839. And this tendency was greatly aggravated by the Act of 1844, and was displayed with far greater intensity in 1847. When the public saw that the Bank's reserve was diminishing so rapidly, and no one knew what would be done, a general run was made at its notes, and they were hoarded away in millions. No sooner was the Act suspended than they came forth in millions from their hiding places, and the panic passed away. Therefore, in this fundamental point, there is no doubt whatever that Sir Robert Peel was entirely wrong, and that the allegation of the opponents of the Act is strictly justified—that, when a pressure reaches a certain point, the Act aggravates and intensifies it into a panic, which can only be allayed by the suspension of the Act.

Moreover, Sir Robert Peel was quite mistaken in supposing that bankers only make advances out of *bona fide* capital. This is so fully set forth in the chapter on the Theory of Banking, that we need only remind our readers that all banking advances are made, in the first instance, by CREATING CREDIT. Every banker knows perfectly well that an excessive restriction of credit causes and produces a run for gold. When the banks see that they can get no assistance from the Bank of England, they must cease discounting. But if they cease discounting, their customers have still engagements to meet, which, of course, they will do as long as they can; and, in order to do so, they have no other resource but to draw their balances, and this, of course, will end in making their bankers stop payment; and bankers and customers will fall together.

Many persons have observed that the variations in the Rate of Discount have been much more frequent since the Act than before it; and they maintain that the Bank Act is the cause of these variations. In answer to this, it may be said that it was the very fixedness of the Rate of Discount in former times that was the main cause of many calamities; and that if the variations had been more frequent and severe, these calamities would have been saved. And as for the frequent variations since the Act, it may be confidently said that the Bank Act is in no way whatever their cause. Their true cause is the increased knowledge of the true scientific principles of Banking, and the increased speed and

cheapness with which bullion now flies from one commercial centre to another.

These considerations give a final and conclusive answer to those persons who conceive that the Rate of Discount can be kept fixed. These variations are in modern times absolutely indispensable, and the only method by which the Bank can preserve its security. They must necessarily have been made, had the Bank Act never existed at all. In fact, if this principle of controlling the Paper Currency had been understood and acted upon in former times, there never would have been any necessity for the Act. It was the very ignorance or neglect of this principle which had brought the Bank into danger so many times before.

25. It is a matter of very serious doubt indeed whether the sweeping words of the Bank Act of 1844 have not rendered all English banking illegal. For the 11th section enacts, in the broadest possible terms, that no banker "shall make any engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand." Now we have shewn the utter misconception of the very nature of banking business so generally prevalent, even among persons who might naturally have been expected to have been better informed. Thus, even Gilbert and Lord Overstone consider the business of banking to consist in borrowing money from one set of persons and lending it to another. So, also, paragraph 62 of the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on the crisis of 1857; among other errors and misconceptions, which we have already refuted, says—"the use of Money, and that only they regard as the province of a bank, whether a private person or incorporation, or of the banking department of the Bank of England."

Now we have over and over again pointed out that this is the business of a Bill Discounter, and not of a "Banker." A banker never lends money in the first instance; we have already explained that the very essence of banking is to create Credit, or liabilities payable to bearer on demand. We have already shewn¹ how completely Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Wilson were mistaken as to the very nature of the business of banking. Equally ill informed also was Mill, for in the early editions of his *Political Economy*, he has this note in his chapter on the *Regulation of Currency*, Book

¹ Vol. I., Ch. 6, § 15.

III., ch. 24, § 3.—“It would not be to the purpose to say, by way of objection, that the obstacle may be evaded by granting the increased advance in book credits, to be drawn against by cheques, without the aid of bank notes. This is, indeed, possible, as Mr. Fullarton has remarked, and as I have myself said in a former chapter. *But this substitute for bank note currency certainly has not yet been organised (!!)*; and the law having clearly manifested its intention that in the case supposed, *increased Credits should not be granted*, it is yet a problem whether the law would not reach *what might be regarded as an evasion of its prohibitions*, or whether deference to the law would not produce (as it has hitherto done!) on the part of banking establishments, conformity to its spirit and purpose, as well as to its mere letter.”

Now what Mill in this extract said has never yet been organised happens to be the precise thing in which “banking” consists! It is right to add that in the later editions of his work this paragraph has been omitted.

But though Mill shewed his ignorance of the existing facts in this case, his admission is valuable that this practice is a direct violation of the spirit and purpose of the Bank Act; but whether it is not also a direct violation of its *letter* is very seriously doubtful.

All banking advances, then, are made by creating Credit or Deposits; and whether this Credit is transferred from one person to another, by means of Bank Notes, or Cheques, in no way affects its nature or its quantity. And it is this very thing which is already creating so much alarm in the minds of many persons when they see the huge mass of deposits, or Banking Credits, reared up by the London Banks, on so slender a basis of bullion: for these Deposits are in reality neither more nor less than so many Bank Notes in disguise.

Now, when a banker creates a Credit in his customer's favour, either in exchange for money, or bills, or any other security, by the fundamental contract between banker and customer he engages to pay this Credit to his customer, *or to any one else to whom his customer may assign it*: and in token of this he delivers to his customer a book containing blank slips payable to bearer on demand, or to order on demand, called in modern commercial language Cheques. The very essence and business of banking consists in “making engagements to pay money payable to bearer

on demand." It may be said, indeed, that a banker is not a party to the cheque: true, his name is not on the face of the instrument, as an obligor; but he is *bonâ fide*, and, in reality, a party to it so long as he has funds to meet it: for it is a legal liability of his to pay his customer, or any one his customer may assign it to; and by the very fact of his creating the Credit, he authorises his customer to put it into circulation. So long as his customer does not exceed the amount at the credit of his account, the banker is legally a sleeping party to the cheque.

Now, suppose that two men agree to assail a traveller; one of them points a loaded pistol at the traveller's head, the other pulls the trigger: both are equally guilty of the murder. Suppose one man lights a match and gives it to another man, and tells him to set the house on fire, both are equally guilty of the arson.

The very same argument applies to the ordinary routine business of banker and customer. The law distinctly says that no banker "shall make any engagement to pay money payable to bearer on demand." But the ordinary routine business of a banker is to create a credit in favour of his customer which he expressly authorises his customer to make payable to bearer on demand, and put it into circulation. Now what is this transaction but a clear conspiracy between the banker and the customer to violate the express words of the Bank Charter Act of 1844? The banker creates the engagement, and the customer puts it into circulation. The banker loads and points the pistol at the Bank Act, and the customer pulls the trigger: or the banker lights the match and delivers it to the customer who consumes the Act. How is this transaction one whit less a conspiracy in law than in the case of the murder or the arson?

Of course, the whole difficulty has been created by the gross ignorance of those who drew the Act of the routine business of banking: but that is no business of ours. There stand the distinct words of the Law; and there are the actual facts of banking; and it is not possible for the wit of man to reconcile them.

26. The subject cannot fail, we think, very soon to engage the attention of the Courts of Law and the Legislature, for very recently a new institution has been founded which is still a bold

contravention, not only of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, but of all our monetary legislation for the last 100 years, with a certain exception.

This Bank is called the CHEQUE BANK, and we will first describe its method of business, and then compare it with the existing monetary Laws.

It receives Money only, and in exchange for this money it issues an exactly equal amount of cheques payable to order, and crossed with the words ———“ & Co.”

Thus, suppose a person pays in £50 ; it will give him a book containing ten cheques payable to order and crossed, and perforated with the mark not exceeding £5. The customer may, of course, fill up the cheque with £5, or any less sum : but not with any greater sum : and supposing that any balance remains after the customer has exhausted the 10 cheques, the Bank will give him cheques to the amount of the balance.

As the cheques are crossed it pays no money over the counter, but all its cheques must pass through the hands of a banker, and are only payable to a banker. But though the Bank itself only pays them to a banker, any banker or other person may give cash for them just in the same way as for an ordinary cheque, and in the first year of its existence it has already established relations with about 1,500 home, foreign, and colonial banks, which will cash its cheques.

The plan adopted by this Bank obviates an objection to which ordinary cheques are liable : when a customer places money with an ordinary banker, the banker gives him a cheque book, but there is no security that the customer may not draw cheques in excess of the credit he has in the Bank : consequently, no one who takes an ordinary cheque has any guarantee that the drawer has any funds to meet it. But this cannot happen with the cheques of the Cheque Bank. They are not issued except in exchange for money : and any one who takes one of them is positively assured that it will be paid. These cheques, therefore, have all the actual security of cash. They are intended by the promoters of the bank to be received as a substitute for cash ; and already several Railway and other companies have agreed to receive them as cash. The Directors also propose to supersede Post Office Orders ; and there can be no doubt that they are far more convenient and cheaper than Post Office Orders. As the Directors take care to

issue no more cheques than money paid in, they publicly announce that none of their cheques will ever be refused, however long it may remain in circulation. These cheques are, therefore, in reality, crossed Bank Notes.

Now we do not intend for one moment to question the merit, the ingenuity, and the utility of this Bank. But the question is, How does it consist with the whole of our monetary legislation for the last hundred years, as well as with the Bank Act of 1844? About one hundred years ago many parts of the country were deluged with silver notes for 5s. and 10s., and even less: they were found such an intolerable nuisance that an Act was passed in 1775 to prohibit all notes under 20s.; and in 1777 another Act was passed, prohibiting all notes under £5. And, with the exception of the period between 1797 and 1829, it has been the inflexible determination of the Legislature to prohibit any banking obligations payable to bearer on demand, for less than £5, from being issued and circulated. And since the Bank Act of 1844, even this right has been restricted to those bankers who were in existence at that period. No new banks may issue obligations payable to bearer on demand. It was even for a long time illegal to draw cheques for less than £5, though that restriction is now removed. It is perfectly well known that coin cannot circulate along with paper of the same denomination; consequently, for a hundred years it has been the settled purpose of Parliament that no paper shall come into competition with the coin of the realm.

Now the Cheque Bank publicly guarantees the payment of all its cheques. It is, therefore, avowedly a party to them. What, then, prevents them, or is supposed to prevent them, from being an express violation of the words of the Bank Charter Act?—

1st. It is said that they are issued payable to order on demand, and not to bearer on demand.

Now, this cannot save them from the penalties of the Act, because as soon as the payee has indorsed them, they become payable to bearer on demand; and, consequently, the bank is a party to an obligation payable to bearer on demand contrary to the express words of the Act.

This subtlety, therefore, will not hold water for an instant.

2nd. But there is a second one. The cheques are *crossed*, and, therefore, they are not literally payable over the counter to *bearer*

on demand; but only to the bearer's banker, or agent, on demand.

Now this is the sole subtlety which is supposed to save these instruments from being a direct violation of the Bank Act. They are distinctly Bank Notes—but they are *crossed* Bank Notes, and, therefore, are supposed to evade, by the skin of their teeth, the precise words of the Act. Now it is a well known maxim of law, that no one shall do indirectly what the law forbids to be done directly. Now the Law most expressly forbids any banking obligations payable to bearer on demand to be issued; and it is supposed that it will allow its solemn purpose to be set aside by the flimsy dodge of making the obligations payable to bearer's agent on demand!

Now whether a Court of Law could, by any possibility, hold that these ingenious gentlemen have succeeded in evading the precise *letter* of the Law, we shall say nothing; because we little doubt but that before very long the question will be formally investigated.

But there can be no possible doubt that these instruments, these crossed Bank Notes, are an utter and complete violation of the manifest purpose and intention, not only of the Bank Charter Act, but of all our monetary legislation for the last century. For what is easier than for the Bank and its customers to agree to make these Cheques for £1, and put them into circulation? Then we have at once £1 Bank Notes. So also the cheques for 10s. and 5s. are the old silver notes back again. If the Cheque Bank may do this with impunity, why may not every other bank in the kingdom do the same?

The Cheque Bank professes, for the present at least, to issue its cheques only in exchange for cash. But if it does so in exchange for cash, what is there to prevent them from issuing them in exchange for bills and other securities? And why should not every other bank do precisely the same thing, if the Cheque Bank may? If the *crossing* is sufficient to save them from the penalties of the Act, they may equally be issued in exchange for bills and other securities.

No bank discounts a bill, or creates a credit in favour of a customer, unless it believes its advance secured. And if it creates a credit in his favour which he may the very next instant demand payment of in cash, it may just as well give him these crossed

Bank Notes, which will probably remain some time in circulation. There is nothing wanting but that the banker and the customer should agree to draw these cheques for even sums such as £5 and £1, or any others, and we have at once the power of unlimited issues of Bank Notes restored to the banks.

Now if it should be found that the ingenuity of these gentlemen has been successful, they will have completely picked the lock of the Bank Charter Act, and opened the floodgates to inundate the country with boundless quantities of paper money, which it has been the settled purpose of the Legislature to suppress.

The directors of the Bank, to do them justice, make no secret of their intentions; they intend to revolutionise the banking system of the country, and they will assuredly do it, if their experiment is allowed to proceed. For this Bank is the germ of a system which will reduce all our monetary laws and Bank Charter Acts to waste paper.

After the passing of the Bank Act of 1844, a custom sprang up in some of the Midland Counties of customers drawing cheques on their bankers, which the banker accepted. These, of course, were simply Bank Notes: and a clause was inserted in the Stamp Act of 1854 to preclude such proceedings.

Thus the Legislature has manifested its fixed determination to suppress banking obligations payable to bearer on demand; and when certain parties had discovered what they thought a loop-hole in the Act, Parliament immediately took care to stop it up. Now is it likely that when the Law Officers of the Crown and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are fully aware of the inevitable consequences which will sooner or later follow the operations of this Bank, they will suffer it to exist? Cheque Bank cheques are nothing more than accepted cheques, which have already been put down by law. The express purpose of Parliament is to suppress unlimited issues of circulating Banking Credit, and is it likely that they will permit their fixed determination to be set at nought by the paltry quibble that these Bank Notes are not payable to *bearer* on demand, but to *bearer's agent* on demand? The ingenious gentlemen who devised the Cheque Bank have laid a cockatrice's egg, which, if suffered to come to maturity, will inevitably devour the Bank Charter Act.

Since these remarks were written the original Cheque Bank has

gone into liquidation, but we allow them to remain because the conception of this Bank has been received with so much public favour, that at the present time an effort is being made to resuscitate it under the care of its original founders: and even though that may not succeed, its idea is so popular that other banks may be tempted to adopt its principle, and it is absolutely necessary to point out its utter illegality.

27. This circumstance will, no doubt, tend to accelerate, what statesmen of all parties are so anxious to avoid, a thorough and searching investigation into the whole of our Banking system. But, however they may strive to stave it off, such an inquiry will inevitably come. For each succeeding crisis will be more severe than its predecessor. In 1847, the first crisis after the Act of 1844, the Credit system was comparatively small; it had greatly increased in 1857, and the crisis was more severe; in 1866 it had greatly increased, and the crisis was far more terrible; and so it will be in future. Every year the system of Credit is attaining more colossal dimensions, and, like a huge octopus, it now grasps all classes and almost all persons in its embrace. And, like the throes of Enceladus, it will periodically convulse the world, until it is settled on true scientific principles.

CHAPTER XV.

ON THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF JOINT STOCK BANKING IN ENGLAND.

1. It is very commonly supposed that Joint Stock Banks were not permitted by law in England before 1826, nor in the metropolis till 1833, but the preceding narrative shews that this idea is incorrect. By the common law, Joint Stock Companies of all sorts, including, of course, banks, are perfectly legal, and, consequently, if we wish to have a correct idea of the matter, we must observe this, and then ascertain what changes and modifications were made in the common law by successive Acts of Parliament.

2. Although the first joint stock mania in England took place in 1694, no one at that time thought of getting up a joint stock bank, in fact, joint stock bank shares are the very last thing any one would think of getting up as a mere speculation. When the Bank of England was founded, it received no monopoly in its favour, and it was only in 1697, after the disastrous failure of the Land Bank Scheme, and the ruin of public credit, that the Bank was enabled to obtain a monopoly. But even that did not affect the common law right to establish such institutions, it only said that no rival bank should be erected or countenanced by Parliament. None, however, were formed; but, in 1708, another Company began doing banking business by issuing notes. The Bank then, in 1709, obtained the clause in the Act of that year, prohibiting any company of persons exceeding six in number from "borrowing, OWING, or taking up money on their bills, or notes payable to bearer on demand," which, we have shewn, was the well understood meaning of the word "banking" at that time. This clause was effectual up to 1742, when, in the Act of that year, it was re-enacted in much more full and explicit terms. But still the restriction was confined to borrowing, or OWING, money on their bills, or notes. Conse-

quently the method of creating liabilities by means of entries and cheques, which was borrowed from the Dutch by our bankers, was not affected by the restrictive words of the Act. When, therefore, the London bankers discontinued their issues of notes, and restricted themselves to entries and cheques, there was no law whatever to prevent joint stock banks being formed, and carried on by that method. This, however, completely escaped observation, and we can have very little doubt that if this flaw in the monopoly had been discovered, and an attempt made to take advantage of it, Parliament would immediately have put it down, and there can be no possible doubt but that it was their manifest intention to create a complete and effectual monopoly on behalf of the Bank, and protect it from any rival banks of any sort whatever. The effects of this monopoly, however, were most disastrous. Bank of England notes had no circulation beyond London, and it would not establish any branches in the country. No other powerful and wealthy banks could be formed, the consequence was, that when enterprise awoke in the country in the last quarter of the last century, and there was a great demand for an increased Currency, all sorts of petty tradesmen in all directions, grocers, linen-drappers, cheesemongers, tailors, &c., started up, and turned "bankers," *i. e.*, issuers of promissory notes, so much so, that in 1793 there were about 400 of these country "bankers." But, of course, this Paper Currency was of a most rotten description, and on the occasion of any great commercial crisis they failed by dozens. In the great crisis of 1793 no less than 100 stopped payment, and double that number were greatly shaken. In 1810 about a similar number stopped, a great number in 1812, and in the three years, 1814-15-16, ninety-two commissions in bankruptcy were issued against banks, and, allowing the usual proportion of four suspensions to one bankruptcy, in those three years alone about 360 banks stopped. In twenty-eight years, from 1791 to 1818, the official return shews that 273 commissions were issued against bankers, or we may fairly assume that upwards of 1,000 banks stopped payment during that period. The intolerable hardship of the monopoly of the Bank Charter may be conceived, when the Bank, doing no business itself at such places as Bristol or Liverpool, no powerful Bank could be formed at these places on account of it. These enormous failures among the country bankers, spreading ruin and desola-

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3. An attempt in 1823 to gain the consent of the Bank of England to give up the privileges of their Charter, so far as to permit joint stock banks to be formed in the country, having failed, even though a bribe was offered, nothing further took place till 1826, when the disasters of the preceding year being very generally attributed to the improper management of the country banks, the Ministry were powerful enough to compel the Bank to give up its unjustifiable monopoly, and at length agreed to permit joint stock banks to be formed beyond sixty-five miles from the metropolis. The Statute 1826, c. 46, was passed for this purpose. Its chief provisions are—

I. That banks of an unlimited number of partners may be formed, and carry on all descriptions of banking business by issuing notes and bills payable on demand, or otherwise, provided that such corporations or partnerships should not have any house of business or establishment as bankers in London, or at any place within sixty-five miles of London; and that each member of such corporation, or partnership, should be liable for all its debts of every description, contracted while he was a partner, or which fell due after he became a partner.

II. No such banking company was to issue or re-issue, either directly or indirectly, within the prescribed distance, any bill or note payable to bearer on demand, or any bank post-bill, nor draw upon its London agents any bill of exchange payable on demand, or for any less sum than £50, but they might draw any bill for any sum of £50 or upwards, payable in London or elsewhere, at any period after date, or after sight.

III. Such banking companies were expressly forbidden, by themselves or their agents, to borrow, owe, or take up in London, or at any place within sixty-five miles of London, any sum of money on any of their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any time less than six months from the borrowing thereof, but they might discount in London, or elsewhere, any bill or bills of exchange, not drawn by, or upon, themselves, or by, or upon, any person on their behalf.

IV. Before such a company began business, they were to make a return of the names and addresses of all their partners, and places for carrying on business, and the names of two or more of their partners, being resident in England, who were to be appointed public officers, and in whose names the company

were to sue and be sued, which return was to be verified by oath. And they were required to make returns of all changes in their body.

V. That all proceedings at law and in equity, civil and criminal, should be taken by and against the public officers of the company. All decrees and judgments obtained against such public officers should be valid against all and every member of the company; and execution upon a judgment against the public officer might be issued against any member of the company. But that every such public officer or person, against whom such execution was issued, should be fully indemnified by the other members of the company; but that no execution should issue against any person more than three years after he had ceased to be a partner.

VI. The Bank of England was authorised to establish branches at any place in England.

VII. Such banking companies might issue unstamped notes upon giving certain securities to the Crown, to make true returns of the amount of their issues, and to pay the amount of stamp duty on them; and they were not obliged to take out more than four licenses for issuing notes in different places. For any breach of these provisions in neglecting to send returns, the penalty was £500 per week, and various penalties were exacted for false returns. And every breach of the provisions relating to their banking business subjected the company to a penalty of £50.

VIII. The rights and privileges of the Bank of England were to remain intact and unaltered, except so far as varied by that Act.

4. Subject to these restrictions upon their business, this Act made no provisions regarding the constitution or capital of these companies. Each one was allowed to devise a constitution for itself, to name its own capital, and to make any public announcement regarding it that it pleased. The formation of joint stock banks under this Act proceeded very slowly at first, not more than four or five being formed in as many years. In fact, such banks could only be successfully formed by influential persons, and, of course, each of these had already his own bank, which he would naturally be unwilling to injure by the formation of so powerful a rival. The first joint stock bank was formed at Lancaster, the

were a banking partnership or any other. It was clear, therefore, that the bank could not itself directly accept bills. But it did not appear that the words of the Act prohibited *trustees* accepting bills for a less date, on behalf of the company. Nor, if trustees could accept, was there anything to prevent them accepting by procuration. Consequently, there appeared to be this method open, of circumventing the monopoly of the Bank of England. On the 21st of February, 1835, the Bank of St. Albans drew a bill for £25 upon the London and Westminster Bank, payable 21 days after date; which, on the 23rd, was presented for acceptance at the London and Westminster Bank, and was accepted in the following form—

Accepted.
At 36. Throgmorton-st., per procuration of
the trustees of the London and Westminster Bank.
J. W. GILBART, *Manager*.

10. The Bank of England moved for an injunction to restrain the Bank from accepting bills in this form, and, the case having been argued, the Court of Common Pleas held that it was an infraction of the Bank Charter Act of 1833, and the other Acts then in force respecting the Bank of England. Accordingly, the Master of the Rolls granted an injunction, restraining them from accepting bills at less than six months' date. The only result was, that the Bank paid the bills drawn upon it, without acceptance. The London and Westminster Bank being defeated in this manner, the London Joint Stock entered the lists against the Bank of England in another form. It agreed with a bank in Canada, that the latter might draw upon Mr. George Pollard, who might accept in his own name, and the London Bank agreed to find the funds to meet Mr. Pollard's acceptances, and such transactions were to be matters of account between the two banks. Mr. Pollard was not a shareholder in the London Bank: but he was their manager, and the transaction was substantially an acceptance by the bank. The House of Lords, however, declared this ingenious device to be illegal, as it was merely doing indirectly what they were forbidden to do directly. Thus ended the attempts of the London joint stock banks to free themselves from this monstrous oppression, from which they were not relieved till the Act of 1844.

11. It was always held at common law, that a man could not sue himself. Consequently, if the same individual was member of two partnerships, they could not go to law against each other. The consequence of this was, that no partnership could sue one of its members, or *vice versa*, and if the same person had shares in two different banks, they could not have sued each other for any demands, or debts. The Statute 1838, c. 96, was passed to remedy this anomalous state of matters; it enacted that a banking company might sue, or be sued, by any of its members, exactly as if they were separate individuals; and by the Statute 1840, c. 111, this was extended to criminal cases, so that if a member of such a banking partnership steals or embezzles any property belonging to it, of any description, or shall commit any offence against it, he may be indicted, and convicted exactly as if he were a stranger.

12. It being unlawful for spiritual persons to engage in any trading concerns, and such partnerships of which any of its members were spiritual persons, being held to be void and illegal, it was suddenly found that most of the banking companies in England were illegal, and all their contracts void, because some of their shareholders were clergymen. The Act, Statute 1841, c. 14, was passed to remedy this, and declared that such partnerships should not be illegal and void; and that their contracts should not be illegal and void, although some of their shareholders were clergymen.

13. When the impediments to the formation of joint stock banks beyond sixty-five miles from London were removed in 1826, they were left perfectly free as to the provisions of their deeds of constitution, their nominal and their paid-up capital, and all the details of management, nor were they obliged to publish any accounts. The public, consequently, were perfectly in the dark as to the magnitude and position of the bank, because they might advertise that their nominal capital was £1,000,000, divided into any number of shares. But no one had any means of knowing how many of the shares were taken and paid upon. Consequently, although the capital of the bank might be advertised in the papers as £1,000,000, no one could tell whether it had *bona fide* £500 paid up.

14. The first few joint stock banks having been apparently successful, naturally turned speculation into that channel. Numbers of new banks were started in all parts of the country, and many private bankers, fearing that the competition would be too powerful for them, united and formed themselves into joint stock banks. The rapid growth of these establishments led to much mismanagement, and many disasters, as might have been expected, and Committees of the House of Commons were appointed to inquire into the subject in 1836-7 and 1840-1.

15. The great abuses which were revealed in the course of these inquiries determined Sir Robert Peel, who was supposed to be the minister who *par excellence* understood banking, to bring in a bill to regulate the future constitution of these establishments. An Act, containing many elaborate provisions for this purpose, was accordingly passed, Statute 1844, c. 113. Fully admitting the enormous evils which this Act was intended to remedy, we will only say that a more unfortunate specimen of legislation, or one more entirely unsuitable to the nature of the business it related to, has not emanated from Parliament in recent times; and, being found to be an unmitigated nuisance, without any counterbalancing advantages, it was wholly repealed in 1857.

16. We have already said that Sir Robert Peel's Joint Stock Banking Act, Statute 1844, c. 113, was found to be wholly unsuitable for the purposes it was intended, and totally repealed. This was done by the Act, Statute 1857, c. 49. The principal provisions of this Act are as follows—

I. Every company formed under the Acts, Statute 1844, c. 113, or the Statute 1845, c. 75, were to register themselves before the 1st January, 1858, under the said Act, under severe penalties.

II. Any banking company, consisting of seven or more persons, having a capital of a fixed amount, divided into shares also of a fixed amount, and legally carrying on the business of banking, before the passing of the Act, may register itself under this Act, and then all provisions of any Act, letters patent, or deed of settlement constituting or regulating the company, as are inconsistent with the Joint Stock Companies' Acts, 1856, 1857, or

with the said Act, are thereby repealed in regard to that Company.

III. The above Banking Acts were then repealed as to any future companies, and as to existing companies, as soon as they were registered under this Act.

IV. Seven, or more, persons might register themselves as a company, other than a limited company, under this Act, provided the shares into which the capital of the company is divided are not less than £100 each.

V. The numbers of partners permitted in a private bank is extended to ten.

17. The question of admitting the principle of limited liability into commercial partnerships in this country has long been debated with much acrimony. The old theory of the law was expressed by Lord Eldon, who said that a man who entered into a commercial partnership, rendered himself liable "to his last shilling and his last acre" for the debts of the company. And this, no doubt, was true, as far as regards ordinary private partnerships. But many great companies had been formed and incorporated, in which the privilege of limited liability was specially conferred upon them. A principle may be good when applied to ordinary traders, who are supposed all to take an active part in the business, and to be each and all parties to every transaction. But in the case of great companies it is rather different. In them the great majority of the partners are specially debarred from all knowledge of the real nature of the transactions, which are expressly left in the hands of a small committee. Now, as there are many great objects in commerce which can only be carried by means of a great company, and it was obviously desirable that they should be carried out, it has long been the practice in granting Acts to these companies to limit the liability of the shareholders. This was done in the case of the Bank of England itself; in railway and other companies, also, almost universally, in the charters granted to Colonial banks. But for a very long time the application of this principle to private partnerships in England was vehemently resisted. However, this resistance was overcome in 1855, and in that year an Act was passed, Statute 1855, c. 133, to permit the formation of joint stock companies with limited

liability. However, although the principle was conceded as to other companies, joint stock banks were still most jealously excluded, on account of some unintelligible distinction between their trading and other trading. In the joint stock banking Act, of 1857, this exclusion was still strictly maintained. But the terrible examples of the failures of joint stock banks in 1857, at last compelled the Legislature to yield, and, in 1858, an Act was passed to extend limited liability to banks.

The chief provisions of this Act, Statute 1858, c. 91, are—

I. So much of the last-mentioned Statute of 1857, as prevented banks being formed on the principle of limited liability, was repealed.

II. All banks which issue promissory notes are subject to unlimited liability, as far as regards their notes, for which they are to be liable, in addition to the sum for which they are to be liable to the general creditors.

III. Every existing banking Company may register itself under this Act, upon giving thirty days' notice, to each and all of its customers. Any customer to whom it may fail to send notice retaining his full rights as before.

IV. All companies formed, or registering themselves, under this Act, must on the 1st February and 1st August, in each year, post up in a conspicuous place in its head office, and each branch, a statement of its liabilities and assets, made up in a form prescribed by the Act.

18. When, in the course of less than thirty-five years, men had seen the whole of England shaken, from end to end, by those tremendous banking catastrophes, which seemed to be of periodical recurrence, they turned to the example of a country, where, though there had been commercial difficulties, there never had been any banking disasters at all comparable to those of England. Many private bankers, it is true, had failed, but, except the Ayr Bank, up to 1826, no joint stock bank in Scotland had failed. A very strong and general demand therefore arose for the Scotch system, many men thinking, that because the Scotch banks were joint stock banks, that, therefore, joint stock banking was all that was requisite to attain security. When, therefore, the monopoly of the Bank was to a certain extent broken up in 1826, they expected to enjoy similar prosperity

and safety to what Scotland had done, and when, after an experience of fourteen years, they found that the joint stock banks were scarcely more secure and equally ill-managed as the private banks, great and bitter disappointment ensued, and joint stock banking became a bye word of reproach.

But in truth the causes of this are very evident. In Scotland the growth of banking had been extremely gradual. The first joint stock bank was founded in 1695, the second in 1727, the next in 1747, and, except a few country ones, no new one of any magnitude was founded till 1810. The consequence was that they gradually expanded with the increasing wealth of the country. They grew with its growth. Moreover, they correspondingly increased their capital. They acquired great experience, after committing many errors, which brought them to the brink of destruction. When the country required additional accommodation, it was done chiefly by throwing out branches from the parent establishments in the metropolis, so that they had all the experience and effective control of the superior officers. At present, there are but eleven distinct establishments in the country, but these have 878 branches extending into every village in the kingdom, so that banking accommodation is ample and abundant. But these are all independent institutions, depending upon their own wealth and resources, and except, perhaps, in the case of a sudden run upon one of them, never seeking assistance from each other. To suppose that the English system of joint stock banking bore any similarity to this would be a most egregious fallacy, and it was this difference chiefly which led to those disastrous consequences which so completely falsified the expectations which were formed on the introduction of joint stock banking into this country.

19. There are, in truth, laws of nature in the industrial world, as well as in the moral and physical world; and a systematic attempt to violate these terminates in disaster, as surely and as certainly as a systematic disregard of the laws of nature in the physical world. It may be a long time before the mischief is developed, nay, for a considerable time, the results may appear to be beneficial, but in the long run the faulty principle is sure to produce its fruits—

*"Raro antecedentem scelestum,
Deseruit pede pœna claudo."*

Now, the great law of nature in the industrial world is **FREE TRADE**. There is nothing more certain in all the range of science, than that exclusive privileges in commerce are great violations of natural right. Trading monopolies are moral crimes. When Parliament sold to the Bank of England the exclusive monopoly of banking, IT SOLD WHAT IT HAD NO RIGHT TO SELL. It had no more right to sell to one body of persons the right of carrying on the business of banking than it had to sell a monopoly of the business of bookselling, or leather dressing, or any other trade whatever. This monopoly was as unjust and as pernicious as any of those which the Commons of Elizabeth and James I. had rebelled against. For a considerable period everything seemed to go well. The Bank of England rendered unquestionable services to the State—so might any other trading corporation in its line—and any other corporation might have done the same, if they had been permitted. But, nevertheless, the principle of the monopoly was utterly vicious; and Time, the Avenger, brought retribution at last. Injustice slumbers long, but it is sure to have its

revènge at last. When, in the natural course of events, the commerce and wealth, and increasing spirit of enterprise, demanded an increased Currency, and, save for this monopoly, powerful and wealthy companies would have been formed in the metropolis and ramifications all over the country, these unjustifiable privileges of the Bank prevented them. The Bank would neither supply this Currency itself, nor permit any other powerful company to do so. The consequence was that the duty of supplying the necessary Currency fell into the hands of any grocer, or tailor, or cheesemonger who chose to call himself a banker. Their power was unlimited. Then came 1793; then 1797; then the long series of disasters from 1810 to 1816; and then 1825.

When these terrible lessons effected a breach in the monopoly of the Bank, it was only a partial one, a large portion still remained and exercised its deadly influence. When the new joint stock banks were formed they were merely local banks, all as dependent on the Bank of England as the private banks had been. The Bank maintained its exclusive privileges within sixty-five miles of the metropolis; and this was the inherent vice of the English system of joint stock banking. Instead of being independent banks, strong in their own resources, and able of their

own strength to withstand a shock, they were carried on upon the most dangerous principle of rediscounting the bills they bought, as indeed they could not help doing; thus their very existence depended upon the Bank of England and the London bill brokers.

20. To suppose that this in any way resembled the Scotch system would be a gross fallacy; the English banks were forbidden to have establishments in the metropolis, which, of all others, is the best feature of the Scotch system. We have already pointed out that capital has a tendency to accumulate in certain districts of the country, where there is not sufficient demand for it, and in others there is a greater demand for it than the district supplies. Now, in the English system, the bankers in the former part of the country remit money to London to be held in deposit for them, and in the latter the bankers remit their bills to be rediscounted, and have the money remitted. Now, this legitimate operation, which is all done by one establishment in Scotland, requires three distinct and independent establishments to do it in England, and has given rise to that system of rediscounting which is so perilous and so objectionable. *But it is the natural result of the monopoly of the Bank.* Because, if it had not been for that, these three establishments would all have been under one control and management; under the present system they are three different and frequently conflicting interests.

And this great violation of natural justice manifested its evil consequences in many other striking ways. No man of common sense now disputes the great principles laid down by the Irish Committee of 1804, the Bullion Report of 1810, and the authors of the Act of 1819, that the Paper Currency must be governed by the Exchanges. But long after the directors of the Bank of England had learnt this principle, and professed to govern her issues by the exchanges, they complained loudly and justly that their efforts to contract their own issues in an adverse exchange were counteracted by the issues of the country banks, and that as soon as they withdrew their paper, the vacuum was immediately filled up by country issues. The reason is very manifest. The Bank of England, being situated at the heart of the exchanges, felt the danger, and saw the necessity of contracting her issues; the country banks, being situated at a distance,

knew and cared nothing about the exchanges; nay, they continually professed that their issues had nothing to do with the exchanges, and naturally, whenever they saw an opening, issued their paper.

Now, if it had not been for this iniquitous monopoly of the Bank, what would probably have been the condition of English Banking at the present day? There would have probably been thirty or forty great banks in the metropolis, each as great as the present Bank of England, with ramifications and branches all over the country. It would, in fact, have been the Scotch system on a much larger scale—one commensurate with the greater magnitude of the country. It would have been one great monetary nervous system. If this had been the case, they would have been acted upon immediately by the exchanges. London, being the centre of the exchanges, any drain of gold would have caused immediate measures of counteraction, which would have been propagated and enforced by the parent establishment all over the country. The tremor of the exchanges would have been instantly felt in every village in the kingdom. Thus, under a natural system, any effect in London would have vibrated through all England, and no country banks could possibly have acted in opposition to the ones in London. And this is the result to which the banking system of the country is slowly gravitating, and which it will ultimately assume. And if this, which is the natural system, had been allowed to grow up from the beginning, we believe that those great banking catastrophes never would have occurred. If any crisis had occurred, they would have stood by and assisted one another, but, when any shock did occur under the unfortunate system which has prevailed, the country banks have all depended on the Bank of England for their very existence.

21. It is a melancholy reflection that these great changes cannot take place without producing much injury to private individuals. The very obnoxious law itself gave birth to the business of a number of persons, which the removal of the shackles of monopoly must necessarily extinguish. In 1832, the banking witnesses felt that the establishment of joint stock banks would be fatal to the existence of many of the private bankers, and some went so far as to wish to prohibit them on

that account. Since these 44 years have passed, we have undergone a mighty revolution of opinion in commercial matters. The ideas of that age are now as antiquated and obsolete as those of the men before the flood. Then, the general public was supposed to be made for the benefit of each separate monopoly, and interest, and class. But now that is all changed. It was akin to the great Ricardian heresy, that cost of production regulates value. Every interest which had bestowed labour and expense in making productions, was allowed to hold the public in thralldom. The value of the law appeared to be measured by the quantity of labour bestowed in mastering its disgusting intricacies and technicalities. Obstinate pedants maintained it gravely as a valid argument for upholding all the old abuses of the law, that great and eminent men had bestowed so much labour and unhappy diligence in accumulating so much legal lore. What, said they, is the fruit of so much ingenuity to be thrown away? In fact, they determined upon loading the public with all sorts of oppression, for the sake of preserving a fictitious value to so much misdirected industry.

22. But all these ideas are now past and gone. They were congenial to times when education was narrowed to a small and select circle, and the general public was in a state of helpless and inert ignorance. But they have all been swept away, before the advancing tide of public intelligence. It is now well settled that the community in general is not made for the benefit of agriculturists, or manufacturers, or lawyers, or bankers, or any set of men whatever, but they are for the benefit of the country. It is the wants of the community which must give rise to the value of their occupations; and all who engage in them must regard them as purely commercial speculations. The wants and requirements of all are not to be restricted or moulded by legislation to be subservient to the advantages of a few, but the interest of particular classes must be subordinate to the necessities of all.

23. We have carefully and purposely abstained throughout this work from making any invidious comparison between the merits of private and joint stock banking. All we say is, let each of them have full and fair play, and let the public generally

This Committee began its sittings on the 19th of April, 1875, and took evidence during 21 days, and reported the evidence taken to the House, but made no report on the evidence taken, and recommended its reappointment this session.

The primary object of the Committee was to ascertain the legality or the contrary of the establishment of the Scotch branches in London. It examined Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, Q.C., and Sir Henry Thring, C.B., Parliamentary draughtsman to the Government, personally, as to the state of the Law: and besides that they had the written opinions of Sir James Scarlett (Lord Abinger), Sir Edward Sugden (Lord St. Leonards), Mr. Richards, and Mr. Roundell Palmer (Lord Selborne).

We shall commence by stating the opinions of these several Counsel on the point.

Mr. Stephen gave it as his opinion, among other points, that—"No joint stock bank which issues notes anywhere, except the joint stock banks in England and more than 65 miles from London, may carry on business in any part of England."

He considered that all "foreign banks whatever, including under the name 'foreign' not only continental banks, but British banks out of England, that is, Scotch, Irish, and colonial banks, are forbidden by the various Acts of Parliament to establish themselves in any part of England." (Q. 206.)

He denied that the Bank of Amsterdam, for instance, could open a branch in London. (Q. 207.)

Mr. Stephen admitted that he had never turned his attention to the subject before, and that he had merely been instructed to look at the matter on behalf of the English bankers some two days or a week previously; and that he was somewhat biassed by the side on which he was called. He also said that he derived most of his information from the memorandum of Sir Henry Thring, to be mentioned immediately.

Sir Henry Thring differed so far from Mr. Stephen, that he thought the Scotch Banks might open branches in the provinces beyond the 65 miles limit, though he spoke somewhat doubtfully (Q. 404, 406). But he agreed with Mr. Stephen that it is illegal to open branches in London or within the limit of 65 miles.

He also presented a memorandum to the Committee containing frequent references to the second edition of this work; and stating certain general conclusions he had arrived at. "Such being the

circumstances of the case, the first question is whether it is or is not legal for Scotch joint stock company banks of issue to establish branches in England. In answer to that question it is submitted that the prohibitions contained in the Acts of 1697 and 1708, and repeated in 1800, are still in force, with the special modification introduced by the Act of 1826, and are perfectly general in their terms and extend to Scotch banks of issue as well as to country banks of issue in England, and, consequently, that, with the exception of the Royal Bank of Scotland, which is empowered by Act of Parliament to have a branch in London, all other branches belonging to Scotch banks of issue in London or within 65 miles thereof, are illegal. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any legal prohibition against the Clydesdale banking company establishing their branches in Cumberland, being at a distance of more than 65 miles from London."

Sir Henry Thring then presented some suggestions as to the policy of expelling the Clydesdale Bank by law from Cumberland : into this consideration we shall not follow him, as, of course, every one is entitled to have his own opinion as to expediency and policy. We shall deal with nothing but the pure Law of the question.

The Author of this work having been expressly selected by the Royal Commissioners for the Digest of the Law to declare the Law on all points respecting to Bank Notes, and, moreover, having been frequently referred to in the memorandum presented by Sir Henry Thring, and being perfectly satisfied that there was no foundation whatever for the doctrines laid down by Mr. Stephen and Sir Henry Thring, applied to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be heard before the Committee, but the Chancellor refused to hear him. As the opinions given by these learned gentlemen were calculated to strike at such wide spread interests, he wrote a letter to the *Daily News*, which appeared in that paper on the 8th May, 1875, shewing that the opinions expressed by these gentlemen were quite destitute of any foundation.

There were also published in the appendix the opinions given in 1833 by Sir James Scarlett, Sir Edward Sugden, and Mr. Griffiths on the question whether Joint Stock Banks of Deposit could be established in London previously to the clause in the Bank Charter Act of 1833. All these three gentlemen held that they could not ; they maintained that the words of the monopoly

they might do upon an inland bill of exchange made or drawn according to the custom of merchants against the person or persons, body politic and corporate, who, or whose servant or agent as aforesaid, signed the same; and that any person or persons, body politic or corporate, to whom such Note that is payable to any person or persons, body politic and corporate, his, her, or their order, is indorsed or assigned, or the money therein mentioned ordered to be paid, by indorsement thereon, shall and may maintain his, her, or their action for such sum of money either against the person or persons, body politic and corporate, who, or whose servant or agent as aforesaid, signed such Note, or against any of the persons that indorse the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange."

Thus we see that even supposing that the doctrine of the King's Bench from 1691 to 1703 was right that Promissory Notes payable to bearer were not legal at Common Law and not within the Law Merchant, this defect was remedied by Statute; and this Act conferred in the fullest manner possible upon every person, or partnership, or Corporation, the right to issue Promissory Notes payable to bearer, and that the bearer might sue the maker or issuer.

But, upon a thorough investigation of the question, the Author was satisfied that the series of judgments in the King's Bench from 1691 to 1703, which were the cause of the Act of Anne being passed, were entirely erroneous, and that the previous series of decisions from Edward III. to William III. were the true law, and he was supported in this by finding that Lord Mansfield pronounced them erroneous, and Lord Kenyon, who was notoriously a rigorous adherent of the Common Law, seems to have agreed in this opinion. After enumerating the several cases, he said—

"The preceding cases seem to establish incontestably the following as the true Common Law doctrine as to the transferability of Debts, or *Choses-in-action*.

1. Where the Obligor granted the Obligation to the Obligee alone, an Assignee of the Obligation could not sue the Obligor in his own name.

2. But wherever the Obligor granted the Obligation to the Obligee and his Assigns, or to "bearer," thereby giving his express consent to its alienation, the Obligor might freely assign it, and

the holder of it had a right of action against the Obligor, for he was bound by his own contract, for *modus et conventio vincunt legem.*"

Upon an examination of the argument contained in the Author's paper, the Royal Commissioners unanimously selected him to prepare the Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Bank Notes, &c. Now, as Lord Cranworth, who, as Chancellor, gave the above-mentioned opinion in the case of *Dixon v. Bovill*, was Chairman of the Commissioners, and concurred in the Author's appointment, the fair inference is that he was satisfied that the cases and arguments contained in the Author's paper proved that the current doctrine as to the non-assignability of *choses-in-action* was untenable; and as the Commissioners included Lord Westbury, Lord Cairns, Lord Hatherley, Lord Penzance, Lord Selborne, the fair inference is that these noble Law Lords were also convinced by the Author's paper; for how could they have selected him to prepare the Digest, with the full knowledge that he intended to state the Law to be the exact reverse of what it was universally supposed to be, unless they had been convinced by his arguments that he was in the right; and that the doctrine prevalent on the Bench and at the Bar was wrong?

The Commissioners discontinued the work on the Digest, and consequently the Author's Digest was never published. But in 1875 the question of the transferability of *choses-in-action* came before the Court of Exchequer in the case of *Goodwin v. Roberts and others*. Scrip to deliver foreign bonds was pledged unlawfully with the defendants, and the original owner brought an action against them to recover it, alleging that Scrip—which was a mere Right to demand a Right—was not subject to the principle of Currency. But the Court of Exchequer held that it was. And this decision was confirmed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber. In this case the latter Court had before them the paper which the Author had prepared for the Royal Commissioners; and in delivering the judgment of the Court, the Lord Chief Justice of England did the Author the very high honour of saying—

"We find it stated in a Law Tract by Mr. Macleod, entitled *Specimen of a Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange*, printed, we believe, as a Report to the Government, but which from its research and ability deserves to be produced in a form calculated to insure a wider circulation," &c.

they might do upon an inland bill of exchange made or drawn according to the custom of merchants against the person or persons, body politic and corporate, who, or whose servant or agent as aforesaid, signed the same; and that any person or persons, body politic or corporate, to whom such Note that is payable to any person or persons, body politic and corporate, his, her, or their order, is indorsed or assigned, or the money therein-mentioned ordered to be paid, by indorsement thereon, shall and may maintain his, her, or their action for such sum of money either against the person or persons, body politic and corporate, who, or whose servant or agent as aforesaid, signed such Note, or against any of the persons that indorse the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange."

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"The preceding cases seem to establish incontestably the following as the true Common Law doctrine as to the transferability of Debts, or *Choses-in-action*.

1. Where the Obligor granted the Obligation to the Obligee alone, an Assignee of the Obligation could not sue the Obligor in his own name.
2. But wherever the Obligor granted the Obligation to the Obligee and his Assigns, or to "bearer," thereby giving his express consent to its alienation, the Obligor might freely assign it, and

the holder of it had a right of action against the Obligor, for he was bound by his own contract, for *modus et conventio vincunt legem*."

Upon an examination of the argument contained in the Author's paper, the Royal Commissioners unanimously selected him to prepare the Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Bank Notes, &c. Now, as Lord Cranworth, who, as Chancellor, gave the above-mentioned opinion in the case of *Dixon v. Bovill*, was Chairman of the Commissioners, and concurred in the Author's appointment, the fair inference is that he was satisfied that the cases and arguments contained in the Author's paper proved that the current doctrine as to the non-assignability of *choses-in-action* was untenable; and as the Commissioners included Lord Westbury, Lord Cairns, Lord Hatherley, Lord Penzance, Lord Selborne, the fair inference is that these noble Law Lords were also convinced by the Author's paper; for how could they have selected him to prepare the Digest, with the full knowledge that he intended to state the Law to be the exact reverse of what it was universally supposed to be, unless they had been convinced by his arguments that he was in the right; and that the doctrine prevalent on the Bench and at the Bar was wrong?

The Commissioners discontinued the work on the Digest, and consequently the Author's Digest was never published. But in 1875 the question of the transferability of *choses-in-action* came before the Court of Exchequer in the case of *Goodwin v. Roberts and others*. Scrip to deliver foreign bonds was pledged unlawfully with the defendants, and the original owner brought an action against them to recover it, alleging that Scrip—which was a mere Right to demand a Right—was not subject to the principle of Currency. But the Court of Exchequer held that it was. And this decision was confirmed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber. In this case the latter Court had before them the paper which the Author had prepared for the Royal Commissioners; and in delivering the judgment of the Court, the Lord Chief Justice of England did the Author the very high honour of saying—

"We find it stated in a Law Tract by Mr. Macleod, entitled *Specimen of a Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange*, printed, we believe, as a Report to the Government, but which from its research and ability deserves to be produced in a form calculated to insure a wider circulation," &c.

After reciting the cases in which the Courts had held that Promissory Notes payable to bearer were perfectly legal and valid documents, and that the bearer had a right of action on them, the Lord Chief Justice said—"Thus far the practice of merchants, traders, and others, of treating Promissory Notes, whether payable to order or bearer, on the same footing as Bills of Exchange, had received the sanction of the Court, but Holt having become Chief Justice, a somewhat unseemly conflict arose between him and the merchants as to the negotiability of Promissory Notes, whether payable to order or to bearer, the Chief Justice taking what must now be admitted to have been a narrow-minded view of the matter, setting his face strongly against the negotiability of these instruments, contrary, as we are told by authority, to the opinion of Westminster Hall, and in a series of successive cases persisting in holding them not to be negotiable by indorsement or delivery. The inconvenience of trade arising therefrom, led to the passing of the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, whereby Promissory Notes were made capable of being assigned by indorsement or made payable to bearer, and such assignment was thus rendered valid beyond dispute or difficulty.

"It is obvious from the preamble of the Statute which merely recites that "*it had been held* that such notes were not within the custom of merchants," that these decisions were not acceptable to the profession or the country. Nor can there be much doubt that by the usage prevalent amongst merchants, these notes had been treated as securities, negotiable by the customary method of assignment, as much as Bills of Exchange, properly so called. The Statute of Anne, may, indeed, practically speaking, be looked upon as a declaratory statute, confirming the decisions prior to the time of Lord Holt."

Thus it is seen that the Exchequer Chamber in 1875, exactly confirmed the doctrine of Law which we set forth in 1868, which had already received the approval of the Digest Commissioners, and which was a complete reversal of the prevalent opinion both on the Bench and at the Bar, as to the transferability of *choses-in-action*, and this miserable superstition was at length exterminated from English Law, just on the eve of its being abolished by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, which enacts that the doctrines of Equity shall prevail wherever they conflict with those of Common Law.

26. Thus we see it finally established that both by Common Law and Statute, every person, and every partnership, and every corporation, is fully entitled to issue Promissory Notes payable to bearer, just in the same way as they may issue bills of exchange. In short, they are legally entitled to trade and make a profit by their Credit in any form they please : and nothing but a Statute can take away this right. We have now to consider the different statutory modifications and restrictions on this Common Law and Statutory right.

At the time of the foundation of the Bank of England there was a large number of banking partnerships in London, doing business in the method we have described in a previous chapter, buying money and debts by creating other debts in the form of deposits, which Credits their customers might utilise either by having the banker's own Notes or by writing a Note to him directing him to pay money to any one or to bearer, called, in modern language, Cheques. Now, these partnerships might at Common Law consist of any number of partners; and it was quite legal at Common Law to form a Joint Stock Bank with transferable shares, though as a matter of fact no one thought of such a thing, and none were formed.

In 1694 the Bank of England was founded by Act of Parliament, with the privilege of limited liability, but it received no monopoly in its favour. So far from that, in 1696, Parliament passed an Act to found another Bank, called the Land Bank, as we have fully detailed in a previous chapter.¹ The unsuccessful attempt to form this Bank greatly added to the embarrassment of the finances, and in 1697 when the capital of the Bank was increased, a clause was inserted in the Act "that during the continuance of the Corporation of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, no other Bank, or any other Corporation, society, fellowship, company or constitution in the nature of a bank, shall be erected or established, permitted, suffered, countenanced, or allowed by *Act of Parliament* within this kingdom, *i. e.*, England."

Now the meaning of this clause is perfectly clear. It never forbade banking partnerships or companies at Common Law, however large they might be ; it only enacted that no Bank should be erected by *Act of Parliament* ; it never for a moment con-

¹ Chapter viii., § 48.

templated, as some learned Counsel have contended, that it prevented banking partnerships at Common Law being created, because a large number of such existed at the time it was passed, which it never pretended to put down, and in 1704, as we have seen, an Act was passed to remove all doubts as to the power of any person, partnership, or corporation, to issue Promissory Notes payable to bearer.

27. Notwithstanding this Act, however, expressly permitting Corporations to issue Notes payable to bearer, when a Corporation did exercise this power, the Act of 1709 was passed, for the first time limiting and restricting the right of "*borrowing, owing, or taking up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable at demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof*" to partnerships of not more than six persons.

Now, as this and the subsequent monopoly clauses are penal acts, they, of course, must be construed in the strictest sense. And here we see that the monopoly or restriction was confined solely to issuing Notes; and still there was nothing to prevent corporations or partnerships of any magnitude from buying money and Debts as before by means of their Credit; so long as they did not issue Promissory Notes at a less date than six months. They were perfectly at liberty to create these Credits and allow their customers to transfer them by means of Cheques, as the present Joint Stock Banks in London do.

Again, in 1742, when the monopoly was more strictly defined, it was still restricted to issuing Notes; and the monopoly of the Bank was expressly defined to consist in this power of issuing Notes, and it was always repeated in the same words in subsequent Acts. Consequently, every other species of banking was left absolutely free. But, in fact, at that time the essence of banking was considered to consist so exclusively in issuing Notes, that to prohibit that was considered as an effectual bar against banking. Nobody at that time ever thought that a bank could be formed without the power of issuing notes. Consequently this clause did for a long time effectually prevent the formation of any Joint Stock Bank in England. But about the end of the last century London bankers of their own accord discontinued issuing Notes, and without any legal compulsion they restricted their customers to the use of Cheques. Hence the discovery was made that

banking could be carried on in a large city like London without the power of issuing Notes.

About the year 1822, as we have seen in a previous section, this flaw in the monopoly of the Bank was detected by Mr. Joplin, but no result followed at that time. In 1826 the first breach was effected in the monopoly of the Bank, and Joint Stock Banks of Issue were allowed to be formed at a distance of not less than 65 miles from London, provided that they had no house of business or establishment as bankers in London, or at any place within 65 miles of it.

At the time of the renewal of the Bank Charter in 1833, the idea of Mr. Joplin had taken root, and a joint stock bank was being formed to carry on banking business in the manner then usual among London bankers, *i. e.*, without issuing Notes. And some eminent Counsel gave it as their opinion that such banks were illegal. The Bank of England endeavoured to get the Government to prohibit them. But Sir John Campbell, the Solicitor-General, declared that Joint Stock Banks of Deposit and Discount were perfectly legal at Common Law, and no infringement of the privileges of the Bank, and he brought up a clause by way of rider declaring the right of any company or partnership to form such a bank; and several joint stock banks were formed.

Now this clause did not confer any new rights; it merely declared the Common Law right which had always existed, and had never been taken away.

We now, then, distinctly see what the monopoly or privilege of the Bank of England does consist in; it is nothing but this, that while the Corporation exists, no banking partnership of more than six persons shall issue notes or bills payable at less than six months date *in England*. All other kinds of banks and banking are left absolutely free. Now, with reference to the circumstances which gave rise to this discussion, the opening of branches by the Scotch banks in London and other parts of England, the sole question is this—By so doing do they issue Notes in England? The plain answer is, they do not: and, therefore, they are perfectly legal. The argument brought forward by Sir Henry Thring that it is not likely that a Scotch Bank may do what a Somersetshire Bank may not, is nothing to the purpose. It is a matter of pure law; and as a matter of fact, a Scotch Bank, or any Foreign bank, the Bank of France, or the Bank of Amsterdam, or a Bank in Japan, may

legally do what a Somersetshire or any provincial Joint Stock Bank of Issue may not do,—it may open a branch in London or anywhere in England and do every kind of banking business, except only issuing Notes. No doubt it is utterly absurd and irrational that such should be the case; but, nevertheless, it is Law; and it is only an example of the chaotic and absurd state of the banking laws of this country, and shows the necessity for their thorough investigation and reform, as they will inevitably, some day, if not reformed, lead to a fearful catastrophe.

CHAPTER XVI.

ON THE BUSINESS OF BANKING.

SECTION I. ON THE NATURE OF BANKING—RELATION BETWEEN A BANKER AND HIS CUSTOMER—ON BANKING INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT—ON BANKING INVESTMENTS.

SECTION II. ON THE CLEARING SYSTEM.

SECTION III. ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to investigate fully the fundamental conceptions of Economics which are necessary to understand the nature of Credit, or Debts, the commodity in which bankers deal, and we have explained the general effects of banking in respect to Commerce and the Foreign Exchanges. We have also set forth the history of banking in this country, and the various monetary crises which have occurred during nearly a century.

We then examined certain theories of Currency which have acquired considerable importance, and explained the somewhat anomalous organisation of the Bank of England, and the theories upon which it has been constructed and managed. We are now come to the more particular question of the practical details of banking business.

The difficulty in compressing the subject within a moderate compass consists in this, that CREDIT, the commodity with which bankers are concerned, constitutes one of the most extensive and abstruse branches of Law and Bankruptcy.

To enumerate all the decisions which have been given, would fill a treatise considerably larger than the whole of this work. That it would be manifestly impossible to do, besides the fact of there being several excellent legal treatises on every branch of it.

The line that we have endeavoured to draw is this—There are certain legal doctrines and cases which are absolutely indispensable for a banker to be familiar with in his daily business,

any one of which may occur in practice at any instant. There are other doctrines and cases which are only necessary to be known, when the banker is unhappily drawn into legal proceedings. In these cases he will be in the hands of, and be guided by, his solicitor and counsel.

We have endeavoured to give a selection of those doctrines and cases only, which are comprised under the former of these divisions—those which are necessary to the daily business of banking, and to omit those in which a banker may find it necessary to have recourse to his solicitor.

In endeavouring, however, to draw this line, we are sure that every one conversant with the subject must be aware of the difficulty of selecting out of the great mass of cases and decisions, those only which are fundamental, and passing over those which are only of secondary importance.

In the first Section, accordingly, we have endeavoured to explain clearly the different relations which a banker may hold to his customers, and his legal rights, duties, and liabilities on each of them, and also the legal points affecting the Instruments of Credit in which the Debts he creates are embodied. We then examine the different investments which bankers usually make.

In the second Section we have explained the general system of exchange, or clearing, by which the various banks in the country tend more and more to constitute one vast banking institution; and shewn what a marvellous economy of coin and Bank notes is effected by this means, and also shewn how it proves several of the prevalent doctrines regarding Currency to be erroneous.

In the third Section we have given what appear to us to be the necessary fundamental doctrines regarding the Instruments of Credit, in which are embodied the debts which bankers purchase from their customers, namely Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.

SECTION I.

ON THE NATURE OF BANKING, AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN A
BANKER AND HIS CUSTOMER—ON BANKING INSTRUMENTS
OF CREDIT—ON BANKING INVESTMENTS.

1. We have found, in a former chapter, that from the time when the word “banker” was first used, it meant a person who purchased specie by means of his Credit, or promise to pay an equal sum on demand, or at some future time. In the business of the exchanges, those are called “banking operations,” which consist in the buying and selling of bills. A “Banker,” also buys other Debts, such as Bills of Exchange, by creating fresh Debts. Hence the business of a merchant is to buy and sell commodities with specie and Debts; the essential business of a “banker” is to purchase specie and Debts by creating other Debts. A “banker” is, therefore, essentially a Debt merchant, though he sometimes adds other species of monetary business to this.

2. In modern practice, a Banker may stand in *four* relations to his customer—1st. As the PURCHASER from him of specie, or specie and debts; 2ndly. As his AGENT, or TRUSTEE, or BAILEE, of his specie and valuable securities, *i. e.*, securities for money, and convertible securities; these are termed Banking securities; 3rdly. As the PAWNEE of the same; 4thly. As his WAREHOUSEMAN for plate, specie, jewels, deeds, &c., not being banking securities.

The duties, rights, and liabilities between a banker and his customer are separate and distinct in all these relations, and we must now endeavour to explain them.

On the relation of a Banker to his Customer, as the PURCHASER from him of Specie, or Specie and Debts.

3. The first of these cases, is the ordinary one where a customer opens an account with a banker, by means of paying in money to his account. In this case, the customer cedes the

absolute property in the money, to the banker, and receives in exchange the Right, or Property, to demand an equal sum from the banker when he may require it. The transaction is, therefore, a sale, or an exchange of Money, for a Debt. The banker, and his customer stand in the common law relation of debtor and creditor. It is also part of this relation that the customer or creditor may transfer this Right, or Property, called Debt, to any one else he pleases, and this Debt may circulate exactly in the same manner as Money itself.

The Banker, therefore, has bought this money; he has acquired an entire property in it, and he may do what he pleases with it. He may apply it exclusively to his own private benefit, or purposes, in any way he pleases, and his customer has no legal ground of complaint against him. He has voluntarily parted with his money, and received in exchange for it the right to demand an equivalent sum again from his banker, and if, when he does so, his banker is unfortunately unable to do so, he is only entitled to receive a proportion of the banker's property rateably with other creditors.

Therefore the common phrase, when a man says he has so much of "his money" at his banker's, is not quite correct. *He* has *no* money at his banker's; what he has is a right residing in his person to demand money, which is recorded in his banker's books.

If a customer makes his will bequeathing "all his ready money," "all his debts," "all his moneys," the sum standing at his credit in his banker's books has been held by numerous decisions in equity to pass under these designations.

The relation between banker and customer being simply that of Debtor and Creditor, if a customer were to leave a balance in his banker's hands for more than six years without operating on his account, it would appear that the Statute of Limitations would take effect, and he might if he chose, refuse to pay it.

The case we have been considering is the simplest between a banker and his customer, and in such a one the latter is said to have a *Drawing* or *Current Account* with his banker.

4. Trading customers, however, usually keep a different kind of an account with their banker. They sell their goods, and take a bill at 3 months for them. As this bill is inconvenient

for trading purposes, they take it to their banker, and offer it to him for sale. If he thinks it a good debt, which will be paid at maturity, he buys it from his customer. He writes down the full sum of the bill to the credit of his customer, and at the same time charges him with the sum he agrees to receive as profit. When the profit is retained at the time of the advance, it is called *DISCOUNT*. The discount is, therefore, the difference between the *price* of the bill and its *amount*. When a banker buys a bill in this manner he is said to *discount* it.

When a banker discounts a bill for his customer it is a complete sale of the debt. The banker first makes his customer *indorse* it, that is, write his name on the back of it. The effect of this is this, that if the principal debtor, or acceptor, does not pay the bill at maturity, the banker has the right to charge his customer with the amount of the bill, provided he gives him immediate notice of the fact of dishonour.

When a banker discounts a bill, the entire property in it passes to him, just as we have seen above, the entire property in the money paid in by his customers vests in him. He has the whole property and interest in it, as much as in any chattels he possesses. He may sell it again if he pleases, or *re-discount* it, as it is termed, and if he became bankrupt, the entire property in it would pass to his assignees.

It is of importance to observe this. In the loose language in which Economic subjects are usually treated, it is commonly said that when a banker discounts a bill for a customer, he makes him a *loan* on the security of the bill. This, however, is a complete misconception of the nature of the transaction; and it can easily be shewn to be so. If the banker merely made a *loan* to his customer on the security of the bill, it would be the *customer's* duty to repay the money at the time fixed, just as in all other loans it is the duty of the person receiving the money to repay it. But when a banker discounts a bill it is wholly different. He does not seek repayment of the money from his own customer, but he demands payment of the debt from the *acceptor* of the bill, and if it is duly paid, his customer never hears of or sees the bill again. It is only in the event of its non-payment by the acceptor that he comes back upon his customer. If he made a loan to his customer on the security of the bill, he would not only seek repayment from his customer,

but give him the bill back again when he was repaid, whereas, he never does so. In such a case the property in the bill would remain with the customer, and pass to his assignees in the case of his bankruptcy; whereas it does not do so, it is given to the banker, and the assignees of the customer have no right to it.

The transaction is, in reality, an exchange of Debts. The banker buys a Debt, payable at a future time, by creating a Debt in his customer's favour, payable on demand.

It may seem to some to be mere logomachy to distinguish between a discount as a sale and as a loan on the security of a bill; it is, however, nothing of the kind; the two transactions are essentially distinct, and involve distinct legal consequences to all parties, of the most important nature, civil as well as criminal.

In these cases, therefore, which are the simplest, the banker does not stand in any fiduciary relation to his customer. They are independent exchangers, or buyers and sellers, of specie and debts.

On the relation of a Banker to his Customer, as his AGENT, or TRUSTEE, or BAILEE of SPECIE, and Banking Securities.

5. Besides, however, the simplest and most ordinary relation between bankers and their customers, as exchangers of Money and Debts, bankers do undertake trusts, and enter into fiduciary relations with their customers. They receive sums of money, which are specifically directed by their customers to be appropriated to some special purpose, as well as securities, and other valuable property, such as Stock, Shares, &c., to receive the dividends, &c., on behalf of their customers; they receive Bills of Exchange on behalf of their customers, and collect them for their customers, in exactly the same manner as they do for themselves, and are answerable to them for any loss incurred through any negligence in not complying with the known usages of commerce. Bills of exchange, stock, shares, Exchequer bills, &c., are called Banking Securities.

In such cases as this, the property in these valuable securities does not pass to the banker; he is the mere AGENT, TRUSTEE, or BAILEE of his customer, and he has to obey his specific instructions in each case, and if he appropriated them to his own use, it would

be criminal. Moreover, in the event of his bankruptcy, the property in such things would, manifestly, not pass to his assignees.

The temptation to a banker to use, for his own benefit, the valuable securities entrusted to his care, is so great in times of commercial pressure, that it has been enacted, by the Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96, s. 75—"As to Frauds by Agents, Bankers, or Factors.—75. "Whosoever having been entrusted either solely or jointly with any other person, as a Banker, Merchant, Broker, Attorney, or other Agent, with any Money, or Security for the payment of Money, with any direction in writing to apply, pay, or deliver, such Money or Security, or any Part thereof respectively, or the Proceeds, or any part of the proceeds of such Security, for any purpose, or to any person specified in such direction, shall in violation of good faith, and contrary to the terms of such direction in any wise convert to his own use or benefit, or the use or benefit of any person other than the person by whom he shall have been so entrusted, such Money, Security, or Proceeds, or any part thereof respectively: and whosoever having been entrusted either solely or jointly with any other person as a Banker, Merchant, Broker, Attorney, or other Agent, with any Chattel or Valuable Security or any Power of Attorney for the sale or transfer of any share or interest in any Public Stock or Fund whether of the United Kingdom, or any Part thereof, or of any Foreign State, or in any Stock or Fund of any Body Corporate, Company, or Society, for safe custody, or for any special purpose without any authority to sell, negotiate, transfer, or pledge, shall in violation of good faith, and contrary to the object or purpose for which such Chattel, Security, or Power of Attorney, shall have been entrusted to him, sell, negotiate, transfer, pledge, or in any manner convert to his own use or benefit, or the use or benefit of any person other than the person by whom he shall have been so entrusted, such Chattel or Security, or the Proceeds of the same, or any part thereof, or the share or interest in the Stock or Fund to which such Power of Attorney shall relate, or any part thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years, and not less than three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement."

*On the Relation of the Banker to his Customer as PAWNEE
of Banking Securities.*

6. In the first of the relations between the banker and his customer above described, the banker was the absolute purchaser of the Money and Securities of his customer, so that he might do what he pleased with them; in the second he was merely his customer's agent, and it is highly penal for him to appropriate to his own use any of his customer's securities. A relation intermediate between these two frequently exists, in which securities are deposited by a customer with his banker; the absolute property in them remains with the customer: but he obtains a loan or advance of money from his banker on their security, which, when he pays off, the full property and possession of his securities reverts to himself. The banker thus becomes the PAWNEE of his customer's securities, and while he is so, he acquires certain Rights over them, though not exactly a Property in them, and it is out of such cases as these that the most difficult and abstruse questions between bankers and their customers arise.

It has always been the custom that if a banker makes an advance, or a loan, to a customer, on the security of bills, &c., deposited with him, he has the right to re-pledge, or sell so much of these securities as is necessary to satisfy his own claim. And this custom is expressly sanctioned in the last recited clause, which says that nothing in the clause shall restrain any banker "from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of, any Securities or Effects in his possession, upon which he shall have any Lien, Claim, or Demand, entitling him by law so to do, unless such Sale, Transfer, or other Disposal, shall extend to a greater number or part of such Securities or Effects than shall be requisite for satisfying such Lien, Claim, or Demand."

This principle has always been held to apply when a banker makes a loan on the pledge of these securities. It is also held to apply where a customer having an ordinary account with his banker, has overdrawn it and become indebted to him: the banker has the right to retain all *banking securities* deposited with him by his customers.

7. Questions of great nicety frequently occur between bankers and their customers, and in the event of the bankruptcy of either or both of them, their assignees, respecting the property in bills placed by customers in the hands of their bankers for various purposes.

It is a very common practice for customers to place in the hands of their bankers the bills they receive for the purpose of collection.

This is very convenient for the customer. By placing these bills in the hands of his banker he frees himself from all anxiety and trouble regarding their safe custody or presentation for payment. The banker is bound, as his customer's agent, to present them for payment, and carry the amount to his customer's credit as soon as they are paid. And if he fails to do so, and any loss occurs through his neglect of the usages of trade, he is liable to his customer.

For the sake of convenience, it is usual to note down the amount of such bills on the proper day, in the customer's account, in a column "short of" or before the column for cash. Hence, these bills are said to be "entered short," and the banker is said to hold such bills "short."

This entry is a mere memorandum to remind the banker that he has such bills to collect for his customer on a certain day. The sum is in no way placed to his customer's credit: and the bills so "held short" are the exclusive property of the customer, which he is entitled to demand back at any time previous to his bankruptcy.

But in the case of the customer's bankruptcy, the banker must not deliver up his short bills to him, as all his property has vested in his creditors.

As "short bills" are merely intrusted to the banker for the purpose of collection, if he appropriated them to his own use by selling or pledging them, he would be indictable under the Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96, s. 76.

The course of dealing between bankers and their customers in such cases often creates perplexity.

The point to be ascertained is, whether at the time of the bankruptcy the relation between the banker and his customer was that of Principal and Agent, or that of Debtor and Creditor. That is, whether the property in the bills can be ascertained to have passed from the customer to his banker.

In some country banks it is the custom to enter the amount of such bills in the cash column and to permit the customer to draw against the amount. But this is a matter of comity, and does not transfer the property in the bills to the banker. They are only held as collateral security against the advance, and are not discounted. The customer, or his assignees, are entitled to demand back the bills *in specie*, if the account shews a credit balance without them.

Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 12. *Ex parte Dumas*, 1 Atk., 233. 2 Ves., sen., 582. *Ex parte Oursell*, Amb., 298. *Thompson v. Giles*, 2 B. & C., 422. *Ex parte Sargeant*, 1 Rose, 153. *Jombart v. Woollett*, 2 My. & Cr., 890. *Ex parte Bond*, 1 M. D. & De G., 10. *Ex parte Armitstead*, 2 Gl. & J., 371. *Ex parte Rouston*, 17 Ves., 426. *Ex parte Smith*, Buck., 355. *Ex parte Eyre*, Mont. & Mac., 268. *Ex parte Sollers*, 18 Ves., 229. *Ex parte Pease*, 19 Ves., 25. *Ex parte Twiggood*, 19 Ves., 227. *Ex parte Edwards*, 2 M. D. & De G., 625. *Zinck v. Walker*, 2 W. Bl., 1154. *Parke v. Eliason*, 1 East, 544.

But if the course of dealing shews that the customer intended the banker to consider and deal with the bills as his own property, they will not be recoverable.

Ex parte Oursell, Amb., 296. *Bent v. Puller*, 5 T. R., 494. *Tooke v. Hollingworth*, 5 T. R., 219. *Bolton v. Puller*, 1 B. & P., 544.

The bills cannot be held to have become the property of the banker unless the customer has an immediate right of action against him for the full amount, less the discount: and the banker has acquired a right of action against all the parties to the bill.

On GOODS taken as Security.

If a banker takes GOODS as a security for a loan, he ought to satisfy himself that his customer is entitled to them: because, by Common Law, the real owner will be able to recover them, or their value, from him, if unlawfully pledged.

The principle of Common Law regarding the transfer of the Property in goods by a sale in market overt, does not apply to pawns.

Marsden v. Panshall, 1 Vern., 407. *Paterson v. Tash*, Strange, 1178. *Hartop v. Hoare*, 3 Atk., 44. *Hoare v. Parker*, 2 T. R., 376. *Daubigny v. Duval*, 5 T. R., 604. *Maccombie v. Davis*, 7 East, 5. *Graham v. Dyster*, 6 M. & S. 1. *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & S., 14. *Queiroz v. Trueman*, 3 B. & C., 348.

Goods were deposited as a security for a loan. The customer afterwards obtained further advances without referring to the goods. He died without paying off his debt to the banker. His executors claimed the goods on payment of the first loan only. Held that the banker was entitled to have all the debt paid off. But if there had been bond creditors or a bankruptcy the banker could only have held the goods for the sum first advanced, and must have proved under the *fiat* for the rest.

Demainbray v. Metcalfe, Prec. Chanc., 419. *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves., 229. *Vanderzee v. Willis*, 3 Bro., C. C. 21.

Such transactions ought to be completed by a Bill of Sale and registered under Act 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 36.

If the debtor is a trader the banker should also take possession of the goods or premises, as registration under the Bills of Sale Act only, does not defeat the operation of the doctrine of "reputed ownership" in bankruptcy.

Badger v. Shaw, 29 L. J., N. S., 73. *Ex parte Ashby, re Daniel*, 25 L. T., 188.

A banker cannot take a Bill of Sale on the whole property of his debtor, as such an instrument is an act of bankruptcy.

Lacon v. Liffen, 32 L. J., Chanc., 315. *Hassels v. Simpson*, 1 Doug., 89. *Giebert v. Spooner*, 1 M. & W., 714. *Smith v. Cannan*, 2 E. & B., 35, 45. 22 L. J., Q. B., 290. *Woodhouse v. Murray*, L. R., 2 Q. B., 638. *Ex parte Foxley, in re Nurse*, L. R., 3 Ch. Ap., 615.

An instrument stating that goods are deposited as a security for a loan, even though containing a power of sale in default of payment, does not require to be stamped as a mortgage deed.

Harris v. Birch, 9 M. & W., 591. *Attenborough v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 11 Exch., 461. See also *Franklin v. Neate*, 13 M. & W., 481,

Policies of LIFE ASSURANCE as Security.

A banker sometimes takes a Policy of Life Assurance as security for a Debt. In such case, he should give notice to the office of the assignment, as, in the event of his customer's bankruptcy, the Policy would vest in his Assignees.

It is a well-established principle that *Choses-in-Action*, or Rights, or a Debt due to a trader though assigned by him, is in his "order and disposition" in the event of his bankruptcy, even though the instrument recording the obligation be delivered over,

unless notice of the assignment has been duly given to the obligor.

Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves., sen., 328. *Ex parte Arkwright*, 3 M. D. & De G., 148. *Ex parte Wood*, 3 M. D. & De G., 815. *Thompson v. Speirs*, 13 Sim., 469. *Ex parte Wilkinson*, 13 Sim., 475. *Belcher v. Bellamy*, 2 Exch., 303. *Thompson v. Tomkins*, 2 Drew. & Sm., 8.

Notice, as a rule, should be given to the officer representing the Company, who may either be the chairman, the directors, or the secretary, according to the deed of constitution.

Where a company had authorised their agents to receive notices of assignments, it was held that where one of their agents had acted as Attorney for the Assignor and Assignee of a Policy, that was sufficient notice to the Company.

Gale v. Lewis, 9 Q. B., 730.

But if the Agent is not Agent for that particular purpose, his knowledge of the assignment is not sufficient.

Ex parte Patch, 7 Jur., 690. 12 L. J., N. S., Bank., 44.

Such notice need not be in writing, verbal notice is sufficient; even though the office refuses to receive verbal notice.

North British Insurance Co. v. Hallet, 7 Jur., N. S., 1263. *Ex parte Masterman*, 2 Mont. & Ay., 209. *Ex parte Littledale*, 6 M. D. & De G., 74.

If the Assignee has sent notice by post to the Obligor, and the Assignor becomes bankrupt before the notice reaches the Obligor in course of post, that is sufficient to take the case out of the Statute.

Belcher v. Bellamy, 2 Exch., 303.

Though the Assignee is a partner in a mutual office, that is not sufficient notice to the Company.

Thompson v. Speirs, 13 Sim., 469. *Ex parte Wilkinson*, 13 Sim., 475.

In the case of an equitable mortgage by the mere deposit of the policy, the assignees of a bankrupt cannot recover the policy itself at law: but they may claim the Debt from the company, and give a valid discharge for it.

Gibson v. Overbury, 7 M. & W., 555.

If a Policy be deposited by way of equitable mortgage, the *onus* lies upon the assignees of the bankrupt to prove that the notice of assignment was not given to the office before the bankruptcy.

Ex parte Stevens, 4 Dec. & Ch., 117.

The banker must also have possession of the Policy. A memorandum of deposit of securities was given to a banker, stating

that a Policy of Insurance on the life of the depositor was among them. The Policy, however, was not delivered, and was in the possession of the depositor at the time of his bankruptcy. Held that the Policy passed to his assignees, and the banker ranked among the general creditors.

Ex parte Halifax, 2 M. D. & De G., 544.

A condition of a Policy of Life Assurance was that it should be void if the assured died by his own hand, unless it had been assigned for valuable consideration six months before his death. The holder deposited it with his bankers with a letter charging it with the payment of any debts that might be due to them at the time of his death; and three years afterwards committed suicide, being indebted his bankers. Held that the bankers were entitled to recover.

Jones v. Consolidated Investment and Insurance Co., 26 Beav., 256.

Bankers who had two policies of Life assurance deposited with them gave no notice to the offices; but the assured mentioned in conversation with the secretaries that the policies were held by his bankers. He died bankrupt, and Stuart, V. C., held that the policies remained in his order and disposition, and that his assignees were entitled to the proceeds.

Edwards v. Martin, L. R., 1 Eq., 121.

ON DOCK WARRANTS and BILLS OF LADING.

There is a distinction between ASSIGNABLE instruments and NEGOTIABLE instruments.

A person can, in general, assign over to any one else no better title in anything than he has himself.

To this rule, we have observed in a previous chapter, Money was always an exception. A person who has acquired money honestly in the course of business can retain it against the real owner, even though it has been stolen. It was from this quality of the property of money being inseparable from the honest possession, that money acquired the name of Currency. Bank Notes, Bills of Exchange, Cheques, &c., also possess this attribute of Currency, or Negotiability, as it is called. Hence they are termed Negotiable Instruments; and the innocent holder for value of a Negotiable Instrument may retain it against the true owner, even though it was lost or stolen, and sue all the parties to it.

But Bills of Lading and Dock Warrants represent only certain

specific goods; and they follow the rules affecting the transfer of goods. The real owner does not lose his property in them though they have been lost or stolen and sold for value to an innocent purchaser. He can recover them in the hands of an innocent holder for value, just the same as he could recover the goods themselves. Hence Bills of Lading and Dock Warrants are *assignable* instruments but not *negotiable* instruments.

Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El. & Bl., 622. *Mangles v. Dixon*, 3 H. L., Ca., 701.

The Factors Acts.

It was established by a long series of cases that a factor could not *pledge* the goods of his principal by indorsing and delivering the bill of lading, although he might *sell* them, and confirmed by—

Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S., 140. *Shipley v. Kymer*, 1 M. & S., 484. *Newsom v. Thornton*, 6 East., 17.

But this doctrine was altered by Statute 4, Geo., 4 (1824), c. 83, amended Statute 6 Geo., 4 (1826), c. 94, commonly called the Factors Act.

By this latter Act it was enacted, § 1—

“Any person or persons intrusted for the purpose of consignment or of sale with any goods, wares, or merchandise, and who shall have shipped such goods, wares, or merchandise, in his, her, or their name or names, and any person or persons in whose name or names any goods, wares, or merchandise shall be shipped by any other person or persons, shall be deemed and taken to be the true owner or owners thereof, so far as to entitle the consignee or consignees of such goods, wares, and merchandise to a lien thereon, in respect of any money or negotiable security or securities advanced or given by such consignee or consignees to or for the use of the person or persons in whose name or names such goods, wares, or merchandise shall be shipped, or in respect of any money or negotiable security or securities received by him, her, or them to the use of such consignee or consignees in the like manner to all intents and purposes as if such person or persons was or were the true owner or owners of such goods, wares, and merchandise.

“Provided such consignee or consignees shall not have notice by the Bill of Lading for the delivery of such goods, wares, and merchandise, or otherwise, at or before the time of any advance of such money or negotiable security, or of such receipt of money or

negotiable security in respect of which such lien is claimed, that such person or persons so shipping in his, her, or their own name or names, or in whose name or names any goods, wares or merchandise shall be shipped by any person or persons, is or are not the actual and *bona fide* owner or owners, proprietor or proprietors, of such goods, wares, and merchandise so shipped as aforesaid."

By S. 2.—"Any person or persons *intrusted with and in possession of* any Bill of Lading, India Warrant, Dock Warrant, Warehouse keeper's certificate, Wharfinger's certificate, Warrant or Order for delivery of goods, shall be deemed and taken to be the true owner or owners of the goods, wares, and merchandise described and mentioned in the said several documents hereinbefore stated respectively, or of them, so far as to give validity to any contract or agreement thereafter to be made or entered into by such person or persons so *intrusted and in possession* as aforesaid, with any person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, for the sale or disposition of the said goods, wares, and merchandise, or any part thereof, *or for the deposit and pledge thereof, or any part thereof*, as a security for any money or negotiable instrument or instruments advanced or given by such person or persons, body or bodies politic and corporate, upon the faith of such several documents or either of them.

"Provided such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall not have notice by such documents or either of them or otherwise, that such person or persons so intrusted as aforesaid is or are not the actual and *bona fide* owner or owners, proprietor or proprietors, of such goods, wares, or merchandise, so sold or deposited, or pledged as aforesaid."

As to the meaning of "a person intrusted with" the documents mentioned, see—

Close v. Holmes, 2 Moo. & Rob., 28. *Philips v. Huth*, 6 M. & W., 572. *Hatfield v. Phillips*, 9 M. & W., 647; 14 M. & W., 666. *Bonzi v. Stewart*, 5 Scott., N. R., 1; 4 M. & G., 525.

In consequence of these decisions, the Statute 5 & 6 Vict. (1842), c. 39, was passed, which enacted, s. 1—"Any agent who shall hereafter be intrusted with the possession of goods, or of the documents of title to goods, shall be deemed and taken to be the owner of such goods and documents so far as to give validity to any contract or agreement by way of pledge, lien, or security *bona fide* made by any person with such agent so

intrusted as aforesaid, as well for any original loan, advance, or payment, made upon the security of such goods or documents, or also for any further or continuing advance in respect thereof, and such contract or agreement shall be binding upon and good against the owner of such goods, and all other persons interested therein, notwithstanding the person claiming such pledge or lien may have had notice that the person with whom such contract or agreement is made is only an agent."

§. 2 enacts—"Where any such contract or agreement for pledge, lien, or security shall be made in consideration of the delivery or transfer to such agent of any other goods or merchandise or documents of title, or negotiable security, upon which the person so delivering up the same had at the time a valid and available lien and security for or in respect of a previous advance by virtue of some contract or agreement made with such agent, such contract and agreement, if *bonâ fide* on the part of the person with whom the same may be made, shall be deemed to be a contract made in consideration of an advance within the true intent and meaning of the Act, and shall be as valid and effectual, to all intents and purposes, and to the same extent, as if the consideration for the same had been a *bonâ fide* present of money.

"Provided that the lien acquired under such last-mentioned contract or agreement upon the goods or documents deposited in exchange shall not exceed the value at the time of the goods and merchandise which or the document of title to which, or the negotiable security which shall be delivered up and exchanged."

§. 3.—This Act and every matter and thing herein contained, shall be deemed and construed to give validity to such contracts and agreements only, and to protect only such loans, advances, and exchanges, as shall be made *bonâ fide*, and without notice that the agent making such contracts or agreements as aforesaid, has not authority to make the same, or is acting *malâ fide* in respect thereof against the owner of such goods and merchandise.

"Nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend or protect any lien or pledge for or in respect of any antecedent debt, owing from any agent to any person with or to whom such lien or pledge shall be given, nor to authorise any agent intrusted as aforesaid in deviating from any express orders or authority received from the owner: but that for the purpose and to the

intent of protecting all such *bonâ fide* loans, advances, and exchanges as aforesaid (though made with notice of such agent not being the owner, but without any notice of the agent's acting without authority), and to no further or other interest or purpose such contract or agreement as aforesaid shall be binding on the owner and all other persons interested in such goods."

8. 4.—"Any Bill of Lading, India Warrant, Dock Warrant, Warehouse keeper's certificate, Warrant, or Order for delivery of goods, or any other document used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or authorising, or purporting to authorise, either by indorsement or by delivery, the possessor of such document to transfer or receive goods thereby represented, shall be deemed and taken to be a Document of Title within the meaning of this Act: and any agent intrusted as aforesaid and possessed of any such document or title whether derived immediately from the owner of such goods, or obtained by reason of such agent's having been intrusted with the possession of the goods, or of any other documents of title thereto, shall be deemed and taken to have been intrusted with the possession of the goods represented by such document of title as aforesaid, and all contracts pledging or giving a lien upon such documents of title as aforesaid, shall be deemed and taken to be respectively pledges of and liens upon the goods to which the same relates: and such agent shall be deemed to be possessed of such goods or documents, whether the same shall be in his actual custody, or shall be held by any other person subject to his control, or for him, or on his behalf.

"Whether any loan or advance shall be *bonâ fide* made to any agent intrusted with and in possession of any such goods or documents of title as aforesaid, on the faith of any contract or agreement in writing to assign, deposit, transfer, or deliver such goods or documents of title as aforesaid, and such goods or documents of title shall actually be received by the person making such loan or advance, without notice that such agent was not authorised to make such pledge or security, every such loan or advance shall be deemed and taken to be a loan or advance on the security of such goods and documents of title within the meaning of this Act, though such goods or documents of title shall not actually be received by the person making such loan or advance till the period subsequent thereto.

"Any contract or agreement, whether made direct with such agent as aforesaid, or with any clerk or other person on his behalf, shall be deemed a contract or agreement with such agent: and any payment made, whether by money or bills of exchange, or other negotiable security, shall be deemed and taken to be an advance within the meaning of this Act: and an agent in possession as aforesaid of such goods or documents, shall be taken for the purposes of this Act to have been intrusted therewith by the owner thereof, unless the contrary can be shown in evidence."

By 6 Geo. 4. (1825), c. 94, s. 8, it is enacted—"In case any person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall accept and take any such goods, wares, or merchandise, in deposit or pledge from any such person or persons so in possession and intrusted as aforesaid, without notice as aforesaid, as a security for any debt or demand due and owing from such person or persons so intrusted and in possession as aforesaid, to such person or persons, body or bodies politic and corporate, before the time of such deposit or pledge, then and in that case such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, so accepting or taking such goods, wares, or merchandise in deposit or pledge, shall acquire no further or other right, title or interest in or upon, or to the said goods, wares, or merchandise, or any such document as aforesaid, than was possessed, or could or might have been enforced by the said person or persons so possessed and intrusted as aforesaid, at the time of such deposit or pledge as a security as last aforesaid: but such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, so accepting or taking such goods, wares, or merchandise in deposit or pledge, shall and may acquire, possess and enforce, such right, title or interest as was possessed and might have been enforced by such person or persons so possessed and intrusted as aforesaid."

As to what constitutes an antecedent debt, see—

Jewan v. Whitworth, L. R., 2 Eq., 692. *Macnee v. Gorst*, L. R., 4 Eq., 315.

S. 4.—"It shall be lawful to and for any person or persons, body or bodies politic and corporate, to contract with any agent or agents intrusted with any goods, wares, or merchandise, or to whom the same may be consigned, for the purchase of any such goods, wares, or merchandise, and to receive the same and pay for the same to such agent or agents: and such contract and payment shall be binding upon and good against the owner of such goods,

wares, and merchandise, notwithstanding such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall have notice that the person or persons making and entering into such contract, or on whose behalf such contract is made or entered into, is an agent or agents.

"Provided such contract and payment be made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall not, when such contract is entered into or payment made, have notice that such agent or agents is or are not authorised to sell the said goods, wares, and merchandise, or to receive the said purchase money."

On this section see—

Baines v. Swainson, 4 B. & Sm., 270. *Feuntis v. Montis*, L. R., 3 C. P., 268: 4 C. P., 93. *Cole v. North Western Bank*, L. R., 9 C. P., 470: affirmed in Ex. Ch., 10 C. P., 354.

S. 5.—"It shall be lawful to and for any person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, to accept and take any such goods, wares, and merchandise, or any such document as aforesaid, in deposit or pledge from any such factor or factors, agent or agents, notwithstanding such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall have such notice as aforesaid that the person or persons making such deposit or pledge is or are a factor or factors, agent or agents; but then and in such case such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall acquire no further or other right, title or interest in or upon or to the said goods, wares, or merchandise, or any such document as aforesaid, for the delivery thereof, than was possessed or could or might have been enforced by the said factor or factors, agent or agents, at the time of such deposit or pledge as a security as last aforesaid: but such person or persons, body or bodies politic or corporate, shall and may acquire, possess and enforce such right, title or interest, as was possessed and might have been enforced by such factor or factors, agent or agents, at the time of such deposit or pledge, as aforesaid.

On this section see—

Blandy v. Allan, Dans. & Ll., 22. *Fletcher v. Heath*, 7 B. & C., 517. *Thompson v. Farmer*, 1 Moo. & Ma., 48.

These Statutes are limited to mercantile transactions.

Wood v. Rowcliffe, 6 Hare, 191. *Monk v. Whittenbury*, 2 B. & Ad., 484. *Lamb v. Attenborough*, 1 B. & Sm., 831. *Jenkyns v. Usborne*, 8 Scott, N. B., 505. *Van Casteel v. Booker*, 2 Exch., 691.

See also—

Gobind Chunder Sain v. Ryan, 9 Moo. Ind. Ap., 140. *Shippard v. Union Bank of London*, 7 H. & N., 661.

Dock Warrants are assignable instruments, and being duly indorsed and delivered, the property in the goods they represent passes by the delivery of the instrument, so as to empower the holder to take possession of the goods. And if the Assignor becomes bankrupt his assignees have no title to the goods.

Swinger v. Samuda, 1 Moore, 12. *Lucas v. Dorrden*, 1 Moore, 29.

Spear v. Travers, 4 Camp., 251.

A broker gave a banker a letter of hypothecation of goods, promising to lodge the warrants for them next day. Having failed to do so after repeated applications, the banker obtained the keys of the warehouse and took possession of the goods. Bacon, V. C., held that the banker had acquired a good title to the goods under the Factors Act, 5 & 6 Vict. (1842), c. 39, s. 4.

Ex parte North Western Bank, re Sloc, 43 L. J., Bank, 6.

Bills of Lading made out to the order of the shipper or consignee are instruments assignable by indorsement and delivery, so as to transfer the property in the goods to a *bona fide* indorsee for value, in the absence of any notice of fraud, insolvency, or want of title in the indorser.

If the consignee or vendee becomes insolvent, the unpaid vendor or consignor may stop the goods *in transitu* before they have been delivered to the vendee, consignee, or his agent.

But if the consignee or vendee has assigned the Bill of Lading for valuable consideration to an indorsee, who has no notice of his fraud or insolvency, such an indorsement and delivery will defeat the unpaid vendor's right of stoppage *in transitu*.

Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R., 63. Smith's L. C., vol. I., p. 756.

Cuming v. Brown, 9 East., 506. *Gurney v. Behrend*, 3 El. & Bl.,

622. *The Marie Joseph*, L. R., 1 P. C., 219. *The Argentina*, L. R.,

1 Ad. & Ec., 370. *Rodger v. The Comptoir d'escompte de Paris*, L.

R., 2 P. C., 393. *Gilbert v. Guignon*, L. R., 8 Ch., Ap. 16.

The forbearance or release of an antecedent debt is not a good consideration for an engagement to indorse Bills of Lading which had not yet come into the consignee's hands, so as to defeat the unpaid vendor's right of stoppage *in transitu*.

Rodger v. The Comptoir d'escompte de Paris, L. R., 2 P. C., 393.

A Bill of Lading in which the words "or order or assigns" are omitted is not an assignable instrument. [But this is cured now by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.]

But where the consignee of a Bill of Lading without the words "or order or assigns" had actually received the goods and had assigned them over to a Bank for valuable consideration, who thus united in themselves the legal and equitable title to the goods, the omission of the words "or order or assigns" is not sufficient to give the indorsees constructive notice of some equitable arrangement between the consignor and the assignee.

Henderson v. The Comptoir d'escompte de Paris, L. R., 5 P. C., 253.

When a Bank had discounted Bills of Exchange to a large amount on the express agreement that they should be accompanied by shipping documents, which the sellers failed to give; and, being pressed by the Bank, indorsed another Bill of Lading in substitution of the documents first promised, it was held to be indorsed for valuable consideration, and to defeat the consignor's right of stoppage *in transitu*.

The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China v. Henderson, L. R., 5 P. C., 501.

A person to whom an indorsed Bill of Lading was sent by mistake by the consignor cannot assign it so as to defeat *bona fide* assignees of others of the same set of Bills of Lading for value.

Gilbert v. Guignon, L. R., 8 Ch. Ap., 16. *Schuster v. McKellan*, 7 E. & B., 704.

If the indorsee knew that the consignee was in insolvent circumstances, and had not paid for the goods; and that no bill had been given for them, or that one having been accepted, it was not likely to be paid, the assignment is void against the unpaid vendor.

Cuming v. Brown, 9 East., 514.

Formerly the indorsement and delivery of a Bill of Lading was sufficient to transfer the property in the goods, but it did not transfer the contract to the assignee. But the 18 & 19 Vict. (1855), c. 111, enacts—

S. 1.—"Every consignee of goods named in a Bill of Lading, and every indorsee of a Bill of Lading *to whom the property in the goods therein mentioned shall pass, upon or by reason of such consignment or indorsement*, shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods, as if the contract contained in the Bill of Lading had been made with himself."

Short v. Simpson, L. R., 1 C. P., 248. *The St. Cloud*, Br. & Lush., Ad. Ca., 4. *Drachaki v. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank*, L. R., 8 C. P., 190. *The Freedom*, L. R., 3 P. C., 594. *Fox v. Nott*, 6 H. & N., 680.

A nude assignee of the Bill of Lading cannot sue in a Court of Common Law under the Statute 18 & 19 Vict. (1855), c. 111; nor in the Admiralty Court, under the Stat. 24 Vict. (1861), c. 10:

The St. Cloud, Br. & Lush., Ad. Ca., 4.

S. 2.—“Nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any right of stoppage *in transitu*, or any Right to claim freight against the original shipper or owner, or any liability of the consignee or indorsee by reason or in consequence of his being such consignee or indorsee, or of his receipt of the goods by reason, or in consequence of, such consignment or indorsement.”

S. 3.—“Every Bill of Lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for valuable consideration, representing goods to have been shipped on board a vessel, shall be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against the master or other person signing the same, notwithstanding that such goods, or some part thereof, may not have been so shipped, unless such holder of the Bill of Lading shall have had actual notice at the time of receiving the same that the goods had not been in fact laden on board.

“Provided that the master or other person so signing may exonerate himself in respect of such misrepresentation by shewing that it was caused without any default on his part, and wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or the holder, or some person under whom the holder claims.”

Where goods are at sea the parting with the Bill of Lading, which is the symbol of the goods, is parting with the ownership of the goods themselves: and this principle applies to goods which for the convenience of the parties have been landed at a sufferance wharf. (11 & 12 Vict. [1848], c. xviii., and 25 and 26 Vict. [1862], c. 63, s. 67.)

The Bill of Lading is a living instrument so long as the engagement of the shipowner has not been completely fulfilled, and the transfer of it for value passes the absolute property in the goods. And it has not been fulfilled so long as the goods, though landed at a wharf, are subject to a stop order.

The person who first gets the Bill of Lading (though only one of a set of three) gets the property in the goods it represents: he need not do any act to assert his title—which the transfer of the Bill of Lading itself renders complete: and any subsequent dealings with the others are subordinate to the rights passed by that one.

Myerstein v. Barber, L. R., 2 C. P., 88; 66 L. J. 4 H. L., 317.

If Bills of Exchange are sent to be accepted and a Bill of Lading along with them to protect the Bills of Exchange, if the consignee refuses acceptance of the Bills of Exchange he cannot retain the Bill of Lading.

A Bill of Lading retained in such a manner conveys no property in the goods to an assignee of the Bill.

Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R., 4 Q. B., 196; 493. 5 H. L., 116.

Title Deeds taken as Security.

A banker frequently takes a deposit of Title Deeds by way of equitable mortgage to secure an advance. In all such cases he should have a written memorandum distinctly stating the purpose for which the deposit is made. A written memorandum of deposit is not, indeed, necessary, for there may be a valid deposit in equity without even a word spoken, when the possession of the securities cannot be accounted for in any other way, the holder being a stranger to the title and deeds (a). But it is laid down that if there is no memorandum of deposit, the Court leans against considering the deposit as security for an antecedent debt. (b)

(a) *Bozon v. Williams*, 3 Y. & J., 150.

(b) *Ex parte Martin*, 4 Deac. & Ch., 457.

If deeds are deposited with a person expressly as a security for a future advance, the creditor has no lien on them for an antecedent debt.

Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turn. & Russ., 274.

But if a banker has completed his equitable title by obtaining possession of the title deeds along with a memorandum stating the purpose of the deposit to be to secure payment of the mortgagor's antecedent debt and interest, as well as all future advances, he will be able to enforce his claim against all judgments of any sort recovered against the mortgagor after the date of the equitable mortgage.

Whitworth v. Gaugain, 3 Hare, 416, affirmed, 1 Phil., 728. *Casberd v. Att. General*, 6 Price, 411.

There must be an actual deposit of the title deeds to exclude the operation of the Statute of Frauds. An order to a third party to deposit a lease when executed is not sufficient.

Ex parte Perry, 3 M. D. & De G., 252.

An agreement to execute a mortgage with a delivery of the

title deeds to have the agreement carried out is an equitable mortgage from the date of the agreement.

Edge v. Wetherington, 1 Cox, 211. *Ex parte Bruce*, 1 Bos., 274.
Hockley v. Bantock, 1 Buss., 141. *Keys v. Williams*, 3 Y. & Col.,
 C. C., 55. *Buſſin v. Dumas*, 12 Ir. Ch. Rep., 67.

To constitute an equitable mortgage it is not necessary that all the title deeds should be deposited, provided that real and material portions of them are.

Ex parte Chippendale, 1 Deac., 67. *Lucas v. Allen*, 26 L. J., Ch. 18.

A memorandum accompanying title deeds stating the purpose for which they are deposited, is not an agreement for a mortgage and does not require to be stamped.

Meek v. Bayliss, 31 L. J., Ch. 448.

A verbal agreement to deposit a lease when executed is not an equitable mortgage.

Ex parte Coombe, 4 Madd., 249.

To create an equitable sub-mortgage by deposit of deeds originally deposited as an equitable mortgage it is not necessary to deposit with the second depositee the written memorandum deposited with the first.

Ex parte Abel Smith, 2 M. D. & De G., 587.

The expression "may advance" in the memorandum given with title deeds as an equitable mortgage may include past as well as future advances if it appears that the parties intended it.

Ex parte Farley, 1 M. D. & De G., 688. *Ex parte Abel Smith*, 2 M. D. & De G., 587.

A legal mortgage cannot be extended by parol (a): but an equitable mortgage may (b).

(a) *Ex parte Hooper*, 2 Rose, 328.

(b) *Ex parte Langston*, 1 Rose, 26. *Ex parte Kensington*, 2 Ves. & Bea., 79. *Ex parte Lloyd*, 1 Gl. & Jam., 389. *Ex parte Nettleship*, 2 M. D. & De G., 124.

An equitable mortgage is the same in effect as a legal mortgage, and a mortgagor will have six months to redeem.

Parker v. Housefield, 2 My. & K., 419. *Thorp v. Gartside*, 2 Y. & Col. Ex. Eq., 730. *Meller v. Woods*, 1 Keen, 16. But see 15 & 16 Vict. (1852), c. 96, s. 48.

An equitable mortgagee by deposit of a lease is not compellable to take a legal assignment of the lease at the suit of the lessor, even though he has entered into possession of the premises and paid rent: nor is he liable to the lessor upon the covenants of the lease, as there is no privity of contract between him and the lessor.

Moore v. Greg, 2 Phil., 717.

If deeds are deposited with a person as an equitable mortgage, they are not to be considered as an equitable mortgage for a loan by another person, without a memorandum in writing.

Ex parte Whitbread, 1 Rose, 299.

A person conveyed certain property to trustees by a post nuptial settlement. Having obtained the deeds from the trustees, he deposited them with his bankers as an equitable mortgage for a loan. Held that the banker was not a purchaser within 27 Eliz. (1585), c. 4, s. 2, and the trustees were entitled to recover the deeds.

Kerrison v. Dorrien, 9 Bing., 76.

A conveyance of a house and furniture was deposited as a security for a debt, with a memorandum stating that it was the deposit of the title deeds of an *estate*. Held that this was not an equitable mortgage of the furniture: if the intention had been to include the furniture, it should have been so stated in the memorandum, and a schedule of the articles given (a).

But when the lease of a house was deposited as an equitable mortgage, and the premises were sold along with the goodwill of the business carried on on the premises; and the produce of the sale of the lease and goodwill was insufficient to satisfy the debt, the deposittee was held entitled to the whole of the proceeds, as the goodwill was the incident of the lease (b).

(a) *Ex parte Hunt*, 1 M. D. & De G., 139.

(b) *Chisum v. Dewes*, 5 Russ., 29.

A mortgagor granted a mortgage to secure an antecedent debt and future advances to a limited amount: he then granted a second mortgage of the same property to another person on similar terms: each party was aware of the mortgage of the other. The first mortgagee made advances to the mortgagor after he was aware that the second mortgagee made advances to him on the security of the second mortgage: he cannot claim that the advances which he had made subsequently to this knowledge should have priority over the advances made by the second mortgagee.

Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Ca., 514.

A misdescription of the mortgagor's interest in land will not invalidate an equitable mortgage.

Ex parte Glyn, 1 M. D. & De G., 29.

An equitable mortgage may be created by a deposit of copy of Court Roll.

Ex parte Warner, 19 Ves., 302. *Winter v. Lord Anson*, 3 Bann., 498. *Whitbread v. Jordan*, 1 Y. & Coll., Ex. Eq., 308. *Tyles v. Webb*, 6 Beav., 552.

If deeds including several estates are deposited as an equitable mortgage with a memorandum specifying only one as mortgaged, it is not a mortgage of the other estates mentioned in the deeds.

Wylde v. Radford, 33 L. J., Chanc., 51.

If a trustee fraudulently deposit title deeds as an equitable mortgage, the trust will prevail over the mortgage.

Manningford v. Toleman, 1 Coll., 670. *Baillie v. McKewan*, 35 Beav., 177.

On the relation of a Banker to his Customer as WAREHOUSEMAN of his Plate, Jewels, Specie, Deeds, Securities, &c.

8. Besides receiving money and securities from their customers in the way of banking business, bankers also receive from their customers chests of plate, jewels, specie, deeds, securities, &c., as mere DEPOSITS for the sake of safe custody in their strong rooms. In this capacity they act simply as WAREHOUSEMEN for their customers, and no property of any description passes to them in the goods deposited.

The banker makes no charge for such a deposit, he is therefore a gratuitous Bailee: and he is not liable for any loss that may occur by the dishonesty of a clerk or servant, provided that he was not aware of his servant's dishonesty, and that he exercises that degree of care and diligence which men of prudence would do in their own affairs.

Giblin v. McMullen, L. R., 2 P. C., 317; 38 L. J., P. C., 25.

A banker misappropriating any such deposits to his own use would be indictable under the Larceny Act 24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96, s. 75.

On a Banker's Lien on his Customer's Securities.

9. A banker's general LIEN is part of the Law Merchant, and is judicially noticed as such.

Brandao v. Barnett, 12 C. & F., 787. *Bock v. Gorrisson*, 2 De G. F. & J., 434. *Jones v. Peppercorne, Johns.*, 430.

A banker has a general Lien upon all Banking, or Paper

Securities placed in his hands as a *banker* by a customer, for his general balance.

Such Paper Securities include Bills, Notes, Exchequer Bills, Stock, Coupons, Foreign Bonds, and others of a similar nature.

And his Lien extends over these securities, not only for debts which have already accrued, but for those which may accrue, such as bills discounted, or for a bill accepted for his customer's accommodation.

Unless there be a special contract relating to these particular chattels, taking them out of the general rule.

But to do this, the particular contract must be inconsistent with the notion of a general Lien.

Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R., 488. *Bolland v. Bygrave*, Ry. & Moo., 271. *Jourdaine v. Lefevre*, 1 Esp., 65. *Scott v. Franklin*, 15 East., 428. *Wylde v. Radford*, 33 L. J., Chan. 53.

But this general Lien does not extend to Securities which are not Banking, or Negotiable Securities, unless by special contract.

A customer deposited with his banker a deed of conveyance including two distinct properties, with a memorandum pledging *one* of them as security for his general balance. Held that the banker had no lien on the other property.

Wylde v. Radford, 33 L. J., Chan. 51.

A customer by deed gave his banker a security over his estate to cover a debt which was then due: held that it only applied to the actually existing debt, and was not a continuing security for the floating balance.

Re Medewe's trust, 26 Beav., 588.

A banker has no lien on any plate, jewels, cash, or securities contained in a box deposited with him in his character of Warehouseman and not as banker (*a*).

Even though he has recovered judgment in an action against his customer for a balance due on his account (*b*).

(*a*) *Brandao v. Barnett*, 12 C. & F., 809. *Wylde v. Radford*, 33 L. J., Chan. 53.

(*b*) *Leese v. Martin*, L. R., 17 Eq., 224.

A banker has no Lien on a customer's balance for bills discounted for him, during the currency of the bills.

Bower v. Foreign & Col. Gas Co., 22 W. R., 740.

If securities be offered to a banker for a loan which he

refuses (a): or on a condition which is not fulfilled (b): the banker has no Lien on them for his general balance.

(a) *Lucas v. Dorrien*, 7 Taunt., 278.

(b) *Burton v. Gray*, 43 L. J., Chanc. 229.

If a Trustee, in violation of his trust, pledges securities with his banker, the trust will override the Lien, and the banker cannot retain them.

Manningford v. Toleman, 1 Coll., C. C., 670. *Moore v. Jervis*, 2 Col., C. C., 60. *Pinkett v. Wright*, 1 Haro, 120; affirmed in *Dom. Proc.* as *Murray v. Pinkett*, 12 C. & P., 764. *Baillie v. MacKewan*, 35 Beav., 177. *Stackhouse v. Countess of Jersey*, 30 L. J., Chanc. 421.

But where an executrix pledged title deeds with a bank as a security for a loan which she spent in violation of a trust, it was held that the bank having no notice of the breach of trust, had a Lien on the deeds.

Farhall v. Farhall, L. R., 7 Eq., 286.

A Banker has a Lien on banking securities pledged with him by a customer if he has no notice, or reasonable cause to believe, that they belong to another person: but if he receives notice that they, in fact, do belong to another person, he has no Lien for any advance he may make after receiving such notice, nor for his general balance.

Locke v. Prescott, 32 Beav., 261.

A *cestui que trust* being indebted to a bank at which the trust account was kept, gave the bank a Lien on his share of the trust fund, and gave notice to one of the trustees to pay his share into his account with the bank: held that this was a valid and irrevocable assignment of the fund, and that the bank's Lien prevailed against the customer's assignees in bankruptcy.

Ex parte Steward, 3 M. D. & De G., 265.

A debtor deposited title deeds with his creditor as security until his debt should be reduced to £100; he died indebted to his creditor in £274: held that the creditor's Lien extended to the whole £274.

Ashton v. Dalton, 2 Col., 565.

An equitable mortgage by the occupier of lands, mills, houses, machinery, and premises, gives the depositor a Lien on all fixtures, whether erected before or after the deposit, including those removeable, as between landlord and tenant.

Ex parte Price, 2 M. D. & De G., 518. *Ex parte Loyd*, 3 Deane & C., 765. *Ex parte Broadwood*, 1 M. D. & De G., 631. *Ex parte*

Cowell, 17 L. J. Bank., 16. *Ex parte Beniley*, 2 M. D. & De G., 591. *Ex parte Wilson*, 4 D. & Ch., 148. *Ex parte Cotton*, 2 M. D. & De G., 725. *Ex parte Reynal*, 2 M. D. & De G., 448.

A banker took from one partner of a firm a legal mortgage over property which he knew belonged to the partnership, as security for a private debt of that partner: held that the rights of the other partner prevailed over the banker's Lien.

Cavander v. Bulleel, L. R., 9 Ch. Ap., 79.

A customer kept three accounts at a bank, and received advances from the bank, which were entered in one of them. He sent securities to the bank to cover a fresh advance. Held that the bank had a Lien on these securities for the general balance.

In re European Bank, L. R., 8 Ch. Ap., 41.

A company can create an equitable mortgage by the deposit of deeds, without complying with the formalities prescribed by their deed of constitution for executing legal mortgages; and a banker is entitled to the same Lien on such deeds as if they had been deposited by a private person.

Ex parte National Bank, L. R., 14 Eq., 507.

A banker has no lien on the balance of a partner on his separate account for a debt due to him from the firm.

Watts v. Christie, 11 Beav., 546.

A firm had an account with a bank, and one of the partners had also a separate account with it. The bank discounted a promissory note of the partner upon his depositing certain shares as security: these shares afterwards became the property of the firm, which failed, being indebted to the bank. Held that the bank held them only as security for the debt of the partner, and had no Lien on them for the debt due from the partnership.

Ex parte McKenna, 80 L. J., Bank., 20.

If a banker takes a security payable at a future day, his Lien is gone.

Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves., 230. *Hewison v. Guthrie*, 3 Scott, 298.

The directors of a colonial banking company were empowered by their deed to issue shares on such terms as they pleased; and it was also provided that they should have a Lien on such shares for any debt of such shareholder. They issued shares with powers of attorney, to enable the holders to remit them to England and deal with them as negotiable securities. Held that they had no Lien on such shares.

Hunter v. Stewart, 4 De G. F. & J., 168.

*The BANKRUPTCY of a CUSTOMER: SETT-OFF and
MUTUAL CREDIT.*

10. Directly a customer is bankrupt he is commercially dead, and he has lost all power to deal with his property, which is gone to his creditors.

Consequently, a banker may receive money on a bankrupt customer's account, because he does so as trustee for the creditors; but he must not pay away any money to his customer's order after notice of his bankruptcy, and if he does so, he will have to refund it to the creditors, and he will not be allowed to prove for it under the fiat.

Fernon v. Henkey, 2 T. R., 113.

Where a Bank, by special agreement with a customer, retained a sum of money as security for bills discounted, and the customer afterwards became bankrupt, it was held entitled to retain this sum against the assignees.

The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China v. Evans, 21 L. T., N. S., 407.

On the bankruptcy of a customer, each bill of his under discount is to be treated as a separate debt, and the bank cannot recover the full amount of the bill from the other parties, and receive the dividend upon it from the bankrupt's estate as well.

Ex parte Hornby, De G., 69. *Ex parte Holmes*, 4 Deac., 83. *Ex parte Brook*, 2 Rose, 334.

A banker, knowing that his customer had committed an act of bankruptcy, took from a surety, who did not know of this act of bankruptcy, a guaranty to secure all debts then, or to become, due from the customer to a given amount; which the surety paid without specifying which portion of the debt it should be applied to. Held that it was to be applied to the portion proveable under the fiat, and not that which was not proveable.

Ex parte Sharp, 3 M. D. & De G., 490.

A creditor generally may apply any security he holds to discharge whichever debt of the bankrupt debtor he pleases.

Ex parte Havard: *ex parte Arkley*, Cooke's Bank. Laws, 147, 148.
Ex parte Hunter, 6 Ves., 94. *Ex parte Johnson*, 3 De G. M. & G., 218.

The holder of a bill of exchange has no Lien on any securities given by the drawer to the acceptor to protect his acceptance, so long as the parties are solvent: but if they fail, the holder has then a lien on these securities to discharge the bill.

But this doctrine does not apply when the drawee has not accepted the bills; nor in any case where the creditor has not double rights against both firms (*b*): nor when either the drawer or acceptor is a joint stock company which has been ordered to be wound up, unless it can be shewn that the company is insolvent (*c*).

(a) *Ex parte Waring*, 19 Ves., 345.

(b) *Vaughan v. Halliday*, L. R., 9 Ch. Ap., 561.

(c) *Hickie & Co.'s case*, L. R., 4 Eq., 226.

Set-off and Mutual Credit. By the common law of England if two persons were mutually indebted, and one brought an action against the other for payment of his debt, the other could not plead that the first was also indebted to him; he was obliged to pay his debt first; and then, if he chose, he might bring an action to recover payment of his own debt.

The Courts of Equity, however, adopting the Law of the Pandects of Justinian, recognised the principle that when two parties were mutually indebted, the debt of one should be *set-off*, or subtracted from the other, and the balance only should be payable. The want of this practice in law was found, as commerce increased, to be productive of great injustice in the case of bankrupts. Persons who owed debts to bankrupts were obliged to pay their debts in full, and then they received only a dividend on what the bankrupt owed them.

The principle of *set-off* was allowed in the case of bankrupts, by Statute 4 Anne, c. 17, and afterwards in the Insolvent Debtors' Act.

At last two general Statutes were passed, 2 Geo. II., c. 22, s. 13, and 8 Geo. II., c. 24, s. 1, called the Statutes of Set-off, which gave a general right of set-off, or *Compensation*, in the case of mutual debts: that is, in the case of ascertained money demands.

But, under these Statutes, the respective claims must be existing legal debts: hence, a debt could not be set-off against damages sought to be recovered in an action: as if a banker had damaged his customer's credit by his conduct, a debt owed to him by his customer could not be set-off against it. Nor can a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations be set-off against an existing one. Nor by these Statutes could a debt, only to arise at a future time, as on a bill or note not yet due, be set-off against an existing debt.

The debts, therefore, must be due and payable at the time of the action, and also at the trial.

The debts also must be strictly mutual: hence, if a firm sue for a partnership debt, a debt due from some members of the firm could not be set-off. If a firm be sued, they could not set-off debts due to some of them. One partner, however, may settle a debt due to the partnership by setting-off against it a debt due from himself.

The Statutes only permit set-off in the case of mutually existing legal debts. But the Bankruptcy Act goes further; it allows the set-off of mutual *credit*, as well as of mutual *debts*; and mutual *credit* is more extensive than mutual *debt*.

There is mutual *credit*, though one of the claims constituting it is not yet due, as in the case of a bond, bill, or note, payable at a future time.

Thus if a banker is indorsee of a bill of a bankrupt acceptor or indorser, and the acceptor or indorser holds an equivalent amount of the banker's notes payable on demand, there is a mutual credit, and the banker may set-off one against the other.

A Bill accepted for the bankrupt's accommodation is within the mutual credit clause, and may, under the Bankrupt Acts, be set-off against a demand by the assignees for money had and received to their use after the bankruptcy.

If a banker, however, commits a breach of trust, as if he receives bills or notes with orders to apply their proceeds to a particular purpose, and, instead of doing so, converts them to his own use, he could not plead set-off.

Mutual credit and a Lien do not destroy each other.

Clark v. Fell, 4 B. & Ad., 404. *Ex parte Barnett*, L. R., 9 Chanc. Ap. 293.

Under the Bankrupt Act a set-off is available in all actions, whether for debt or damages.

Under the term *mutual credit*—the credit need not necessarily be given in money. Thus, if goods be deposited with the authority to convert them into money, that may be pleaded as set-off. Thus the mutual credit must be such as was intended to terminate in a debt. This is manifestly the same principle as applies to bills and notes not yet due.

Mutual credit, however, must actually exist at the time between the bankrupt; therefore, when the defendant promised to indorse a bill to the bankrupt, in consideration of his acceptance, it was held not to be mutual credit.

On Securities given by Third Parties to Bankers to secure advances to their customers.

11. We have now given what appears to us to be necessary to explain the relations between a banker and his customer, and securities given by the customer; we have now to consider the case where strangers give securities to bankers on behalf of their customers, which are much more strictly interpreted than securities given by the customer himself.

The general rule is this—That if a person gives a guaranty to a banking firm to secure advances made or to be made to another firm as customers, if any change takes place in either firm, either from death or the withdrawal of any partner; or the adoption of a new one; the guaranty holds good as to any operations which have already been commenced but not completed before the change: as, for instance, to bills accepted, discounted, or negotiated before the change, but which did not become payable till after it; but it then becomes *ipso facto* void and determined as regards any new transactions.

These doctrines having been established by a host of cases were confirmed by Statute, 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 4—

“No promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, made to a firm consisting of two or more persons, or to a single person trading under the name of a firm: and no promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of a firm consisting of two or more persons, or of a single person trading under the name of a firm, shall be binding on the person making such promise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done, after a change shall have taken place in any one or more of the persons constituting the firm, or in the person trading under the name of a firm, unless the intention of the parties that such promise shall continue to be binding, notwithstanding such change, shall appear, either by express stipulation, or by necessary implication from the nature of the firm, or otherwise.”

If, therefore, it be the intention that the guaranty should be a continuing security, notwithstanding any change in either or both of the firms, such a stipulation must be clearly set forth in it.

A guaranty is also vitiated if the banker deviates in the slightest degree from its precise terms, for there is, in fact, a dealing between the banker and his customer to which the guarantor has never consented.

Before 1856 a guaranty required to have the consideration it was given for stated on the face of it; but by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 18 & 19 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 8, it is enacted—
 “No special promise to be made by any person after the passing of this Act to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, being in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorised, shall be deemed invalid to support an action, suit or other proceeding to charge the person by whom such promise shall have been made, by reason only that the consideration for such promise does not appear in writing, or by necessary inference from a written document.”

Evans v. Whyte, 5 Bing., 485. *Eyre v. Bartrop*, 3 Madd., 221.
Archer v. Hale, 4 Bing., 464. *Whitcher v. Hall*, 5 B. & C., 269.
Bonar v. Macdonald, 8 H. L. Ca., 226.

If the banker advances to his customer a sum in excess of the sum guaranteed, that is not a variation of the terms of the guaranty.

Sellers v. Jones, 16 M. & W., 112. *Parker v. Wise*, 5 M. & S., 247. *Lawrie v. Scholefield*, L. R., 4 C. P., 622.

If a surety guarantees a fixed sum, and the banker advances to his customer beyond the sum fixed, and the customer becomes bankrupt, the surety is only liable for the sum he guaranteed, less the amount of any dividend on the bankrupt's estate.

Ex parte Rushforth, 10 Ves., 409. *Paley v. Field*, 12 Ves., 435.
Bardwell v. Lydall, 7 Bing., 489. *Raikes v. Todd*, 8 Ad. & E., 846.
Ex parte Brook, 2 Rose, 334. *Ex parte Holmes*, M. & Ch., 301.
Gee v. Pack, 33 L. J., Q. B., 49.

But a guaranty is not determined by the death of the guarantor, so long as the obligation is uncompleted.

Bradbury v. Morgan, 1 H. & C., 249.

A guaranty, even though it states a specified time, is always countermandable—except, of course, as regards any advances made under it.

Oxford v. Davies, 12 C. B., N. S., 748.

Any variation between the precise terms of the guaranty and the actual dealing between the banker and the debtor will avoid the guaranty.

Glyn v. Hertel, 8 Taunt., 208. *Bacon v. Chesney*, 1 Stark., N. P. C., 192. *Bonser v. Cox*, 6 Beav., 110. *The General Steam Navigation Co. v. Rolt*, 6 C. B., N. S., 550. *Calvert v. the London Docks Co.*, 2 Keen, 638.

A guaranty will be construed most strictly against the grantor.

Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East., 227. *Mayor v. Isaac*, 6 M. & W., 605. *Wood v. Priestner*, L. R., 2 Exch., 66.

An omission or misstatement of facts which affects the guarantor's responsibility will avoid the guaranty (a).

But an omission to state facts which do not affect the guarantor's responsibility will not do so (b).

If the creditor knows that the principal has committed an act of dishonesty, and does not inform the surety, he is discharged (c).

(a) *Pidcock v. Bishop*, 8 B. & C., 605. *Jackson v. Duchaire*, 8 T. R., 551. *Mayhew v. Crickett*, 2 Swanst., 193. *Glyn v. Hertel*, 8 Taunt., 208. *Stone v. Compton*, 5 Bing., N. C., 142. *Pledge v. Buss*, John., 663. *Swan v. Bank of Scotland*, 1 Dow., 272. *Blest v. Brown*, 8 Jur., N. S., 603. *Lee v. Jones*, 17 C. B., N. S., 482.

(b) *Hamilton v. Watson*, 12 Cl. & F., 109. *North British Insurance Co. v. Lloyd*, 10 Exch., 523.

(c) *Phillips v. Foxall*, L. R., 7 Q. B., 666.

If the Creditor, without the surety's knowledge and consent, gives the principal debtor time by a positive legal contract which suspends his right of action against him—and is not a mere forbearance to sue: or if he obtains execution against him and then withdraws it (1): or agrees that the debtor's estate shall be administered for the benefit of the creditors, "in like manner as if he had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy" (2): the surety is discharged (a).

But not if it is done with the surety's knowledge and consent (b).

(a) *Nisbet v. Smith*, 2 Bro. C. C., 579. *Rees v. Berrington*, 2 Ves., jun., 540. *Samuell v. Howarth*, 3 Mer., 272. *Creighton v. Rankin*, 7 Cl. & F., 346. *Eyre v. Everett*, 2 Buss., 381. *Heath v. Key*, 1 Y. & Jer., 434. *Howell v. Jones*, 1 C. M. & R., 97. *Combe v. Woolfe*, 8 Bing., 156. *Orme v. Young*, Holt, N. P. C., 84. *Boulbee v. Stubbs*, 18 Ves., 20. *Bank of Ireland v. Beresford*, 6 Dow., 233. *Perfect v. Musgrave*, 6 Price, 111.

(1) *Mayhew v. Crickett*, 2 Swanst., 191.

(2) *Cragoe v. Jones*, L. R., 8 Exch., 81.

(b) *Tyson v. Coz*, Turn. & Russ., 398.

But an additional and collateral security which does not suspend the creditor's right of action does not discharge the surety.

Twopenny v. Young, 3 B. & C., 206. *Bell v. Banks*, 3 M. & G., 258.

If the principal debtor is discharged by operation of law, as by a certificate of bankruptcy, the surety is not discharged.

Brown v. Carr, 7 Bing., 506. *Langdale v. Parry*, 2 Dow. & Ry., 337.

If the creditor takes a security of a higher order, such as a specialty instead of a simple contract, the latter is "merged" and the surety is discharged.

But if the remedy against the surety is expressly reserved in the specialty, the surety is not released, even though it is given without his knowledge.

For a specialty to operate as a merger it must coincide exactly in amount and with the parties, with the simple contract.

Ex parte Overend, Buck, B. C., 550. *Ex parte Glendinning*, Buck, B. C., 517. *Ex parte Gifford*, 5 Ves., 805. *Beales v. Mayor*, 19 G. B., N. S., 76. *Keareley v. Cole*, 16 M. & W., 128. *Hooper v. Marshall*, L. R., 5 O. P., 4. *Batson v. Gosling*, L. R., 7 O. P., 4. *Teele v. Johnson*, 11 Exch., 840.

If the holder of a security agrees with the principal debtor to give time to the surety, he thereby discharges the surety.

Oriental Financial Co. v. Overend & Co., L. R., 7 Ch. Ap., 142.

On the Appropriation of Payments.

12. If a debtor owes several debts to a creditor he may appropriate or impute any payment he makes to whichever of the debts he pleases, if he declares his intention at the time of making the payment (a).

And such an appropriation may be implied from circumstances, even though not expressly declared (b).

(a) *Anon. Oro. Eliz.*, 68. *Pinnel's case*, 5 Co., 117b. *Peters v. Anderson*, 5 Taunt., 596. *Malcolm v. Scott*, 6 Hare, 570. *Smith v. Smith*, 9 Beav., 80. *Waugh v. Wren*, 11 W. R., 244. *Ex parte Rafael del Sar*, 1 De G. & J., 152.

(b) *Shaw v. Picton*, 4 B. & C., 715. *Young v. English*, 7 Beav., 10. *Stoveld v. Eade*, 4 Bing., 154. *Waters v. Tompkins*, 2 C. M. & B., 723. *Knight v. Bowyer*, 4 De G. & J., 619. *Pearl v. Deacon*, 24 Beav., 186. *Marryate v. White*, 2 Stark., 102. *Newmarch v. Clay*, 14 East., 239. *Taylor v. Kymer*, 3 B. & Ad., 320. *Wright v. Hickling*, L. R., 2 O. P., 199. *Nash v. Hodgson*, 6 De G. M. & G., 474. *Henniker v. Wigg*, 4 Q. B., 792. *Williamson v. Rawlinson*, 10 J. B., Moore, 371. *Pease v. Hirst*, 10 B. & C., 122. *Wickham v. Wickham*, K. & J., 478.

If the debtor makes no appropriation at the time of the payment, the creditor may appropriate it to whichever debt he pleases (a).

And he may do this at any time before trial (b).

The appropriation is not complete until he has notified it to his debtor, but when it is once notified he cannot revoke it (c).

The creditor cannot appropriate the payment to an illegal debt (d).

But he may do so to one upon which the remedy only is barred by a Statute, or by a legal technicality (e).

If one debt be certain, and another doubtful or uncertain, he must appropriate it to the certain debt (f).

(a) *Goddard v. Cox*, 2 Stra., 1194. *Bloss v. Cutting*, 2 Stra., 1194. *Hall v. Wood*, 14 East., 243n. *Kirby v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 M. & S., 18. *Hutchinson v. Bell*, 1 Taunt., 564. *Dawson v. Remnant*, 6 Esp., N. P. C., 26. *Peters v. Anderson*, 5 Taunt., 596. *Grigg v. Cocks*, 4 Sim., 438. *Bosanquet v. Wray*, 6 Taunt., 597. *Nash v. Hodgson*, 6 De G. M. & G., 474.

(b) *Philpott v. Jones*, 2 A. & E., 44. *Simson v. Ingham*, 2 B. & C., 65. *Williams v. Griffith*, 5 M. & W., 300. *Nash v. Hodgson*, 6 De G. M. & G., 474.

(c) *Fraser v. Birch*, 3 Knapp., 380. *Bodenham v. Purchas*, 2 B. & Ald., 39. *Bank of Scotland v. Christie*, 8 C. & F., 214. *Wickham v. Wickham*, 2 K. & J., 478.

(d) *Wright v. Laing*, 3 B. & C., 165. *Ex parte Randleston*, 2 Dea. & Ch., 534. *Ribbans v. Crichtett*, 1 B. & P., 264.

(e) *Mills v. Fowkes*, 5 Bing., N. C., 455. *Philpott v. Jones*, 2 A. & E., 41. *Cruikshanks v. Rose*, 1 Moo. & B., 100. *Arnold v. Mayor of Poole*, 4 M. & G., 860. *Lamprell v. Billericay Union*, 3 Exch., 283.

(f) *Goddard v. Hodges*, 1 C. & M., 33. *Burn v. Boulton*, 2 C. B., 476. *Goddard v. Cox*, 2 Str., 1194. *James v. Child*, 2 Cr. & Jer., 678.

If neither the debtor nor the creditor appropriates the payment, and none can be presumed from circumstances, the Law will appropriate it to the discharge of the earlier debts.

Clayton's case, 1 Mer., 608. *Bodenham v. Purchas*, 2 B. & Ald., 39. *Field v. Carr*, 5 Bing., 13. *Pemberton v. Oakes*, 4 Buss., 154. *Simson v. Ingham*, 2 B. & C., 65. *Brooke v. Enderby*, 2 B. & B., 70. *Sterndale v. Hankinson*, 1 Sim., 398. *Smith v. Wigley*, 3 Mo. & Sc., 174. *Beale v. Caddick*, 2 H. & N., 326. *Holland v. Teed*, 7 Hare, 50. *Siebel v. Springfield*, 12 W. B. Q. B., 78. *Re Medewe's trust*, 26 Beav., 592. *Merriman v. Ward*, 1 J. & H., 371. *Scott v. Beale*, 6 Jur., N. S., 559.

An executor cannot alter a previous appropriation of payments so as to revive a liability on the estate which has already been extinguished.

Merriman v. Ward, 1 J. & H., 371.

Bankers as Agents or Correspondents of other Bankers.

13. Bankers not only have their own customers, but they act as agents and correspondents of other bankers. They are therefore the agents of an agent.

A customer frequently requires his banker to perform some duty for him which can only be done by his employing another banker at a distance; and even sometimes that agent employing another agent. In these successive agencies losses may happen quite innocently in the course of trade. In all such cases the banker originally employed is liable to his customer, because it was he who chose the agent who made the loss: or who chose the agent who chose the agent who made the loss. Therefore, the first banker must bear the loss as regards his customer, and then have recourse against his own agent.

Lord North's case, Dyer, 161. Matthews v. Haydon, 2 Esp., N. P. C., 509. Mackenay v. Ramsays, 9 Cl. & Fin., 818.

If a customer pays in a sum of money to his own banker, with directions to him to remit it to another banker, and the first banker fails before he has done so, the property in it remains with the customer.

Farley v. Turner, 26 L. J., Chanc., 710.

On BANKING INVESTMENTS.

14. Though a banker is bound theoretically to repay every one of his customers instantly on demand, yet, as no man what-ever would spend all his money if it were in his own possession, but would keep a store of it, and spend it gradually, so, when he keeps it at his banker's, he will not be likely to require it all at once, but will keep a store of it there, just as he would have done if he had kept it at home; and the banker is able to trade with it in a variety of ways, if he takes care to keep by him sufficient to meet any demand his customers are likely to make on him. The different methods in which a banker trades with the money left with him by his customers, depend very much on the class of his customers and their occupations, and the general business of the locality he lives in. He must adapt his business in such a way as may be most suitable for the class of customers he has to deal with; so that he may never fail, for an instant, to meet any demand. If his customers are chiefly country gentlemen, whose rents are remitted regularly, and who draw them

only for family expenditure, he may calculate pretty accurately on the demand likely to be made on him, and he may lend out his funds on more distant securities than are proper in other cases. Such are chiefly country bankers in agricultural districts, and those at the West End of London.

But when a banker does business in a trading community, who are in constant want of their money, and whose demands are much more frequent and unexpected, he must adopt a very different line of business. He must then have his funds within reach at a very short notice, and he ought to have them invested in such property as he can re-sell on a very short notice, to meet any unexpected pressure upon him. The business of such a banker will chiefly consist in discounting bills of exchange, and is of a distinct nature from that of lending money on mortgage.

We must now consider the various methods in which bankers trade. They are—1st, by discounting bills of exchange; 2ndly, by advancing to their customers on their own promissory notes, with or without collateral security; 3rdly, by means of cash credits, or, as they are sometimes called, overdrawn accounts; 4thly, by lending money on mortgage; 5thly, by purchasing public securities, such as stock or Exchequer bills.

On Discounting Bills of Exchange.

15. In Chap. IV., sect. 3 we have fully explained the nature and origin of bills of exchange—in the present Chapter we have only to make some practical observations on the subject.

If an abundant supply of perfectly good bills of exchange were always to be had, they are, no doubt, the most eligible of banking investments, for their date is fixed, and the banker always knows the precise day when his money will come back to him. He charges the profit at the time of the advance, and he gains it, whether the customer draws out the money or not; and, in a large bank, it must often happen that drawers, acceptors, and payees, are all customers of the same bank, so that when the drawer has his account credited with the proceeds of the bill, and draws out the money, so far as he is concerned, in many cases it must happen that the cheque finds its way to some one who is a customer to the same bank, and, therefore, the bank has reaped a profit on creating a credit, which is simply transferred,

from one account to another. And the same results take place much more frequently by means of the system of clearing, explained in the next Section, by which all the banks that join in it, are, in fact, but one great banking institution. If it should happen that a customer of one of the great banks draws a cheque in favour of the customer of another, the chances are, that some customer of that other bank has done precisely the same in favour of a customer of the first bank, and these claims are settled by means of the Clearing House, by being set off one against the other, without any demand whatever for coin. The more perfect, of course, the clearing system, the less coin will be required. Consequently, the greater part of banking profits are now made simply by creating credits, and these credits are paid, not in cash, but by exchanging them for other credits.

When a banker *discounts* a bill for a customer, he buys it, or purchases it, out and out from him, and acquires all his customer's rights in it, that is, of bringing an action against all the parties to it, and also of reselling it again if he pleases, or *re-discounting* it, and this is one of the great advantages of *discounting bills*, that if there be an unusual pressure for cash on the banker, he can resell the bills he has bought.

The bills a banker, then, has bought, are his stock-in-trade. He buys them from his own customer at a certain price, and sells them again to the acceptor, just as a hosier may buy stockings from the manufacturer, and sell them to a customer.

When a banker discounts a bill he writes down the full amount of the bill to the credit of his customer, and at the same time he debits him with the discount on it.

We have observed that this method of trading is more profitable than interest, and the profit rapidly increases the higher discount is. A very slight consideration will shew this. Suppose a money lender advances money at 50 per cent. interest. He would advance his customer £100, and at the end of the year receive his £100 back, together with the £50. His profits, therefore, would be 50 per cent. But suppose he *discounts* a bill for £100 at 50 per cent. He would only actually advance £50, and at the end of the year he would receive £100, consequently he would make a profit of 100 per cent.

If the lender lent the money at 100 per cent. *interest*, he would advance £100, and receive £200 at the end of the year. If he

discounted a bill at 100 per cent., he would advance *nothing*, and receive £100 at the end of the year, or his profits would be *infinite*!

Now, without incumbering ourselves with mathematical formulæ, we may give a table shewing the difference in profit between *Interest* and *Discount*:—

Table shewing the profits per cent. and per annum at Interest and Discount.

Interest.	Discount.	Interest.	Discount.
1	1·010101	8½	9·811475
1½	1·522882	9	9·890109
2	2·040816	9½	10·496182
2½	2·564102	10	11·111111
3	3·092788	15	18·825529
3½	3·626948	20	25·000000
4	4·166666	30	42·857142
4½	4·701570	40	66·666666
5	5·263157	50	100·000000
5½	5·820105	60	150·000000
6	6·382968	70	238·000000
6½	6·951871	80	400·000000
7	7·526881	90	900·000000
7½	8·108108	100	Infinite.
8	8·695652	—	—

A consideration of this table will explain the enormous profits made by bankers when discount is high, and also shew what discounting a bill at 50 and 60 per cent.—which we occasionally hear of in courts of law—means.

The system of discounting bills is intended to be the sale of *bonâ fide* debts for work done, or for property actually transferred from one party to another, and there is nothing that requires more sleepless vigilance on the part of a banker than to take care that the debts he buys are genuine and not fictitious ones. When bills are offered for sale, he ought to know whose

debt it is that he is buying, and he ought to be able to form some conjecture as to the course of dealing between the parties, which could give rise to the bill. Bills should not only be among traders, but only according to a particular course of trade. We will speak of real debts in the first place; and these may arise in a number of different ways. First, between traders in the same business, and, secondly, between traders in different species of business, but yet for work done. If we take the case of manufactured or imported goods, there are usually three stages they pass through—1st, from the manufacturer or importer to the wholesale dealer; 2ndly, from the wholesale dealer to the retail dealer; and 3rdly, from the retail dealer to the consumer. Each transfer of property may give rise to a bill; but, of these, the first two are by far the most eligible, and are most peculiarly suitable for a banker to buy, the third should only be purchased with very great caution, and but rarely.

There are other cases of good trade bills, when one business requires the supply of different productions, such as a builder requires supplies of wood, lead, slates, bricks, and other materials.

Hence, a bill of a wood merchant, or a lead merchant, on a builder, would be a very natural proceeding, and apparently a proper trade bill. Again, bills may legitimately arise between traders of wholly different descriptions, but yet for work done. Thus, if a builder fits up premises for a shopkeeper or merchant, a bill between the parties for the work done is a very legitimate one for a banker to discount. All these bills, therefore, follow the natural course of trade, and carry the appearance, on the face of them, of being genuine.

But if a banker sees bills drawn against the natural stream of trade, it should instantly rouse his suspicion. Thus, a bill drawn by a wholesale dealer upon a manufacturer, or by a retail dealer upon a wholesale dealer, would be contrary to the natural course of trade, and should arouse suspicion. A bill drawn by a lead merchant upon a builder would be proper on the face of it, if there were nothing to excite suspicion; but a bill of a builder upon a lead merchant would be *suspicious*, unless it were satisfactorily explained. Moreover, bills of one person upon another doing the same business are suspicious upon the face of them. Thus, a bill of one manufacturer upon another in the same business, or between one wholesale dealer

and another, are evidently suspicious, because there is no usual course of dealing between them. Besides, such bills are chiefly generated in speculative times, when commodities change hands repeatedly, on speculation that the prices will rise. Bankers should be particularly on their guard against buying bills drawn against articles which are at an extravagant price, in times of speculation.

As it by no means commonly happens that the drawers and acceptors of bills are customers of the same bank, the banker is *prima facie* influenced by the respectability of his own customer, who is the drawer or indorser of the bill. He ought, however, to acquire specific information regarding the persons upon whom his customers are in the habit of drawing, and satisfy himself that they are likely to be genuine bills. And this vigilance should never be relaxed in any case whatever. We hold it to be utterly contrary to all sound banking to take bills merely on the supposed respectability of the customer. But we believe it to be far too common a practice to look merely to the customer's account. Customers begin by getting the character of being respectable—they bring, perhaps, good bills at first—and keep good balances; and their bills are punctually met. This regularity and punctuality are very apt to throw a banker off his guard. He thinks his customer is a most respectable man, doing a good business; all the bills are taken to be trade bills. By-and-by the customer applies for an increased discount limit, on account of his flourishing business. The banker is only too happy to accommodate so promising a customer. His discounts swell and his balances diminish, but his bills are still well met. However, the time comes, perhaps, when the banker thinks it prudent to contract his business generally, and this may be one of the accounts he may think it expedient to reduce; and then he makes the pleasant discovery that there are no such persons at all as the acceptors, and that the funds for meeting all these bills have been got from himself!

Such cases as these are not unlikely to happen when London houses supply small country tradesmen, and draw bills on them. When a man has established a good character, it is impossible to require information about every bill before it is discounted; but we do not hesitate to say, that it is of the first importance that a banker should be constantly probing his customer's ac-

counts, and get information of the persons they draw upon. It was wittily said by some one (Lord Halifax, we believe) "that man in this world is saved chiefly by want of faith." This is eminently true of banking. A banker should have faith in no man. The amount of villainy and rascality which is practised by means of accommodation and fictitious and forged bills, would exceed belief, if such disclosures were made public. However, it is contrary to the policy of bankers to allow it to be known how they are robbed and cheated. Their interest covers a multitude of sins. If criminals were prosecuted according to their merits, the calendar would swell up to a frightful extent. There is, probably, no class of society who see felonies committed so frequently as bankers, and are accustomed to let them go unrepressed and unpunished. The number of unconvicted felons that go about with impunity in the commercial world is something horrible; and there is reason to fear that such things are encouraged by the too easy faith reposed in their customers by bankers. If bankers were more vigilant in scrutinising their customers' accounts, many would have been cut short in a career of crime—of accumulated robberies, which generally terminate in disaster to the bank.

As it is contrary to all sound principles of banking to discount bills solely on the customer's respectability, as appearing from his account, so any customer should be regarded with suspicion who is not ready and willing to communicate information to his banker about his affairs. If he will not candidly communicate the state of his affairs to his banker, how can he expect him to give him assistance in the day of trouble? Some customers, however, are mightily indignant if their banker will not discount their bills on the strength of their names without regard to the acceptor. But as such a practice is contrary to sound banking, so it will invariably be found that these are not desirable customers to have, and it would be well for a banker quietly to shake off his connection with them, as, in the long run, they will probably bring him more loss than profit.

So much for discounting bills of exchange, which consists of buying debts, and not *lending* money. A banker, however, may not always be able to find a sufficient quantity of debts to buy, to absorb all his disposable funds, or he may not choose to employ

them all in that manner ; and some of his customers may want a temporary loan on security, who have no bills to sell. The banker takes his customer's promissory note for the sum payable at the date agreed upon, and also a deposit of the convertible security as collateral security. He does not advance on the goods or security itself—that is the business of a pawnbroker—but on the personal obligation of his customer, and the securities are only to be resorted to in case of the failure of the customer to pay his debt. These convertible securities are chiefly public stock, Bank stock, India bonds, shares in all sorts of companies, railway, bank, insurance, &c., dock warrants, bills of lading. Whenever he takes any of these as collateral security, he ought to have a power of sale from his customer, in case he fails to discharge his obligation. These loans, though often they may be made to respectable customers, are not desirable advances for a banker to make, and he should be chary in encouraging them too much, for they frequently are demanded from the borrower having locked up too much of his funds in an unavailable form ; consequently, there is much danger of the obligations not being paid at maturity, and then come requests for renewals, and the banker is either driven to the unpleasant necessity of realising this security, or else having his temporary advance converted into a dead loan.

Persons who seek for such advances habitually, are most probably speculating in joint stock companies' share. They buy up shares on speculation, which they hope will advance in price ; they then wish to pledge the shares they have already bought to purchase more, then perhaps, a turn in the market comes, and the value of the whole goes down rapidly ; they are unable to pay their note, and the banker may perhaps have to realise the shares at a loss. During the railway mania of 1845, a number of banks, called exchange banks, were founded expressly on this principle of making advances on joint stock companies' shares, especially railway shares ; but they have all been ruined, and some of them, we believe, suffered frightful losses from the great fall in the value of railway stock.

The objection to such transactions in a banking point of view is that the promissory notes of these customers and their securities are not available to the banker in case he is pressed for money. Moreover, they are barren, isolated transactions.

which lead to nothing ; whereas a discount account promotes commerce, and grows more profitable as the business of the customer increases.

There is also a very important point to be considered in the shares of many companies which are offered as collateral security, that, by the deeds of the companies, no property in the shares passes, except by the registration of the name of the holder in their books. Now, while the customer is in good circumstances, there may be no danger ; but if he becomes bankrupt, the banker is not entitled to retain the shares against the other creditors. If the bankrupt is the registered owner of the shares, his creditors are entitled to them, consequently, if the banker means to complete his security, he must have himself registered as the owner of the shares, and thereby become a partner in a multitude of joint stock companies, of whose condition he can know nothing. Then, perhaps, calls are made, and the banker finds that, instead of buying a *security*, he has bought a *liability*, and he must pay up the calls, or forfeit the shares.

All such advances, therefore, should be made very sparingly, and only with such surplus cash as the banker may not be able to employ in buying good bills ; and they should only be made to such persons as he believes to be perfectly safe without the deposit of the security. No banker would make such an advance if he really believed that he should be obliged to realise the security to repay himself, as such proceedings will always make a soreness between himself and his customer, who will be averse to seeing his property sold at a sacrifice, as he may call it.

Advances on dock warrants, and other similar securities, are also liable to many similar objections, and should be very sparingly done, as they subject a banker to much trouble beyond the line of his proper business, and are indications of weakness in a customer. Many customers will expect to have loans upon leasehold or freehold property left as security, but these are the most objectionable of all as collateral securities. Many, if not the greater portion of leases, prohibit the tenant letting the property, without the written permission of the landlord, consequently, such leasehold property is no security at all to a banker. Freehold property is not exposed to this disadvantage, but the process of realisation is so uncertain, and long, and tedious, that it is

perfectly unavailable to the banker in case of necessity. In fact, we believe the best rule in all cases of loans with collateral security (except in such instances as public stock) is to avoid, as much as possible, making them to any one who is not perfectly good without them.

16. The objection to cash credits on the part of London bankers is exactly similar to advances on mortgage, that in time of pressure it is very difficult to call up the advances, and the securities are not generally realisable. But if cash credits are objectionable still more are purchases of foreign securities, such as stock in foreign railways. Many of the Joint Stock Banks that stopped payment during the crises of 1857 and 1866 sinned grievously in this respect of locking up their funds in foreign countries.

If temporary loans on real property are objectionable as securities to City bankers, much more so are mortgages, which are intended by their very nature to last for years. Such transactions are, therefore, chiefly confined to country bankers, and those at the West-end of London, whose connections lie more among the landed than the commercial interest, and who are not liable to be called upon so suddenly for cash.

17. Besides these operations, all of which are founded upon personal liability—all of which contain personal obligations to pay fixed sums of money, and are, therefore, dealings in "currency"—bankers usually invest part of their funds in public securities, which are supposed to be more readily convertible into cash than others. Public securities are of two descriptions—the one "currency, or securities for money," such as Exchequer bills—the other "property, or convertible securities," such as stock, or the funds; the former being an engagement on the part of the Exchequer to pay a certain sum of money, like any other bill; and the latter being no engagement to repay any fixed sum at all, but only a fixed rent, or sum, for its use. The public funds are a great estate, of which the nation is tenant, and pays a rent for it, solely guaranteed by the public faith.

Each description of public securities has its advantages and disadvantages. The interest on public stock will be found, in

the long run, to be higher than those on other descriptions of public securities; but there is this serious consideration, that the value of these stocks is so extremely fluctuating, that when any public crisis comes, and bankers wish to *sell* their stock, they may sustain a very great loss. In the week of the great crisis of 1847, when many banks had to sell stock to provide for contingencies, the losses were immense when they bought in again to replace it. Another disadvantage regarding stock is, that all the transactions of bankers must become known, as they have to transfer it. Exchequer bills have this advantage, that a banker can deal in them without its being known to any one but the broker. Exchequer bills, being, like any other promissory note, an engagement of the Government to pay a definite sum of money, it is not probable that the banker can ever lose so much on them as on stock. In order to prevent Exchequer bills falling to a discount, they always bear interest, and, in consequence of this, are usually at a premium; and when, by the change in the market rate of interest, they fall to a discount, the interest upon them is usually raised. From these circumstances, the profit of investment in Exchequer bills is less than from stock.

18. Bankers collect money from those who have it to spare, and advance it, or its equivalent, to those who require it. They may sometimes, themselves, be in a similar predicament. Sometimes they may have more by them than they have employment for; sometimes, from unusual demands, they may be in want of temporary advances. There is a class of persons who undertake this great equalising process—namely, the bill brokers. They go the round of the bankers every morning, and borrow from those who have to lend, and lend to those who want to borrow.

19. At the present day, the principle of association has been developed to a much greater degree than ever it was before. Companies are being formed for all manner of purposes. When these customers apply to open an account with a banker, it will generally be found that they want accommodation. But a banker should very rarely indeed accommodate the *company*, of whose affairs he can know very little. He should never grant accommodation to such a company, unless he is well assured of the responsi-

bility and respectability of the directors themselves ; and if he allows the company to have accommodation, it should be only on the personal liability of the directors. He should require from them a joint and several note, payable on demand, reserving his right against the company only as a collateral security. This course will be found to be attended with many advantages, because, if anything goes wrong with the company, he has an immediate remedy without any trouble. Whereas, if the company goes into the Winding-up Court, it will be a considerable time before his claim can be settled ; and then there may be some technical objection. The contributor may say the directors had no right to draw bills by the constitution of the company, or they may have exceeded their power ; and then he may have to contest his claim through a number of different courts, bringing him nothing but vexation and anxiety.

20. In February, 1876, the Scotch banks unanimously agreed to the following scale of charges—

Table of Interest, Discount, and Charges.

I.—INTEREST ON MONEY LODGED.

The Rates to be fixed, from time to time, at Meetings of the Banks to be held in Edinburgh.

Note.—No interest to be paid on other than regular operative Accounts, unless the Money has been lodged a month. Savings Banks may, according to the discretion of each Bank, be allowed upon money lodged on Deposit Receipt, $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. more than the ordinary Deposit Receipt rate for the time, when that rate is not above $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

II.—INTEREST ON ADVANCES ON CURRENT ACCOUNTS.

The Rates to be fixed, from time to time, at Meetings of the Banks to be held in Edinburgh,—but the charge on *Overdrafts* on Cash or Deposit Accounts may be limited to the Cash Account Rate *in special cases in which this is sanctioned by the Head Office.*

III.—DISCOUNT AND COMMISSION ON BILLS.

The Rates of Discount to be fixed, from time to time, at Meetings of the Banks to be held in Edinburgh.

The following Rates of Commission to be charged on Bills other than Local, in addition to the Discount—

On Bills payable in Scotland, 1s. 3d. per cent. Maximum charge, 7s. 6d.

On Bills payable in London, no Commission.

On Bills payable elsewhere in England, or in Ireland, 2s. 6d. per cent.

Exempt from charge—1. Bank of England Post Bills. 2. Bills on London not having more than four days to run inclusive of days of grace.

On Bills payable on the Continent of Europe at "*Exchange as per indorsement*," Discounted Bills—10s. per cent., in lieu of discount. Bills lodged—see below.

IV.—CHARGES FOR NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS PAYABLE ON DEMAND.

On Cheques and Drafts on *Bankers* in Scotland, 1s. 3d. percent. Minimum charge, 6d. Maximum charge, 15s.

On all other Cash Documents payable in Scotland, 2s. 6d. per cent. up to £400. Minimum charge, 6d. For each additional £100, or part of £100, 1s. 3d. per cent. Maximum charge, 20s.

Exempt from Charge—Cheques drawn by the Bank's Customers on any other Office of the Bank, when presented by the Customers *personally*, by *Members of their families*, or by *persons exclusively in their employment*; also Cheques on Church Accounts, issued in favour of Clergymen or Teachers, Cheques in favour of Religious or Charitable Institutions, and Cheques issued by any Government Department.

On Documents payable in London, no Commission.

On Documents payable elsewhere in England, or in Ireland, 2s. 6d. per cent. Minimum charge, 6d.

V.—CHARGES FOR GRANTING DRAFTS AND MAKING TRANSFERS BY ADVICE.

On the Bank's Agents or Correspondents in London, Drafts payable *on demand*—For sums up to £300, 2s. per cent; minimum charge, 6d.; for sums from £300 to £600, uniform charge, 6s.; for sums above £600, 1s. per cent. The Stamp to be charged in addition, and each Draft or Transfer to be charged for separately. Drafts payable at "*7 days after date*" to be charged

the Stamp only. When at a shorter currency, or at a currency to cover the expense of the Stamp, the difference to be reckoned at the deposit receipt rate. Transfers by advice to be made free, if payment be postponed 10 days. Drafts for remittance of *Government Revenue* to be granted at 11 days' date, free of Stamp duty.

On the Bank's Correspondents elsewhere in England or in Ireland, 2s. 6d. per cent; minimum charge, 6d. The stamp to be charged in addition.

On the Bank's Head Office, Branches, or Correspondents in Scotland, 1s. per cent.; maximum charge, 10s.; minimum charge, 6d.; but for sums of £5 and under, 8d. The Stamp to be charged in addition.

Exempt from charge—1. Drafts on the Bank's Agents or Correspondents in Scotland, purchased by Collectors of Revenue, as such, and Remittances to Religious and Charitable Institutions. On these the Stamp alone to be charged. 2. Transfers of sums paid in by Customers *personally*, by *Members of their families*, or by *persons exclusively in their employment*, for their credit at another Office of the Bank in Scotland; the Stamp to be charged when a Draft is given.

VI.—OTHER CHARGES.

On Retiring Bills in London, 2s. 6d. per cent. with Interest due. The following modified charges may be made, at the option of each Bank, in the case of Customers having large transactions, viz.—For the first £50,000 in any one year, 2s. 6d. per cent.; for the second £50,000 in any one year, 1s. 6d. per cent.; for the excess beyond £100,000 in any one year, 1s. 0d. per cent., chargeable at the end of the year.

On Drafts on Demand against Credits with London, English Provincial, or Irish Correspondents, 3s. per cent. with Interest due. If against cash deposited without Interest, same rate as for drafts on London.

On Bills payable in England or Ireland recalled before maturity, 2s. 6d. per cent. Bills re-called for non-acceptance only, discretionary.

On Discounted Bills or other Documents payable in Scotland, returned dishonoured, 2s. 6d. per cent. with Interest due.

On Discounted Bills or other Documents payable elsewhere, returned dishonoured, 5s. per cent. with Interest due.

On acceptances by the Bank, or their London Correspondents, of Foreign Bills, payable in London: If secured by a special Deposit of the amount, 5s. per cent. with Interest due. If on other security, if not exceeding three months in Currency, 10s. per cent. with Interest due; if exceeding 3 months in currency, 15s. per cent. with Interest due.

On Bills or other Documents payable in the United Kingdom lodged for Collection, if paid, same Commission as on similar Documents discounted: if dishonoured, half as much as on similar discounted documents dishonoured.

On Bills or other Documents payable abroad, lodged for collection, whether paid or not, 5s. per cent., in addition to charges paid out by Bank.

On Pay, Dividends, or Annuities drawn by London Correspondents, except for regular Customers, 2s. 6d. per cent.; minimum, 1s.; maximum, 5s.

On Purchases of Government or other Stocks, in London, 3s. per cent. with Interest due.

On Transfers of Government or other Stocks, without purchase, discretionary, according to trouble and amount.

On Powers of Attorney taken out, and Wills or Deaths proved for Transfer of Stock, &c., discretionary, according to trouble, but not less than 2s. 6d. each.

Note.—Bills and other documents *not having more than five days to run* to be cashed by the Banks with each other without charge.

The usual discount to be charged for the additional days on Bills of longer currency.

In all matters of Charges, **BERWICK-ON-TWEED** to be treated as a *Scotch Town*.

Questions as to the true meaning of any part of the Scale, shall be decided at Meetings of the Banks to be held in **Edinburgh**.

SECTION II.

ON THE CLEARING SYSTEM.

1. We must now explain the nature of the Clearing System, which has been very generally misunderstood.

It is usually supposed that the clearing system is an example of the great principle of Compensation, by which two Debts are paid and extinguished by being set-off or exchanged against each other, as happened at the great fair of Lyons, and a multitude of other fairs on the continent.

This, however, is a great misconception: and a comparison between the two systems will clearly illustrate the distinction between Commercial Credit and Banking Credit. The one is only created to last for a certain definite time, and is extinguished along with the documents which embody it; the other is not intended to be extinguished at any definite time; and is not generally extinguished along with the documents which embody it.

It was the custom in a great many parts of the continent for merchants to make their bills payable at certain great fairs which took place in various cities. In the meantime they circulated throughout the country and got covered with indorsements. At these fairs, on a certain day, they met together and exchanged their various acceptances. And thus the paper documents and debts were extinguished simultaneously by the doctrine of compensation, or set-off.

The purpose and effect of the Clearing System are very different. When any number of customers have transactions among themselves and give each other cheques on their accounts, if the receivers of the cheques do not draw out the money, but pay them into their accounts, the credits are simply transferred from one account to another. The paper document is extinguished, but the credit is not extinguished, it is only transferred: and it may be transferred any conceivable number of times from one account to another without ever being extinguished at all. In all such cases,

therefore, the cheque is a mere order of transfer; and when the credit is transferred from one account to another, the document has effected its purpose, and is cancelled—but the credit exists exactly as it did before.

It is exactly the same thing with a Bank note. Suppose a person holding a banker's notes pays them into his account, the note is then extinguished; but the credit is not extinguished; the amount is entered to the customer's credit; and he has exactly the same Right of action as before; and the banker's liability remains exactly as it was. If a customer pays into his account the notes of another banker, he receives a credit for them from his own banker; and the banker has then a claim against the other banker. The Clearing system is a device by which all the banks which join in it are formed into one huge institution for the purpose of transferring Credits from one bank to another, just in the same way as Credits are transferred from one account to another within the same bank.

The first plan of this kind in this country, that we are aware of, was adopted by the banks at Edinburgh. For a considerable time the rival banks used to do all they could to injure each other. They used sometimes to collect a large quantity of each other's notes, and present them for payment, in the hope of ruining their rivals. At last, however, they became sensible that this undignified conduct was mutually injurious, and they agreed that they should meet twice a week and adjust their respective claims, and that they should make no demand on each other except at these times. This exchange was made alternately at the offices of the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank. The different Edinburgh banks acted as agents for the provincial banks of issue, so that by this means all the banks in Scotland were brought into the "clearing room." The clerk of each bank made out a list of his claims against, and liabilities to, each of the others, and each bank used formerly to settle its debts by a draft at ten days' on London. Subsequently to this another plan was adopted by which each bank was obliged to keep a certain amount of Exchequer bills, and the balances were paid by means of these Exchequer bills. This plan, however, was discontinued in 1864, and another adopted, which is now in force, as settled in February, 1876.

Rules to be observed at the Edinburgh Clearing House.

I. The Clearing House shall be opened every business day, except Saturday, at one o'clock, and closed at fifteen minutes past one, after which no documents shall be received. On Saturdays the Clearing house shall be opened at eleven o'clock, and closed at fifteen minutes past eleven.

II. The Clearing House shall not be opened on Bank Holidays. On half-holidays it shall be opened at ten o'clock, and closed at fifteen minutes past ten.

III. Each Bank shall be represented at the Clearing House by a competent clerk, who shall deliver and receive the documents referable to his Bank. An assistant clerk shall also attend when required, that there may be no delay in closing the clearing.

IV. Each clerk shall be furnished with a set of books for the various Banks, in which the documents delivered by him shall be entered and summed up before he goes to the Clearing House, and he shall hand to each of the other Banks a duplicate list along with the documents delivered. He shall also be furnished with a book in which he shall strike the balances against him or in his favour with the other Banks, and he shall not leave the Clearing House until the general balance is completed.

V. Besides orders payable on demand at the Banks in Edinburgh (including district branches), and bills domiciled with the head offices of the Banks in Edinburgh, orders or bills payable elsewhere in Scotland, and requiring to be cashed by the Banks with each other, may be passed through the Clearing House. Although the general rule is to pass all clearing documents through the Clearing House, it shall be in the option of each Bank to collect any such documents in cash.

VI. Each document shall be sufficiently discharged before being sent in, and shall bear a Clearing House stamp containing the name of the Bank to which it belongs, and the date of clearing, in addition to which, if it has been cashed at a district branch, it shall bear the stamp of that branch.

VII. Documents passed through the Clearing House, payable at the district branches of banks in Edinburgh, shall be forwarded in time for presentation the next morning.

VIII. Documents drawn on the head office of any Bank, which are not duly honoured, shall be returned on same day, by messenger to the head office of the Bank to which they were cashed, by

3 o'clock on ordinary days, and 12.30 on Saturdays, and shall be repaid in cash. Documents payable at the district branches, which are not duly honoured, shall be returned through the Clearing House on the day after that on which they were cleared; or it shall be optional to return any such document direct by messenger to the office at which it was cashed, provided that this be done before the hour of clearing, on the day after that on which the document in question was passed through the Clearing House.

IX. All documents returned unpaid shall have a written answer appended, stating the cause of dishonour.

X. The Banks agree to dispense with the indorsement of country exchange vouchers, passed through the clearing.

XI. The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland agree to undertake the settlement of the clearings each alternate month. On Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, the balances shall be included in the general settlement of the exchange and clearing, the odd shillings and pence being accounted for in cash. On other days, the settling Bank will receive from those Banks which are *Debtors* on the settlement, and give to those which are *Creditors*, exchange vouchers for the respective balances, including the odd shillings and pence, within one hour after the closing of the Clearing House, and these vouchers shall be brought into the next day's clearing. The rules for conducting the general settlement of the exchange and clearing are laid down separately.—Neither the Bank of Scotland nor the Royal Bank of Scotland shall incur any responsibility whatever in respect of these transactions.

XII. All expenses connected with the Clearing House shall be borne by the Banks in equal proportions and shall be paid by them half-yearly.

Rules to be observed at the Exchanges of Notes and General Settlements of Balances between the Banks in Edinburgh.

I. There shall be exchanges of notes and general settlements of these exchanges, and of the Clearing House, as follows—

Exchange of Notes.	General Settlement of Exchanges and Clearing.		
	On	To include	
		Notes.	Clearings.
Daily, except Monday, at 10 a.m. Also on Saturday, at 1.30 p.m., for large Notes only.	Tuesday at 2 p.m.	Small Notes of Saturday, the Notes of Monday, and the Glasgow Settlement of Tuesday	Tuesday.
	Thursday at 2 p.m.	The Notes of Tuesday and Wednesday; also the Country Exchanges of Wednesday, and the Glasgow and Leith Settlements of Thursday.	Wednesday and Thursday.
	Monday at 2 p.m.	The Notes of Thursday and Friday, and the large notes of Saturday; also the Glasgow and Country Exchanges of Saturday.	Friday, Saturday, and Monday.

The general settlements shall be made by the clearing clerks.

II. When Tuesday is a holiday, the general settlement shall be made on Wednesday; when Thursday is a holiday, the general settlement shall be made on Friday; when Saturday is a holiday, there shall be an exchange on Friday afternoon; and when Monday is a holiday, the general settlement shall be made on Tuesday, but there shall be no exchange of notes on that day.—

When the Term day falls on a Saturday, the Exchange shall meet in the afternoon, at such hour as may be agreed upon.

III. The clerks shall be in attendance punctually at the hour stated, *fifteen minutes* after which the doors are to be closed, and the notes in the hands of the Banks not represented excluded until next exchange. Such Banks shall, however, retire by granting bills on London in accordance with Rule VII., the notes brought into the exchange against them by other Banks.

IV. Each Bank shall be represented by at least two clerks. On arriving at the Exchange Room, one of the clerks shall deliver the notes, and the other clerk shall remain in the box to receive the notes from the other Banks. Unless there is a clerk to receive them, on no account shall any notes be passed through the wickets. No one shall enter the box of another Bank—the door must be kept locked.

V. The clerks from each Bank shall *all* remain in the Exchange Room until the whole of the notes received by them have been counted, and at least one clerk from each Bank shall remain until the whole of the notes delivered by that Bank have been counted. The notes received from any one Bank shall not be mixed with those received from the other Banks, until they have been found to agree with the specification received along with them. In case of a dispute arising on any occasion as to the amount contained in any parcel of notes, received or delivered by a Bank, which has infringed the rules in this clause, such Bank shall, in the absence of conclusive evidence in its favour, be held to be in the wrong.—To prevent any undue delay in counting the notes, each of the Banks shall provide a competent staff for that purpose, to the satisfaction of the settling Bank of the day.

VI. The settlements shall be undertaken each alternate month by the Bank of Scotland, and by the Royal Bank of Scotland; but neither Bank shall be held to incur any responsibility in respect of these transactions.—On Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, the balances shall be included in the general settlement of the exchange and clearing. On Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday, unless when a general settlement falls on any of these days, the settling Bank shall grant and receive vouchers for the balances, which shall be carried into the next day's clearing.

VII. When the balances of the general settlement have been struck, the settling clerk of the day shall at once enter the par-

ticulars in a record provided for that purpose, and the Banks who are debtors in the settlement shall, on the same day before the close of business, send to the Banks who are creditors a bill or bills on London for the respective amounts due. These bills shall be drawn at 5/8 days' date. The Banks drawing them shall bear the expense of the stamp-duty, and shall, on delivering them, pay in cash to the respective Banks in whose favour they are drawn, eight days' interest on the amounts, at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum.

VIII. In the event of any exchange draft being dishonoured, without prompt and satisfactory explanation of the cause, the Bank issuing such draft shall be immediately excluded from the Exchange Room and Clearing House.

IX. When exchanges are established in provincial towns, the exchangeable notes received at the agencies there must wait for the return of the next local exchange day ; and must under no pretext be forwarded to meet the exchanges in Edinburgh, or at the other agencies.

X. It is further understood and agreed, in consideration of the circulation of each Bank (other than what may be issued against gold and silver coin), being fixed and limited by the Act 8 and 9 Vict., cap. 38, that the Banks shall bring to the Exchange Room regularly, at their head offices and agencies, all the exchangeable notes which they receive ; and that under no circumstances shall any of the subscribing Banks issue the notes of another Bank of Issue in Scotland, without permission first asked and obtained.

XI. The vouchers of the Glasgow Exchanges shall be conveyed by railway guard ; and the letters containing the vouchers shall be delivered by the guard to the Clearing House messenger, to be delivered by him personally at the Banks to which they are addressed in Edinburgh.

XII. The record of the general settlements shall be open for the inspection of any of the subscribing Banks, at such times as may be convenient.

XIII. Any of the parties to this agreement shall be entitled to withdraw from it on giving three months' notice.

On the London Clearing House.

2. In 1775 some of the London bankers established a similar daily custom among themselves.

We will now explain the advantages and operations of the Clearing House in detail.

Every banker has every morning claims against most, if not all, of his neighbours, and, of course, they have claims against him. It used to be the custom for every banker, the first thing in the morning, to send out a number of clerks to collect the Debts that were due to him from his neighbours, who, of course, were obliged to keep cash and notes to meet them. The Metropolis is partitioned out into districts called "walks," and each clerk has to collect all the bills, cheques, &c., within his walk. These claims are called *bankers' charges*, and were paid either in Bank Notes, or by Cheques drawn upon the Bank of England. The slightest reflection will shew the waste of Bank notes caused by this barbarous and clumsy method of settling bankers' charges. It is evident that a very large amount of Bank notes might be saved if the bankers had some method of balancing their claims against each other, and settling only the difference in Bank notes. What the amount of Bank notes which were positively wasted by this method may be, is not very easy to tell. It was stated in evidence, before the Committee of the House of Commons, on one occasion, that one bank alone, the London and Westminster, were obliged to keep £150,000 of notes for this very purpose, which, by a better method, might have been set free, and would have, to all intents and purposes, been so much additional trading capital. Now, if this bank alone, many years ago, was obliged to keep this enormous sum unprofitable, what must have been the total amount wasted in this manner by all the bankers?

About 1775 the inconvenience of sending out to collect these charges led a number of the city bankers to organise an exchange among themselves, on a similar plan to that already practised among the banks in Edinburgh. They met in a room, and exchanged their mutual claims against each other, and paid only the difference in cash, or Bank notes. It is stated in the Bullion Report, that in the year 1810 there were 46 bankers who cleared; that the average amount of drafts, &c., passed through the Clearing House every day was about £4,700,000, and that all the balances on this account were settled by about £220,000 in Bank notes. The Clearing House was merely an assemblage of private bankers; when the joint stock banks were instituted in the city, they were rigidly excluded until 1854, when the intolerable

inconvenience caused to them by the large amount of notes they had to keep idle to meet the "charges," set a question afloat of organising another Clearing House among themselves. Moreover, it is said, that the private bankers, themselves, felt the inconvenience of the heavy "charges" of the joint stock banks. Partly owing to these circumstances, and partly, we hope, owing to the feeling against the joint stock banks having abated, the London and Westminster, the Union, the London Joint Stock, the London and County, and the Commercial Banks, were admitted to the Clearing House in August, 1854, and the Southwark Branch of the London and Westminster, in August, 1855. The latter being remarkable, not only as a branch of a bank being treated as an independent bank, but also as not being in the City of London. The Bank of England was not admitted to the Clearing House till 1864.

The mode of doing business is as follows—The bills and cheques which each banker holds on the other clearing banks, are sorted in separate parcels, and at 10.30 a clerk from each bank arrives at the Clearing House. He delivers to each of the other clerks the obligations he has against his house, and receives from each the obligations due from his own. When these obligations are interchanged, each clerk returns to his own bank. The same process is repeated at 2.30. Each bank has till 4.45 to decide whether it will honour the drafts upon it; if it does not return any drafts upon it before that hour, it is held to have made itself liable on them to the Clearing House. At 4.45 the business closes, and the accounts are made up; and so admirable is the system, that in settlement, of the claims, *not a single Bank note or sovereign passes.*

Each clearing bank keeps an account at the Bank of England, and the inspector of the Clearing House also keeps one. Printed lists of the clearing banks are made out for each bank, with its own name at the head, and the others placed in a column in alphabetical order below it. On the left side of these names is a column headed "Debtors," and on the right side are marked "Creditors." The clerk of the Clearing House then makes up the accounts between each bank, and the *difference* only is entered in the balance sheet, according as it is debtor or creditor. A balance is then struck between the debtor and creditor columns, and the paper delivered to the clerk, who takes it back

to his own bank. The balance then is not paid to, or received from, the other bankers, as formerly, but it is settled with the Clearing House, which keeps an account itself at the Bank of England. The accounts are settled by means of a species of cheque appropriated to the purpose, called *transfer tickets*. They are of two colours, white and green, the white when the Bank has to pay a balance to the Clearing House, the green when it has to receive a balance from it. They are signed by some authorised official of the Bank. Thus, if the Bank is debtor on the balance, it gives a

White Ticket.

SETTLEMENT AT THE CLEARING HOUSE.

London, 187

To the Cashiers of the Bank of England.

Be pleased to transfer from our Account the sum of

and place it to the credit of the Account of the Clearing Bankers, and allow it to be drawn for by any of them (with the knowledge of either of the Inspectors, signified by his countersigning the Drafts).

£

SETTLEMENT AT THE CLEARING HOUSE.

BANK OF ENGLAND,

187

A TRANSFER for the sum of
has this evening been made at the Bank
from the account of Messrs.
to the Account of the Clearing Bankers.

For the Bank of England.

£

The Certificate has been seen by me.

Inspector.

If the Bank is creditor on the balance, it gives a

Green Ticket.

<i>Settlement at the Clearing House.</i>	<i>Settlement at the Clearing House.</i>
<p style="text-align: right;">London, 187</p> <p>To the Cashiers of the Bank of England.</p> <p><i>Be pleased to CREDIT our Account</i> <i>the Sum of</i></p> <p><i>out of the money at the credit of the</i> <i>account of the Clearing Bankers.</i></p> <p>£ _____</p> <p>Seen by me,</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Inspector at the Clearing House.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: right;">BANK OF ENGLAND, 187</p> <p><i>The account of Messrs.</i> <i>has this evening been CREDITED with the</i> <i>Sum of</i></p> <p><i>out of the money at the credit of the</i> <i>account of the Clearing Bankers.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">For the Bank of England.</p> <p>£ _____</p>

By this admirable system, transactions to the amount of many millions daily are settled without the intervention of a single Bank note.

The two methods which London bankers have of settling their mutual claims, which we have described, by collecting the charges in the morning, and by the Clearing House, suggest several important reflections upon the circulating medium, and the Act of 1844. That Act fixed the sum of £14,000,000, since extended to £15,000,000, as the limit below which the requirements of business would probably not permit the internal circulation to fall. But there is this objection to it, that it was *fixed with reference to a particular method of doing business.* If all the London bankers were admitted to the Clearing House, there would immediately be a very large quantity of Bank notes disengaged from business, and they would either disappear from circulation altogether, or else they might be employed as fresh capital in discounting bills and making loans. On the other hand, let us suppose the Clearing House dissolved, and the clearing banks to revert to the barbarous method of settling their mutual claims practised by the non-clearing banks, several millions of Bank notes would be required to settle their claims,

We are satisfied that between these two extreme methods of transacting business—either there being no Clearing House at all, and all the banks demanding payment from each other of their claims in Bank notes, and, on the other hand, all the banks entering the Clearing House, there would be a difference of Bank notes necessary to transact the same amount of business of not less than £12,000,000. Now, it is perfectly manifest, that if the Clearing House were dissolved, the additional quantity of Bank notes necessary to transact business would not in any way affect prices or business; nor if all the banks were to enter it, could the quantity of Bank notes withdrawn from circulation affect prices or business. Consequently, we observe, that the quantity of Bank notes requisite to transact business depends very much on the particular method of settling claims.

It appears, then, to us to be a fundamental and philosophical objection to all attempts to fix the numerical amount of Bank notes which may be issued by the Bank, that it depends very much on the method of doing business what amount will be required. Consequently, if any Act fixes that amount, and a change takes place in the method of doing business, it must necessarily be fatal to the principle of such an Act. And these remarks touch not merely the Act of 1844, but some of the objections to it; for, in the first place, if the method of doing business upon which the Act is founded, be improved so as to dispense with a large quantity of the notes permitted to be issued by the Act, the Act fails in this—that it contains no power to compel these notes which are so disengaged, to be withdrawn from circulation, which, if the principles of the Act were true, would be a redundancy of the currency. On the other hand, those persons who complain of the restricted amount allowed to be issued by the Act, should, in the first instance, economise the use of those already permitted to be issued to the greatest possible extent, before they demand new issues. Now, an improved method of doing business by the London bankers would certainly liberate a very large amount of Bank notes, which are at present, as we may say, wasted, and afford so much relief to the alleged contraction of the currency.

The operations of the Clearing House also enable us to dispel a very prevalent error among those persons who maintain that bills of exchange are not “currency” or circulating medium, because

they can only be discharged by payment of money. Even if such an assertion were true, it would not affect the question in any way, but the assertion itself is wholly erroneous. It is not true that bills of exchange can only be discharged by payment in money. Bills of exchange to the amount of millions are daily discharged without any coin whatever, just in the same manner as cheques are. A bill of exchange, on the day it matures, becomes a cheque; a cheque is nothing but a bill of exchange payable to bearer on demand. Now, let us take the case of a wholesale dealer who accepts bills to a manufacturer, and draws bills upon retail dealers. When he opens a discount account with his banker, he brings the bills he draws upon his own customers, the retail dealers, and sells them to his banker. He also makes the bills drawn upon himself payable at his bankers, and the proceeds of the bills he sold are appropriated to the payment of the bills he has to meet. Now, he knows when the bills he has accepted fall due, and he takes care to sell some bills to his banker to meet them. The banker, as usual, buys these bills, by merely writing so many figures—so many “promises to pay”—to the credit of his customer. Now, if this banker is a member of the Clearing House, and the banker who presents his customer's acceptance for payment, is also a member of it, they are presented through the Clearing House, and fall into the mighty mass of transactions which are settled by its means, without any intervention of coin, or Bank notes.

Now, when we see that Cheques are merely substitutes for Bank notes, that in every case where a Cheque now passes, Bank notes would be required if Cheques had not existed; when we also see that a Bill of Exchange on the day it is payable becomes a Cheque, which is equivalent to a Bank note, it follows very clearly that all the obligations interchanged at the Clearing House form an integral part of the Circulating Medium. Their being exchanged at the Clearing House can make no difference to what they would be if they were presented and paid by each banker, for they have all done their duty *before* they arrive at the Clearing House; they have caused commodities to circulate, perhaps many more times than once, before they come to be discharged.

In most country towns in England of any size similar exchanges are organised, and the differences settled by a draft on London;

and in 1860 a clearing establishment was instituted in London for country bankers. All these institutions have the general tendency to constitute, as it were, all the different banks in the country one vast banking establishment to extinguish the credit created by commercial transactions, by mutual interchanges without the use of Bank notes or coin. What the economy of notes or coin may be by means of the present system of clearing, which is even yet far from complete, no one has the means of ascertaining. In the year 1839, when we may fairly say that the present banking system was in its very infancy, and there were only 20 private bankers in the Clearing House, the claims settled there amounted to £954,401,600 and these were discharged by means of £66,375,600 in Bank notes. Last year the quantity of Credit which passed through the Clearing House exceeded £6,000,000,000, and no notes or coin are required. But a consideration of the details of this system will impress the reader with the truth of what we have endeavoured to explain fully in the previous volume, that a debt is in all respects an article of commerce, or merchandise. In former times money was required to adjust the balances on unequal exchanges of *commodities*; in modern times, when commodities are almost universally circulated by means of debts, and these debts are themselves articles of commerce, money and notes are chiefly required to adjust the outstanding balances on *unequal* exchanges of DEBTS.

SECTION III.

ON CREDIT, BILLS, AND NOTES.

We propose in this section to give only such parts of the Law relating to Credit, Bills of Exchange, and Promissory Notes as it is indispensable that a banker should be familiar with in his daily business. It will be seen that changes of great practical importance have been made in the Law of Credit by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.

DEFINITIONS *and* GENERAL PRINCIPLES.*On the Origin and Nature of CREDIT or DEBT.*

1. 1. When one person "borrows" money, or buys goods from another "on credit," an Obligation, or Contract, is created between these two persons, consisting of two parts—

(a) A RIGHT TO DEMAND payment is created in the person of the lender or seller.

(b) A DUTY TO PAY is created in the person of the borrower or buyer.

2. The lender or seller's *Right to Demand* payment is termed a CREDIT: and the borrower's or buyer's *Duty to pay* is termed a DEBT.

3. But in law and common usage the Right to demand payment is also called a DEBT.

4. The word Debt is, therefore, used indiscriminately to mean the *Right to demand* as well as the *Duty to pay*: and it must always be observed from the context of the passage in which sense it is used.

5. Hence CREDIT or DEBT in Legal, Commercial, and Economical language, means a Right of Action against a person for a sum of money.

6. Such a Right, Credit, or Debt is a *Chose-in-action*, and is included under the term Goods and Chattels.

Sheppard. *A grand Abridgment of the Common and Statute Law of England.* 1875. p. 329. *Ford & Sheldon's Case*, 12 Co. Rep., 2. *Ryal v. Rowles*, Ves., sen., 348. *Stephen's Blackstone*, Vol. I., ch. 5.

7. The person who owes the money is termed the DEBTOR: the person to whom it is owed is termed the CREDITOR, and sometimes the DEBTEE.

On the TRANSFER of a CREDIT, or DEBT.

2. 1. A Credit, Debt, or *Chose-in-action* may be transferred orally by the Creditor to another person with the consent of the Debtor: a trust is then created in the person of the Debtor, and the transferee may sue him in his own name.

Bracton, Lib. iii., c. 2., s. 13. *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 T. R., 174.
Fairlie v. Denton, 8 B. & C., 395.

2. If a debtor creates an Obligation assignable or transferable to bearer, such an Obligation may be sold or transferred; and the assignee, or bearer, may sue the Debtor in his own name.

Three Priests' Case, Y. B., 41 Edw. III. (1368), 27. *Baker v. Brook*, Dyer, 65, 1. *Maund v. Gregory*, 7 Co. Rep., 28b. *Gerard v. Bowden*, Hott., 80. *Shelden v. Hentley*, 2 Show., 1601. *Hinton's case*, 2 Show., 235. *Bromwich v. Lloyd*, 2 Lutw., 1583. *Williams v. Williams*, Carth., 269. *Pearson v. Garrett*, Comb., 227. *Lambert v. Oakes*, 1 Ld. Raym., 443. *Carter v. Palmer*, 12 Mod., 380. *Miller v. Race*, 1 Burr., 452. *Grant v. Vaughan*, 3 Burr., 1516. *Keene v. Beard*, 8 C. B., N. S., 372. *Goodwin v. Roberts*, L. R., 10 Ex., 357.

3. "Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any Debt, or other legal *Chose-in-action*, of which express notice in writing shall have been given to the Debtor, Trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such Debt, or *Chose-in-action*, shall be, and be deemed to be effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal right to such Debt, or *Chose-in-action*, from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor.

"Provided always that if the Debtor, Trustee, or other person liable in respect of such Debt, or *Chose-in-action*, shall have had notice that such assignment is disputed by the assignor, or any one claiming under him; or of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such Debt, or *Chose-in-action*, he shall be entitled if he think fit, to call upon the several persons making claim thereto,

to interplead concerning the same; or he may if he think fit pay the same into the High Court of Justice, under and in conformity with the provisions of the Acts for the relief of trustees.

36 & 37 Vict. (1873), ch. 66, s. 25, § 6.

“Generally in all matters in which there is any conflict or variance between the Rules of Equity and the Rules of the Common Law with reference to the same matter, the rules of Equity shall prevail.

36 & 37 Vict. (1873), ch. 66, s. 25, § 11.

Definitions of Instruments of Credit or Debt.

3. 1. Any written record of a fact is termed an INSTRUMENT. Any written evidence of a Debt is termed an INSTRUMENT OF CREDIT or of DEBT.

2. A written contract by which one person is bound to pay (1) a certain sum of money; (2) to a certain person; (3) at a certain time; is termed an OBLIGATION, or SECURITY FOR MONEY, or a VALUABLE SECURITY.

24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96, s. 1.

3. A written ORDER from one person to another who *owes*, or appears to owe, him money as a DEBTOR, directing him to pay absolutely and at all events (1) a certain sum of money; (2) to a certain person; (3) at a certain time; is, in modern language termed a BILL of EXCHANGE, or, shortly, a BILL.

4. A written PROMISE made by one person to pay absolutely and at all events (1) a certain sum of money; (2) to a certain person; (3) at a certain time; is in modern language termed a PROMISSORY NOTE, or, shortly, a NOTE.

5. A written ORDER addressed by one person to another, who *holds* a fund not as his own property, but merely as the AGENT, BAILEE, TRUSTEE, or SERVANT of the writer, to pay a sum of money, is termed a DRAFT, or ORDER for the payment of money.

Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves., sen., 331.

6. A mere acknowledgment of a debt, not containing any promise to pay, is usually termed an I O U.

7. A Bill, Note, or I O U is always a *chose-in-action*, that is, it operates as a charge, or Credit against the person of the Debtor.

8. A Draft, or Order, is always a *chose-in-possession*, and it operates as a charge, or Credit against the fund.

Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves., sen., 331.

Definitions of Parties to an Instrument of Credit.

4. 1. In a Bill the person who addresses the order is termed the **DRAWER**: the person to whom he addresses it is termed the **DRAWEE**.

2. If the Drawee consents to pay the order he must subscribe his name to it, usually with the word "accepted" before it; he is then termed the **ACCEPTOR**.

3. In a Note the person who makes the promise is termed the **MAKER**.

4. The person to whom a Bill, Note, or Draft is made payable is termed the **PAYEE**.

5. The Acceptor of a Bill and the Maker of a Note is termed the **PRINCIPAL DEBTOR** or **OBLIGOR**.

6. Before the 36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, came into effect, unless the Obligor of a Bill or Note expressly made it payable to the payee, or order, the instrument could not be transferred so as to enable the transferee to sue the obligor at law in his own name: and such an instrument was termed non-Negotiable.

Since that Act came into effect on Nov. 1, 1875, this is no longer the case, and any instrument of Credit or Debt may now be transferred so that the transferee may sue the Obligor in his own name.

7. If, however, the instrument is made payable to the payee "or order," it cannot be transferred without the payee's order; this the payee does by writing his name on it, usually on the back of it: hence, this signature is termed the **INDORSEMENT**. The payee is then termed the **INDORSER**, and the person to whom he delivers it is termed the **INDORSEE**.

8. The person who has the lawful possession of the instrument, either actual or constructive, and is entitled to sue the parties to it, is termed the **HOLDER**.

Definitions of Terms relating to the Instrument.

5. 1. To "DRAW," "MAKE," "ACCEPT" (a) or "INDORSE" (b) a Bill, Note, or Draft, means besides writing the instrument, or the name on it, as the case may be, to deliver it to some person, or his agent, as his property.

(a) *Cox v. Troy*, 5 B. & Ald., 474.

(b) *Rez v. Lambton*, 5 Price, 428. *Brind v. Hampshire*, 1 M. & W., 365. *Adams v. Jones*, 12 A. & E., 455. *Marston v. Allen*, 8 M.

& W., 494. *Green v. Steer*, 1 Q. B., 707. *Bell v. Lord Ingestre*, 12 Q. B., 817. *Lloyd v. Howard*, 15 Q. B., 995. *Barber v. Richards*, 6 Exch., 63.

2. To "ISSUE" a Bill, Note, or Draft, is to deliver it to some one who thereby acquires a right of action on it.

3. To "PRESENT" a bill for "ACCEPTANCE" or "SIGHT" (a) is to bring it to the Drawee, and to request him to undertake to pay it.

(a) *Campbell v. French*, 6 T. R., 200.

4. To "PRESENT" a Bill or Note for "PAYMENT" is to bring it to the Principal Debtor and demand payment of it.

5. To "COLLECT" a Bill, Note, or Draft, is to present it for payment as agent for the holder.

6. To "RETIRE" a Bill or Note is for one of the parties to it to buy it up and so withdraw it from circulation.

Elsam v. Denny, 15 C. B., 87.

7. To "DISCOUNT" a Bill or Note is to buy from the holder of it the right to receive the money due upon it.

8. To "DOMICILE" a Bill or Note is to state in it the place where it is payable.

Lowndes v. Anderson, 13 East., 130. *Robarts v. Tucker*, 16 Q. B., 579.

9. To "UTTER" a Bill or Note is for a person either himself, or by his agent, to use it in any way whatever to obtain Money or Credit by means of it.

Rex v. Shukard, R. & B., 200. *Reg. v. Radford*, 1 Den., C. C., 59. *Reg. v. Ion*, 2 Den., C. C., 475.

10. "DAYS OF GRACE" are days which mercantile usage and law allow the obligor on certain Notes and Bills to pay them in, beyond the day limited in the instrument itself.

11. If a person merely writes a Bill or Note, or signs his name on one, and then retains it in his own possession, he does not draw, make, accept, or indorse, the instrument as the case may be.

12. But if he then delivers the instrument to another person without any consideration, and for his accommodation only, so that the transferee acquires a property in it, the writer draws, makes, accepts or indorses the instrument as the case may be, but he does not issue it.

13. A Bill, Note, or Draft is not issued until it is delivered to some person, who is entitled to sue all the parties to it.

Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & Ald., 674. *Bignold ex parte*, 2 Mont. & Ayr., 633. *Tarleton v. Shingler*, 7 C. B., 812. *Swan v. Bank of Scotland*, 2 Mont. & Ayr., 656.

14. If one person makes himself a party to a Bill or Note, either by drawing, making, accepting, or indorsing it, for the use benefit, or advantage of another person, without receiving any consideration for so doing or being indebted to such person, such an instrument is termed an ACCOMMODATION BILL, or NOTE, and the person who so makes himself a party to it is termed the *accommodation drawer, maker, acceptor, or indorser*, as the case may be.

The person for whose use, benefit, or advantage he has so made himself a party to such an instrument, has no right of action against him upon it.

6. No consideration, nor even the words "value received" need be expressed in a Bill, Note, or Draft.

White v. Ledwick, 4 Doug., 247. *Macleod v. Snee*, 2 Ld. Raym., 1481. *Josceline v. Lasserre*, Fort., 281.

7. Bills, Notes, and Drafts usually have the sum for which they are payable written at full length in the body of the instrument, and also in figures in the margin. If the two sums differ, the instrument is good for the sum stated in the body of it: the sum stated in figures in the margin is a mere memorandum.

Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing., N. C., 425.

8. Bills and Notes must be drawn payable absolutely and at all events in money only, at some certain event, such as *demand, sight*, or some *date*, or some event which must *certainly* happen; or at a certain time after demand, sight, or date, or such certain event.

9. An instrument bearing no date or time of payment, is held to be dated at the time it is made, and is payable on demand.

De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show., 422. *Hague v. French*, 3 B. & P., 173. *Giles v. Bourne*, 6 M. & S., 73. *Whitlock v. Underwood*, 2 B. & C., 157.

10. The signature of any party to a Bill or Note may be by a mark or stamp.

George v. Surrey, 1 M. & M., 516.

On the STAMP.

11. 1. All Bills and Notes must be stamped with an *impressed* stamp previous to their execution.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 53, § 2.

2. "The fixed duty of one penny on a bill of exchange for the payment of money on demand may be denoted by an *adhesive* stamp, which is to be cancelled by the person to whom the bill is

signed, before he delivers it out of his hands, custody, or power."

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 50.

3. "Where a Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note has been written on material bearing an impressed stamp of sufficient amount, but of improper denomination, it may be stamped with the proper stamp on payment of the duty, and a penalty of forty shillings, if the bill or note be not then payable according to its tenor, and of ten pounds of the same be so payable.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 53, § 1.

4. "Every person who issues, indorses, transfers, negotiates, presents for payment or pays any bill of exchange or promissory note liable to duty and not being duly stamped, shall forfeit the sum of ten pounds: and the person who takes or receives from any other person any such Bill or Note not being duly stamped, either in payment or as a security, or by purchase or otherwise, shall not be entitled to recover thereon, or to make the same available for any purpose whatever."

12. 1. An instrument not "lawfully" stamped is absolutely void, and no action can be brought on it by any person cognizant of its illegality.

2. An instrument not "duly" stamped subjects the issuer of it to penalties, but it may be received in evidence, and an action may be brought on it.

55 Geo. 3. (1815), c. 184, s. 10.

13. An instrument not "lawfully" stamped is a bill or note written upon unstamped or insufficiently stamped paper (a); or upon paper stamped with a superseded die (b); or a post dated cheque payable to bearer on demand (c). Such instruments are absolutely void, and cannot be received as evidence in any action brought upon them by any person who takes them with knowledge of the facts.

(a) 31 Geo. 3 (1791), c. 28, s. 19. *Green v. Davies*, 4 B. & C., 235.

(b) 3 & 4 Will. 4 (1833), c. 97, s. 16. *Dawson v. Macdonald*, 2 M. & W., 26.

(c) *Allen v. Keeves*, 1 East., 435. *Ardern v. Rowney*, 5 Esp., 255. *Serle v. Norton*, 9 M. & W., 809. *Borrodaile v. Middleton*, 2 Camp., 53. *Swan v. Blair*, 3 Cl. & Fin., 610. *Oliver v. Mortimer*, 2 F. & F., 127.

14. An instrument not duly stamped is one upon which there is a stamp of an improper denomination or rate of duty, but of equal or greater value in the whole with or than the stamp or stamps which ought regularly to have been used thereon (a).

Thus Bills and Notes drawn upon wrong stamps of equal value with the proper one (b): or a post dated cheque payable to order on demand stamped with a 1d. stamp (c) are instruments not duly stamped, but they are nevertheless valid and receivable in evidence.

(a) 55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 10.

(b) 55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 12. *Upstone v. Marchant*, 2 B. & C., 10. *Williams v. Jarrett*, 5 B. & Ad., 32.

(c) *Key v. Mathias*, 3 F. & F., 279. *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 C. B., N. S., 248.

15. If an instrument appears to be properly dated and stamped on the face of it, though really invalid from having a wrong place and date on it, and therefore void as between the parties cognizant of the illegality, yet if it be taken by a holder for value, who is ignorant of the facts, he may recover on it.

Wright v. Riley, Peake, 280. *Martin v. Morgan*, 3 B. & Mer., 635. *Williams v. Jarrett*, 5 B. & Ad., 32. *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 C. B., N. S., 248. *Austin v. Bunyard*, 6 B. & S., 687. *Begbie v. Levi*, 1 C. & J., 180.

16. 1. An instrument which is void under the stamp laws is no payment even though the receiver take it without objection (a).

2. The receiver of such an instrument cannot be charged with laches for not presenting it in due time for payment (b); nor for not giving notice of dishonour (c); nor even can it be used to prove a debt in bankruptcy (d).

3. Neither will equity relieve on the instrument (e); but if a person bound to give a stamped instrument gives one void under the stamp laws, equity will make him give a good one (f).

4. Taking an instrument void under the stamp laws does not avoid the consideration (g).

(a) *Ruff v. Webb*, 1 Esp., 128. *Wilson v. Vysar*, 4 Taunt., 288. *Bond v. Warden*, 1 Coll., C. C., 583.

(b) *Wilson v. Vysar*, 4 Taunt., 288.

(c) *Cundy v. Marriott*, 1 B. & Ad., 696.

(d) *Manner*, ex parte, 1 Rose, 68.

(e) *Price v. Toulmin*, 5 Ves., 235.

(f) *Aylett v. Bennett*, 1 Anst., 45.

(g) *Ruff v. Webb*, 1 Esp., 129. *Wilson v. Kennedy*, 1 Esp., 245. *Brown v. Watts*, 1 Taunt., 353. *Tyte v. Jones*, 1 East., 58n. *Aloes v. Hodgson*, 7 T. R., 241.

17. All instruments not allowed to be reissued are upon payment to be cancelled and annulled by the person paying them; and if any one reissue or negotiate them, or if the person paying them

neglect to cancel them, he is to forfeit £50. The person issuing them is also liable for the duty, and any person taking them in payment is to forfeit £20.

55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 19.

18. 1. Bills and Notes made payable after date may be issued any number of times even by the principal debtor until the time when they become payable.

2. But if they be paid at maturity by or on behalf of the principal debtor, they are finally extinguished, and cannot be re-issued.

3. If, however, they be not paid by or on behalf of the principal debtor, they may be re-issued under certain conditions.

19. 1. A Bill or Note may be negotiated for the space of six years after it has become payable.

2. The Statute of Limitations prevents any action being taken after that period, either on the instrument or on the consideration (a); without a fresh promise in writing signed by the party to be charged (b); or his agent (c); or by part payment of principal or interest.

3. Such written promise or payment will revive the remedy for six years from its date.

(a) 21 Jac. 1 (1623), c. 16, s. 3.

(b) 9 Geo., 5 (1828), c. 14, s. 1.

(c) 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 13

20. 1. Days of Grace are not allowed on any instruments payable on or after demand: or at sight or presentation (a).

2. Instruments payable on demand are due and payable immediately: no demand is necessary before action brought: and the Statute of Limitations begins to run from their date (b).

(a) 34 & 35 Vict. (1871), c. 74, s. 2.

(b) *Capp v. Lancaster*, Cro. Eliz., 548. *Collins v. Benning*, 12 Moo., 444. *Rumball v. Ball*, 10 Moo., 38. *Meggison v. Harper*, 2 C. & M., 322. *Norton v. Ellam*, 2 M. & W., 461.

21. 1. Three days of grace are allowed on instruments payable after sight (a); at or after a fixed date, or a certain event.

2. Such instruments are payable on, and not before (b), the last day of grace: no action can be brought, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run until the last day of grace has expired (c).

3. If the instrument is payable by instalments, days of grace are allowed on each instalment (d).

4. If the last day of grace be Sunday, Christmas Day, Good

Friday, or a public fast or thanksgiving, the instrument is payable the day before (e).

5. By statute 34 Vict. (1871), c. 17. the following days are declared to be Bank Holidays—

In England and Ireland—Easter Monday; the Monday in Whitsun week; the first Monday in August; the Twenty-sixth day of December, if a week day.

In Scotland—New Year's Day; Christmas Day; (if either of these days falls on a Sunday, the next Monday shall be a Bank holiday;) Good Friday; the first Monday of May; the first Monday of August.

All Bills and Notes due and payable on these days shall be payable on the following day; and in case of non-payment may be noted and protested on the day next following on which they may be lawfully protested.

If the day on which any notice of dishonour of an unpaid bill or note should be given; or any bill presented or received for acceptance, or accepted or forwarded to any referee or referees, is a bank holiday, such notice of dishonour shall be given, and such bill or note shall be presented or forwarded on the day next after such bank holiday.

(a) *Coleman v. Sayer*, 2 Stra., 829. *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym., 290.

(b) *Wiffen v. Roberts*, 1 Esp., 261.

(c) *Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle*, 1 H. Bla., 631.

(d) *Orridge v. Sherborne*, 11 M & W., 374.

(e) 7 & 8 Geo. 4 (1827), c. 15, s. 3.

22. If any Bill, Note, Obligation, or Valuable Security made or become payable to bearer, be taken in exchange for any goods, merchandise, money, or other Bill, Note, Obligation, or Valuable Security, without the indorsement of the transferor, it is an unconditional sale of the security, and the transferee has no right of action against the transferor if it be not paid, either on the instrument or on the consideration.

Bank of England v. Newman, 1 Ld. Raym., 442. *Ward v. Evans*, 2 Ld. Raym., 928. *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. B., 787. *Ex parte Shuttleworth*, 2 Ves., jun., 368. *Fyde v. Clarke*, 1 Esp., 447. *Emlye v. Lye*, 15 East., 7. *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 B. & C., 373. *Guardians of Lichfield Union v. Green*, 1 H. & N., 884.

23. 1. The transferor of a Bill or Note by mere delivery warrants the *genuineness* of the instrument, i. e., that it is not

forged or fictitious; he does not warrant the *solvency* of the parties to it.

2. But if he knew that the parties to it had failed, or if it be forged or fictitious, he is liable to refund payment to the transferee.

Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt., 488. *Bruce v. Bruce*, 1 Marsh., 165. *Gurney v. Womersley*, 4 E. & B., 183. *Gompertz v. Bartlett*, 2 E. & B., 849. *Fuller v. Smith*, 1 C. & P., 197.

24. A Bill, Note, *Chose-in-action*, Obligation, or Valuable Security is included under the words "goods and chattels" or "effects," in an Act of Parliament (a); or under an extent (b); or a writ of *fieri facias* (c); in a will, unless there be words to negative such an inference (d); and in the clause of "reputed ownership" in bankruptcy (e).

(a) *Slade v. Morley*, 4 Co. Rep., 92b. *Ford's case*, 12 Co. Rep., 1. *Clayton's case*, Lytt., 86. *Ryal v. Rowles*, 1 Ves., sen., 348.

(b) *Byles on Bills*, 3.

(c) 1 & 2 Vict. (1838), c. 110, s. 12.

(d) *Anon.*, 1 P. Wms., 267. *Campbell v. Prescott*, 15 Ves., 500. *Kendall v. Kendall*, 4 Russ., C. C., 360. *Parker v. Marchant*, 1 Y. & Coll. C. C., 290.

(e) *Ryall v. Rowles*, 1 Ves., sen., 348. *Ex parte Colwill*, Mont., C. B., 110. *Bozon v. Bollond*, M. & Bl., 74. *Hornblower v. Proud*, 2 B. & Ald., 327. *Ex parte Burton*, 1 Gl. & J., 207. *Belcher v. Campbell*, 8 Q. B., 1. *Ex parte Richardson*, Buck, 483. *Barlett v. Barlett*, 1 De G. & J., 127. *Edwards v. Cooper*, 11 Q. B., 33. *Bullock v. Dodds*, 2 B. & Ald., 258. *Cumming v. Bailey*, 6 Bing., 363. *Harman v. Fisher*, 1 Cowp., 117.

25. The property in an instrument remains in the owner until he has *entirely* parted with it: if he cuts it in two and sends one part by post, he does not lose the property in it till he has sent the other part, and he may reclaim the first part sent.

Smith v. Mundy, 3 E. & B., 22.

26. 1. Instruments payable by a banker must, in general, be presented for payment during banking hours, otherwise such presentment is void (a).

2. But if the banker has a clerk stationed to give answers after hours, and the same answer is given as would have been given during hours, such presentment is sufficient (b).

3. Instruments payable by other persons may be presented for payment at any reasonable hour (c): between 8 and 9 p.m. is the latest hour yet decided to be reasonable (d).

(a) *Parker v. Gordon*, 6 Esp., 41; 7 East., 385. *Elford v. Teed*, 1 M. & S., 28. *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, 1 C. M. & R., 744.

(b) *Garnet v. Woodcock*, 6 M. & S., 44. *Henry v. Lee*, 2 Chit., 124. *Crook v. Jadia*, 6 C. & P., 191.

(c) *Barclay v. Bailey*, 2 Camp., 527. *Morgan v. Davison*, 1 Stark., 114. *Wilkins v. Jadia*, 1 Mo. & R., 41; 2 B. & Ad., 188.

(d) *Triggs v. Newnham*, 1 C. & P., 631; 10 Moo., 249.

27. A Bill, Note, or Valuable Security may be the subject of *donato mortis causa*.

Bank Notes. *Drury v. Smith*, P. Wms., 404. *Ashton v. Dawson*, 2 Coll. C. C., 363n. *Clavering v. Yorke*, 2 Coll. C. C., 363n. *Miller v. Miller*, 3 P. Wms., 356. *Hill v. Chapman*, 1 Bro. C. C., 612.

Bills of Exchange. *Rankin v. Weguelin*, 27 Beav., 309.

Promissory Notes payable to donor's order unindorsed. *Veal v. Veal*, 27 Beav., 303.

Cheques.¹ *Lawson v. Lawson*, 1 P. Wms., 440. *Snellgrave v. Bayly*, Ridg., ca. t. Hard., 202. *Ward v. Turner*, 2 Ves., sen., 431. *Tate v. Hilbert*, 2 Ves., jun., 111. *Bouts v. Ellis*, 17 Beav., 121.

Bank Deposit Receipt. *Witt v. Amis*, 1 B. & S., 109. *Amis v. Witt*, 33 Beav., 19.

28. The rules relating to the transferee's title by delivery in lost and stolen instruments have already been given in Chap. xiii., § 4. To these cases may be added now that of *Goodwin v. Roberts*, L. R., 10 Exch., 357, in which scrip for foreign bonds was declared negotiable.

29. 1. If any Bill, Note, or Security for money be lost or destroyed, the right owner may sue any party to it, upon giving him an indemnity to the satisfaction of a court, judge, or master, against the claims of any other person upon it (a).

2. And such a security may be proved in bankruptcy (b).

3. If half of an instrument be lost or destroyed, the owner of

¹ In several text books of authority it is laid down absolutely that a cheque cannot be the subject of a gift *mortis causa* (*Roper on Legacies*, vol. i., p. 11; *Williams on Executors*, vol. i., p. 723; *Byles on Bills*, 9th Edit., p. 170; *White and Tudor's lead. ca. in Eq.*, vol. i., p. 743), and in the case of *Hewitt v. Kaye* (L. R., 6 Eq., 198), Lord Romilly, M. R., laid it down as an absolute doctrine that a cheque is incapable of being made a gift *mortis causa*. But having been obliged to investigate the question in my Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, as prepared for the Digest of Law Commissioners, I was satisfied that the doctrine stated by the writers, and the decision of Lord Romilly, above mentioned, is erroneous; and I accordingly excluded the case of *Hewitt v. Kaye* from my Digest. My reasons for so doing are given at full length in that Digest; but are, of course, far too long to be inserted here. I merely state this that I may not be supposed to have overlooked the case of *Hewitt v. Kaye*.

the other half may enforce payment of it with or without an indemnity (*c*).

(*a*) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 125, s. 87.

(*b*) *Ex parte Greenway*, 6 Ves., 812.

(*c*) *Mossop v. Eadon*, 16 Ves., 430. *Redmayne v. Burton*, 2 L. T., N. S., 324.

30. 1. If any Valuable Security be lost in its transmission through the post, or by any conveyance which the person who should receive it directs, the loss falls upon him (*a*).

2. No action lies against the Postmaster-General for the loss of any instrument during its transmission through the post (*b*).

3. But any person in the employment of the post office is liable for any act of negligence or misconduct of his own (*c*).

(*a*) *Warwick v. Noakes*, Peake, 98. *Hawkins v. Rutt*, Peake, 241.

(*b*) *Lane v. Cotton*, 1 Ld. Raym., 646. *Whitfield v. Lord Despencer*, Cowp., 754.

(*c*) *Lane v. Cotton*, 1 Ld. Raym., 646. *Whitfield v. Lord Despencer*, Cowp. 754. *Rowning v. Goodchild*, 2 W. Bla., 906. *Hordern v. Dalton*, 1 C. & P., 181.

Of an I O U.

31. A mere acknowledgment of a debt not containing any promise to pay is usually termed an I O U, and is often in the following form—

London, May 4, 1876.

I O U £100.

To Mr. A. B.

C. D.

32. Such an acknowledgment, or an acknowledgment, or receipt for money lent or deposited to be accounted for, does not require a stamp.

Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esp., 425. *Israel v. Israel*, 1 Camp., 499.

Childers v. Boulnois, D. & R. N. P. Ca., 8. *Tomkins v. Ashby*, 6 B.

& C., 541. *Beeching v. Westbrook*, 8 M. & W., 412. *Melanotte v.*

Teasdale, 13 M. & W., 216. *Gould v. Coombs*, 1 C. B., 543.

33. Nor does such a document require a stamp if it contains a promise to pay only interest on the sum due, and not the principal (*a*).

But if it promises to pay the principal it must be stamped as a Note (*b*).

(*a*) *Melanotte v. Teasdale*, 13 M. & W., 216. *Smith v. Smith*, 1 F. & F., 589.

(*b*) *Brooks v. Elkins*, 2 M. & W., 74. *Waithman v. Elsea*, 1 C. & K., 35.

34. An I O U not having the name of any creditor on it is *prima facie* evidence in favour of the party who produces it.

Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esp., 427. *Curtis v. Rickards*, 1 M. & Gr., 46.
Douglas v. Holme, 12 A. & E., 641. *Fesenmayer v. Adcock*, 16 M. & W., 449.

35. An acknowledgment of debt may be given as a *donatio mortis causa*.

Moore v. Darton, 4 De G. & Sm., 517.

36. A bill in equity lies to discover whether an I O U was given for a gaming debt (a): and equity will restrain an action on an I O U given for an illegal consideration (b).

(a) *Wilkinson v. L'Eaugier*, 2 Y. & Coll., C. C., 366.

(b) *Quarrier v. Colston*, 12 L. J., Ch., 57.

ON BANKING OBLIGATIONS.

37. 1. A banker is a trader whose business consists in buying money, or money and Debts, in exchange for which he gives his own Credit.

2. A banker gives his Credit in two forms—

(a) His own PROMISSORY NOTES.

(b) Credits in his books, termed in banking language DEPOSITS.

3. Banking Obligations are Bank Notes, Deposits, Cheques, Deposit receipts, Letters of Credit, Bankers' drafts, and Circular notes.

38. No banker who was not on the 6th of May, 1844, lawfully issuing his own notes; nor any banker then lawfully issuing his own notes who has become bankrupt, or discontinued the issue of bank notes; nor any person since that date, may become a party to any obligation payable to bearer on demand, in any part of the United Kingdom.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c 32, ss. 10, 11, 12. 17 & 18, Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 11.

39. No banking partnership consisting of more than *ten* (a) persons in London, or within 65 miles thereof, may borrow, owe, or take up in England any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof (b).

(a) 20 & 21 Vict. (1857), c. 49, s.

(b) 3 & 4 Will. 4 (1833), c. 98, s. 3.

40. A BANK NOTE is defined by Statute to be—"Any Bill Draft, or Note (other than Notes of the Bank of England) which shall be issued by any banker, or the agent of any banker, for the

payment of money to the bearer on demand, and any Bill, Draft, or Note so issued, which shall entitle, or be intended to entitle, the bearer or holder thereof, without indorsement, or without any further or other indorsement than may be thereon at the time of issuing it, to the payment of any sum of money on demand, whether the same shall be so expressed or not, in whatever form and by whomsoever such bill, draft, or note, shall be drawn or made."

17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 11.

41. The following establishments only may issue obligations payable to bearer on demand in England—

1. The Bank of England.

2. Private banking firms which were lawfully issuing their own notes on the 6th day of May, 1844, and which have not become bankrupt, or discontinued such issue since that date.

3. Joint stock banks formed under Stat. 7 Geo. 4 (1826), issuing their own notes at a distance not less than 65 miles from London.

42. The following provisions relating to the issue of Notes by the Bank of England are at present in force—

1. The Bank is divided into the banking department and the issue department.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 1.

2. The issue department creates and issues to the banking department Notes in exchange for £15,000,000 of public securities and any amount of gold and silver coin and bullion, of which the silver coin and bullion must not be more than one fifth part.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, ss. 2, 3, 5.

3. The banking department may not issue notes to any person whatever except in exchange for other notes, or such as they have received from the issue department in terms of the Act.


7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 2.

4. Any person may demand bank notes in exchange for standard gold bullion at the rate of £3 17s. 9d. per ounce.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 4.

5. If any banker who was lawfully issuing his own notes on the 6th day of May, 1844, ceases to do so, the Crown in council may authorise the Bank to increase its issues on public securities to any amount not exceeding two-thirds of the amount of notes withdrawn from circulation.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 5.



6. So long as the Bank pays its notes in legal coin on demand they are legal tender of payment for all sums *above* £5, by all persons, except by the Bank itself, or any of its branches.

3 & 4 Will. 4 (1833), c. 98, s. 4.

7. Notes issued at any branch of the Bank must be made payable in coin at that branch as well as in London (a): no branch may issue notes not made payable there (b): and no note not made specially payable at any branch is liable to be paid there (c).

(a) 7 & 8 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, s. 15.

(b) 3 & 4 Will. 4 (1833), c. 98, s. 4.

(c) 3 & 4 Will. 4 (1833), c. 98, s. 6.

8. Bank of England notes may circulate, and be offered in payment, but they are not legal tender, in Scotland (a): or Ireland (b).

(a) 8 & 9 Vict. (1845), c. 35, s. 15.

(b) 8 & 9 Vict. (1845), c. 37, s. 6.

9. No person except bankers lawfully issuing their own notes may make, sign, issue, or re-issue, any promissory note payable to bearer on demand in England, under a penalty of £20 for each offence.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 6, s. 3.

10. No person may by any art, device, or means whatsoever, publish, utter, negotiate, or transfer, in any part of England, any promissory or other note, draft, engagement, or undertaking in writing made payable on demand to the bearer thereof, and being negotiable or transferable for the payment of any sum of money less than five pounds, or on which less than the sum of five pounds shall remain undischarged, which shall have been made or issued or shall purport to have been made in Scotland or Ireland, or elsewhere out of England, under a penalty of not less than five nor more than twenty pounds for each offence.

9 Geo. 4 (1828), c. 68, s. 1.

11. By Statute 7 Anne (1709), c. 7, s. 61, no banking partnership exceeding six persons, other than the Bank of England, might borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof.

12. By statute 7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, partnerships consisting of an unlimited number of members might carry on the business of banking, and make and issue bills and notes payable on demand at any place in England, exceeding the distance of 65 miles from

London, and not elsewhere, and borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes so made and issued.

13. Such partnerships may not have any house of business or establishment as bankers in London, or at any place not exceeding 65 miles from London.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, s. 1.

14. Every member of such partnership shall be liable for all money borrowed, from the time he becomes a member, and for all bills and notes which are due and unpaid, or which become payable after he has become a member.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, s. 1.

15. No such banking company may issue or re-issue in London or at any place not exceeding 65 miles from London, any bill or note payable on demand, or any bank post bill, nor draw upon any partner nor agent, or other persons resident within these limits, any bill of exchange payable on demand, or for a less amount than £50, under a penalty of £50 for each offence.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, s. 2.

16. Such banking company may draw any bill for any sum of £50, or upwards, payable in London or elsewhere, at any period after date or after sight.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, s. 19.

17. Such banking company may not borrow, owe, or take up in London or at any place not exceeding 65 miles from London, any sum of money on any bill or promissory note payable on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof, under a penalty of £50 for each offence; but they may discount in London or elsewhere any bills of exchange not drawn by or upon them, or by or upon any person on their behalf.

7 Geo. 4 (1826), c. 46, ss. 3, 19.

18. All banks in London or within 65 miles of it, may draw, accept, or indorse bills of exchange, not being payable to bearer on demand.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 11.

19. All banks of issue existing on the 6th of May, 1844, may continue to issue an amount of notes not exceeding on an average of four weeks, such an average sum as they were issuing during the 12 weeks preceding the 27th April, 1844, certified by the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 13.

20. If any two or more banks of issue become united, such

united bank may continue to issue the aggregate average amount of notes circulated by the separate banks, provided the united bank does not exceed *ten* (1) persons.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 17.

(1) 20 & 21 Vict. (1857), c. 49.

21. If any banker in his monthly average exceeds his authorised issue, he is to forfeit the excess.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 17.

22. Every bank of issue must send to the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, weekly, an account of its issues, shewing the amount of its notes in circulation on every day of the preceding week, and also the average during the week; and at the end of every period of four weeks, a statement of the average amount of the said four weeks, along with the authorised amount, duly verified, in the case of a private banker, by the signature of the banker or his cashier; and in the case of a company or partnership, by the signature of the managing director, partner, or chief cashier. Any neglect or refusal to render such an account, or a false return, incurs a penalty of £100.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 18.

23. All existing banking companies may register themselves under the Limited Liability Act, 1858, upon giving 30 days' notice to each of their customers.

21 & 22 Vict. (1858), c. 91, s. 1.

43. If there be several partners in a country bank of issue, the right of issue, on the death of the other partners, belongs exclusively to the surviving partner.

Smith v. Everett, 27 Beav., 446.

44. 1. Tender of payment in country bank notes is good, if not objected to on that account (a).

2. Even if a banker tender his own notes which are afterwards dishonoured (b).

(a) *Vernon v. Bouverie*, 2 Show., 296. *Tassel v. Lewis*, *Ld. Raym.*, 743. *Ward v. Evans*, 2 *Ld. Raym.*, 298. *Polglass v. Oliver*, 2 *Tyr.*, 89. *Owenson v. Morse*, 7 *T. R.*, 64. *Lockyer v. Jones*, *Peake*, 239. *Tiley v. Courtier*, 2 *C. & J.*, 6n. *Pickard v. Bankes*, 13 *East.*, 20. *Shipton v. Casson*, 8 *D. & R.*, 130. *Clarke v. Shee*, 1 *Cowp.*, 197.

(b) *Guardians of Lichfield Union v. Green*, 1 *H. & N.*, 884.

45. 1. If country bank notes be taken in payment of goods at the time of the sale, and as part of the contract, so that no debt is created, and without indorsement, the vendor takes them at his

own risk, and has no remedy against the transferor, if the banker fails before he obtains payment of them.

2. But if the transferor knew at the time he offered the notes in payment that the banker had failed, he is liable.

3. But if the note be taken, not at the time of the exchange, but in payment of a pre-existing debt, however short a period has elapsed between the creation of the debt and the tender of the notes, if the transferee presents the notes within due time, and finds that the banker has failed, and gives due notice of dishonour to the transferor, he may demand payment of his original debt.

Vernon v. Bouverie, 2 Show., 296. *Cooksey v. Bouverie*, 2 Show., 296. *Ward v. Evans*, Ld. Raym., 928. *Moore v. Warren*, 1 Stra., 415. *Holme v. Barry*, 1 Stra., 415. *Turner v. Meade*, 1 Stra., 416. *Manwaring v. Harrison*, 1 Stra., 508. *Howard v. Bank of England*, 1 Stra., 550. *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 B. & C., 378. *Rogers v. Langford*, 1 C. & M., 637. *Robson v. Oliver*, 10 Q. B., 704.

46. 1. If a customer pays into his account with his banker, the notes of another banker, for which his banker gives him either credit in account, or a deposit receipt; and if the banker on duly presenting the notes for payment finds that the banker who issued them has failed, and if he gives due notice of dishonour to his customer, he may cancel the credit (a).

2. But if instead of demanding payment of the notes he takes a credit in account with the banker who issued the notes, that is equivalent to payment, and he is liable to his customer, if the other banker fails (b).

(a) *Timmins v. Gibbons*, 18 Q. B., 722.

(b) *Gillard v. Wise*, 5 B. & C., 184.

47. If one person changes a bank note as a favour for another, and if on duly presenting the note for payment he finds that the banker has failed, and if he gives due notice of dishonour he may demand back his money.

Rogers v. Langford, 1 C. & M., 637. *Turner v. Stones*, 1 D. & L., 122.

48. 1. Bank notes made payable at a particular place must be presented there for payment, to enable the holder of them to sue the maker (a).

2. Even if the banker is notoriously insolvent and has closed his place of business, that will not excuse the want of presentment (b).

3. But between third parties, if a banker has become notoriously insolvent and has closed his place of business, presentment of his

notes there is not necessary to charge the transferor, if the transferee is informed of the banker's stoppage of payment within the time limited for presentment, and gives notice of dishonour to the transferor within reasonable time after being informed of the fact (c.)

4. And reasonable time for notice of dishonour is not necessarily limited to the time for presentment for payment (d).

(a) *Sanderson v. Bowes*, 11 East., 500. *Dickinson v. Bowes*, 16 East., 110. *Bowes v. Howe*, 5 Taunt., 30. *Butterworth v. Lord Despencer*, 3 M. & S., 150. *Emblin v. Dartnell*, 12 M. & W., 831. *Spindler v. Grellet*, 1 Ex., 384. *Sands v. Clarke*, 8 C. B., 751.

(b) *Bowes v. Howe*, 5 Taunt., 30. *Sands v. Clarke*, 8 C. B., 751.

(c) *Henderson v. Appleton*, Chit., 8th ed., p. 388. *Turner v. Stones*, 1 D. & L., 122. *Robson v. Oliver*, 10 Q. B., 704.

(d) *Robson v. Oliver*, 10 Q. B., 704.

49. If country bank notes are given in payment to a servant, such acceptance by the servant does not bind the master, and he has full time to present them for payment after he has received them from his servant.

Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym., 928. *James v. Holditch*, 8 D. & R., 40.

50. If payment for goods be made in country bank notes, and the banker fails before delivery of the goods, the vendor may retain them if not sent, and has the right of stoppage *in transitu*.

Owen v. Morse, 7 T. R., 64.

51. If a person pays his acceptance by notes in which he has no property, it is no payment, and he is still liable.

Mannin v. Cary, 1 Lutw., 277.

52. A bank note made payable at two places may be presented at either, and if payment be refused at once it is no *laches*, even though it might be more convenient to present it at the other where it would have been paid.

Beeching v. Gower, Holt, N. P., 313.

53. 1. The holder of country bank notes must circulate them or present them for payment within banking hours (a), of the next day after he has received them, if the banker lives in the same place, to charge the transferor if the banker fails (b).

2. If the banker lives in a different place, he must transmit them for payment by the post of the next day after he has received them (c).

3. The receiver has all the banking hours of the next day after he has received them to present them for payment (c).

4. The sender may cut the notes in halves, and send one set of halves the day after he has received them, and the second set the day after that (c).

5. The time for the receiver to present the notes for payment does not begin to run until he has received the second set of halves (c): the sender has not parted with the property of the notes until he has sent the second set of halves: and until he has done that he may reclaim the first set of halves (d).

6. Sunday, Christmas day, Good Friday, a public fast or thanksgiving day; or a day on which a man is forbidden by his religion to transact secular business (f); but not a bank holiday (g); are not counted: therefore, if a man receives a bank note on such a day, he has till the second day after to present or transmit it for payment (h).

(a) *Parker v. Gordon*, 7 East., 385. *Elford v. Teed*, 1 M. & S., 28. *Jameson v. Swinton*, 2 Taunt., 224. *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, 1 C. M. & R., 744.

(b) *Manwaring v. Harrison*, 1 Stra., 508. *Medcalf v. Hall*, 3 Doug., 113. *Appleton v. Sweetapple*, 3 Doug., 187. *Robson v. Bennet*, 2 Taunt., 388. *Rickford v. Ridge*, 2 Camp., 537. *Beeching v. —*, Holt, N. P., 315. *Williams v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ald., 496. *Boddington v. Schlenker*, 4 B. & Ad., 752. *Pocklington v. Sylvester*, Chitty, 9th ed., p. 385. *Moule v. Brown*, 4 Bing, N. C., 266. *Hare v. Henty*, 10 C. B., N. S., 65.

(c) *Williams v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ald., 496.

(d) *Smith v. Mundy*, 2 E. & B., 22.

(f) *Lindo v. Unsworth*, 2 Camp., 602.

(g) 34 Vict. (1871), c. 17.

(h) *Tassel v. Lewis*, 1 Ld. Raym., 743. 39 & 40 Geo. 3 (1800), c. 42. 7 & 8 Geo. 4 (1827), c. 15.

ON CHEQUES.

54. 1. The relation between a banker and his customer on an ordinary banking account is that of simple debtor and creditor: and not that of trustee and *cestui que trust*.

2. Money paid by a customer to a banker belongs absolutely to the banker; it is a *Mutuum*, or Loan, and not a *Depositum*, or Bailment.

3. In exchange for the money the banker gives his customer a Credit, or a right to demand an equal sum of money with or without notice.

Vernon v. Hankey, 2 T. R., 113. *Carr v. Carr*, 1 Meriv., 541n. *Sleech's case*, 1 Mer., 560. *Sims v. Bond*, 5 B. & Ad. 392. *Bank*

of England v. Anderson, 3 Bing., N. C., 328. *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Jur., 401. *Gossett v. Taylor*, 2 Hare, 413. *Foley v. Hill*, 2 H. L. Ca., 31. *Watts v. Christie*, 11 Beav., 548. *Ex parte Waring*, 36 L. J., Ch. 151.

55. A Credit in a banker's books in favour of a customer is, in banking language, termed a **DEPOSIT**.

Banking Credits, or Deposits, are of two sorts—

1. Where the customer has the right of requiring repayment of his money without notice. This kind of account, in banking language, is termed a **DRAWING or CURRENT ACCOUNT**.

2. Where the customer agrees not to demand repayment without a certain notice. This account in banking language is termed a **DEPOSIT ACCOUNT**. In exchange for the money, the banker gives his customer a receipt, termed a **DEPOSIT RECEIPT** containing the terms of the contract.

3. Formerly these deposit receipts were what was termed non-negotiable. They were made payable to the customer himself only, and, consequently, if the customer transferred his deposit receipt to any one else, the transferee could not sue the banker at Law in his own name, though he might in the name of the transferor; but he might sue him in Equity. But since the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, which enacts that the rules of Equity shall prevail over those of Common Law, a Deposit Receipt is as transferable as a Bank Note or a Cheque.

56. An Order on a drawing account at a banker's, payable to any person, or "bearer," or "order," on demand, is in modern commercial language usually termed a **CHEQUE**.

57. A creation or declaration of trust of a Debt, or *Chose-in-action*, may be made by mere words, without writing, and when once made is irrevocable, except by consent of all parties.

Nab v. Nab, 10 Mod., 404. *Fordyce v. Williams*, 3 Bro., C. C., 577. *Ardern v. Riney*, 5 Esp., 255. *Bayley v. Boulcott*, 4 Russ., 345. *Benbow v. Trenchard*, 1 My. & K., 506. *Crabb v. Crabb*, 1 My. & K., 511. *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 My. & K., 520. *Boyd v. Emerson*, 2 A. & E., 184. *Tibbits v. George*, 5 A. & E., 107. *Macfadden v. Jenkyns*, 1 Hare, 458. *Hawkins v. Gardiner*, 2 Sm. & Gil., 451. *Peckham v. Taylor*, 31 Beav., 250.

Rules relating to the transfer of Choses-in-action.

1.—*Assignment of a Chose-in-action by Creditor to Transferee.*

58. 1. An assignment of a *chose-in-action* in equity is equivalent to the delivery of the chattel in Law.

4. The sender may cut the notes in halves, and send one set of halves the day after he has received them, and the second set the day after that (c).

5. The time for the receiver to present the notes for payment does not begin to run until he has received the second set of halves (c): the sender has not parted with the property of the notes until he has sent the second set of halves: and until he has done that he may reclaim the first set of halves (d).

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(c) *Williams v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ald., 496.

(d) *Smith v. Mundy*, 2 E. & B., 22.

(f) *Lindo v. Unsworth*, 2 Camp., 602.

(g) 34 Vict. (1871), c. 17.

(h) *Tassel v. Lewis*, 1 Ld. Raym., 743. 39 & 40 Geo. 3 (1800), c. 42. 7 & 8 Geo. 4 (1827), c. 15.

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Vernon v. Hankey, 2 T. R., 113. *Carr v. Carr*, 1 Meriv., 541n. *Sleech's case*, 1 Mer., 560. *Sims v. Bond*, 5 B. & Ad. 392. *Bank*

v. Campbell, 8 Q. B., 1. *Marten v. Sedgwick*, 9 Beav., 333. *Swayne v. Swaney*, 11 Beav., 463. *Elder v. Maclean*, 5 W. R., 447. *Pennell v. Duffell*, 4 De G. M. & G., 372. *Clayton's case*, 1 Mer., 572. *Bodenham v. Purchas*, 2 B. & Ald., 39.

60. For the purpose of notice no particular form of words is necessary. Any words are sufficient which shew an intention of transferring or appropriating the *chose-in-action* to or for the use of the assignee.

Row v. Danson, 1 Ves., sen., 332. *Yates v. Grove*, 1 Ves., jun., 281. *Howell v. Maciver*, 4 T. R., 690. *Smith v. Everett*, 4 Bro. C. C., 63. *Heath v. Hall*, 4 Taunt., 326. *Ex parte Alderson*, 1 Mad., 53. *Crowfoot v. Gurney*, 2 Mo. & Sc., 473. *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Cr. & M., 231. *Ex parte Carlie*, 4 D. & Ch., 357. *Ex parte South*, 3 Swans., 393. *Tibbitts v. George*, 5 A. & E., 107. *Hutchinson v. Heyworth*, 9 A. & E., 375. *Macfadden v. Jenkins*, 1 Hare, 438. *L'Estrange v. L'Estrange*, 13 Beav., 281. *Riccard v. Prichard*, 1 K. & J., 277. *Randome's bequest*, re, 3 K. & J., 300. *Jones v. Farrell*, 3 Jur., N. S., 751.

61. But the notice given must be *legal*. An instrument not "*lawfully*" stamped is void and of no effect; if notice be given by such an instrument the holder of the fund must not regard it: if he pays on such an instrument the payment is void, even though he agreed to do so.

But if the notice be given by an instrument not "*duly*" stamped, the notice is valid.

Firbank v. Bell, 1 B. & Ald., 36. *Emly v. Collins*, 6 M. & S., 144. *Rippiner v. Wright*, 2 B. & Ald., 478. *Butts v. Swan*, 2 Bro. & B., 78. *Collyer v. Fallon*, Turn. & R., 459. *Lord Braybrooke v. Meredith*, 13 Sim., 271. *Parsons v. Middleton*, 6 Hare, 261. *Macgowan v. Smith*, 26 L. J. Ch., 8. *Pott v. Lomas*, 6 H. & N., 529.

62. 1. Notice given to a person who has not yet received the fund is null, void, and of no effect.

2. If, therefore, several assignments of the fund have been made, and notices given to a person before he has received it, they are null and void, and the priorities take effect according to the order of the assignments (a).

3. But if the person who expects to receive the fund promises the assignee that he will hold it when received for him, he is bound by that promise (b).

(a) *Rodick v. Gandell*, 1 De G. M. & G., 763. *Buller v. Plunkett*, 1 Johns. & H., 441. *Webster v. Webster*, 31 Beav., 393. *Somersett v. Cox*, 33 Beav., 634. *Earl of Suffolk v. Cox*, 36 L. J., Ch. 591.

(b) *Clark v. Adair*, cited 4 T. R., 343. *Stephens v. Hill*, 3 Esp., 247. *Kilsby v. Williams*, 5 B. & Ald., 815.

63. The Purchaser of a *chose-in-action* takes it subject to any prior trusts, equities, claims, or possibilities of such, at the time of the assignment.

Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern., 692. *Turton v. Benson*, 1 P. Wms., 496. *Davis v. Austin*, 1 Ves., jun., 247. *Matthews v. Wallwyn*, 4 Ves., 118. *Hill v. Caillovel*, 1 Ves., sen., 123. *Daubery v. Cockburn*, 1 Mer., 626. *Hamil v. Stokes*, 4 Price, 161. *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Mer., 86. *Morris v. Livie*, 1 Y. & Col., C. C., 380. *Ord v. White*, 3 Beav., 357. *Moore v. Jervis*, 2 Coll., 60. *Smith v. Parkes*, 16 Beav., 115. *Cockell v. Taylor*, 15 Beav., 103. *Cavendish v. Greaves*, 24 Beav., 163. *Manningford v. Toleman*, 1 Col. C. C., 235.

2.—*Order given by a Creditor to a Debtor to pay a third person.*

64. If a creditor gives an authority or order to his debtor to pay a third person, then—

1. If the debtor pays the money to the third person in pursuance of such authority, the payment is good (*a*).

2. If the debtor assents to make such payment and communicates such assent to the third person, a trust is created, irrevocable, except by the consent of all parties, and the third person has an action against the debtor for the money (*b*).

3. An agreement to pay funds which will only be received at a future time is equally binding as one to pay funds in actual possession (*c*).

4. If the third person becomes informed that the debtor has been directed to pay him a sum of money, he may sue him for it (*d*).

5. Until the debtor has actually paid the money or entered into a binding agreement to do so in pursuance of the authority, the creditor may countermand the direction and demand repayment of the money (*e*).

(*a*) *Gibson v. Minet*, 2 Bing., 7. *Brind v. Hampshire*, 1 M. & W., 365.

(*b*) *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East., 582. *Hodgson v. Anderson*, 3 B. & C., 842. *Humphreys v. Briant*, 4 C. & P., 157. *Lilly v. Hays*, 5 A. & E., 548. *Hutchinson v. Heyworth*, 9 A. & E., 875. *Walker v. Rostron*, 9 M. & W., 411. *Hamilton v. Spottiswoode*, 4 Ex., 200. *Farley v. Turner*, 26 L. J., Ch. 710. *Noble v. National Discount Co.*, 5 H. & N., 225. *Griffin v. Weatherby*, L. R., 3 Q. B., 753.

(*c*) *Walker v. Rostron*, 9 M. & W., 411. *Hamilton v. Spottiswoode*, 18 L. J., Ex., 392. *Griffin v. Weatherby*, L. R., 3 Q. B., 753.

(*d*) *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 My. & Cr., 690. 36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, s. 25, § 11.

(*e*) *Whitfield v. Savage*, 2 B. & P., 277. *Gibson v. Minet*, 2 Bing., 7. *Brind v. Hampshire*, 1 M. & W., 365. *Malcolm v. Scott*, 5 Ex., 601. *Morrell v. Wootton*, 16 Beav., 197.

65. A Credit in account or Deposit, if taken instead of money, is good payment.

Gillard v. Wise, 5 B. & C., 134.

66. 1. If a customer leaves a deposit or balance on his account without operating on it for six years, the Statute of Limitations applies, and the banker is not liable (*a*).

But if the banker enters up interest to the credit of his customer, that will save the statute (*b*).

(*a*) *Pott v. Clegg*, 16 M. & W., 321. *Foley v. Hill*, 2 H. L. Ca., 39.

(*b*) 9 Geo. 4 (1828), c. 14, s. 1. *Bamfield v. Tupper*, 7 Ex., 27. *Bealy v. Greenlade*, 2 C. & J., 61.

67. A Deposit or balance on a banking account passes by will under the words "all his ready money" (*a*); "all debts due to him" (*b*); but not under "all his stock in trade" (*c*).

(*a*) *Vaisey v. Reynolds*, 5 Russ., 12. *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Jur., 401. *Parker v. Marchant*, 1 Phil., 356. *Manning v. Purcell*, 2 Sm. & Giff., 292.

(*b*) *Carr v. Carr*, 1 Mer., 561n.

(*c*) *Stuart v. Marquis of Bute*, 11 Ves., 666.

68. By the General Stamp Act (*a*) drafts or orders for the payment of money to bearer on demand were exempted from stamp duty, provided that—

1. They were drawn upon a banker or a person acting as a banker.

2. The place where they were drawn did not exceed 15 (*b*) miles from the banker's place of residence.

3. The place where they were drawn was truly stated on them.

4. They were issued on the day or the day after they were dated.

5. The payment was directed to be made in money, and not in bills or notes.

(*a*) 55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, sched.

(*b*) 9 Geo. 4 (1828), c. 49, s. 15.

69. The stamp duty on any draft for the payment of money to bearer or to order on demand, or at sight or presentation is one penny.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 50.

70. Every person who makes or issues an unstamped draft violating any one of the previous conditions, is liable to a penalty of £100; every one knowingly taking it to a penalty of £20;

any banker knowingly paying it to a penalty of £100, and he is not allowed it in account against the persons by whom or for whom it was drawn, or any person claiming under them.

55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 13.

71. 1. If any person remits an unstamped draft payable to bearer on demand, drawn upon a banker, to any place more than 15 miles distant from the place where such draft is payable, or circulate, negotiate, or receive in payment such a draft in such a place, he shall forfeit £50 (*a*).

2. But if it be duly stamped it may be remitted to or circulated and negotiated in such a place (*b*).

(*a*) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 7.

(*b*) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 8.

72. 1. The penny stamp on such a draft may be either impressed on the paper or adhesive: and may either be a draft or a receipt stamp (*a*).

2. If the stamp used be adhesive, the person who signs the draft must, before he issues it, cancel or obliterate the stamp by writing his name or initials over it, under a penalty of £10.

(*a*) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 10.

(*b*) 33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 24, § 2.

73. The penalty for issuing an unstamped cheque on a banker is the same as for issuing an unstamped bill of exchange.

21 & 22 Vict. (1858), c. 20, s. 2.

74. 1. If any draft or order subject to the penny stamp duty comes unstamped into the hands of a banker, he may affix the stamp and cancel it, and pay the draft and charge the duty against the person liable, or deduct it from the sum payable.

2. The draft is then good and valid, so far as it relates to the stamp duty, but it does not relieve the person who issued it unstamped from the penalty.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 54, § 3.

75. A draft or order for payment sent or delivered by the drawer or maker to the banker or person acting as such, by, or through, whom the payment is to be made, and not delivered to the person to whom the payment is to be made, or to any person on his behalf, requires a penny stamp and may be post dated.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 48, § 3.

76. If a draft or order be duly stamped previously to issue, whether it be payable to bearer or order on demand, it may be drawn at or remitted to any distance from the place of payment;

It may be drawn upon any person and requires no place nor date upon it.

16 & 17 Vict. (1853), c. 59, sched.

77. If it be issued, stamped, and post dated, or dated on a day subsequent to its issue—

1.—If the cheque be payable to bearer—

(1.) It is wholly void in the hands of all parties cognizant of the facts; it cannot be given in evidence in any proceeding in law or equity to establish a valid contract between them (a).

(2.) But it is valid in the hands of an innocent indorsee for value who was not aware of the facts (b).

(3.) If a banker pays such an instrument without knowing the facts, the payment is good (c).

(4.) It may be used in evidence to prove a fraud (d); or in any criminal proceeding (d).

(a) 31 Geo. 3 (1791), c. 25, s. 19. *Allen v. Keese*, 1 East, 485. *Whitwell v. Bennett*, 3 B. & P., 559. *Swan v. Biber*, 3 Ol. & Fin., 210. *Serie v. Norton*, 9 M. & W., 300. *Dunford v. Carlisle*, 1 F. & F., 702. *Oliver v. Mortimer*, 3 F. & F., 702. *Austin v. Bunyard*, 6 B. & S., 687.

(b) *Williams v. Jarrett*, 5 B. & Ad., 32. *Austin v. Bunyard*, 6 B. & S., 687.

(c) *Watson v. Poulson*, 15 Jur., 1,111.

(d) *Watson v. Poulson*, 15 Jur., 1,111.

(e) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 27.

2.—If the cheque be payable to order—

(1.) It is a valid instrument and may be received in evidence (a); and should be paid by a banker at its date, even though he knew it to be post dated (b).

(2.) But the issuer is liable to a penalty for issuing a bill not duly stamped (c).

(a) *Key v. Mathias*, 3 F. & F., 279. *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 C. B., N. S., 248.

(b) *Emanuel v. Roberts*, 17 L. T., N. S., 646.

(c) 55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 11. 21 & 22 Vict. (1858), c. 20, s. 2.

78. A post dated cheque drawn by a member of a firm who has no power to bind his partner by bill is absolutely void in the hands of a person cognizant of the fact, whether it be payable to bearer or to order.

Foster v. Mackreth, L. R., 2 Eq., 163.

79. No banker who has not the right of issuing notes may accept or engage to pay a cheque.

(2.) A banker who accepts or engages to pay a cheque must include such cheques in the return of his issue of notes.

7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 82, s. 11.

17 & 18 Vict. (1854) c. 83, s. 11.

80. 1. By the custom of bankers, the contract between a banker and his customer having an ordinary drawing or current account with him, is to pay on demand, either to him or to any one else to whom his customer may assign them, whatever funds he may have at his customer's credit, within a reasonable time after he has received them, and to accept his customer's bills to that amount (*a*).

2. By the custom of bankers possession of funds is equivalent to acceptance, and admission of funds is a legal acceptance of a cheque drawn by a customer (*b*).

3. A verbal promise to pay, or a collateral writing promising to pay, or any mark such as initials placed on a cheque, the well understood meaning of which is a promise to pay, is a legal acceptance by a banker having funds of his customer.

4. The Acts, 1 & 2 Geo. 4 (1821), c. 78, s. 2, and 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 6, requiring the acceptance of a bill to be in writing on the bill, do not apply to the promise of a banker to pay a cheque, having funds of his customer.

(*a*) *Marzetti v. Williams*, 1 B. & Ad., 415. *Swan v. Bank of Scotland*, 2 Mont. & Ayr., 656. *Foley v. Hill*, 2 H. L. Ca., 28. *Watts v. Christie*, 11 Beav., 546. *Robarts v. Tucker*, 16 Q. B., 560. *Rolin v. Steward*, 14 C. B., 595.

(*b*) *Stevens v. Hill*, 5 Esp., 247. *Ardern v. Rowney*, 5 Esp., 254. *Robson v. Bennett*, 2 Taunt., 388. *Kilsby v. Williams*, 5 B. & Ald., 816. *George v. Surrey*, 1 M. & M., 516. *Boyd v. Emerson*, 2 A. & E., 184. *Marzetti v. Williams*, 1 B. & Ald., 415. *Robarts v. Tucker*, 16 Q. B., 570.

81. 1. A cheque is payment unless dishonoured, and tender of payment by cheque is good, unless objected to on that account.

2. A cheque, to be good tender, must be unconditional; and if the creditor refuses it as being conditional, he may commence an action against the debtor before he returns the cheque (*b*).

3. But the fact of a cheque being drawn in favour of any one is no proof of payment, as it may be drawn in any one's name: there must be evidence that the money came into the creditor's hands, as by his indorsement (*c*).

4. A cheque is not evidence *per se* of a loan from the drawer to the payee (1): nor to establish a set-off (2): nor of a loan from

the drawee (a banker) to the drawer (3): without further evidence of the circumstances under which it was given (d).

5. But, if a debt be proved to have existed between the drawer and the payee, a cheque, though not given directly by the drawer to the payee, if proved to have passed through the payee's hands and been paid to him, is *prima facie* evidence of the payment of the debt, unless contradicted by collateral evidence (e).

(a) *Pearce v. Davis*, 1 Mo. & Rob., 365. *Jones v. Arthur*, 8 Dowl., 442. *Bevan v. Hill*, 2 Camp., 381.

(b) *Hough v. May*, 4 A. & E., 954.

(c) *Egg v. Barnett*, 3 Esp., 196. *Cary v. Gerrish*, 4 Esp., 9.

(d) (1) *Cary v. Gerrish*, 4 Esp., 9. *Lloyd v. Sandilands, Gow*, 15. *Pearce v. Davis*, 1 Mo. & Rob., 365.

(2) *Aubert v. Welsh*, 4 Taunt., 298.

(3) *Fletcher v. Manning*, 18 L. J., Ex., 180.

(e) *Egg v. Barnett*, 3 Esp., 196. *Mountford v. Harper*, 16 M. & W., 625. *Boswell v. Smith*, 6 C. & P., 60.

82. When a customer has placed securities in the hands of his banker, and is allowed to draw against them in a certain well-understood way, the banker cannot change the usual course of dealing, and dishonour his customer's cheques without giving him notice.

Cumming v. Shand, 5 H. & N., 95.

83. A banker who pays a cheque must cancel it by crossing out the drawer's signature, under a penalty of £50.

55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 19.

84. Paid cheques are the property of the drawers, who may demand them back at any time: unless they be overdrafts, for then the banker has a right of action on them.

Partridge v. Coates, 1 Ry. & Mo., 156. *Burton v. Payne*, 2 C. & P., 520. *Reg. v. Watts*, 2 Den. C. C. R., 14.

85. No cheque, draft, or order for the payment of money, drawn by any person or accountant authorised to draw for the public service, is payable at the Bank of England after 3 p.m.

4 & 5 Will. 4 (1834), c. 15, s. 21.

86. 1. If a banker cancels the drawer's signature to a cheque, and if, before actual payment, he discovers any reason why he should not pay it, he may withhold payment (a).

2. But if the money be actually paid over to the presenter of the cheque in mistake, the property in the money is gone from the banker, and he cannot retake it (b).

(a) *Fernandey v. Glynn*, 1 Camp., 426.

(b) *Chambers v. Miller*, 18 C. B., N. S., 125.

87. Cheques are within the "summary procedure on Bills of Exchange Act" (a): and may be taken in execution (b).

(a) 18 & 19 Vict. (1856), c. 67. *Rochford v. Daniel*, 1 F. & F., 602. *Eyre v. Watter*, 5 H. & N., 460.

(b) 1 & 2 Vict. (1838), c. 110, s. 12. *Watts v. Jefferyes*, 3 Mac. & Gor., 422.

88. 1. If a cheque payable to order bears an indorsement purporting to be that of the payee, the banker is not bound to inquire into its genuineness: and an indorsement by procuration is within the meaning of the Act (a).

2. But if any other banker cashes it for the bearer, or gives him credit for it, and obtains payment of it from the banker upon whom it is drawn, he will be liable to the drawer (b).

(a) 16 & 17 Vict. (1853), c. 59, s. 19. *Hare v. Copland*, 13 Ir. Com., L. R., 426. *Charles v. Blackwell*, *The Times*, May 6, 1876.

(b) *Ogden v. Benas*, L. R., 9 C. P., 518. *Arnold v. The Cheque Bank*, *The Times*, April 24, 1876.

89. A married woman or an infant cannot draw a valid cheque except as an agent.

Calland v. Loyd, 6 M. & W., 26.

90. 1. A cheque is an assignment of a *chose-in-action*, and when communicated or notified by the holder to the banker is a complete assignment of the fund (a).

2. If a cheque be notified to the banker and the drawer dies before it is paid, the holder is entitled to payment (b).

(a) *Snellgrave v. Bayley*, Ridg. ca. t., Hard., 202. *Morrell v. Wootton*, 16 Beav., 197.

(b) *Bromley v. Brunton*, L. R., 6 Eq., 275.

21. 1. If a banker pays a cheque with a forged signature, he must bear the loss (a).

2. So if the body of the cheque be written by his customer, and fraudulently altered by another person, so as to be payable for a larger sum than originally drawn, and, the banker not detecting the alteration, pays it, he must bear the loss of the excess (b).

3. But if the customer authorises another person to write the body of the cheque, and that person fraudulently alters the cheque so as to make it payable for a larger sum than authorised, and so the body of the cheque is all in the same handwriting, the banker will not be liable (c).

4. So if a banker pays a cheque under circumstances which are evidently suspicious, he must bear the loss (d).

(a) *Young v. Grote*, 4 Bing., 253. *Hall v. Fuller*, 5 B. & C., 750.

(b) *Hall v. Fuller*, 5 B. & C., 750.

(c) *Young v. Grote*, 4 Bing., 253.

(c) *Scholey v. Ramsbottom*, 2 Camp., 485. The drawer had torn the cheque into four pieces, and thrown them away. A person found the pieces, pasted them together, and presented the cheque. The banker paid it, and was held liable.

92. 1. A banker must pay his customer's cheques strictly in the order in which they are notified, communicated, or presented to him for payment (a).

2. He must debit his customer's account with cheques on the day they are notified or paid, and not on the day they are drawn (b).

3. Sums paid by a banker extinguish the debts created by sums paid to him in strict chronological order (a).

(a) *Robson v. Bennett*, 2 Taunt., 388. *Clayton's case*, 1 Mer., 579. *Bodenham v. Purchas*, 2 B. & Ald., 39. *Kilsby v. Williams*, 5 B. & Ald., 816. *Pennell v. Deffell*, 4 De G. M. & G., 372. *Bromley v. Brunton*, L. R., 6 Eq., 275.

(b) *Goodbody v. Foster*, Byles, 8th ed., p. 25.

93. 1. If a banker having funds of his customer wrongfully dishonours his cheque or bill made payable at the bank, so that the customer suffers damage, he has an action against the banker for such damage (a).

2. But such special damage must be laid and proved (b).

3. If the customer becomes bankrupt in consequence of the wrongful dishonour of his cheques, his assignees have an action against the banker.

4. The holder of the cheque or bill may sue the banker on the instrument.

(a) *Marzetti v. Williams*, 1 B. & Ald., 415. *Rolin v. Steward*, L. J.

(b) *Davies v. The Royal British Bank*, *The Times*, July 10, 1854.

94. 1. The holder of a cheque is not entitled to enlarged time by presenting it through an agent.

He must therefore pay a *plain* cheque into his banker's the same day that he receives it, and the banker has all the next day to present it, being the same time that the holder has (a).

2. Receiving a cheque payable to order does not enlarge the time for presentment (b).

3. But the holder of a crossed cheque which can only be paid through an agent, has all the next day to pay it into his banker's, and the banker has all the next day after that to present it (a).

(a) *Alexander v. Burchfield*, 3 Scott, N. R., 555. *Fenwick v. Dewar*, *The Times*, Feb. 22, 1867.

(b) *Fenwick v. Dewar*, *The Times*, Feb. 22, 1867.

95. 1. If the holder of a bill gives it up to the acceptor in exchange for his cheque, and the cheque is dishonoured, he may give notice of dishonour of the bill, and sue the drawer and indorsers; and the bill may be declared on as a lost bill (*a*).

2. A London banker is not guilty of negligence in giving up bills remitted to him for collection by his country correspondents to the acceptor, in exchange for his cheque, though it is dishonoured (*b*).

(*a*) *Ridley v. Bluckett, Peake, Ad. Ca., 62.*

(*b*) *Russell v. Hankey, 6 T. R. 12.*

96. If a creditor, being offered payment by his debtor's agent either in money or by his cheque, prefers his cheque, and the cheque is dishonoured, the debtor is still liable.

Everett v. Collins, 2 Camp., 515.

97. 1. If a cheque is given on a fraudulent misrepresentation of facts (*a*): or on a verbal condition which the drawer finds is to be broken or eluded (*b*): he may stop payment of the cheque.

2. But he is liable to an innocent holder for value (*c*).

(*a*) *Mills v. Oddy, 3 Dowl., 722.*

(*b*) *Wienholt v. Spitta, 3 Camp., 375.*

(*c*) *Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S., 84.*

98. 1. A cheque may be presented any time within six years of its date to charge the banker, and the drawer of the banker does not fail (*a*).

2. If the banker fails with sufficient funds of his customer to meet the cheque, the same rule applies to cheques as to bank notes, the payee must present it within banking hours, or remit it by post the day after he receives it; otherwise it is *laches* and he must bear the loss (*b*).

3. If the cheque is indorsed away the drawer's liability is discharged after banking hours of the day after he has issued it: and the liability of each indorser in succession is discharged after banking hours of the day after he has indorsed it.

4. If the drawer has not funds to meet the cheque in his banker's hands when he fails, he is liable immediately.

(*a*) *Serle v. Norton, 2 Moo. & R., 401. Robinson v. Hawksford, 9 Q. B., 52. Laws v. Rand, 3 C. B. N. S., 442.*

(*b*) *Bishop v. Chitty, 2 Stra., 1195. Appleton v. Sweetapple, 3 Doug., 137. Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp., 537. Beeching v. —, Holt's N. P., 315n. Pocklington v. Sylvester, Ch. & Hu., 9th edit., 385. Moule v. Brown, 5 Scott, 694. Bailey v. Bodenham, 18 C. B., N. S., 288.*

99. The transferee of an overdue cheque is not subject to the equities of the transferor, as the transferee of an overdue bill.

Rothschild v. Corney, 9 B. & C., 388.

100. If a customer pays into his account a cheque drawn upon the banker by another customer, and the banker takes it without engaging to pay it, he may receive it as the agent of the holder, and has the same time to present it and consider if he will pay it, as if it were drawn upon another banker.

Boyd v. Emerson, 2 A. & E., 184.

101. A cheque drawn by several persons as a collateral security is a joint, and not a joint and several, liability.

Other v. Iveson, 3 Drew., 177.

102. A change in the names on the cheques supplied by a banking firm to their customers is sufficient notice to them of the change of the partners.

Barfort v. Goodall, 3 Camp., 46.

103. 1. If a customer has an account of a fiduciary nature, such as Trustee, Executor, or otherwise, a banker may not refuse his cheques on the account, because he may believe that the customer intends to apply the funds in a breach of trust (a).

2. And he will not be liable to the *cestui que trust* if he is not privy to the breach of trust (b).

3. But if he acts in concert, agreement, or collusion with his customer in committing the breach of trust; and especially if he obtains some benefit by it, as by his customer paying a debt of his own to him by means of cheques drawn on the trust account, he must replace the trust fund (b).

4. The Statute of Limitations does not apply to a banker misapplying a trust fund (c).

(a) *Keane v. Roberts*, 4 Mad., 332. *Nicholson v. Knowles*, 5 Mad., 47. *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav., 550. *Lockwood v. Abdy*, 14 Sim., 437. *Maw v. Pearson*, 28 Beav., 196. *Gray v. Johnston*, L. R., 3 H. L., 1.

(b) *Hill v. Simpson*, 7 Ves., 152. *Keane v. Roberts*, 4 Mad., 333. *Wilson v. Moore*, 1 My. & K., 126, 137. *Pannell v. Hurley*, 2 Coll., C. C., 240. *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav., 550. *Bodenham v. Hoskyns*, 2 De G. M. & G., 903. *Bridgman v. Hill*, 24 Beav., 302. *Hardy v. Caley*, 33 Beav., 365.

(c) *Bridgman v. Hill*, 24 Beav., 302.

104. If an account in a bank stands in the name of several persons, unless there be a special contract with the banker to the contrary—

1. 1. If they be regarded in law as *one* person, such as partners (*a*): executors or administrators (*b*): each may draw cheques, and payment to one is payment to all.

2. Even after a dissolution of partnership and a receiver has been appointed to collect the partnership debts (*c*).

3. But if one draws a cheque the others may countermand it (*d*).

(*a*) *Anon.*, 12 Mod., 446. *Henderson v. Wild*, 2 Camp., 560. *Duff v. East India Co.*, 15 Ves., 198. *Hope v. Cust*, cited 1 East., 53. *Porter v. Taylor*, 6 M. & S., 156. *Tomlin v. Lawrence*, 3 Mo. & Pa., 555. *King v. Smith*, 4 C. & P., 108.

(*b*) *Pond v. Underwood*, 2 Ld. Raym., 1210. *Carr v. Read*, 3 Atk., 695. *Jacome v. Harwood*, 2 Ves., 265. *Allen v. Dundas*, 3 T. R., 125. *Ex parte Rigby*, 19 Ves., 462. *Gaunt v. Taylor*, 2 Hare, 413. *Smith v. Everett*, 27 Beav., 446.

(*c*) *Duff v. East India Co.*, 15 Ves., 198. *Porter v. Taylor*, 6 M. & S., 116. *King v. Smith*, 4 C. & P., 108.

(*d*) *Gaunt v. Taylor*, 2 Hare, 413.

2. But if they be *not* regarded in law as *one* person, such as Trustees (*a*): or Assignees of a bankrupt (*b*): all must sign. Directors of a company must sign as directors (*c*): and payment to less than all will not discharge the banker.

(*a*) *Ex parte Rigby*, 19 Ves., 462. *Stone v. Marsh*, 6 B. & C., 551. *Husband v. Davis*, 2 Low. M. & P., 50.

(*b*) *Carr v. Read*, 3 Atk., 695. *Innes v. Stephenson*, 1 Mo. & Rob., 145.

(*c*) *Serrell v. Derbyshire, Ry. Co.*, G. C. B., 811.

3. If any of the assignees or Trustees die the right remains with the survivors: and if any become disqualified, as by absconding, going to reside abroad, equity will direct the funds to be paid to the remaining ones.

Staples v. Staples; Shortbridge's case, 12 Ves., 28. *Ex parte Collins*, 2 Cox., Eq. Ca., 427. *Ex parte Hunter*, 2 Rose, 863. 13 & 14 Vict. (1850), c. 60, s. 22.

105. 1. If a banker, either at the request of a customer, or when a cheque is presented by the holder or his agent, places a "mark" on it as by his initials, signifying that the cheque is good and will be paid, such "mark" is a legal acceptance of the cheque by the banker (*a*).

2. A cheque so "marked" or accepted becomes a bank note of the banker who makes it (*b*).

(*a*) *Robson v. Bennett*, 2 Taunt., 388.

(*b*) 7 & 8 Vict. (1844), c. 32, s. 11. 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 83, s. 11. 33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 45.

106. 1. A banker must not pay any cheque of his customer presented after he has received notice of his having committed an act of bankruptcy (*a*), or of his death (*b*).

2. Payment of cheques notified or presented before such notice are good, and may be enforced by the holder; but payments after such notice are bad and will not discharge the banker (*c*).

(*a*) 1 Jac., 1, c. 15, s. 14. *Vernon v. Hankey*, 2 T. R., 119.

(*b*) *Tate v. Hilbert*, 3 Ves., jun., 111.

(*c*) 12 & 13 Vict. (1849), c. 106, s. 133. *Bromley v. Brunton*, L. R., 6 Eq., 275.

107. 1. If a banking company has several branches, each with its own customers and accounts, each branch is considered as an independent bank, for the purpose of receiving and transmitting notice (*a*).

2. Each branch must collect its own cheques and bills, and time will not be enlarged so as to permit it to collect them through its head office (*b*).

(*a*) *Corlett v. Jones*; *Clode v. Bailey*, 12 M. & W., 51.

(*b*) *Woodland v. Fear*, 7 E. & B., 519.

108. If a person changes a cheque as a favour for another person, and if the cheque be duly presented and dishonoured, he may give notice of dishonour, and recover the money.

Woodland v. Fear, 7 E. & B., 519.

109. 1. A LETTER OF CREDIT is a written request by one person to another requesting the latter to give credit to a person named in it.

2. If the request is unconditional, it is termed an OPEN CREDIT.

3. If the request be on the condition that bills of lading be deposited as collateral security it is termed a DOCUMENT CREDIT.

4. A MARGINAL letter of credit is one by which a person named in the margin guarantees to another person that he shall receive credit from, or have his bills accepted by, another person.

110. 1. Letters of credit must be stamped as bills.

2. Except letters of credit, whether in sets or not, sent by persons in the United Kingdom to persons abroad, authorising drafts on the United Kingdom.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, s. 49, § 1, and sched.

111. 1. If a banker pays a letter of credit upon a forged signature he is liable (*a*).

2. The 16 & 17 Vict. (1853), c. 59, s. 19, does not protect a banker paying a letter of credit with a forged signature (*b*).

(a) *Orr v. Union Bank of Scotland*, 1 Macq., H. L. Ca., 513.

(b) *British Linen Co. v. Caledonian Insurance Co.*, 4 Macq., H. L. Ca., 107.

112. 1. If a person obtains a letter of credit from a banker for a sum paid down, he may demand repayment without producing the letter.

2. The banker can only prove payment by producing the draft of the person in whose favour it is drawn.

Orr v. Union Bank of Scotland, 1 Macq., H. L. Ca., 513.

113. The indorsee of a marginal letter of credit, not being on the face of it a document credit, is not bound in the absence of notice to inquire whether it is being used for the purpose for which it is granted.

Maitland v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China, 2 Hem. & Mill., 440.

114. 1. The holder of a banker's circular letters may demand payment of them from himself, as well as from his correspondents abroad.

2. But he is not bound to cash them unless they are returned to him, or he receives an indemnity.

Conslans Stone Quarry Co. v. Parker, L. R., 3 C. P., 1.

115. The following are exempt from stamp duty—

1. Any draft or order drawn by any banker upon any other banker, not payable to bearer or order, and used solely for the purpose of settling or clearing any account between such bankers.

2. Any letter written by a banker to any other banker directing the payment of any sum of money, the same not being payable to bearer or to order, and such letter not being sent or delivered to the person to whom payment is to be made, or to any person on his behalf.

33 & 34 Vict. (1870), c. 97, sched.

On the Form of Bills and Notes.

116. No particular form of words is necessary for a Bill or Note.

2. It may be written in any language and on any material; and in pencil (*a*) as well as in ink.

(a) *Geary v. Physick*, 5 B. & C., 284.

117. It is usual, but not necessary, to insert the name of the

place where the bill or note is made: if there is no date it will be considered as dated at the time it is made.

De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show., 422. *Hague v. French*, 3 B. & P., 173. *Giles v. Bourne*, 6 M. & S., 73.

118. Bills and Notes were formerly specialties under seal; and therefore no consideration was required to be expressed in them: the same principle holds good now that the formality of sealing is dispensed with, and they are in the form of mere simple contracts.

White v. Ledwick, 4 Doug., 247. *Grant v. Da Costa*, 3 M. & S., 351.

119. A Bill or Note must be an engagement to pay absolutely and at all events—

1. A fixed sum of money: and not to make a payment out of a particular fund (a): and not in bills or banker's notes (b).

2. And not pay a sum of money and, or, do something else (c).

3. And not pay a sum of money, and adding, or deducting, other moneys (d).

(a) *Jenny v. Herte*, 2 Ld. Raym., 1361. *Haydock v. Lynch*, 2 Ld. Raym., 1563. *Josselyn v. Lucier*, 10 Mod., 294. *Banbury v. Lisset*, 2 Stra., 1211. *Dawkes v. Ld. Deloraine*, 2 W. Bl., 782. *Carlos v. Fancourt*, 5 T. B., 482. *Yeates v. Grove*, 1 Ves. jun., 280. *Leeds v. Lancashire*, 2 Camp., 205.

(b) *Ex parte Imeson*, 2 Rose, 225. *Ex parte Davison*, Buck, 31.

(c) *Martin v. Chauntry*, 2 Stra., 1271. *Smith v. Boheme*, cited Ld. Raym., 1362, 1396. *Moore v. Vanlute*, Bull., N. P., 272.

(d) *Smith v. Nightingale*, 2 Stark., 375. *Bolton v. Dugdale*, 4 B. & Ad., 619. *Barlow v. Broadhurst*, 4 J. B., Moore, 471. *Ayrey v. Fearnside*, 4 M. & W., 168. *Davies v. Wilkinson*, 10 A. & E., 98.

2. 1. And not payable on a contingency (a)—

2. The happening of the contingency before action brought does not cure the defect (b).

(a) *Pearson v. Garrett*, 4 Mod., 242. *Beardsley v. Baldwin*, 2 Stra., 1151. *Carlos v. Fancourt*, 5 T. B., 482. *Roberts v. Peake*, Burr., 323. *Leeds v. Lancashire*, 2 Camp., 205. *Williamson v. Bennett*, 2 Camp., 417. *Hill v. Halford*, 2 B. & P., 413. *Hartley v. Wilkinson*, 4 Camp., 127. *Clarke v. Perceval*, 2 B. & Ad., 661. *Drury v. Macaulay*, 16 M. & W., 146. *Alexander v. Thomas*, 16 Q. B., 333. *Palmer v. Pratt*, 2 Bing., 185. *Worley v. Harrison*, 3 A. & E., 669. *Robins v. May*, 11 A. & E., 214.

(b) *Hill v. Halford*, 2 B. & P., 413.

3. 1. The payee must be a definite person capable of being ascertained at the time the instrument is made (a).

2. A Bill or Note payable after date to the officer for the time being of a company is void (a).

3. A Bill or Note payable in the alternative to several persons who are strangers in interest is void (*b*): but not if one may be considered as the agent for the other (*c*).

(*a*) *Storm v. Stirling*, 3 E. & B., 882. *Cowie v. Stirling*, 6 E. & B., 833. *Yates v. Nash*, 8 C. B., N. S., 581.

(*b*) *Blanckenhagen v. Blundell*, 2 B. & Ald., 417.

(*c*) *Holmes v. Jaques*, L. R., 1 Q. B., 876.

4. 1. A Bill drawn payable to —, or order, is void (*a*).

2. But a *bonâ fide* holder for value may insert his own name in it, and sue the parties to it (*b*).

(*a*) *Rex v. Richards*, R. & B. C. C., 193. *Rex v. Randall*, R. & B. C. C., 195.

(*b*) *Crutchley v. Clarence*, 2 M. & S., 190. *Attwood v. Griffin*, R. & M., 225. *Crutchley v. Mann*, 8 Taunt., 529.

5. If the drawer of a bill inserts the name of a fictitious payee without the acceptor's knowledge, and indorses it in the name of the fictitious payee, the holder cannot sue the acceptor (*a*).

6. But if the acceptor knew that the payee was fictitious, the holder may sue him on it as payable to bearer (*b*).

(*a*) *Bennett v. Farnell*, 1 Camp., 130.

(*b*) *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 T. R., 174. *Vere v. Lewis*, 3 T. R., 182. *Minet v. Gibson*, 3 T. R., 481: affirmed in *Dom. Proc.*, 1 H. Bla., 569.

7. The event must certainly happen: though the time when it may happen is uncertain.

Colehan v. Cooke, Willes, 393. *Roffey v. Greenwell*, 10 A. & E., 222. *Andrews v. Franklin*, 1 Stra., 24.

120. A man may draw a bill upon, or make a note payable to, himself, and when indorsed in blank it becomes payable to bearer.

Starke v. Cheesman, Carth., 508. *Dehors v. Harriot*, 1 Show., 168. *Robinson v. Bland*, 2 Burr., 1077. *Richards v. Macey*, 14 M. & W., 484. *Browne v. De Winton*; *Gay v. Lander*, 6 C. B., 386. *Wood v. Mytton*, 10 Q. B., 805. *Magor v. Hammond*, cited in *Harvey v. Kay*, 9 B. & C., 864. *Roach v. Ostler*, 1 Man. & Ry., 120. *Miller v. Thompson*, 3 M. & G., 576.

121. A bill, though accepted, is of no force without the drawer's signature, either as a bill or note.

Stoessiger v. S. E. Ry. Co., 3 E. & B., 553. *Goldsmid v. Hampton*, 5 C. B., N. S., 94. *Maccall v. Taylor*, 84 L. J., C. P., 865. *Rex v. Hart*, 6 C. & P., 106.

122. If an instrument is made in terms so ambiguous that it

is doubtful whether it is a bill or note, the holder may treat it as either.

Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Ex., 410. *Armfield v. Allport*, 27 L. J. Ex., 42. *Fielden v. Marshall*, 9 Q. B., N. S., 606. *Shuttleworth v. Stevens*, 1 Camp., 407. *Allan v. Maunsell*, 4 Camp., 115. *Gray v. Milner*, 8 Taunt., 799. *Miller v. Thompson*, 3 M. & G., 576.

Stamp Duties on Bank Notes, Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, at present in force. (33 & 34 Viet. (1870), c. 97.)

On Bank Notes.

123. By the above Stamp Act it is enacted, s. 45—

“The term ‘banker’ means and includes any corporation, society, partnership, and persons, and every individual person carrying on the business of banking in the United Kingdom.”

The term “bank note” means and includes—

(1) “Any bill of exchange or promissory note issued by any banker, other than the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, for the payment of money not exceeding one hundred pounds to the bearer on demand.”

(2) “Any bill of exchange or promissory note so issued which entitles, or is intended to entitle, the bearer or holder thereof, without indorsement, or without any further or other indorsement than may be thereon at the time of the issuing thereof, to the payment of money not exceeding one hundred pounds on demand, whether the same be so expressed or not, and in whatever form, and by whomsoever such bill or note is drawn or made.”

S. 46.—“A bank note issued duly stamped or issued unstamped by a banker duly licensed, or otherwise authorised to issue unstamped bank notes, may be from time to time re-issued without being liable to any stamp duty by reason of such re-issuing.”

S. 47, 1.—“If any banker not being duly licensed or otherwise authorised to issue unstamped bank notes, issues, or causes or permits to be issued, any bank note not being duly stamped, he shall forfeit the sum of £50.”

2. “If any person receives, or takes any such bank note in payment or as a security, knowing the same to have been issued unstamped contrary to law, he shall forfeit the sum of £20.”

Duties on Bank Notes.

			£	s.	d.
For money not exceeding £1	0	0	5
Exceeding £1 and not exceeding £2	0	0	10
„ £2	„	£5	0	1	3
„ £5	„	£10	0	1	9
„ £10	„	£20	0	2	0
„ £20	„	£30	0	3	0
„ £30	„	£50	0	5	0
„ £50	„	£100	0	8	6

Bills and Notes.

S. 48, 1.—“The term ‘Bill of Exchange’ for the purposes of this Act includes also draft, order, cheque, and letter of credit, and any document or writing (except a bank note) entitling or purporting to entitle any person, whether named therein or not, to payment by any other person of, or to draw upon any other person for, any sum of money therein mentioned.”

2.—“An order for the payment of any sum of money by a bill of exchange or promissory note, or for the delivery of any bill of exchange or promissory note, in satisfaction of any sum of money, or for the payment of any sum of money, out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or conditions which may or may not be performed or happen, is to be deemed for the purposes of this Act a bill of exchange for the payment of money on demand.”

3.—“An order for the payment of any sum of money weekly, monthly, or at any other stated periods; and also any order for the payment by any person at any time after the date thereof of any sum of money, and sent or delivered by the person making the same by the person to whom the payment is to be made, and not to the person to whom the payment is to be made, or to any person on his behalf, is to be deemed for the purposes of this Act a bill of exchange for the payment of money on demand.”

S. 49, 1.—“The term ‘Promissory Notes’ means and includes any document or writing (except a bank note) containing a promise to pay any sum of money.”

2.—“A note promising the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed

or happen, is to be deemed for the purposes of this Act a promissory note for the said sum of money."

S. 51, 1.—"The ad valorem duties upon bills of exchange and promissory notes drawn or made out of the United Kingdom are to be denoted by adhesive stamps."

2. "Every person into whose hands any such bill or note comes in the United Kingdom before it is stamped shall, before he presents for payment, or indorses, transfers, or in any manner negotiates, or pays such bill or note, affix thereto a proper adhesive stamp, or proper adhesive stamps of sufficient amount and cancel every stamp so affixed thereto."

3. Provided as follows—

(a) "If at the time when any such bill or note comes into the hands of any *bonâ fide* holder thereof there is affixed thereto an adhesive stamp effectually obliterated, and purporting and appearing to be duly cancelled, such stamp shall, so far as relates to such holder, be deemed to be duly cancelled, although it may not appear to have been so affixed or cancelled by the proper person."

(b) "If at the time when any such bill or note comes into the hands of any *bonâ fide* holder thereof there is affixed thereto an adhesive stamp not duly cancelled, it shall be competent for such holder to cancel such stamp as if he were the person by whom it was affixed, and upon his doing so such bill or note shall be deemed duly stamped, and as valid and available as if the stamp had been duly cancelled by the person by whom it was affixed."

4. "But neither of the foregoing provisoes is to relieve any person from any penalty incurred by him for not cancelling any adhesive stamp."

S. 52.—"A bill of exchange or promissory note purporting to be drawn or made out of the United Kingdom is, for the purposes of this Act, to be deemed to have been so drawn or made, although it may in fact have been drawn or made within the United Kingdom."

Duties payable on Bills and Notes.

	£	s.	d.
Bill of Exchange payable on demand	0	0	1
Bill of Exchange of any other kind whatsoever (<i>except a Bank Note</i>), and Promissory Note of any kind whatsoever (<i>except a Bank Note</i>), drawn or expressed to be payable, or actually paid, or indorsed, or in any manner negotiated in the United Kingdom. Where the amount or value of the money for which the bill or note is drawn or made does not exceed £5	0	0	1
Exceeds £5 and does not exceed £10	0	0	2
„ £10 „ „ £25	0	0	3
„ £25 „ „ £50	0	0	6
„ £50 „ „ £75	0	0	9
„ £75 „ „ £100	0	1	0
For every £100 and also for any fractional part of £100 of such amount or value	0	1	0

S. 55.—“When a bill of exchange is drawn in a set according to the custom of merchants, and one of the set is duly stamped, the other or others of the set shall, unless issued or in some manner negotiated apart from such duly stamped bill, be exempt from duty: and upon proof of the loss or destruction of a duly stamped bill, forming one of a set, any other bill of the set which has not been issued or in any manner negotiated apart from such lost or destroyed bill, may, although unstamped, be admitted in evidence to prove the contents of such lost or destroyed bill.”

On the Consideration.

124. A Consideration is any loss or detriment to the plaintiff sustained at the request or for the sake of the defendant: or any benefit to the defendant moving from the plaintiff.

The debt of a third person is good consideration for which a person may bind himself by bill payable after date.

Popplewell v. Wilson, 1 Stra., 264. *Coombs v. Ingram*, 4 D. & B., 211. *Ridout v. Bristow*, 1 C. & J., 281. *Wilders v. Stevens*, 15 M. & W., 208. *Sowerby v. Butcher*, 2 C. & M., 868. *Balfour v. The Sea, Fire, and Life Insu. Co.*, 3 C. B., N. S., 300.

125. But not for a Bill or Note payable on demand, unless taken in substitution for the other debt.

Forth v. Stanton, 1 Wms., Saunders, p. 210c., note c. *Crofts v. Beale*, 11 C. B., 172.

126. Cross acceptances for mutual accommodation are respectively considerations for each other.

Rolfe v. Caslon, 2 H. Bla., 571. *Rose v. Sims*, 1 B. & Ad., 521. *Cowley v. Dunlop*, 7 T. R., 568. *Buckler v. Buttivant*, 3 East., 72. *Cardwell v. Martin*, 9 East., 190.

127. 1. If the bill or note has been given for an illegal consideration, or has been obtained by fraud, or duress, or lost or stolen, the defendant may call upon the holder to prove the consideration he gave for it.

2. But not otherwise.

Mills v. Barber, 1 M. & W., 425. *Parcial v. Stungton*, 2 C. M. & R., 180. *Whitaker v. Edmunds*, 1 A. & R., 338. *Jacob v. Hargreave*, 1 Moo. & Rob., 445. *Edmonds v. Grouse*, 3 M. & W., 642. *Smith v. Martin*, 9 M. & W., 804. *Fearn v. Figgis*, 7 M. & G., 512. *Bingham v. Stanley*, 2 Q. B., 117.

On Presentation for Acceptance.

128. The holder of an unaccepted bill should present it for acceptance as soon as possible.

If the drawee refuses acceptance the preceding parties become liable immediately.

If the holder is a mere agent he will be liable for any loss which may occur through his negligence to present.

A bill payable at sight or presentation is payable on demand.

If a bill is payable at any period after sight there is no right of action against any one until presentment for acceptance.

Unless presentment for acceptance is made within reasonable time the holder loses his remedy against the preceding parties.

What is reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact, and depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.

The holder may put it into circulation without presenting it.

Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bla., 565. *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt., 160. *Fry v. Hill*, 7 Taunt., 395. *Strakes v. Graham*, 4 M. & W., 721. *Mellish v. Rawdon*, 9 Bing., 416. *Shute v. Robins*, 1 M. & Mal., 133. *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 9 Moore, P. C. Ca., 46.

129. Presentment must be made to the drawee or his authorised agent.

Check v. Roper, 5 Esp., 175.

130. The drawee is entitled to have reasonable time, usually 24 hours, to consider whether he will accept or not. If he detains the bill longer than allowed by mercantile usage he is held to have accepted it.

Ingram v. Foster, 2 Smith, 242. *Harvey v. Martin*, 1 Camp., 425n.

131. If the drawee has changed his residence the holder must use due diligence to find him.

Collins v. Butler, 2 Stra., 1087. *Bateman v. Joseph*, 12 East., 433.

Of Acceptance.

132. Acceptance is, in general, an engagement to pay the bill when due in money.

Clark v. Cock, 4 East., 72. *Russell v. Phillips*, 14 Q. B., 891.

133. The acceptance of all bills inland (a), and foreign (b), must be in writing on the bill, signed by the acceptor or some person duly authorised by him.

(a) 1 & 2 Geo. 4 (1821), c. 78, s. 2.

(b) 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 6.

134. The term "acceptance" includes delivery or notification of the fact of acceptance to the parties interested.

Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & Ald., 474. *Chapman v. Cottrell*, 34 L. J. Ex., 186.

135. A drawee holding funds of the drawer is now liable to the holder of a bill, after notification or presentment, without acceptance.

36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, s. 26, § 6.

136. 1. An acceptance once completed, i. e., by writing and delivery or notification, is irrevocable (a).

2. But the drawee may cancel his signature before delivery or notification if he pleases (b).

(a) *Clarke v. Cock*, 4 East., 57. *Wynne v. Raikes*, 5 East., 514. *Powell v. Monnier*, 1 Atk., 611. *Mendizabal v. Machado*, 3 Moo. & Sc., 841. *Fairlee v. Herring*, 3 Bing., 625.

(b) *Cox v. Troy*, 5 B. & Ald., 474. *The Bank of Van Dieman's Land v. The Bank of Victoria*, L. R., 3 Pr. C., 526.

137. By accepting the bill the drawee admits the signature and capacity of the drawer; and he is estopped from saying afterwards that the signature is forged.

Price v. Neal, 3 Burr., 1354. *Wilkinson v. Lutwidge*, 1 Stra., 648. *Jenys v. Fowler*, 2 Stra., 946. *Porthouse v. Parker*, 1 Camp., 482. *Prince v. Brunatti*, 1 Bing., N. C., 485. *Bass v. Clive*, 4 M. & S., 18. *Phillips v. Im Thurm*, L. R., 1 C. P., 468.

138. The acceptor of a bill or the maker of a note admits the capacity of the payee to indorse (a).

But he does not admit the genuineness of the indorsement (b).

Unless he knew of the forgery at the time of acceptance, and intended the bill to be circulated with a forged indorsement (b).

(a) *Drayton v. Dale*, 2 B. & C., 293. *Braithwaite v. Gardiner*, 8 Q. B., 473. *Pett v. Capellow*, 8 M. & W., 616. *Taylor v. Crocker*, 4 Esp., 187. *Jones v. Darch*, 4 Price, 300. *Halifax v. Lyle*, 3 Ex., 446. *Ashpitel v. Bryan*, 3 B. & Sm., 474: aff. 23 L. J., Q. B., 328. *Cotes v. Davis*, 1 Camp., 484. *Prestwick v. Marshall*, 7 Bing., 565.

(b) *Smith v. Chester*, 1 T. R., 655. *Robinson v. Farrow*, 7 Taunt., 455. *Beeman v. Duck*, 11 M. & W., 251.

139. If the bill is drawn in a *fictitious name* or is a forgery of a real name, to the knowledge of the acceptor, he undertakes to pay to an indorsement by the same hand.

Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R., 174. *Vere v. Lewis*, 3 T. R., 182. *Minet v. Gibson*, 1 H. Bla., 569. *Gibson v. Hunter*, 2 H. Bla., 187. *Bennett v. Farnall*, 1 Camp., 130. *Schultz v. Astley*, 2 Bing., N. C., 544. *Taylor v. Croker*, 4 Esp., 187. *Bass v. Clive*, 4 M. & S., 13. *Cooper v. Mayor*, 10 B. & C., 468. *Beeman v. Duck*, 11 M. & W., 251. *Phillips v. Im Thurn*, L. R., 1 C. P., 463.

140. The acceptance of a bill purporting to be indorsed by the payee does not admit the genuineness of the indorsement.

Tucker v. Roberts, 16 Q. B., 560. *Garland v. Jacomb*, L. R., 8 Ex., 216.

141. A person who accepts a bill ostensibly as agent for another person, but without his authority, is personally liable.

Gurney v. Evans, 3 H. & N., 122.

142. A bill can only be accepted by the drawee, and not by a stranger; unless the drawee ratifies and adopts the signature as that of his agent: or for the honour of the drawee.

Nichols v. Diamond, 9 Exch., 154. *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 C. B., 583. *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 B. & Ad., 114. *Eastwood v. Bain*, 3 H. & N., 738. *Davis v. Clarke*, 6 Q. B., 16. *Jackson v. Hudson*, 2 Camp., 447.

143. There cannot be two or more separate acceptors to a bill not jointly responsible.

But the second acceptance may be held as a guaranty for the first.

Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447.

144. An instrument drawn, but not addressed to any one, is

yet a valid instrument, if any one accepts it, or it may be inferred who the drawee is intended to be.

Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt., 789. *Rex v. Hunter*, Russ. & Ry., 511. *Shuttleworth v. Stevens*, 1 Camp., 407. *Allan v. Mawson*, 4 Camp., 115. *Reg. v. Hawkes*, 2 Mood., C. C., 60. *Reg. v. Smith*, 2 Mood., C. C., 295.

145. If the drawee has once admitted that the acceptance is his writing, he cannot afterwards allege that it is forged (*a*).

If he pays several bills drawn upon him by a person connected with him in business but who has forged his signature, he is liable to pay other bills drawn upon him in a similar way (*b*).

But if he pays one bill drawn upon him by a person not connected with him in business, who has forged his signature, that will not bind him to pay similar forgeries in future (*c*).

(*a*) *Leach v. Buchanan*, 4 Esp., 226. *Brook v. Hook*, L. R., 6 Ex., 89.

(*b*) *Barber v. Gingell*, 8 Esp., 60.

(*c*) *Cash v. Taylor*, Ll. & Webs., 178. *Morris v. Bethell*, L. R., 5 C. P., 47.

146. An acceptance is either *general* or *qualified*.

A *general* acceptance is an absolute engagement to pay the bill according to its tenor and effect.

A *qualified* acceptance is either *conditional*, i. e., an engagement to pay the bill on a certain condition being fulfilled; or *partial*, that is, *varying* from the tenor of the bill.

The holder of the bill is entitled to have a general acceptance; and if the drawee offers a qualified acceptance, the holder may refuse it; note the bill; and give notice of dishonour to the preceding parties.

If he intends to receive it he must give notice to the other parties, and obtain their consent, or they will be discharged (*a*).

But he must not note or protest the bill, or give general notice of dishonour, as by doing so the acceptor would be discharged (*b*).

Whether an acceptance is absolute or conditional is a question of Law.

(*a*) *Sebag v. Abitbol*, 4 M. & S., 462. *Rowe v. Young*, 2 Bligh, 391: see answers of the Judges to question three. *Outhwaite v. Luntley*, 4 Camp., 177. *Boehm v. Garcias*, 1 Camp., 425n.

(*b*) *Sproat v. Matthews*, 1 T. R., 182. *Bentinch v. Dorrien*, 6 East., 200.

147. A bill domiciled at a particular place is a general acceptance unless made payable there only, and not elsewhere.

1 Geo. 4, c. 78. *Siggers v. Nichols*, 8 Jur., 841.

On the Alteration of a Bill or Note.

148. A Bill or Note may be altered by the consent of the parties before it is issued, *i. e.*, passed away for value.

Kennedy v. Nash, 1 Stark., 453. *Downes v. Richardson*, 5 B. & Ald., 674. *Tarleton v. Shingler*, 7 C. B., 812. *Marsch v. Post*, 1 Camp., 82n.

149. After a Bill or Note has once been issued it cannot be altered in any material part, *i. e.*, so as to alter the responsibility of the parties.

Except only to correct a mistake, and to fulfil the original intention of the parties.

Master v. Miller, 4 T. R., 520; affirmed 3 H. Bl., 151. *Forbes v. Nichol*, 5 T. R., 557. *Keeble v. Cox*, 3 Esp., 248. *Tropp v. Spearman*, 3 Esp., 57. *Cardwell v. Martin*, 3 East., 100. *Smith v. Williams*, 10 East., 481. *Cowie v. Haskell*, 4 B. & Ald., 197. *Tidmarsh v. Grover*, 1 M. & S., 735. *Cock v. Caswell*, 2 Q. M. & B., 291. *Cotton v. Simpson*, 3 A. & E., 136. *Burghfield v. Moore*, 3 E. & B., 683. *Macintosh v. Haydon*, Ry. & Mo., 202. *Dempsey v. Wetherby*, M. & Rob., 488. *Taylor v. Mosley*, 6 Q. & P., 273. *Hamelin v. Bruck*, 9 Q. B., 306. *Rodge v. Pringle*, 29 L. J. Ex., 115. *Outwaite v. Luntley*, 4 Camp., 179. *Watton v. Hastings*, 4 Camp., 223. *Bathe v. Taylor*, 15 East., 412. *Brutt v. Pickard*, Ry. & M., 87. *Jacob v. Hart*, 6 M. & S., 142. *Ex parte White*, 3 Dea. & Ch., 334. *Byrom v. Thompson*, 11 A. & E., 31. *Cariss v. Tattershall*, 2 M. & G., 890. *Mason v. Bradley*, 11 M. & W., 590. *Hirschman v. Budd*, L. R. & Ex., 171. *Warrington v. Early*, 23 L. J., Q. B., 47.

150. An alteration which is not material, *i. e.*, which does not vary the responsibility of the parties will not vitiate it.

Tropp v. Spearman, 3 East., 57. *Walter v. Cubley*, 2 C. & M., 151. *Aldous v. Cornwell*, L. R., 3 Q. B., 573.

151. An accommodation bill may be altered by the parties to it before it is issued, *i. e.*, before it is passed away for value.

Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & Ald., 674. *Atwood v. Griffin*, 2 C. & P., 368. *Tarleton v. Shingler*, 7 C. B., 812.

152. An alteration by the drawer or payee of a bill, or the payee of a note, does not extinguish the debt (a): unless the bill or note was taken in satisfaction of the debt (b).

(a) *Sutton v. Toomer*, 7 B. & C., 416. *Atkinson v. Hawdon*, 2 A. & E., 628. *Sloman v. Cox*, 1 C. M. & R., 471.

(b) *Macdowall v. Boyd*, 17 L. J., Q. B., 296.

153. An alteration by the indorsee not only makes the instrument void as against all parties, but also extinguishes the debt due from the indorser to the indorsee.

Alderson v. Langdale, 3 B. & Ad., 660.

154. The transferee of an altered bill has only the rights of the transferor.

Burchfield v. Moore, 3 E. & B., 683.

155. If a person gives a renewal for a bill which has been vitiated by an alteration, he is not liable on the renewal, if he was not aware of the alteration at the time he gave the renewed bill.

Bell v. Gardiner, 4 M. & G., 11.

156. The maker of a promissory note is discharged from his liability by any alteration of the note, wherever the altered instrument, if genuine, would operate differently from the original instrument, even though it should be to his advantage: as, for instance, if names are added to a joint and several note besides those originally intended to be on it.

Clerk v. Blackstock, Holt's N. P. C., 474. *Gardner v. Walsh*, 5 E. & B., 83.

157. A person who sues upon an altered bill will be required to prove the circumstances of the alteration; and if he cannot, it is a question for the jury.

Johnson v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Stark., 818. *Henman v. Dickinson*, 5 Bing., 183. *Knight v. Clements*, 8 A. & E., 215. *Bishop v. Chambre*, 1 M. & Mal., 116. *Disbrow v. Wetherby*, 6 C. & P., 758. *Taylor v. Moseley*, 6 C. & P., 273.

On Signing by Procuration.

158. It is very common for persons to authorise others to draw, accept, or indorse and negotiate bills for them, and such signing is called—signing *by procuration*.

As the agent is the mere hand which performs the duty, persons may sign by procuration who have no capacity in their own right to contract, such as infants, married women, persons attainted, or, in fact, labouring any disqualification.

Co. Litt., 52a.

159. No particular form is necessary to convey this authority, either verbal or written. But any one who takes a bill drawn, accepted, or indorsed by procuration, should make inquiry whether or not the authority has been properly followed.

Alexander v. Mackenzie, 6 C. B., 766. *Attwood v. Munnings*, 7 B. & C., 278.

160. General authority to transact business does not carry with it powers to negotiate bills: but if the agent gives notice that he is acting as agent, and the principal afterwards adopts his acts, he will be bound by them.

Saunderson v. Griffiths, 5 B. & C., 909. *Vere v. Ashby*, 10 B. &

C., 269. *Wilson v. Tummen*, 6 M. & G., 236. *Ansons v. Marks*, 7 H. & N., 666.

161. Special authorities will be construed strictly: but if an agent has been in the habit of negotiating bills for his principal, or other person connected with him in business, and he has adopted this person's acts, he will be bound by them.

Barber v. Giggell, 3 Esp., 60. *Llewellyn v. Winckworth*, 13 M. & W., 598. *Cash v. Taylor, Ld. & Web.*, M. C., 178. *Prescott v. Flinn*, 9 Bing., 19.

162. An agent's authority will be presumed to continue until notice is given of its termination. Such notice as regards strangers must be given in *The Gazette*, and to customers and correspondents by individual communication.

163. An agent who wishes to avoid personal liability, must either sign his principal's name only; or expressly state on the face of the instrument that he signs as agent.

164. Evidence cannot be received to charge a principal who is not named on the face of the bill or note (a): nor to discharge an agent who signs it in his own name (b).

(a) *Leadbitter v. Farrow*, 5 M. & S., 349. *Bult v. Morrell*, 13 A. & E., 750. *Edmunds v. Bushell*, 35 L. J., Q. B., 91.

(b) *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 M. & W., 834.

165. Where an agent, being duly authorised, expressly states on the face of the instrument that he merely signs it by procuration, for a principal, he will not be bound.

But if in any case whatever he signs it without authority, he, and he only, will be personally liable; and his representatives as well.

Lee v. Zagury, 8 Taunt., 114. *Leadbitter v. Farrow*, 5 M. & S., 345. *Sowerby v. Butcher*; *Alexander v. Sizer*, L. R., 4 Ex., 105. *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt., 160. *Lefevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt., 749. *Thomas v. Bishop*, 2 Stra., 955. *Rew v. Pettet*, 1 A. & E., 196. *Mare v. Charles*, 5 E. & B., 978. *Lewis v. Nicholson*, 18 Q. B., 509. *Randall v. Tummen*, 18 C. B., 786. *Collen v. Wright*, 7 E. & B., 301. *Kelner v. Baxter*, L. R., 2 C. P., 174. *Scott v. Lord Ebury*, L. R., 2 C. P., 255. *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 B. & Ad., 114.

166. In ordinary trading partnerships each member of the firm may bind it by bills.

But he must use the name of the firm, or one which it is sometimes known by.

Dormant or secret partners, and also ostensible partners, or persons who hold themselves out as partners, are also bound.

Pinckney v. Hall, 1 Salk., 126. *Lane v. Williams*, 2 Vern., 277. *Wells v. Masterman*, 2 Esp., 731. *Harris v. ...*, 7 T. R.,

207. *Swan v. Steele*, 7 East., 210. *Ridley v. Taylor*, 18 East., 175. *Lewis v. Reilly*, 1 Q. B., 849. *Stephens v. Reynolds*, 5 H. & N., 518. *Mason v. Rumsey*, 1 Camp., 884. *Nicholson v. Ricketts*, 29 L. J., Q. B., 55. *South Carolina Bank v. Case*, 8 B. & C., 427. *Ex parte Bolitho*, Buck., 100. *Thicknesse v. Bromilow*, 2 C. & J., 425. *Lloyd v. Ashby*, 2 B. & Ad., 23. *Vere v. Ashby*, 10 B. & C., 288. *Gurney v. Evans*, 3 H. & N., 122. *Williams v. Johnson*, 1 B. & C., 146. *Forbes v. Marshall*, 11 Ex., 166. *MacLae v. Sutherland*, 3 E. & B., 1. *Brown v. Kidger*, 3 H. & N., 858.

167. If he does not sign the name of the firm it will not be bound.

Faith v. Richmond, 11 A. & E., 389. *Kirk v. Blurton*, 9 M. & W., 284. *Siffn v. Walker*, 2 Camp., 308. *Ex parte Emly*, 1 Rose, 61. *Emly v. Lye*, 15 East, 7.

168. But a member of a non-trading partnership cannot bind it by bills: unless authority may be inferred.

Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C., 128. *Brown v. Byers*, 16 M. & W., 252. *Thicknesse v. Bromilow*, 2 Cr. & J., 425. *Greenslade v. Dewar*, 7 B. & C., 635. *Hedley v. Bainbridge*, 3 Q. B., 816. *Levy v. Pyne, C. & Mar.*, 458. *Forster v. Mackreth, L. B.*, 2 Ex., 69. *Smith v. Craven*, 1 Cr. & J., 500.

169. Creditors carrying on a business to satisfy their debts out of the business are not partners.

Wheatcroft v. Hickman, 9 C. B., N. S., 47.

170. 1. A person, however, who takes a bill or note from one partner, knowing, or having reasonable cause to suspect, that it is contrary to the consent of the other partners, cannot sue them (a).

2. And the indorsee of such bill taken in fraud of the partnership, must prove that he innocently gave value for it (b).

(a) *Heilbut v. Nevill, L. B.*, 5 C. P., 478. *Barber v. Backhouse*, Peake, 86. *Jones v. Yates*, 9 B. & C., 582. *Jacaud v. French*, 12 East., 817. *Laveson v. Lane*, 13 C. B., N. S., 278. *Ex parte Bonbonus*, 8 Ves., 540. *Green v. Deakin*, 2 Stark., 347. *Ex parte Goulding*, 2 Gl. & J., 118. *Frankland v. McGusty*, 1 Knapp, P. C., 274. *Lord Galway v. Mathew*, 10 East., 264. *Sherriff v. Wilkes*, 1 East., 48.

(b) *Arden v. Sharpe*, 2 Esp., 524. *Wells v. Masterman*, 2 Esp., 731. *Hogg v. Skeen*, 34 L. J., C. P., 158. *Ridley v. Taylor*, 18 East., 175. *Sutton v. Gregory*, 2 Peake, 150.

171. If the same person, a partner in two firms of the same name, negotiates a bill in the common name of the firms, the holder may sue either.

Baker v. Charlton, Peake, 80. *Swan v. Steel*, 7 East., 210.

172. Dissolution of partnership should be notified in *The Gazette*, which will avail against persons who have had no dealings

with the firm: but all customers and correspondents should receive individual notice of dissolution; otherwise ex-partners may still bind the firm to parties who have had no notice of the fact.

Heath v. Sansom, 4 B. & Ald., 172. *Heath v. Quin*, 7 Price, 193.
Godfrey v. Turnbull, 1 Esp., 371. *Graham v. Hope*, Peake, 151.
Garham v. Thompson, Peake, 42. *Newcome v. Cole*, 2 Camp., 617.
Farrar v. Deffinne, 1 C. & K., 580. *Williams v. Keats*, 2 Stark., 290.

173. The change of the names on the cheques of a firm of bankers is a sufficient notice to their customers of a change in the firm.

Barfoot v. Goodhall, 3 Camp., 147.

174. After a dissolution of partnership the members are separate individuals, and, therefore, all must join in signing bills (a).

Unless they give authority to one of their number to sign for them (b).

(a) *Abel v. Sutton*, 3 Esp., 108. *Kilgorn v. Finlayson*, 1 H. Bl., 155.

(b) *Smith v. Winter*, 4 M. & W., 454.

On the Transfer of Bills and Notes.

175. All Bills and Notes are now transferable or negotiable without being made payable to the payee, "or bearer," or "order."
 36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, s. 26, § 6, 11.

If, however, the words "or order" are inserted, they can only be transferred by the payee's indorsement.

Signature and delivery constitute indorsement.

§ 5, 1, *supra*.

176. An indorsement may either be in blank; or *special* or *in full*.

An indorsement in blank is when the indorser simply writes his name, *usually*, but not *necessarily* (1), on the back of the instrument, and delivers it to the indorsee. Such an indorsement makes the bill or note payable to bearer (a).

The delivery may be either actual or constructive, as where the indorser notifies to the indorsee that he has indorsed the bill to him, but yet retains it in his own possession.

(a) *Peacock v. Rhodes*, 2 Doug., 633. *Francis v. Mott*, cited in preceding case. *Ord v. Portal*, 3 Camp., 239. *Low v. Copestake*, 3 C. & P., 300. *Machell v. Kinnear*, 1 Stark., 499.

(1) *Rex v. Bigg*, 1 Stra., 18. *Ex parte Yates*, 27 L. J., Bkey., 9.

177. A *special* indorsement, or an indorsement in full, is where the instrument is indorsed by name to some specific person.

The special indorsee can then only transfer it by indorsement: and this he may do whether it is merely indorsed to him, or to him "or order."

Moore v. Manning, Com., 311. *Acheson v. Fountain*, 1 Stra., 557.

Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr., 1216. *Cunliffe v. Whitehead*, 5 Scott, 31. *Gay v. Lander*, 6 C. B., 336.

178. A bill once indorsed in blank, and afterwards indorsed in full, is payable to bearer as regards all the parties before the special indorser: but as against the special indorser title must be made through his indorsee.

Smith v. Clarke, 1 Peake, N. P. O., 295. *Leonard v. Wilson*, 2 Cr. & M., 589. *Walker v. Macdonald*, 2 Ex., 527.

179. There may be any number of indorsements on a bill or note; and if there is not room for them on the original instrument, an additional piece of paper may be added to it—called an *allonge*—which requires no stamp.

180. A misspelling does not necessarily avoid an indorsement.

Leonard v. Wilson, 2 Cr. & M., 589.

181. Every indorser is in the nature of a new drawer.

Penny v. Innes, 1 C. M. & R., 441. *Allen v. Walker*, 2 M. & W., 317.

182. He contracts that if the drawee does not at maturity pay the bill, he will, on receiving due notice of dishonour, pay the holder the sum which the drawee ought to have paid together with such damages as the law allows as an indemnity.

Suse v. Pompe, 8 C. B., N. S., 538.

183. A person who accepts or indorses a blank bill or note is liable for any amount the stamp will cover.

Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug., 514. *Usher v. Dauncy*, 4 Camp., 97. *Pasmore v. North*, 13 East., 517. *Snaitth v. Mingay*, 1 M. & S., 87. *Cruchley v. Clarence*, 2 M. & S., 90. *Collis v. Emet*, 1 H. Bla., 313. *Schultz v. Astley*, 2 Bing., N. C., 544.

184. An indorser admits the signature and capacity of every prior party (a), but he does not warrant them (b).

(a) *Lambert v. Pack*, 1 Salk., 127. *Williams v. Seagrave*, 2 Barnard., 82. *Crichlow v. Parry*, 2 Camp., 182. *Free v. Hawkins*, Holt., N. P. C., 550. *Macgregor v. Rhodes*, 25 L. J., Q. B., 318.

(b) *East India Co. v. Tritton*, 3 B. & C., 280.

185. If two persons not partners are the payees of a bill or note, both must indorse.

Carvick v. Vickery, 2 Doug., 658n.

186. A bill may be indorsed conditionally, and if, after such conditional acceptance, the drawee accepts it and pays it without the condition being fulfilled, he is liable to pay it again to the payee.

Robertson v. Kensington, 4 Taunt., 30.

187. If a bill be reindorsed to a previous indorser he has no action against the intermediate indorsers (a).

Unless there are special circumstances which would prevent them from suing him (b).

(a) *Bishop v. Hayward*, 4 T. R., 470. *Butten v. Webb*, 2 B. & C., 483.

(b) *Wilders v. Stevens*, 15 M. & W., 208. *Morris v. Walker*, 15 Q. B., 589. *Boulcott v. Woolcott*, 16 M. & W., 584. *Williams v. Clarke*, 16 M. & W., 834.

188. An indorser may exempt himself from liability by adding the words "sans recours," or "without recourse to me," or similar words.

He may also exempt himself from personal liability to his immediate indorsee by an agreement, written or oral.

But this would not affect a holder for value without notice.

Pike v. Street, 1 M. & M., 226. *Thompson v. Chibley*, 1 M. & W., 212. *Castrigue v. Buttigieg*, 10 Moore, P. C. Ca., 94.

189. Striking out an indorsement intentionally discharges the indorser (a): but not if done by mistake (b).

(a) *Fairclough v. Pavia*, 9 Ex., 690.

(b) *Wilkinson v. Johnson*, 3 B. & C., 428.

190. The rules relating to the transferee's title to lost or stolen instruments have been given already in Chapter XIII., s. 4.

191. A trust may be expressed on the face of the bill, or in the indorsement.

Evans v. Cramlington, Carth., 5. *Snee v. Prescott*, 1 Atk., 247. *Anchor v. Bank of England*, 2 Doug., 637. *Edie v. East India Co.*, 2 Burr., 1227. *Treuttel v. Barandon*, 8 Taunt., 100. *Sigourney v. Lloyd*, 8 B. & C., 622; affirmed 5 Bing., 525.

192. The transferee of a bill held in trust cannot retain it against the true owner (a): and if the acceptor is obliged to pay it he may recover the amount from the depository (b).

(a) *Goggerly v. Cuthbert*, 2 N. B., 170. *Evans v. Kymmer*, 1 B. & Ad., 528. *Robson v. Rolls*, 1 M. & Rob., 239.

(b) *Bleaden v. Charles*, 7 Bing., 246.

193. If a person holds a Bill or Note merely as the agent of another person, he has only the title of his principal.

Solomons v. Bank of England, 18 East., 135.

194. For the rules relating to the transfer of instruments by delivery, without indorsement, see §§ 22, 23, 45, 108.

195. 1. If an indorsee gives value for a bill which has been refused acceptance, without knowledge of the fact, he has the usual remedies against the parties to it (*a*).

2. But if he takes it with knowledge that it has been refused acceptance, he can only charge his immediate indorser (*b*).

(*a*) *O'Keefe v. Dunn*, 6 Taunt., 305; aff. 5 M. & S., 282. *Whitehead v. Walker*, 9 M. & W., 506; 10 M. & W., 696.

(*b*) *Crossley v. Ham*, 13 East, 498. *Bartlett v. Benson*, 16 M. & W., 696.

On Presentment for Payment.

196. A Bill or Note must be duly presented for payment; for if not, all the parties to it, except the acceptor or maker, are discharged.

Personal demand on the drawee, acceptor, or maker is not necessary: demand at his residence or usual place of business is sufficient.

If he changes his residence he is bound to leave funds on the premises to meet the bill.

Brown v. Macdermot, 5 Esp., 265. *Saunderson v. Judge*, 2 H. Bla., 510. *Buxton v. Jones*, 1 M. & G., 83. *Hine v. Allely*, 4 B. & Ad., 624.

197. Demand must be made even though the drawee or acceptor is bankrupt (*a*); or even if he declares in the presence of the drawer that he will not pay the bill (*b*).

(*a*) *Russell v. Langstaffe*, 2 Doug., 514. *Nicholson v. Gouthit*, 2 H. Bla., 610. *Ex parte Johnstone*, 1 Mont. & Ayr., 622. *Esdaile v. Sowerby*, 11 East., 114.

(*b*) *Ex parte Bignold*, 1 Deac., 728.

198. If the drawee or acceptor is dead presentment should be made to his representatives; and, if he has none, at his house.

199. Presentment for payment is not necessary to charge the guarantor of a Bill or Note.

Hitchcock v. Humphrey, 5 M. & G., 559. *Walton v. Maseall*, 13 M. & W., 453. *Warrington v. Furber*, 8 East, 242.

200. The word month in Bills and Notes means a calendar or solar month.

Cockell v. Gray, 3 B. & B., 186.

201. When drawn so many days after date or sight, it excludes

the day on which the instrument is drawn and includes the day on which it becomes due.

Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barnard., 303.

202. On days of grace see § 21.

203. Bills and Notes payable on demand, sight, or presentation, must be presented within a reasonable time.

What is reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of the case; and is a mixed question of law and fact, for the determination of the Court and jury.

Manwaring v. Harrison, 1 Stra., 508. *Hankey v. Trotman*, 1 W. Bla., 1. *Godfray v. Coulman*, 13 Moo. P. C. Ca., 11. *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 9 Moo., P. C. Ca., 46. *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 H. Bla., 565. *Fry v. Chapman*, 7 Taunt., 397. *Mellish v. Rawdon*, 9 Bing., 417. *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt., 159. *Straker v. Graham*, 4 M. & W., 721.

204. Usance is a period which in early times was appointed as the usual time between different countries.

When usance is a month, half usance is always 15 days.

Usance between London and—

1. Aleppo, Altona, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brabant, Bruges, Flanders, Geneva, Germany, Holland, the Netherlands, Lisle, Paris and Rouen—is one month.

2. Spain and Portugal—two months.

3. Italy—three months.

205. The Act 1 & 2 Geo. 1 (1821), c. 78, does not apply to promissory notes.

Hence if a promissory note is made payable at a particular place in the body of it, it must be presented there for payment (a).

But not if a place be merely mentioned in a corner as a memorandum (b).

(a) *Saunderson v. Bowes*, 14 East., 500. *Dickinson v. Bowes*, 16 East., 112. *Rowe v. Young*, 2 B. & B., 165. *Emblin v. Dartnell*, 12 M. & W., 830. *Spindler v. Grellet*, 1 Ex., 384. *Vanderdonck v. Thelluson*, 8 C. B., 812.

(b) *Williams v. Waring*, 10 B. & C., 2. *Price v. Mitchell*, 4 Camp., 200. *Exon v. Russell*, 4 M. & S., 505. *Masters v. Barretto*, 8 C. B., 433.

206. A Bill drawn or accepted payable at a particular place must be presented there to charge the drawer or indorser.

Gibb v. Mather, 8 Bing., 214. *Saul v. Jones*, 1 E. & E., 59. *Parks v. Edge*, 1 C. & M., 429. *Harris v. Parker*, 3 Tyrw., 370. *Boydell v. Harkness*, 3 C. B., 168. *Burton v. Jones*, 1 M. & G., 83. *Hine v. Allely*, 4 B. & Ad., 624.

207. Promissory notes payable on demand are often intended to be continuing securities: and whether any unnecessary delay has taken place in presenting them for payment must be determined in each case by the Court and Jury.

Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W., 15. *Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, &c., v. Dickson*, L. R., 3 P. C., 574.

On the Extinguishment of Bills and Notes.

208. The liability of parties to Bills and Notes may be discharged and extinguished by WAIVER, or DISCHARGE, by RELEASE, and by PAYMENT and SATISFACTION, JUDGMENT, EXECUTION, and MERGER.

Of Waiver.

209. The holder or any of the parties to a Bill or Note may discharge any of the parties antecedent to himself by an express renunciation, either orally or in writing; either before or after it has become due; and without consideration.

Whatley v. Tricker, 1 Camp., 35. *Dingwall v. Dunster*; *Black v. Peel*; *Walpole v. Pulteney*, Doug., 247. *Farquhar v. Southey*, M. & Mal., 14. *Cartwright v. Williams*, 2 Stark., 340. *Ellis v. Galindo*, Doug., 250. *Steele v. Harmer*, 4 Ex., 1. *Foster v. Dawber*; *Mayhew v. Cooze*, 6 Ex., 581.

210. If the waiver be not for the whole amount and unconditional there must be a consideration.

Parker v. Leigh, 2 Stark., 228. *Owen v. Pizey*, 11 W. R. C. P., 21.

Of Release.

211. A Release under seal may be given which requires no consideration.

212. 1. The Release of a Debt by one of the several joint Creditors discharges the Debtor from his liability to all the Creditors (a).

2. But if the release is given in fraud of the other creditors, the Courts will set it aside (b).

3. If a Creditor gives a release of the DEBT to one of the several joint debtors, the debt is extinguished, and all the joint debtors are discharged (c).

4. A covenant not to sue one joint debtor is a release to him; but it does not discharge the other joint debtors (d).

5. Where deeds are drawn relieving one of several joint debtors, but expressly reserving the remedies against the others, the Courts invariably hold them to be mere covenants not to sue the debtor, but not a release of the debt (*d*).

(a) *Ruddock's case*, 6 Co. Rep., 25a. *Jacomb v. Harwood*, 2 Ves., sen., 267. *Barker v. Richardson*, 1 Y. & Jer., 362. *Webb v. Hewitt*, L. R., 7 Eq., 28.

(b) *Payne v. Rogers*, Doug., 407. *Hickey v. Bart*, 7 Taunt., 49. *Jones v. Herbert*, 7 Taunt., 42. *Legh v. Legh*, 1 B. & P., 447. *Innell v. Newman*, 4 B. & Ald., 419. *Manning v. Cox*, 7 J. B., Moore, 617. *Sargent v. Wedlake*, 11 C. B., 372. *Rawstone v. Gandell*, 15 M. & W., 305. *Barker v. Richardson*, 1 Y. & J., 362. *Ex parte Morrison*, 33 L. J., Bkey., 47. *De Pothonier v. De Matias*, E. B. & E., 461.

(c) Y. B., 21 Edw., 4, 81, c. 33. Co. Litt., 252a. *Fowell v. Forrest*, 2 Wms. Saund., 48. *Clayton v. Kynaston*, 2 Salk., 574. *Wankford v. Wankford*, 1 Salk., 300. *Chestham v. Ward*, 1 B. & P., 680. *Evans v. Brembridge*, 2 K. & J., 174. *Nicholson v. Revill*, 4 A. & E., 675. *Price v. Barker*, 4 E. & B., 760.

(d) *Lacy v. Kinaston*, 1 Ld. Raym., 690. *Fitzgerald v. Trant*, 11 Mod., 254. *Dean v. Newhall*, 8 Tr., 168. *Hutton v. Eyre*, 6 Taunt., 289. *Solly v. Forbes*, 2 Bro. & B., 38. *Thompson v. Lack*, 3 C. B., 240. *Price v. Barker*, 4 E. & B., 760. *Walmsley v. Cooper*, 11 A. & E., 216. *Kearsley v. Cole*, 16 M. & W., 128. *Henderson v. Stobart*, 5 Ex., 99. *Willis v. De Castro*, 4 C. B., N. S., 216. *Owen v. Homan*, 4 H. L. Ca., 1037. *Bateson v. Gosling*, L. B., 7 C. P., 9. *Green v. Wynn*, L. R., 7 C. P., 28: aff. 4 Ch. Ap., 204. *Keyes v. Elkins*, 5 B. & S., 240. *Andrew v. Macklin*, 6 B. & S., 201.

213. 1. A covenant not to sue for a limited time is not a release and cannot be pleaded in bar (*a*).

2. Unless it is expressly provided in the deed that it may be pleaded in bar (*b*).

(a) *Ayliff v. Scrimsheire*, 1 Show., 46. *Deuz v. Jefferies*, Cro. Eliz., 352. *Smith v. Mapleback*, 1 T. R., 446. *Burgh v. Preston*, 8 T. R., 486. *Thimbleby v. Barron*, 3 M. & W., 210.

(b) *Walker v. Nerille*, 34 L. J., Ex., 73.

214. 1. A release after the bill is due discharges all the parties prior to the releasor.

2. But a release before the bill is due, though good between the parties, does not invalidate the claims of an indorsee for value without notice of the release.

Dod v. Edwards, 2 C. & P., 602.

215. A release given to the drawee before acceptance is void.

Drage v. Netter, 1 Ld. Raym., 65. *Ashton v. Freestun*, 2 Scott., N. R., 273. *Hartley v. Manton*, 5 Q. B. 247.

216. A creditor who releases a debt cannot retain any securities he holds for the debt.

Shepherd's Touchstone (Preston), 342. *Cowper v. Green*, 7 M. & W., 633.

Of Payment, Discharge, and Satisfaction.

217. 1. The words Payment, Discharge, and Satisfaction are not synonymous.

Payment, *pacatio*, is anything which is taken as an equivalent in exchange for something else, and which appeases or estops a right of action for a time, but it is not necessarily a final discharge, or a *satisfaction*.

Thus a Bill or note taken "for or on account of" a debt; for goods sold and delivered; or a bill taken in renewal of a previous one: is payment for the time being, because the vendor has agreed to take it as an equivalent for the goods or bill; but it is not a satisfaction until the bill is paid. If the second bill is not given and accepted expressly in satisfaction of the former bill, the holder may sue for interest on the first.

Louviere v. Laubray, 10 Mod., 37. *Holdipp v. Otway*, 2 Wms. Saund., 103 b. n. (e). *Kearlake v. Morgan*, 5 T. R., 513. *Tapley v. Martens*, 8 T. R., 451. *Plimley v. Westley*, 2 Bing., N. C., 249. *Thorne v. Smith*, 10 C. B., 659. *Belshaw v. Bush*, 11 C. B., 191. *Jones v. Broadhurst*, 9 C. B., 173. *Stedman v. Gooch*, 1 Esp., N. P. C., 3. *Lewis v. Lyster*, 4 Dowl., 377. *Bottomley v. Nuttall*, 5 C. B., N. S., 122. *Ford v. Beech*, 11 Q. B., 864. *Maillard v. Duke of Argyll*, 6 Scott., N. R., 938. *Mercer v. Cheese*, 5 Scott., N. R., 664. *Griffiths v. Owen*, 13 M. & W., 58. *James v. Williams*, 13 M. & W., 328. *Price v. Price*, 16 M. & W., 232. *Kendrick v. Lomax*, 2 C. & J., 405. *Simon v. Lloyd*, 2 C. M. & R., 187. *Wilkinson v. Casey*, 7 T. R., 713. *Ex parte Barclay*, 7 Ves., 597. *Bishop v. Rowe*, 3 M. & S., 362. *Ditton v. Rimmer*, 1 Bing., 100. *London and Birmingham and S. Staffordshire Bank, in re*, 34 L. J., Ch., 418. *Lumley v. Musgrave*, 5 Scott., 230. *Lumley v. Hudson*, 5 Scott., 238.

218. If however the security is dishonored at maturity and

is in the possession of the plaintiff, the original debt remains in force, and may be sued for.

Puckford v. Maxwell, 6 T. B., 52. *Owenson v. Morse*, 7 T. B., 64. *Swinyard v. Bowes*, 5 M. & S., 62. *Van Wart v. Woolley*, 3 B. & C., 439. *Burdon v. Hatton*, 4 Bing., 454. *Sayer v. Wagstaff*, 5 Beav., 423. *Maillard v. Duke of Argyll*, 6 Scott, N. B., 938. *Valpey v. Oakeley*, 16 Q. B., 941.

219. The words "Payment" and "Discharge" do not mean a final and absolute extinguishment of the debt.

"Satisfaction" is the only legal term which means a final and absolute extinguishment of the debt (*a*).

If a creditor takes a bill or note in "satisfaction" and discharge of a debt (*b*): or if he takes a bill or note "for and on account of" a debt, and commits laches by not getting it paid in due course (*c*); it is a satisfaction and extinguishment of the debt.

If he has once consented to accept a bill in "satisfaction" of a debt he cannot revoke his consent (*d*).

(*a*) *Maillard v. Duke of Argyll*, 6 Scott, N. B., 938. *Kemp v. Watt*, 15 M. & W., 672. *Macdowall v. Boyd*, 17 L. J., Q. B., 295. *Bottomley v. Nuttall*, 5 C. B., N. S., 122.

(*b*) *Sard v. Rhodes*, 1 M. & W., 153. *Lewis v. Lyster*, 4 Dowl., 377.

(*c*) 2 & 3 Anne (1704), c. 9, s. 7.

(*d*) *Hardman v. Bellhouse*, 9 M. & W., 600.

220. Whether a Security is given "for and on account of" or in "satisfaction" of a debt is a question for the jury.

Goldshede v. Cottrell, 2 M. & W., 20. *Sibtree v. Tripp*, 15 M. & W., 23.

221. A bill is not discharged and finally extinguished until it is paid by or on behalf of the acceptor; or a note by or on behalf of the maker at or after maturity: after which it cannot be reissued, and is absolutely void.

If paid before maturity they may be reissued, and the acceptor or maker will be liable to an indorsee (*a*).

Paying a security before it is due does not discharge the debtor (*b*).

(*a*) *Beck v. Robley*, 1 H. Bla., 89n (*a*). *Thorogood v. Clarke*, 2 Stark., N. P. C., 251. *Roberts v. Eden*, 1 B. & P., 398. *Burbridge v. Manners*, 3 Camp., 193. *Callow v. Lawrence*, 3 M. & S., 95. *Morley v. Culverwell*, 7 M. & W., 174. *Harmer v. Steele*, 4 Ex., 1. *Lazarus v. Cowie*, 3 Q. B., 459. *Jewell v. Parr*, 13 C. B.,

909. *Freakley v. Fox*, 9 B. & C., 130. *Bartrum v. Caddy*, 9 A. & E., 275. *Attenborough v. Mackenzie*, 25 L. J., Ex., 244.

(b) *Da Silva v. Fuller*.

222. Payment should be made to the holder or his agent : but it is sufficient if the funds reach him.

Field v. Carr, 5 Bing., 13.

223. The party paying a bill has a right to demand it (a) : receipted (b) : which imports *prima facie* that it has been paid by the acceptor (c).

(a) *Hansard v. Robinson*, 7 B. & C., 90. *Powell v. Roach*, 6 Esp., 76. *Alexander v. Strong*, 9 M. & W., 733. *Cornes v. Taylor*, 10 Ex., 441.

(b) 43 Geo. 3 (1803), c. 126, s. 5.

(c) *Pfiel v. Vanbatenberg*, 2 Camp., 439. *Scholes v. Walsby*, Peake, 27.

224. If a person accepts and pays a bill under a mistake of facts he may recover it back.

Kendall v. Wood, L. R., 6 Ex., 243.

225. Payment of a bill or note to a person who holds through a forged indorsement does not discharge the debtor.

East India Co. v. Tritton, 3 B. & C., 280. *Smith v. Mercer*, 6 Taunt., 76. *Robarts v. Tucker*, 13 Q. B., 575.

226. 1. If a creditor having the option of receiving cash from a principal chooses to take a security, that is a "satisfaction" of his debt (a).

2. But not from an agent (b).

(a) *Strong v. Hart*, 6 B. & C., 160. *Smith v. Ferrand*, 7 B. & C., 19. *Anderson v. Hillies*, 12 C. B., 499. *Robinson v. Read*, 9 B. & C., 494.

(b) *Marsh v. Pedder*, 4 Camp., 257. *Everest v. Collins*, 2 Camp., 515.

227. A creditor may transfer his debt against another person to a creditor of his own, by the consent of the common debtor ; and if the arrangement is consented to by all the parties it is a satisfaction of the first creditor's debt.

Bracton, Lib. iii., c. 2., s. 13. *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 T. R., 174. *Fairlie v. Denton*, 8 B. & C., 400. *Crowfoot v. Gurney*, 2 M. & Sc., 482. *Hodgson v. Anderson*, 3 B. & C., 842.

228. Payment may be demanded at any reasonable hour of the day on which the bill or note is due, and if refused, notice of dishonour may be given.

But the acceptor or maker has the whole day to pay, and if he pays the instrument on the day, the notice is void.

Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C., 339.

229. Payment of an accommodation bill by the drawer extinguishes the bill.

Lasarus v. Cowie, 2 Q. B., 459. *Cook v. Lister*, 32 L. J., C. P. 121.

230. 1. Payment by the debtor of a smaller sum is not satisfaction of a larger sum due (*a*).

2. But payment by a stranger may be (*b*).

3. Or a negotiable security given by a debtor (*c*).

(*a*) *Pinnel's case*, 5 Co. Rep., 117. *Adams v. Tapling*, 4 Mod., 88. *Fletcher v. Sutton*, 5 East., 230. *Watters v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ad., 889. *Beaumont v. Greathead*, 2 C. B., 294. *Smith v. Page*, 15 M. & W., 683. *Perry v. Attwood*, 6 E. & B., 691.

(*b*) *Welby v. Drake*, 1 C. & P., 557. *Henderson v. Stobart*, 5 Ex., 99.

(*c*) *Sibtree v. Tripp*, 15 M. & W., 23.

231. An agreement not to sue for a limited time does not suspend the right of action on a bill or note.

Ford v. Beech, 11 Q. B., 842. *Moss v. Hall*, 5 Ex., 50. *Webb v. Spicer*, 13 Q. B., 894. : *aff.* in Dom. Proc., as *Salmon v. Webb*, 3 H. L., Ca., 510.

232. A set off, or a part payment in cash and part set off, is now payment of a bill or note.

36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, s. 25, § 11.

233. Payment by a stranger or any other party to a bill is not payment by the acceptor; unless made for and on his account, and ratified by him (*a*).

A banker who has rediscounted a bill accepted by his customer, payable at his bank, may pay the bill either as indorser or as agent for the acceptor, and take time to consider in which capacity he does so (*b*).

(*a*) *Deacon v. Stodhart*, 2 M. & G., 317. *Jones v. Broadhurst*, 9 C. B., 173. *Randall v. Moon*, 12 C. B., 261. *Goodwin v. Cremer*, 22 L. J., Q. B., 30. *Kemp v. Balls*, 10 Ex., 607. *Agra and Masterman's Bank v. Leighton*, L. R., 2 Ex., 56.

(*b*) *Pollard v. Ogden*, 3 E. & B., 459.

234. Taking a co-extensive security of a higher nature in lieu of a Bill or Note "merges" or extinguishes it: but unless it is strictly co-extensive it will not.

Ansell v. Baker, 15 Q. B., 20. *Bell v. Banks*, 3 M. & G., 358. *King v. Hoare*, 13 M. & W., 494. *Sharpe v. Gibbs*, 5 C. B., N. S., 527.

235. Judgment recovered on a Bill or Note extinguishes the

original debt of the defendant and all parties jointly liable with him.

But without satisfaction it does not extinguish the plaintiff's claim against other parties not jointly liable with the defendant.

Nor between a prior party to whom the plaintiff after judgment returns the bill, and the defendant.

A judgment recovered against one joint and several debtor is no bar to an action against another joint and several debtor.

Claxton v. Swift, 2 Show., 441. *King v. Hoare*, 18 M. & W., 494. *Tarleton v. Allhusen*, 2 A. & E., 32.

236. Discharging a party from execution is a satisfaction of the debt from all parties who are sureties for him, but not of those parties who are not.

Hayling v. Nuthall, 2 W. Bla., 1235. *English v. Darley*, 2 B. & P., 61. *Clark v. Clement*, 6 T. R., 525. *Mayhew v. Crickett*, 2 Swans., 190. *Michael v. Myers*, 6 M. & G., 702.

Upon Notice of Dishonour.

237. If a bill is refused acceptance or payment by the drawee or acceptor, or a note by the maker, the holder must give notice of the fact, termed Dishonour, to the antecedent parties, or they will be discharged.

No particular form of words is necessary, and it may be either written or oral. The person to whom it is sent must be informed either directly, or by reasonable intendment, that the bill or note has been duly presented for acceptance or payment, and has been dishonoured.

Many intimations have been held invalid for the want of these requisites and the parties discharged (a).

It has been held in many cases that a demand for payment is also necessary in a notice of dishonour: but this doctrine has now been overruled; and it is expressly decided that a demand of payment from the party is not necessary in a notice of dishonour (b).

(a) *Boulton v. Welsh*, 4 Scott, 425. *Phillips v. Gould*, 8 C. & P., 355. *Strange v. Price*, 10 A. & E., 125. *Messenger v. Southey*, 1 Scott, N. R., 180. *Furze v. Sharwood*, 2 Q. B., 388. *Hartley v. Case*, 4 B. & C., 339. *Solarte v. Palmer*, 7 Bing., 590; aff. in Dom. Proc., 1 Bing., N. C., 194.

(b) *Furze v. Sharwood*, 2 Q. B., 388. *King v. Bickley*, 2 Q. B., 419. *Miers v. Brown*, 11 M. & W., 372. *Chard v. Fox*, 14 Q. B., 200.

238. Notices which imply that the Bill or Note has been duly presented for acceptance or payment, and been dishonoured, are sufficient.

Caunt v. Thompson, 7 C. B., 400. *King v. Bickley*, 2 Q. B., 419. *Chard v. Fox*, 14 Q. B., 200. *Hedges v. Steavenson*, 2 M. & W., 799. *Lewis v. Gompertz*, 6 M. & W., 402. *Woodthorpe v. Lawes*, 2 M. & W., 209. *Grugeon v. Smith*, 6 A. & E., 499. *Armstrong v. Christiani*, 5 C. B., 687. *Edmonds v. Cates*, 2 Jur., 188. *Houlditch v. Cauty*, 4 Bing., N. C., 441. *Cooke v. French*, 10 A. & E., 181. *Skelton v. Braithwaite*, 7 M. & W., 436. *Housego v. Cowne*, 2 M. & W., 348. *Bailey v. Porter*, 14 M. & W., 44. *Paul v. Joel*, 3 H. & N., 455: aff. 4 H. & N., 855. *Robson v. Curlewis*, 2 Q. B., 421. *Everard v. Watson*, 1 E. & B., 801.

239. The notice should describe the instrument so that it may not be confounded with any other.

But minor mistakes will not invalidate the notice, so long as the bill or note can be identified.

Messenger v. Southey, 1 Scott, N. B., 180. *Stockman v. Parr*, 11 M. & W., 809. *Mellersh v. Rippen*, 7 Ex., 578. *Bromage v. Vaughan*, 9 Q. B., 608. *Harpham v. Child*, 1 F. & F., 652. *Beauchamp v. Cash*, 1 D. & Ry., N. P., 3.

240. Notice of dishonour need not state on whose behalf payment is applied for, nor where the bill is lying; mistakes on these points will not invalidate it (a): nor the omission of a signature, so long as it appears that the notice came from the proper quarter (b).

(a) *Woodthorpe v. Lawes*, 2 M. & W., 109. *Housego v. Cowne*, 2 M. & W., 348. *Harrison v. Ruscoe*, 15 M. & W., 231. *Rowlands v. Sprinnett*, 14 M. & W., 7.

(b) *Maxwell v. Brain*, 10 Jur., N. S., 777.

241. The best way of giving notice is to send it by the general post; as any miscarriage of the post office will not invalidate it.

Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bla., 509. *Kufh v. Weston*, 3 Esp., 54. *Langdon v. Hulls*, 5 Esp., 157. *Dobree v. Eastwood*, 3 C. & P., 250. *Stocken v. Collin*, 7 M. & W., 515. *Woodcock v. Houldsworth*, 16 M. & W., 126. *Mackay v. Judkins*, 1 F. & F., 208.

242. The letter should be addressed particularly to the person's residence: and not generally to a large town; unless the drawer has dated it so.

Walter v. Haynes, R. & M., 142. *Mann v. Moors*, 1 R. & M., 249. *Clarke v. Sharpe*, 3 M. & W., 166. *Siggers v. Browne*, 1 M. & Rob., 520. *Burmester v. Barron*, 17 Q. B., 828. *Hewitt v. Thompson*, 1 M. & Rob., 543.

243. Some evidence must be given that the notice was actually posted.

Skilbeck v. Garbett, 7 Q. B., 846. *Hetherington v. Kemp*, 4 Camp., 194. *Hawkes v. Salter*, 4 Bing., 715. *Langdon v. Hulls*, 5 Esp., 156. *Stocken v. Collin*, 7 M. & W., 515.

244. It may be sent by special messenger; and under peculiar circumstances the expenses of the messenger have been allowed.

Dobree v. Eastwood, 8 C. & P., 250. *Bancroft v. Hall*, Holt's N. P., 476. *Pearson v. Crallan*, 2 Smith, 404. *Housego v. Cowne*, 2 M. & W., 348.

245. The notice should be sent to the party's residence or place of business; unless otherwise directed.

Skelton v. Braithwaite, 8 M. & W., 252. *Cross v. Smith*, 1 M. & S., 545. *Bancroft v. Hall*, Holt, N. P., 476. *Allen v. Edmundson*, 2 Ex., 719. *Housego v. Cowne*, 2 M. & W., 348. *Cromwell v. Hynson*, 2 Esp., 511. *Stedman v. Gooch*, 1 Esp., 4.

246. Notice must be given by the holder or some party to the bill; or their agent (*a*).

2. A stranger (*b*): or a party discharged by *laches* (*c*): cannot give notice.

(*a*) *Chapman v. Keane*, 3 A. & E., 193. *Harrison v. Ruscoe*, 15 M. & W., 231. *Lysaght v. Bryant*, 9 C. B., 46. *Wilson v. Swabey*, 1 Stark., 34. *Jennings v. Roberts*, 4 E. & B., 615. *Newen v. Gill*, 8 C. & P., 867.

(*b*) *Stewart v. Kennett*, 2 Camp., 177. *East v. Smith*, 16 L. J., Q. B., 292.

(*c*) *Harrison v. Ruscoe*, 15 M. & W., 231.

247. Notice may be given by the holder or any party to all the preceding parties.

Fisher v. Kieran, 4 Camp., 87.

248. 1. If the parties live in the same town notice must be sent so as to be received on the day following dishonour: unless the party sending it is unable to ascertain the address of the other parties in time (*a*).

2. If the parties live in different towns notice must be posted so as to go on the day after dishonour (*b*).

(*a*) *Smith v. Mullett*, 2 Camp., 208. *Jameson v. Swinton*, 2 Taunt., 224. *Williams v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ald., 500. *Fowler v. Hendon*, 4 Tyrw., 1002. *Hilton v. Fairclough*, 2 Camp., 683. *Darbishire v. Parker*, 6 East., 3. *Poole v. Dicus*, 1 Scott, 600. *Edmonds v. Cates*, 2 Jur., 188. *Bateman v. Joseph*, 2 Camp., 461. *Gladwell v. Turner*, L. R., 5 Ex., 59.

(*b*) *Williams v. Smith*, 2 B. & Ald., 496. *Geill v. Jeremy*, M. & Mal., 61. *Hawkes v. Salter*, 4 Bing., 715. *Wright v. Shawcross*, 2 B. & Ald., 501n. *Miers v. Brown*, 11 M. & W., 872.

249. Notice may be given on the day of dishonour.

Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp., 193. *Ex parte Molina*, 19 Ves., 216. *Hine v. Alley*, 4 B. & Ad., 624.

250. 1. If the holder gives notice to all parties, he must do so within the time limited to give notice to his immediate indorser.

2. Each indorser is entitled to notice and to a day to transmit it to his indorser (a).

3. If any indorsee fails to give notice to his indorser all the prior parties are discharged: unless the holder has preserved his remedy against them by giving him notice as above (b).

(a) *Rowe v. Tipper*, 13 C. B., 249. *Hilton v. Shepherd*, 6 East, 14n. *Smith v. Mullett*, 2 Camp., 208. *Marsh v. Maxwell*, 2 Camp., 210. *Jameson v. Swinton*, 2 Taunt., 224. *Turner v. Leach*, 4 B. & Ald., 451.

(b) *Marsh v. Maxwell*, 2 Camp., 209. *Hilton v. Shepherd*, 6 East, 14n. *Smith v. Mullett*, 2 Camp., 208.

251. A banker who holds a bill for collection is, for the purpose of notice, a distinct holder, and has a day to give notice to his customer; and the customer has a day to give notice to the other parties.

Langdale v. Trimmer, 15 East., 291. *Bray v. Hadwen*, 5 M. & S., 68. *Frith v. Thrush*, 8 B. & C., 387. *Scott v. Lifford*, 9 East., 347. *Haynes v. Birks*, 3 B. & P., 599.

252. Where a bill passes through several branches of the same bank, each branch is a separate bank for giving notice.

Corlett v. Jones: *Clode v. Bailey*, 12 M. & W., 51. *Woodland v. Fear*, 7 E. & B., 519.

253. Notice to an agent for this purpose is sufficient; but not to a person's general solicitor.

Cross v. Smith, 1 M. & S., 545.

254. A creditor who holds a bill as collateral security is bound to present and give notice.

Peacock v. Pursell, 14 C. B., N. S., 728.

255. A person who guarantees a bill or note, is not entitled to notice of dishonour unless he incurs special damage by such want of notice.

Warrington v. Furber, 8 East, 242. *Philips v. Astling*, 2 Taunt., 206. *Holbrow v. Wilkins*, 1 B. & C., 10. *Van Wart v. Woolley*, 3 B. & C., 439. *Walton v. Mascall*, 13 M. & W., 72. *Hitchcock v. Humfrey*, 5 M. & G., 559. *Murray v. King*, 5 B. & Ald., 165.

256. The death or bankruptcy of the drawer or acceptor does not excuse want of notice.

Russell v. Langstaff, 2 Doug., 514. *Esdaile v. Sowerby*, 11 East, 114. *Boulbee v. Stubbs*, 18 Ves., 21. *Housego v. Cowne*, 2 M. & W., 348. *Ex parte Moline*, 19 Ves., 216. *Rhode v. Proctor*, 4 B. & C., 517. *Ex parte Johnson*, 3 D. & Ch., 433. *Ex parte Chapple*, 3 Deac., 218. *Nicholson v. Gouthit*, 2 H. Bla., 609. *Lafitte v. Slatter*, 6 Bing., 623.

257. 1. If any party to a Bill or Note, with a knowledge that *laches* has been committed, and that he is legally free, expressly promises to pay it entirely or partially, such promise is binding (a).

2. But not if he makes such promise without such knowledge (b).

(a) *Vaughan v. Fuller*, 2 Stra., 1246. *Hopley v. Dufrene*, 15 East, 275. *Lundie v. Robinson*, 7 East, 231. *Haddock v. Bury*, 7 East, 236. *Hodge v. Fillis*, 3 Camp., 463. *Anson v. Bailey*, Bull., N. P., 276. *Wilks v. Jacks*, Peake, 202. *Horford v. Wilson*, 1 Taunt., 12. *Gibbon v. Coggan*, 2 Camp., 181. *Potter v. Payworth*, 13 East, 417. *Wood v. Brown*, 1 Stark., 217. *Hopes v. Alda*, 6 East, 16n. *Rogers v. Stephens*, 2 T. R., 713. *Dixon v. Elliott*, 5 C. P., 437. *Stevens v. Lynch*, 12 East, 38. *Taylor v. Jones*, 2 Camp., 105. *Fletcher v. Froggatt*, 2 C. P., 569. *Gunson v. Mets*, 1 B. & C., 193. *Rabey v. Gilbert*, 6 H. & N., 536. *Norris v. Solomonson*, 4 Scott, 257.

(b) *Goodall v. Dolley*, 1 T. R., 712. *Blesard v. Hirst*, 5 Burr., 2670.

258. A party who is entitled to receive notice of dishonour and does not, is discharged from all liability, either on the note or the consideration.

Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt., 180. *Soward v. Palmer*, 3 Taunt., 277.

259. A drawer who has no funds in the hands of the drawee, or has previously instructed him not to pay, is not entitled to notice of dishonour.

Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp., 158. *Hill v. Heap*, D. & R., N. P. C., 59. *Brett v. Levett*, 13 East, 214.

260. Notice of dishonour may be waived by agreement of the parties.

Phipson v. Kneller, 4 Camp., 285. *Hill v. Heap*, D. & R., N. P. C., 57.

261. 1. If the drawer of a bill or the payee of a note has no funds in the hands of the drawee or maker, he is not entitled to notice of dishonour (a).

2. But if he had any reasonable expectation that the bill or

note would be paid by the drawee or maker, he is entitled to notice (b).

3. An indorser is entitled to notice in all cases (c).

(a) *Bickerdike v. Bollman*, 1 T. R., 406. *De Berdet v. Atkinson*, 2 H. Bla., 836. *Legge v. Thorpe*, 12 East, 176. *Staples v. O'Kines*, 1 Esp., 882. *Corney v. Mendez des Aster*, 1 Esp., 301. *Callot v. Haigh*, 3 Camp., 281. *Claridge v. Dalton*, 4 M. & S., 226. *Walwyn v. St. Quentin*, 1 B. & P., 652. *Thomas v. Fenton*, 2 B. & C., 68. *Fitzgerald v. Williams*, 6 Bing., N. C., 68. *Terry v. Parker*, 6 A. & E., 502. *Kemble v. Mills*, 1 M. & G., 757. *Carew v. Duckworth*, L. B., 4 Ex., 313.

(b) *Orr v. Maginnis*, 7 East, 359. *Blackan v. Doren*, 2 Camp., 503. *Hammond v. Dufrene*, 3 Camp., 145. *Robson v. Gibson*, 3 Camp., 834. *Thackray v. Blackett*, 3 Camp., 164. *Rucker v. Hiller*, 16 East, 43. *Spooner v. Gardiner*, 1 R. & M., 84. *Ex parte Heath*, 3 V. & Bea., 240. *Lafitte v. Slatter*, 6 Bing., 623. *Claridge v. Dalton*, 4 M. & S., 226. *Cory v. Scott*, 3 B. & Ald., 619. *Norton v. Pickering*, 8 B. & C., 610.

(c) *Nicholson v. Gouthit*, 2 H. Bla., 610. *Esdaile v. Sowerby*, 11 East, 114. *Wilkes v. Jacks*, Peake, N. P. C., 202. *Smith v. Becket*, 18 East, 187. *Brown v. Maffey*, 15 East, 216. *Carter v. Flower*, 16 M. & W., 749.

262. If the drawer of bill makes it payable at his own house, it is presumed to be an accommodation bill, and he is not entitled to notice of dishonour.

Sharp v. Bailey, 9 B. & C., 44.

263. Notice need not be given to a transferor of the instrument without indorsement.

Unless the instrument was taken for and on account of a pre-existing debt, which is not a sale of the bill: if, therefore, the bill is dishonoured, his liability revives, and he is entitled to notice.

And allowance for time for giving him notice will be given for transmitting notice to prior parties.

Van Wart v. Woolley, 3 B. & C., 439. *Swinyard v. Bowes*, 5 M. & S., 62.

264. When parties are jointly liable on a bill, notice to one is notice to all.

Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp., 83.

265. The owner must in all cases give notice of dishonour in reasonable time.

But delay in giving notice may be excused if he is ignorant of the addresses of the preceding parties: or other circumstances.

But he must use all due diligence to discover them.

Whether he has used due diligence or not is in all cases a question for the jury.

Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East, 433. *Browning v. Kinnear*, Gow, 81. *Baldwin v. Richardson*, 1 B. & C., 245. *Siggers v. Browne*, 1 M. & Rob., 520. *Hewitt v. Thompson*, 1 M. & Rob., 543. *Chapcott v. Curlewis*, 2 M. & Rob., 484. *Beveridge v. Burgis*, 3 Camp., 262. *Frith v. Thrush*, 8 B. & C., 387. *Dixon v. Johnson*, 1 Jur., N. S., 70. *Allen v. Edmundson*, 2 Ex., 719. *Sturges v. Derrick*, Wight., 76.

Of Acceptance or Payment supra Protest or for honour.

266. Protest for non-acceptance and non-payment is in complete disuse for inland bills, but it is necessary for foreign bills; but not for foreign promissory notes which are not intended for general circulation throughout the world.

When the drawee refuses acceptance or payment, or the holder desires better security, any other person may accept or pay it, or accept it for better security, for the honour of any of the parties to it. In such a case a protest is necessary, as the bill can only be accepted *after* a protest for non-acceptance or for better security.

The acceptor then writes "Accepted *supra protest* in honour of A. B."

The drawee may refuse to accept it generally: but he may accept it *supra protest* for the honour of any party to it.

A bill which has been accepted *supra protest* for the honour of one party may be accepted *supra protest* by another person for the honour of another party to it.

The holder is not bound to take an acceptance for honour.

Mitford v. Walcott, 1 Ld. Raym., 575.

The holder at maturity must present the bill to the drawee, who may in the meantime have received funds to pay it.

If the drawee refuses payment the holder must then have the bill protested for non-payment, and it should then be presented to the acceptor for honour.

In all cases a presentment for payment to the drawee and a protest for non-payment are necessary to charge the acceptor for honor.

Vandewall v. Tyrrell, 1 M. & M., 87. *Hoare v. Casenove*, 16 East., 391. *Williams v. Germaine*, 7 B. & C., 477. *Mitchell v. Baring*, 10 B. & C., 4. *Geralopulo v. Wisler*, 10 C. & B., 690. *Ex*

parte Wyld, 30 L. J., Bkcy., 10. *Ex parte Wackerbath*, 5 Ves., 574. *Ex parte Swan*, L. R., 6 Eq., 344. *Mertens v. Winnington*, 1 Esp., 113. *Goodhall v. Polhill*, 1 C. B., 233.

267. The acceptor *supra protest* is bound by the same admissions as bind the party for whose honour he accepts.

Phillips v. Im Thurn, L. R., 1 C. P., 463.

268. The acceptor *supra protest* acquires all the rights of the party *from* whom he receives the bill; except that he discharges all the parties after the one for whose honour he takes it up, and he cannot indorse it over.

Ex parte Wackerbath, 5 Ves., 574. *Ex parte Swan*, L. R., 6 Eq., 344.

269. Payment for the honour of any party puts the person in the place of an indorsee from that party: he may therefore either send notice of dishonour to all parties himself or he may send it to the party for whom he pays, and that party may send notice in due course.

Goodall v. Polhill, 1 C. B., 233.

On the Order of Liability of the Parties to a Bill or Note.

270. The parties on a Bill are never, and the parties on a Note are very frequently not, liable in an equal degree.

In a Bill the acceptor, and in a Note the maker, is the principal debtor, liable always and in any case to the holder; the drawee of the bill or the payee of the note, and the indorsers in either case, are only sureties, liable only to pay on certain conditions: and a release of the debt to the principal is in all cases a discharge to the sureties.

Each party in succession is a principal debtor to the holder, and the subsequent parties are his sureties.

Thus the acceptor or maker is the principal debtor to the holder; and the drawer or payee, and indorsers are his sureties.

Between the holder and the drawer or payee and subsequent indorsers, the drawer or payee is the principal debtor and the indorsers are his sureties.

So the first indorser is a principal debtor to the holder and the subsequent indorsers are his sureties: and so on in succession.

Where the payee is a different person from the drawer he

stands in the position of first indorsee of a bill payable to drawer's order.

Claridge v. Dalton, 4 M. & S., 226.

271. A discharge to any party is a discharge to all subsequent parties because they are merely his sureties: but a discharge to a surety is no discharge to a principal.

Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp., 46. *Claridge v. Dalton*, 4 M. & S., 226. *English v. Darley*, 3 Esp., 49. *Hall v. Cole*, 4 A. & E., 577.

272. If the holder of a bill has notice that it is an accommodation bill and given without value to the drawer he must consider the drawer as his principal debtor and the acceptor as his surety.

Davies v. Stainbank, 6 De G. M. & G., 679. *Bailey v. Edwards*, 4 B. & S., 761.

273. "Every person who being surety for the debt or duty of another, or being liable with another for any debt or duty, shall pay such debt or perform such duty, shall be entitled to have assigned to him, or to a trustee for him, every judgment, specialty, or other security which shall be held by the creditor in respect of such debt or duty, whether such judgment, specialty, or other security shall or shall not be deemed at law to have been satisfied by the payment of the debt or the performance of the duty; and such person shall be entitled to stand in the place of the creditor, and to use all the remedies, and, if need be, and upon a proper indemnity, to use the name of the creditor in any action or other proceeding at law or in equity, in order to obtain from the principal debtor, or any co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, as the case may be, indemnification for the advances made and loss sustained by the person who shall have so paid such debt or performed such duty: and such payment or performance so made by such surety shall not be pleadable in bar of any such action or other proceeding by him: provided always that no co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor shall be entitled to receive from any other co-surety, co-contractor, or co-debtor, by the means aforesaid, more than the just proportion to which, as between those parties themselves, such last mentioned person shall be justly liable."

19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97., s. 5.

274. In a joint and several note one party is frequently the principal and the others the sureties.

Evidence may be given that the holder has possession of the instrument with this knowledge: and therefore he must deal with the parties as principal and sureties.

Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B., 481. *Taylor v. Burgess*, 5 H. & N., 1. *Mutual Loan Fund Assoc. v. Sudlow*, 28 L. J., C. P., 108. *Rayner v. Fussey*, 28 L. J., Ex., 132. *Greenough v. McClelland*, 30 L. J., Q. B., 15. *Oriental Financial Co. v. Overend, Gurney & Co.*, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap., 142.

275. A legal agreement founded upon a good consideration to give the principal debtor time to pay, or taking a new bill from him in lieu of the former one, without the consent of all the sureties will discharge them.

Unless the agreement contains a stipulation that the holder shall on default have judgment at as early a period as if he had sued him.

(a) *Moss v. Hall*, 5 Ex., 46. *Gould v. Robson*, 8 East., 576. *Pooley v. Harradine*, 7 E. & B., 481. *Taylor v. Burgess*, 5 H. & N., 1. *Michael v. Myers*, 6 M. & G., 702.

(b) *Kemard v. Knott*, 4 M. & G., 474. *Hall v. Cole*, 4 A. & E., 577. *Price v. Edmunds*, 10 B. & C., 578. *Hulme v. Collins*, 2 Sim., 12.

276. But a mere forbearance to sue; or a promise not to sue; or an offer to give time not acted upon; is no discharge to the sureties because it is a *nudum pactum* revocable at will.

Philpot v. Briant, 4 Bing., 717. *Bell v. Banks*, 3 Scott, N. R., 497. *Hewet v. Goodrick*, 2 C. & P., 468. *Badnall v. Samuel*, 3 Price, 521. *Walwyn v. St. Quentin*, 1 B. & P., 652.

277. So if the creditor takes a new bill or other security as a mere collateral security and in addition to, and not in lieu or substitution of the old one, the sureties are not discharged.

Pring v. Clarkson, 1 B. & C., 14. *Twopenny v. Young*, 3 B. & C., 208. *Bedford v. Deakin*, 2 B. & Ald., 210. *Bell v. Banks*, 3 M. & G., 258.

278. If the acceptor or any party is discharged by operation of law, as by the bankrupt Act, it does not discharge the sureties.

Browne v. Carr, 7 Bing., 508. *Langdale v. Parry*, 2 D. & R., 337. *Nadin v. Battie*, 5 East, 147.

279. So if the creditor expressly agrees with the principal debtor that the sureties shall not be discharged, they are not.

See § 212.

280. If the creditor agrees with the principal debtor to give time to the surety, the surety is discharged.

Oriental Financial Co. v. Overend, Gurney & Co., L. R., 7 Ch., Ap., 142.

On Foreign Bills, and Bills drawn in Sets, Parts, or Copies.

281. An inland bill at common law is one both drawn and payable in one of the realms of the United Kingdom (*a*): though it may be accepted abroad (*b*).

(*a*) 9 & 10 Will. 3 (1699), c. 17. *Mahoney v. Ashlin*, 2 B. & Ad., 478.

(*b*) *Amner v. Clark*, 2 C. M. & R., 468.

282. A foreign bill is one which is drawn or payable abroad; or one drawn in one part of the United Kingdom and payable in another.

283. By Statute 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 17, all bills which are both drawn and made payable in any part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the islands of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark, and the islands adjacent to them belonging to the British Crown are declared to be inland bills; except so far as relates to the stamp duties payable in respect of them.

Bills, Notes, and Cheques drawn or made in one part of the United Kingdom are therefore subject to the duties payable on foreign bills.

Griffin v. Weathersby, L. R., 3 Q. B., 753. *Heywood v. Pickering*, L. R., 9 Q. B., 428. *Godfray v. Coulman*, 13 Moo. P. C., 11.

284. Foreign Bills are often drawn in parts or copies, all the parts together making a set, and the whole set constituting one bill.

Each part is numbered and refers to the other parts, and contains a condition that it shall be paid as long as the others are unpaid.

The parts should properly circulate together, but one part may be sent to the drawee for acceptance, and another may be given to the indorsee.

285. Every transferor ought to deliver over to his transferee all the parts in his possession: but if a subsequent transferee takes one part from his transferor without demanding the remaining parts, he cannot sue an indorser prior to his own who has not got them.

Pinard v. Klockman, 3 B. & S., 388.

286. The person who first acquires a title to one part of the bill is entitled to the other parts; and the payment of one part cancels and extinguishes the others.

But if the drawee accepts two parts of the same bill and they get into separate hands, he is liable upon both parts.

Houldsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C., 449. *Pereira v. Jopp*, 10 B. & C., 450n.

287. If the drawee pays one part of the bill with a forged indorsement, he is still liable to pay the real holder of another part.

Cheap v. Harley, 3 T. R., 127.

288. If a foreign bill is refused acceptance or payment it is necessary in order to charge the drawer to have it protested (a).

But a protest is not necessary on a foreign promissory note (b).

(a) *Borough v. Perkins*, 2 Ld. Raym., 993. *Rogers v. Stephens*, 2 T. R., 713. *Gale v. Walsh*, 5 T. R., 239. *Orr v. Maginnis*, 7 East, 359. *Vandewall v. Tyrrell, M. & Mal.*, 87. *Geralopulo v. Wieler*, 10 C. B., 690.

(b) *Bonar v. Mitchell*, 5 Ex., 415.

On the Forgery of Bills and Notes.

289. Forgery is defined to be the making, altering, or misapplying any writing with intent to defraud.

Forging bills or notes or any part of them, as well as uttering them, knowing them to be forged, are each felonies, punishable by penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five (1) years—or by imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement.

24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 98, s. 22.

(1) 27 & 28 Vict. (1864), c. 47, s. 2.

290. If several persons make different parts of the instrument, they are each chargeable with forging the entire instrument, though they may be ignorant of each other's proceedings.

Rez v. Bingley, R. & R., C. C., 446. *Rez v. Kirkwood*, 1 Mood., C. C., 304. *Rez v. Dade*, 1 Mood., C. C., 307.

291. The offence of forgery is complete without any publication or uttering.

Elliott's case, 1 Leach, C. C., 175. *Crocker's case*, R. & R., C. C., 97.

292. Altering the date of a Bill of Exchange after acceptance (a): altering the place where a note is made payable (b): or altering the sum for which a bill or note is made payable (c), are forgeries.

(a) *Master v. Miller*, 4 T. R., 320. *Rez v. Atkinson*, 7 C. & P., 669.

(b) *Rez v. Treble*, 2 Taunt., 328.

(c) *Rez v. Post, R. & R.*, C. & C., 101.

293. If a person is authorised to fill up a bill or note with one sum it is forgery to fill it up with a larger sum, or even a less sum, and apply the instrument to purposes different from his instructions.

Reg. v. Hart, Mood., C. C., 486. *The Queen v. Bateman*, 1 Cox, C. C., 186. *The Queen v. Wilson*, 1 Den., C. C., 284.

294. To write one's own name with the intention that it should pass as the signature of another person of the same name is forgery.

Mead v. Young, 4 T. R., 28. *Reg. v. Parkes*, 2 Leach, C. C., 775.

295. A person having obtained genuine signatures wrote above one a promissory note; and on the other side of the other a promissory note payable to that person, and so changed the signature into an indorsement; was convicted of forging the note and the indorsement.

Reg. v. Hales, 17 State Tr., 161, 209, 229.

296. Using the genuine signature of one person in any way so as to make it appear that it is the signature of another person of the same name is forgery.

Reg. v. Blenkinsop, 1 Den., C. C., 276. *Reg. v. Mitchell*, 1 Den., C. C., 282. *Reg. v. Rogers*, 8 C. & P., 649. *Reg. v. Parke*, 1 Cox, C. C., 4.

297. Discounting bills or drawing drafts with fictitious names on them is forgery.

Dunn's case, 1 Leach, 57. *Bolland's case*, 1 Leach, 83. *Lockett's case*, 1 Leach, 94. *Taft's case*, 1 Leach, 172. *Shepherd's case*, 1 Leach, 226. *Reg. v. Wardell*, 3 F. & F., 82.

298. Signing a bill or note by procuration for another person fraudulently, and without lawful authority; and uttering such a bill knowing that it is so signed by procuration without lawful authority, is felony, punishable with penal servitude for not more than fourteen and not less than five years: or imprisonment for not more than two years and with or without hard labour and solitary confinement.

24 & 25 Vict. (1861), c. 98, s. 24.

299. If the holder of a bill or note has come into possession of it by the means of any forged signature, he cannot recover on it, or retain it against the true owner.

A debtor who pays a holder who derives his title through forgery is not discharged.

In *Roberts v. Tucker* (16 Q. B., 575), MAULE, J., said that in his opinion if a banker is called upon to pay an acceptance of his customer's, bearing several indorsements, he is entitled to reasonable time to inquire into their genuineness and the title of the presenter.

A banker who issues cheques to his customer payable to order is not bound to inquire into the genuineness of the payee's indorsement.

But any person who obtains the money from the banker by means of a forged indorsement is liable to the true owner of the cheque.

§ 225.

§ 88—To the cases mentioned in this paragraph add *Bobbett v. Pineskett*, Ex. Div., May 5, 1876.

300. A person who discounts a forged bill or note may recover the money back.

Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt., 488. *Bruce v. Bruce*, 5 Taunt., 495. *Gurney v. Womersley*, 4 E. & B., 133. *Wilkinson v. Johnson*, 3 B. & C., 428.

301. Where bankers paid forged acceptances of their customers, and did not discover the mistake the same day, they were held not entitled to demand it back.

In *Cocks v. Masterman*, the Court expressly refrained from giving an opinion as to whether they might have done so if the demand had been made the same day.

Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt., 76. *Cocks v. Masterman*, 9. B. & C., 902. *Mather v. Lord Maidstone*, 18 C. B., 273.

These seem to be the chief points relating to bills and notes, which occur in daily practice, and are most necessary to be known. Other proceedings upon such instruments will be in charge of the banker's solicitor, for which we must refer to the larger treatises on the subject.

NOTE.

A Bill is now passing through Parliament to amend the Law relating to Crossed Cheques; we have, therefore, omitted all notice of crossed cheques. As soon as the Bill has become law, an account of it will be furnished to purchasers of this work.

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